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EDITORIAL NOTE: The third volume of Ernst 
Rabel's comparative treatise on the conflict of laws was 
originally published in 1950. With the continued support of 
The University of Michigan Law School and the coopera-
tion of the Max-Planck-Institut fiir ausHindisches und inter-
nationales Privatrecht in Hamburg, this second edition of 
Volume III has been prepared. Plans for the revision of 
Volumes I and II were made before the death of the author 
on September 7, I 9 55, and the work was carried to com-
pletion by Dr. Ulrich Drobnig of the staff of the Institut in 
Hamburg. We were fortunate in obtaining the services of 
another well-qualified member of the staff of that Institut, 
Dr. Herbert Bernstein, who spent the academic year 1962-
1963 as research associate at The University of Michigan 
Law School. As in previous revisions of this work, this volume 
has very few changes in the text, as distinguished from the 
footnotes. Citations and illustrations have been brought up 
to date to the end of 1962. 
Introductory Note to First Edition 
AMONG the multitude of conflicts principles that, 
.l'l.. according to various claims, should determine the 
law applicable to all contracts, only two have re-
sisted the test of critical analysis. These, indeed, form an 
adequate groundwork. First, the freedom of parties to 
choose the law applicable to their contract must be recog-
nized as a general rule without petty restraint. Second, in 
the absence of such agreement, a contract should be gov-
erned by the law most closely connected with its character-
istic feature. 
The first proposition is essential to the second. To deny 
party autonomy means rigid conflicts rules created by some 
superior authority. A scholastic doctrine may invest the 
law of the place of contracting with ineluctable force; a 
state may forbid stipulations for a foreign law. However, 
our modest task requires but a reasonable choice of law 
advisable for average use by courts and legislatures. This 
cannot aspire to ascertain more than subsidiary rules. It 
is not possible to achieve anything practical by attempting 
to coerce the parties into an inexorable law of our creation. 
This conception is perfectly consistent with a considered 
regard to the large significance of public law at the present 
time. It even allows and facilitates a line of thought leading 
to the subsidiary application of the private law of that 
state which, by its administrative law, preponderantly regu-
lates certain kinds of business. This will appear in such con-
tracts as maritime carriage of goods, employment, and 
msurance. 
It has been further explained, in virtual agreement with 
a growing volume of authority, that, for our purpose, more 
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specific conflicts rules should be devised with local connec-
tions corresponding to the different types of transactions. 
The usual types, especially of business contracts, therefore, 
must be studied one by one. The characteristics of these 
contracts should be ascertained by comparative investiga-
tion of their economic and legal structure in the various 
countries and of their function in international life. 
Part Nine is an attempt to demonstrate that this method 
leads to some definite and many suggestive conclusions. 
In a few matters such as money obligations, sales of goods, 
and workmen's compensation, excellent work has been ac-
complished by treatises, drafts, and even treaties, estab-
lishing a new range of observation on the international 
level. In others, much confusion must be cleared up, and 
some topics are full of difficulty. It may be well to re-
emphasize that merely partial research is submitted here. 
The method followed in this work requires strict avoidance 
of the generalizations which are all too familiar in this 
branch of law. In the very first topic of this volume, it will 
only be possible to state that no sure conflicts rule can be 
formulated. 
In such and in atypical cases, the courts must refer back 
to the general principle and weigh the individual circum-
stances and stipulations of the contract. Categories of 
transactions insufficiently treated here ought to find more 
competent and detailed consideration than I have been able 
to devote to them. 
Whether localizing an individual contract or a type of 
contract, we do, of course, survey the multiple territorial 
connections involved (domicil, place of contracting, place 
or places of performance, etc.) and decide which is the 
most important. But, as said before,1 scarcely any of these 
"criteria" from which courts have deduced in particular 
1 Vol. II (ed. x) p. 432. 
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cases specific choices of law, command respect in themselves, 
and no general evaluation of them, hence, will be under-
taken. 
But should not one exception be advisable with respect 
to a criterion almost unchallenged in the civil law countries? 
I am referring to the contracts baptized by Saleilles2 as 
11contrats d' adhesion." Carriers, banks, insurance companies, 
warehouses, manufacturers, traders, buying departments 
and many other enterprises establish standard forms or use 
forms drafted by organizations, for contracting with an 
indefinite number of persons. In these cases, the enterprise 
offers a ready-made contract, which the other party simply 
accepts by "accession." 
The customer has little opportunity to bargain for con-
ditions and none at all when the enterprise, by its own 
resources or through a cartel, enjoys a monopoly. This well-
known fact of modern commercial life, the object of many 
discussions, leads in conflicts law to the conclusion that the 
customer who simply "adheres" to the offer, ought to 
understand that the contract has to serve its purpose on a 
single legal basis, irrespective of nationality and domicil of 
the customer. Hence, the law of the domicil of the enter-
prise, or of the branch concluding the transaction, is re-
garded as tacitly agreed upon, or at least presumably 
intended. The German courts have constantly argued to this 
effect, the French courts often, and the C6digo Bustamante 
has formally adopted this as the rule.3 
2 SALEILLES, De Ia declaration de volonte (Paris 1901) 229. For a survey 
of the rich French and Italian literature on the nature and interpretation of 
these transactions, see Dr PACE, "II negozio di adesione nel diritto privato," 
39 Riv. Dir. Com. ( 1941) 34-47. For a comprehensive theory, LUDWIG RAISER, 
Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen (Hamburg 1935). 
3 Germany: For a list of cases, see NussBAUM, D. IPR. 231 n. 2; BATIFFOL 
102 §§ II5-II9 adopts the German view. Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 
BGE. II 287. C6digo Bustamante, art. 185: in the absence of an express or 
tacit intention, in contracts of adhesion the law of the party offering or 
preparing them is presumed to be accepted. 
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No such rule, however, exists in the United States. 
American courts rather seem inclined to react against the 
preponderance of one party by protecting the other and 
granting him the privilege of his own domiciliary law, 
directly or in the guise of the law of the place of contract-
ing. On the subject of carrier's liability and life insurance, 
this phenomenon is particularly strong. We are thus warned 
not to presume generally that the law of the party issuing 
a form should govern. 
Of course, the Continental argument is not valueless. 
Obviously, an enterprise of the kind mentioned is vitally 
interested in a secure, uniform basis on which to deal with 
an international public, and the latter profits by the more 
favorable conditions offered on such basis. 
Also, the Supreme Court of the United States has recog-
nized that a finance corporation in Pennsylvania lending 
funds in other states on standard terms at a rate of interest 
permitted at its place of business was not guilty of usury.4 
Precisely for small loans issued in mass, the argument has 
an inevitable bearing. A good case may further be made out 
for the law of the business place where a bank provides 
professional services of all kinds to private customers, and 
an especially strong case for the law of the business place 
from which an insurance company delivers its policies. But 
in contrast to the sweeping statements in Europe and Latin 
America, we should not acknowledge an automatic subjec.: 
tion of mass contracts to the domiciliary law of the 
enterprise. 
In Part Ten, the questions concerning modification and 
discharge of obligations are selected with regard to the 
interest they enjoy in conflicts law. Accordingly, the problems 
of performance do not appear in this Part, their relevant 
topics having been treated in Chapters 30 and 35. 
4 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. (1927) 274 U. S. 403; Vol. II 
( ed. r) p. 409. 
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On the other hand, the conflicts of law respecting nego-
tiable instruments are too complex and important to be 
investigated before property law will be examined in Volume 
Four. 
In sending out the present volume, I do not ignore the 
fact, emphatically stressed by some writers, that in this 
postwar period the organization in which international busi-
ness thrived before and even after the First World War, 
has undergone very conspicuous changes. No one knows 
how much of the transformation is unrepealable, and where 
it will end. But after as much inquiry of American trade 
experts as was feasible, I am fairly satisfied that at this time 
our critical survey of past and present conflicts doctrines and 
the outlook for their reasonable progress ought not to be 
disturbed by the fear that it may shortly become obsolete. 
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Money Loans and Deposits* 
I. MONEY LOANS 
I. Municipal Differences1 
I N THE systems of private law, rather by historical accident than on rational grounds, certain contrasts in 
construing a loan contract have survived. Thus, the 
Roman requirement of actual delivery of the res, that is, 
coins or their equivalent, persists in laws still considering 
loan to be a "real contract," the mere promise being only 
a preliminary agreement (pactum de mutuo dando) .2 At 
common law, the promise to pay money in consideration of 
the borrower's return promise forms a perfect contract.8 
This result agrees with the modern construction of loan as 
a contract by mere consent.4 
The common law doctrine that the creditor of a fixed sum 
of money cannot claim damages beyond the amount of the 
*In recent years several studies have been published dealing with conftict-
of-laws aspects of these transactions: NIEDERER, Kollisionsrechtliche Probleme 
bei internationalen Anleihen, Festgabe fiir Eugen Grossmann (1949); 
LocHNER, Darlehen und Anleihe im internationalen Privatrecht ( 1954) 
[hereinafter cited as LOCHNER-see Bibliography, infra p. 539, for other short 
citation forms] ; RENE ScHMID, Kollisionsrechtliche Probleme bei interna· 
tionalen Darlehen und Anleihen (1954); VAN HEeKE, Problemes juridiques des 
emprunts internationaux (1955). 
1 VoN ScHWARTZKOPPEN, :z Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 640. 
2 France: C. C. art. 1892. 
Germany: BGB. §§ 607 par. 1, 610. 
Italy: C. C. (r865) art. 1819. 
Spain: C. C. art. 1753. 
And most other codes. 
a JENKS, 1 Digest § 462. 
4 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 3n; nevertheless the pact preliminary to loan 
has some role, C. Obi. art. FS· 
) 
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loan and interest, is followed by few foreign codes ;5 modern 
laws allow recovery of special damage.6 The main field for 
choice of law is furnished by the immense variety of usury 
laws. But time of repayment, burden of giving notice of 
termination, and the amount of interest due by force of law 
are also variously regulated. 
Contracts involved. Conflicts rules concerning loans in-
clude ordinary agreements for opening of credit and prin-
cipal debts secured by suretyship or pledge. 
Rights involved. The usual problem raised in this subject 
matter deals with the law under which the duties of pay-
ment of interest and of repayment arise and are perform-
able. Of course, the obligation, assumed by the potential 
creditor in a pactum de mutuo dando or consensual loan, 
of delivering the promised value likewise needs determina-
tion. But the conclusion will become obvious after the main 
discussion. 
2. Connecting Factors 
(a) Place of contracting. Many American decisions have 
determined the validity of loan contracts according to the 
law of the place of contracting. In most cases, however, no 
other localization was in question.7 A similar practice is ob-
served in France.8 The only conclusion to be drawn is that 
the law of the forum has no imperative force.9 
5 England: }ENKS, I Digest§§ 284, 465. 
Brazil: C. C. art. 1061; C. Com. art. 249. 
Denmark: Law of April 6, 1855, § 3, see Die Handelsgesetze des Erdballs, 
Vol. 10, Das Handelsrecht und Konkursrecht Diinemarks, p. 67. 
The Netherlands: C. C. art. 1286. . 
8 Germany: BGB. § 288 par. 2. . 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1224 par. 2 replacing old art. 1231 which was dis-
puted, see DE CUPIS, II danno (Milano 1946) 189, 217. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 106. 
7 For closer analysis, see BATIFFOL 203 §§ 229, 230. 
8 Cass. req. (June 10, 1857) D. 1859-1.194, S. 1859·1·751; lower courts, see 
BATIFFOL 210 § 236. 
9 BATIFFOL id. n. 3· 
MONEY LOANS AND DEPOSITS s 
Again, where both parties are domiciled in the state of 
contracting, this state, of course, determines the law.10 
(b) The debtor's domicil. In a view that has found ex-
pression in the Polish law, unilateral contracts are governed 
by the law of the domicil of the debtor.U 
The same rule has been adopted by the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in a case where the sum of money was expressed 
in the currency of the debtor's state.12 Likewise, the French 
Court of Cassation applied the law of Ecuador to deter-
mine the rate of interest due from a borrowing company 
domiciled there; the loan was to be utilized in the company's 
operation in the same country, although the lender was 
domiciled in Paris and made the funds available there.13 
(c) Place of repayment. Many American decisions have 
resorted to the law of the place where repayment is due14 
because the creditor's claim is deemed to be centered in this 
place. In some cases, the court presumed a corresponding 
intention of the parties, Hi or the place coincided with the 
debtor's domicil and the place of his use of the money.16 
As a result, the place held decisive has sometimes been 
the domicil of the debtor, but in the great majority of cases 
the business place of the lenderP It is scarcely feasible to 
IO Canada: Stuart & Stuart, Ltd. v. Boswell (I9I6) 26 D. L. R. 7II (English 
Money Lenden Act applied). 
11 Proposals by WALKER 406 § 5 (I) and (2), though with some qualifica-
tion. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. I; applied in Polish S. Ct. (Nov. 18, 
1936) 4 Z. osteurop. R. (1937) 380, though the money had been sent to another 
country. 
Same proposal, NIBOYET, 33 Annuaire ( 1927) III 222. 
12 BG. (Oct. 8, 1935) 6I BGE. II 242, 244. In this suit, the parties invoked 
the German law, but this is only an auxiliary instance following the prevailing 
practice. 
18 Cass. req. (Feb. I91 I89o) Gaz. Pal. I890.I-46o, Clunet I89o, 495· 
14 List of cases: BATIFFOL 199 n. I. 
15 Nakdimen v. Brazil (I9I7) 13I Ark. 144, 198 S.W. 524. 
16Potter v. Tallman (1861) 35 Barb. S.C. 182; Lyon v. Ewing (1863) 17 
Wis. 61; 2 BEALE II70 n. 3; Bf'TIFFOL 200 n. 1. 
17 See BATIFFOL 201 n. 2. 
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explain all these decisions on one ground. But we may sug-
gest that, whether the decisions say so or not, preferably 
the loan was localized with the lender when the lender was 
a credit institution operating from a central place of busi-
ness on a uniform basis in several states. 
In the German practice, the place of repayment is em-
phasized on the general principle of lex loci solutionis.18 But 
before any choice of law, the lex fori states for the purpose 
of this choice where the money should be repaid.19 This 
means normally the domicil of the debtor.20 By the same 
method, the domicil of the creditor should be decisive in 
Switzerland.21 
Recent advocates of lex loci solutionis recommend it as 
respects repayment of the loan22 and the payment of in-
terest.23 
(d) The creditor's domicil. Some writers have urged 
the law of the lender.24 A rational attempt has also been 
made to infer this approach from the situation of the par-
ties. The creditor is menaced by specific dangers, such as the 
debtor's insolvency, money depreciation, and difficulty of 
legal enforcement, whereas the borrower may use the funds 
at his pleasure and should mitigate possible damage; the 
risk of the creditor should at least be measured under his 
law.21:> However, this is scarcely a consideration within the 
contemplation of the parties. 
(e) Place of using the money. Certain French decisions 
have applied the law of the place where the loan should be 
18 RG. (Sept. 30, 1920) 100 RGZ. 79; (March I·2, 1928) JW. 1928, II96. 
19 See Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 473· 
20 RG. (Feb. 16, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 35; (Jan. 14, 1931) id. 193 I No. 30. 
21 BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. II 397, 398; but see Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 474 
n. 168. 
22 BATIFFOL § 238. 
23 HAME.L, 2 Banques 452 n. 2 § 920. 
24 2 MEILI 55; NOLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire (1927) II 940; SCHOENENBERGER-
}AEGGI Nos. 280-281. 
25 HERZFELD, Kauf und Darle.hen 75· 
MONEY LOANS AND DEPOSITS 7 
urtfalise."26 The writers question what this means, viz., 
whether the courts point to the place of utilization or con-
sumption of the loan or to the place where the money is 
delivered.27 The latter opinion emphasizing the place where 
the money is in fact delivered to the borrower has been 
explained by the technical construction of loan in French 
law as a real contract; the contract is completed only by 
delivery. But the point is obscure. It should be noted in 
addition that the cases dealt only with the scope of a French 
Law of September 3, 1807, on the legal rate of interest 
and reached the result that it was confined to "civil," i.e., 
noncommercial, loans contracted and consumed in France. 
Hence, the ordinary conflicts rule was not necessarily 
concerned. 
3· Rationale 
Loans may be granted either by financial institutions on 
a large scale to an indefinite number of customers or in 
isolated cases on individual terms. Each of these types 
requires separate discussion, although perhaps not different 
conflict rules. 
(a) Individually determined loans. It may be taken for 
granted that no one objects to the law of a place at which 
both parties have their domicils and make the contract. 
Furthermore, the place where the loan is to be repaid, 
according to express stipulation or an unequivocal business 
usage, may be regarded as a characteristic localization of 
26 Cass. civ. (Dec. 21, 1874) D. 1876.1.107, S. 1875-1·78, Clunet 1875, 353; 
Cass. req. (Feb. 19, 1890) Clunet 1890, 495; see supra n. 13; Cour Paris (May 
23, 1912) S. 1913.2.21, Gaz. Pal. 1912.2.13 commented upon by BATIFFOL 212. 
As an additional element for applying German law to a loan granted by 
a Swiss institution to a German brewery, the Swiss Federal Tribunal stressed 
the purpose of the loan, viz., for installations in the factory. BG. (Sept. 18, 
1934) 6o BGE. II 294>'301. 
27 For the first interpretation, BATIFFOL 2II § 237 n. 2 criticizing SAVATIER 
in Planiol et Ripert, II Traite Pratique ( ed. 2) 478 § II49 and authors cited 
by the latter. 
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the only obligation flowing from a completed loan. 
The same cannot be said of a place of repayment solely 
determined by law,278 since this very law ought to be selected 
and the municipal laws are far from agreeing where the 
payment is "performable." 
In the civil law codes, with some difficulty, a common 
denominator may be found. The money is either to be paid 
to the creditor at his residence as of the time of contract-
ing,28 or it is to be sent to him at the debtor's risk and 
charge, although the "place of performance" may remain 
at the debtor's domicil.29 It may therefore be suggested that 
the creditor's country should prevail.30 This conclusion ap-
pears weak, however, if confronted with the common law. 
The principle that the debtor must seek the creditor, strong 
as it has remained, has no bearing since it is limited to 
places within the realm, or in the United States, within the 
debtor's state. If a contract has been made outside this state, 
American courts consider payment due at the place of con-
tracting, unless the creditor designates an authorized agent 
in the state of the debtor.31 In interstate and international 
contracts this conception seems to exclude the law of the 
creditor's place. 
In conclusion, there is no general conflicts rule for a loan 
individually contracted between private parties.318 
27a 11 ccord, VAN HEeKE, supra n. *, at pp. 68 If.; contra: LocHNER 76 If. 
28 The Netherlands: C. C. art. 1429 par. 2. 
Switzerland: Rev. C. Obi. art. 74· 
Japan: C. C. art. 574, cf. 484. 
29 Austria: AUg. BGB. § 905; Allg. HGB. art. 325. 
Germany: BGB. § 270. 
so The result would agree with the writings cited supra ns. 24, 25, but is 
opposed to the prevailing German doctrine regarding § 269 BGB., see Vol. II 
( ed. 2) p. 473 n. 166. 
31 United States: Chase, J., in Weyand v. Park Terrace Co. (1911) 202 
N. Y. 231, 241, 95 N. E. 723; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1812; 40 Am. Jur., 
Payment §§ 16-19. · 
31a The new Restatement urges "the local law of the state where the con-
tract requires that repayment be made"; see Restatement (Second), Tent. 
Draft No.6 (1960) § 346k. In agreement with the view taken above, this rule 
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(b) M.ass operation by financial institutions. The opera-:-
tion of banks and loan or savings associations necessarily 
involves central organization and conditions in which busi-
ness is conducted and planned substantially for all the 
territory to be embraced. Despite concessions that may have 
to be made to the diverse state laws, it is vital for such 
institutions to base calculations and forms on one given 
law. Commonly, the borrower not only does not care what 
law may apply, but he does not expect his own domicil to 
be taken into account in this connection. This is manifest 
if he sends his application for credit to the address of the 
company in another state or deals with a company repre-
sentative who only solicits applications, action on which is 
understood to be left to the central office. Not because the 
last act of concluding the contract occurs in the state of the 
company, but because this locality is prominent in the con-
templation of the parties, does it determine the law appli-
cable. The result agrees with the bulk of the cases, which 
stress either the place where the transaction is concluded 
by the company's consent, or the place of repayment, or in 
Europe and under the C6digo Bustamante the mass char-
acter of the operation.32 
It follows, however, that this approach has definite limits. 
A significant divergence occurs when the foreign corporation 
operates through a permanent agency in the state of the 
does not apply unless the place of repayment is designated either by the 
parties or by business usage; see Comment, id. at 138. For a useful study of 
express choice of law clauses in loan transactions, see SOMMERS, BROCHES & 
DELAUME, "Conflict Avoidance in International Loans and Monetary Agree-
ments," 21 Law and Cont. Probl. (1956) 463. Additionally, one of the authors 
has afforded a study of jurisdictional clauses; see DELAUME, "Jurisdiction of 
Courts and International Loans," 6 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1957) 189. 
82 Germany: ROHG. (Jan. 13, 1877) 21 ROHGE. z88; Bay. ObLG. (March 
17, 1928) 28 Bay. ObLGZ. 259; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. 14, z9o2) 57 Seuff. 
Arch. 345 (bank deposit). 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 22, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 489; HERZFELD, Kauf und 
Darlehen 6x. '" 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185. 
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borrower, which issues loans in the name of the company. 
In this case, the contract has a local center. It should not 
make any difference that the agent may have to ask for the 
assent of the central office, where this appears as a matter 
of internal administration. Nor should the fact in itself that 
the company is considered to do business in the state be 
decisive, although many legislators think otherwise. State 
supervision over loans cannot be compared in intensity and 
importance with state intervention in such matters as insur-
ance or utilities. The vague and inconclusive concept of what 
the states mean by doing business does not present a sound 
basis for choice of law. It should be noted, moreover, that 
even in the case where the customer deals with an agency 
or branch, it is this and not his own residence that is sig-
nificant. 
As a result, it is always the place of business of the lender 
that localizes a loan of money to be repaid in kind.32a If a 
branch or agency of the lender negotiates the contract, the 
question to be asked is not where, but by which office, fun-
tioning as a party to the contract, the loan is issued. This 
fact may at times be doubtful, but no more than in other 
cases of agency. A presumption would be helpful in the case 
of foreign corporations advertising offers of small loans 
with reference to their local agencies, that the agent is au-
thorized to contract, and therefore the local law is implied. 
4· The Obligation to Give the Loan 
Whenever a loan or credit is promised by a finance cor-
poration, the place of its establishment has a double func-
tion: it figures as the domicil of the promisor and as the 
center of the obligation of repayment. It does not seem 
32a Accord, EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 524; Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft 
No.6 (1960) I39i Uniform Commercial Code§ 4-102; VAN HECK!!, supra n. 
*, at 69 j LOCHNER 18 ff. 
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doubtful that a bank credit is governed by the local law of 
the bank. For isolated contracts between private parties, 
again, no general rule is needed or possible. 
II. BoNDs (DEBENTURES) 
International credits are created by the most varied 
methods.33 We are not dealing here with credit operations 
between sovereign states, nor with state guarantees for 
bolstering the credit of other governments or of individual 
borrowers, lately much discussed in public international 
law.34 The loans expressed in partial obligations, however, 
which form our subject matter may be contracted by states 
or other public entities as well as by private persons. 
(a) American loans of the L920' s. After the First World 
War, during the great wave of private American loans to 
European states, municipalities, and corporations, the usual 
type of loan conformed perfectly to the technique used in 
large domestic loans by New York banks. It has been said 
that most debentures and bonds of this group contained an 
express submission to the law obtaining in the state of New 
York. Such a clause, more or less clearly drafted, at any 
rate,85 was frequently inserted in the "Trust Deed," if not 
in the text of the bond. But even without stipulation, the 
transaction was commonly impregnated by the unmistakable 
style of New York. As a German court described such a 
loan, 86 the bonds were issued by a New York bank; the sums 
expressed in the currency of the United States; the external 
appearance, form~ and text of the securities as well as the 
concepts and stipulations of the debenture conformed to 
33 For a general survey, unfortunately little documented, see LEON MARTIN, 
"Les emprunts internationaux," Nouv. Revue 1943, 229-276, 525-571. 
34 J. FiSCHER WILLIAMS, 34 Recueil (1930) 81, 137; LAUTERPACHT 5; MANN, 
"The Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1944) 
II ff. 
35 HAUDEK 105 n. 3· 
ss OLG. Koln, Senate of Saarlouis, JW. 1936, 203. 
12 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
the habits, views, and needs of the American finance and 
monetary market; everything was calculated for admission 
to the stock exchange of New York. Also, the trust deed 
was usually agreeable to the American standard and modi-
fied only with respect to foreign mortgages to meet local 
exigencies. 
This characterization corresponded with the distribution 
of economic power: 
"When the post-war loans were floated, the American 
bankers were largely in a position to dictate the terms; and 
the loan agreements were usually drafted in New York and 
merely passed upon or modified abroad."37 
(b) Decisive connection. This transaction as well as the 
ensuing negotiable instruments were doubtless centered in 
New York. The purely American character of the contract 
created obligations, naturally governed by American law, 
between the parties and their successors deriving rights 
from the original transaction. 
The law of the place of contracting, in such cases, can 
certainly not govern on its own merits. Nor has the debtor's 
domicil any importance. Also, the places of payment avail-
able to bondholders should not be overemphasized. It is 
true that in the loan contract, during the period between 
the two world wars, the debtor, whether a private or munici-
pal corporation or a state, usually undertook to place all 
sums due for principal, premium, or interest on deposit with 
the bank in Manhattan charged with the service of payment, 
in immediately available funds, several . days before the 
payment date. Thus, the debtor is significantly bound to 
the main place where payments are due. But this is only 
characteristic of the market at which the bank is located. 
The lessons of experience point to two conclusions. In 
37 QUINDRY and FEILCHENFELD, 2 Bonds and Bondholders (1934) § 634. 
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the first place, the most vital principle for every sound treat-
ment of debenture rights is the economic and legal equality 
to be enjoyed by all holders of the same bond issue. Bonds 
are not so much characterized by the individual position of 
the particular creditor in relation to the debtor, as by the 
conditions appearing in the fundamental contract, defining 
the total claim of which the bondholder possesses a part. 
The serial number indicates this part of the debt; conditions 
of payment, redemption, conversion, and notice are agreed 
upon in the debenture. The total debt is also affected by such 
events as moratorium, mortage foreclosure, consolidation, 
amortization, and premature repayment.38 The modern 
laws for the protection of bondholders contemplate associa-
tions or trustees acting in their common interest, et cetera. 
In the second place, if the creditors of a bond issue are 
to be treated on the same footing, the applicable law can be 
chosen only once and for all on the basis of the original 
contract. This conclusion is probably universally recognized, 
but exactly what local contact it indicates has scarcely been 
discussed. 
It has been c9rrectly stated in France, however, that 
where the place of issue, the currency, and the place of pay-
ment coincide, neither the debtor's nationality nor domicil 
-as once was claimed39-nor the purpose or place of use 
of the money is material.4° Likewise we may agree with a 
Canadian decision that where a bond issue was made in 
British Columbia, the debtor being there at the time, the 
mortgage being there situated, and the bulk of the provi-
sions performable there, it did not matter that the three 
trustees named in the deed were residents of Oregon.41 In a 
ss Swiss BG. (Nov. Io, I923) 49 BGE. III ISS. 
89 2 BAR I3S; 2 MElLI 274; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 354· 
40 LAPRADELLE, Note, Nouv. Revue I94I, 204. 
41 British Columbia: Harris Investments, Ltd. v. Smith [ 1934] I D. L. R. 
748, 48 B.C. 274· 
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typical case of an internal American bond indenture, an 
Ohio corporation was the borrower, the mortgaged prop-
erty was in Ohio, and the deal for the sale of the bonds was 
closed in New York, whereas an Ohio bank was named the 
trustee for the security of the loan and the service for 
payment was stipulated simultaneously through the partici-
pating banks of New York and Ohio. 42 Clearly in that case, 
the New York market was looked to, if not for the volume 
of trade, at least for the leading significance of its quota-
tions. Indeed, if similar combinations appear in international 
finance, it would seem that the main emphasis, despite multi-
ple connections, always rests on the market on which the 
issue principally relies. This market should be selected as 
the decisive factor if a neat rule is desired.43 Hence, special 
rules are needed if the issue is distinctly divided into partial 
"tr.anches'' to be placed on several international markets 
and the creditors are granted choice of currency (to be 
discussed in the next chapter). That issues of bonds may be 
subject to protective administrative regulation at any place 
involved,44 is important but should not affect choice of law. 
III. LoANS TO STATES 
Practice and discussions of the difficult border line be-
tween international public law and the private law, in the 
writer's opinion, converge in the result that loans made to 
a state by a private money lender in another country are 
subject to private law. This law, in the case of a private 
lender, moreover, is a particular state's law; it is not inter-
national law as ascertained by consulting the general prin-
42 Republic Steel Corporation to Central United National Bank of Cleve-
land and H. R. Harris Trustees, Purchase and Improvement Mortgage, 
Nov. 1, 1934. 
43 Possibly, NuSSBAUM, D. IPR. 331, referring in an undefined manner to 
the "issue" or the placing of securities on public s'ale, has the same result in 
view. Clearly to the same effect: VAN HEeKE, supra n. •, 70; ScHMID, supra 
n. •, at 72, 79 ff.; probably also LOCHNER 43 ff., 52 ff. 
44 FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 473 f. No. 9· 
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ciples of the civilized nations.45 Whether the debtor state 
nevertheless enjoys exemption from suit is another, and a 
jurisdictional, question. 
The main question is whether the governing law is regu-
larly that of the debtor state, a view generally assumed 
and the one adopted by the World Court.46 The difficulties 
that this court immediately encountered and failed to mas-
ter47 show that the rule is no longer tenable.47a It is likewise 
confusing to believe that, because one party to the contract 
is an international person, the contract loses its national 
character and becomes delocalized and internationalized.48 
The Supreme Courts of Austria, Denmark, England, 
Norway, and Sweden had no hesitation in subjecting the 
American loans to their respective governments to the 
abrogation of the gold clause by the Joint Resolution of 
Congress of June 6, 1933 ;49 a national law of the debtor 
45 See LAUTERPACHT 5· 
46 Brazilian and Serbian loans, Publications Permanent Court ( 1929) Series 
A, Nos. 2oj:u; German RG. (Nov. 14, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196. 
4 1 Cf. the literature referred to supra n. 34· 
47a Accord, VAN HECKE, supra n. *, at 70 ff.; LOCHNER 68-69; I BORCHARD, 
State Insolvency and J;i'oreign Bondholders ( 1951) 65 ff. 
4 8 Thus, MANN, "Tile Law Governing State Contracts," 21 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law (1944) u, 31, whose tendency seems to be approved by JESSUP, A 
Modern Law of Nations ( 1948) 139 n. 39, 141. Cf. also MANN, "The Proper 
Law of Contracts Concluded by International Persons," 35 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law ( 1959) 34, 43 ff. and DELAUME, "The Proper Law of Loans Con-
cluded by International Persons: A Restatement and a Forecast," 56 Am. J. 
Int. Law ( 1962) 63, 69 ff., giving an account of the practice of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development relating to loans granted 
to private borrowers. For a discussion of the implications of these and similar 
instances, see RAY, "Law Governing Contracts Between States and Foreign 
Nationals," 1960 Institute on Private Investments Abroad 5· 
49 Austria: OGH., Opinion de pleno (Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1935) 
89I. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (Jan. r, 1939) Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel a 
Amsterdam v. Ministre des Finances, 40 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1939) 284-
England: Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders 
A. G. [1937] A. C. soo-H. L. 
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) Norwegian Government (Ministere des 
Finances) v. Stavanger Sparekasse etc., 38 Bull. In st. Int. ( 1938) 71. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Skandia Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Swedish 
National Debt Office, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 215, Clunet 1937, 
925, 4 Nouv. Revue ( 1937) 402. 
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country, on the contrary, would not have had the power to 
reduce the debt with international force. The Swedish 
tranche of the international Young Loan to Germany was 
determined under Swiss law by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 5° 
In the future, of course, a fair protection of an invest-
ment may be accomplished by treaty through the efforts 
started before the last war ,51 and if high hopes are fulfilled, 
by an international judicial forum. "Some day," it has been 
said, "we shall be led to create a veritable international 
law of business but this will be a future very remote."112 
IV. MoNEY DEPOSITS 
The old controversy whether or to what extent a deposit 
of fungible things, to be acquired by the depositary and 
to be returned by him in unascertained equivalents of the 
same class (depositum irregulare) should follow the mu-
nicipal rules of loan,53 has produced a contrast among the 
national laws. However, a money deposit with a bank ought 
to be considered a loan everywhere.54 Moreover, there is 
no reason to establish different rules for the choice of law 
because of such variations. 
A deposit of money, whether as a sum or in specie, is 
naturally bound to the place of the bank or savings institu-
50 BG. (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II 140, Revue Crit. 1937, 138; (Sept. 28, 
1937) Clunet 1939, 192. 
51 See Int. Law Association, 40th Report ( 1939) 192 ff.; Report of the 
Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts (Geneva 1939) 
League of Nations C.145.M·93·I939 II A zo; Draft of Uniform Preliminary 
Rules Applicable to International Loans, Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law in Rome ("L'Unification du droit") published by this Institute 
(1948) 223. 
52 CASSIN, in r Travaux: du comite fran~tais de droit international prive 
( 1934) 97· 
58 See VON ScHEY, Die Obligationsverhiiltnisse des osterr. allg. Privatrechts 
( 1890) 55, ( 1895) 351. • . 
54 See HAMEL, 2 Banques 95 ff. §§ 752, 753 on the contrast between French 
and German construction. 
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tion to which it is entrusted,115 on the double ground that 
the money is brought to that place to be conserved and 
repaid there and that the transaction is one of a mass of 
similar deals by the institution. Storage or warehouse con-
tracts and agreements for the custody of valuable objects 
by innkeepers are similarly localized. 
Even though, exceptionally, a deposited object may be 
recoverable at a place different from that of the domicil of 
the depositee or bailee, the contract will be most conven-
iently determined by the law of the latter place. 
In general, it seems settled that the customer of a branch 
of a bank is to be treated under the law of the branch rather 
than that of the principal establishment situated in another 
country. In English decisions, repeatedly a bank debt has 
been regarded as tied primarily to the branch where the 
account is kept, for the purposes of legal representation, 
collection, administration, and redelivery. 56 
A question different from that of the applicable law is 
whether the customer may or must sue the bank at the place 
of its branch; he has been required to do so as a measure 
of convenience for the administration of bank business, so 
long as he has no prevailing contrary interest.57 
1111 3 FIORI! § 1204; NoLDE, Draft, 33 Annuaire (1927) II 941 No. 14; 
FI!DOZZI-CI!RI!TI 748 shuns any rule. 
116 Rex v. Lovitt [ 1912] A. C. 212, 219; Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit 
Bank [1948] 2 All E. R. 1025, 1030, C. A., per Lord Goddard, C. J. 
117 England: Clare & Co. v. Dresdner Bank [1915] 2 K. B. 576; see N. 
Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp. [1921] 3 K. B. no, 127; only in the case 
of nonpayment has the customer the right to sue the bank at its head office, 
apparently for damages rather than debt, see Hill, J., in Richardson v. 
Richardson [ 1927] P. 228, 232, 234· From Maude v. Commissioners of Inland 
Rev. [ 1940] I K. B. 548, KAHN-FREUND in Annual Survey of English Law 
1940, 255 concludes that the customer may pay at the bank's headquarters, 
but the bank owes him at the place of the branch. 
United States: Note, "Branch Banks," so A. L. R. 1340, 1357. 
Germany: RG. (June 25, 1919) 96 RGZ. 161 (semble). 
For details, see RABEL, "Situs Problems," II Law & Cont. Probl. (1945) 
at 130. 
CHAPTER 35 
Special Problems of Money Obligations1 
T HE extreme instability of the monetary systems in the entire world has caused a great number of diffi-
culties involving conflicts law. Recent writers have 
felt compelled to devote a separate chapter to money obli-
gations. 
Fortunately, one principle may be claimed to prevail over 
occasional objections: the law of the contract governs the 
amount due. The special law of the place of payment has in-
fluence only on the "mode of performance," while exceptions 
to the principle may be made for the sake of public policy. 
1 Selected literature, including comparative research: United States: Nuss-
BAUM, Money (1950); WEIGERT, "The Abrogation of Gold-Clauses in Inter-
national Loans, and the Conflict of Laws," Contemporary Law Pamphlets, 
Ser. 4 No.4 (1940); FREUTEL, "Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the 
Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) 30; RASHBA, "Foreign Exchange 
Restrictions and Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws," 41 Mich. L. Rev. 
(1943) 777, 1089; CABOT, "Exchange Control and Conflict of Laws: An Un-
solved Puzzle," 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1951) 476; DAcH, "Conversion of 
Foreign Money: A Comparative Study of Changing Rules," 3 Am. J. Comp. 
Law ( I9S4) ISS; DELAUME, "Gold and Currency Clauses in Contemporary 
International Loans," 9 Am. J. Comp. Law (1960) 199; HAUSER, "The Use of 
Index Clauses in Private Loans: A Comparative Study," 7 Am. J. Comp. Law 
(I9S8) 35o; NussBAUM, "The Legal Status of Gold," 3 Am. J. Comp. Law 
( 1954) 360. 
England: MANN, Money (ed. 2, 1953). 
Continental laws: NussBAUM, "La clause-or dans les contrats interna-
tionaux," 43 Recueil (1933) I 559; RABEL, "Golddollar-Anleihen mit 
Vereinbarung des New Yorker Rechts," 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 492; HAMEL, 
"L'application des lois monetaires annulant les clauses-or et les principes des 
conflits des lois," Nouv. Revue 1937, 499; BAGGE, "L'effet international de Ia 
legislation americaine clause-or," 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1937) 457, 
786; DoMKE, "Die Amerikanische Goldklauselgesetzgebung," 13 Annuario 
Dir. Comp. ( 1938) I 209; id., "Les efforts Jegislatifs tend ant a restreindre Ia 
validite de Ia clause-or," Revue Crit. 1938, 22; HAMEL, BERTRAND & RoBLOT 
( eds.) Le controle des changes; ses repercussions sur les institutions juridiques 
( I95S) ; KEGEL, Probleme des internationalen Enteignungs- und Wiihrungs-
rechts (1956); KAGI, Der Einfluss des D~visenrechts auf internationale 
schuldrechtliche Vertriige (1961). · 
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I. MUNICIPAL LAWS 
A. NOMINALISM 
1. Devaluation 
A monetary sign has the value printed on its face. This 
is the nominalistic principle. In the discharge of obligations, 
no heed is given to the oscillations of monetary value that 
continually accompany international financial intercourse. 
In periods where a currency is stable, fluctuating within a 
small margin in a free exchange market, nominalism has a 
sound inner foundation. Throughout history, however, innu-
merable embarrassed rulers have enforced the principle 
in the wildest crises by manipulating the weight and metal 
composition of their stamped coins and, in more recent 
times, under the modern pattern by releasing floods of paper 
money from their printing presses. A quite different devalu-
ation in the United States has accomplished the same result 
by making a dollar of I 5 5/2 I grains of nine-tenth fine gold 
the same legal tender as the former dollar of 25 8/Io 
grains, and by legally equalizing a dollar bill to a gold dollar 
com. 
When in November, I923, the German "mark" was 
degraded to one billionth of its former value, the German 
Supreme Court could no longer restrain its rebellion against 
the rule that "mark" is equal to "mark." The Second World 
War has left all of Europe in the clutches of inflation, which 
in the case of Hungary for a time reached the proportions 
of quintillions. , 
Inflation and its opposite, deflation, when carried to such 
extremes, are sooner or later adjusted by stabilization of 
the nominal money values or ended outright by a new cur-
rency. The rules that in such cases determine the relation 
between the old and new monetary units pertain to domestic 
public law, but imply a change in the rules of domestic 
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private law. Consequently, the conflicts problem arises: to 
what persons and obligations do the latter rules apply? 
Some old codes,2 reflecting the sentiment of natural jus-
tice, have expressly put the losses suffered through debase-
ment or alteration of coined money on the borrower. The 
creditor should receive exactly the value represented by the 
indicated sum of coins of a certain standard, weight, and 
fineness. Thus, nominalism has been partly replaced by 
a "metallistic" doctrine. In the United States, since the 
monetary catastrophes of the Civil War, a highly stereo-
typed stipulation has served in place of such a rule. In 
present legislation, the nominalistic doctrine is firmly and 
universally settled. In a vain effort to draw an analogy, a 
few writers, in the desperation of inflation, invoked the old 
rules regarding the loan of coined money. 
2. Protective Stipulations3 
Gold coin clause. Customary usage has produced various 
formulas. In the United States, the clause generally em-
ployed before 1933 read: "to pay X dollars in gold coin 
of the United States of, or equal to, the standard of weight 
and fineness existing on (the day of contracting)." The 
analogous clause in France and Germany more briefly stipu-
lated for X francs in gold or X marks in gold or in Reichs-
Goldwiihrung, or the like. 
Thus, in the "gold coin clause," clause especes-or, clausula 
curso-oro, Goldmiinz-Klausel, the debtor promises to pay 
gold coins of the currency specified. But although this suffices 
so long as gold coins are available in addition to depreciated 
bills, a crisis usually tends precisely to chase the precious 
metal out of circulation, often causes prohibitions of gold 
2 E.g., Austria: Allg. BGB. § 988 in fine. 
s For literature, see NussBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz gegen Schwankungen 
des Geldwertes (Beitriige zum auslandischen und internationalen Privatrecht, 
Heft I) (1928}; NusSBAUM, Money 223 n. I. 
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exportation and trade, and sometimes leads to seizure by 
the state, as happened in the Roosevelt era. 
In one opinion, the doctrine of impossibility was em-
ployed; the requirement of paying in gold coins was 
considered a frustrated specification of the modality of per-
formance; hence, the debtor could simply discharge his 
obligation in bills of the stipulated currency.4 This leaves 
the clause ineffective in the very case where it is most needed 
and makes it almost senseless. In the words of the World 
Court, "The treatment of the gold clause as indicating a 
mere modality of payment without reference to a gold stand-
-' 
ard of value, would be, not to construe but to destroy it."5 
The highest courts of almost all countries6 have finally ral-
lied to the view that gold coin clauses induce a tacit addi-
tional agreement that in any event the creditor should 
4 United States: Irving Trust Co. v. Hazlewood (1933) 148 Misc. 456, 265 
N.Y. Supp. 57· 
Australia: Jolley v. Mainka (1933) 49 Commw. L. R. 242. 
Belgium: Cass. (June 12, I930) Pasicrisie 1930.1.245; (April 27, 1933) 
Clunet I933 1 739· 
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite [ I9331 Ch. 
684-C.A. (reversed). 
Germany: RG. (Jan. II, I922) 103 RGZ. 384; (March I, 1927) 107 RGZ. 
370; (May 24, 1924) Io8 RGZ. 176 (overruled). 
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. 15, 1924) 20 SJZ. 309. 
5Publications Permanent Court (I929) Series A, Nos. 20{21 at 32; Clunet 
1929, at 996. · 
6 Most decisions, it is true, wind up by declaring the clause invalidated by 
the Joint Resolution of Congress. 
England: Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Eiectricite [ 19341 A. C. 
161-H. L.; New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British and French Trust Corp. 
[19391 A. c. I-H. L. 
Austria: OGH. plenazy decision of the "large senate" (Nov. 26, 1935) 
Clunet I936, 442, 717; OGH. (June r, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 245· 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Dec. 10, 1936) Prager Archiv I937, 1067; (June 
II, 1937) id. I9371 2088. 
Denmark: S. Ct. (June 21 and Oct. 6, 1933) Ugeskr. Retsv. 1933, 703, 1028, 
7 Z.ausl. PR. (I933) 960, 962. 
Germany: RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, I936) two decisions, W. I936 Nos. 280, 
281, 34 Bull. Inst. Int. (1936) 304, one of which, the Royal Dutch case, applies 
Dutch law, see infra n. 49· 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) Scandia Ins. Co., Ltd. v. The Swedish 
National Dept Off., 64 NJA. (1937) 1, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 286. 
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receive in actual currency the value embodied in the original 
amount, or, in other words, imply a gold value clause, as 
described hereafter. 
The House of Lords, then, construed a promise to pay 
100 pounds "in sterling in gold coin of the United Kingdom 
of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness existing 
on September 1, 1928," as though the clause ran thus: "pay 
in sterling a sum equal to the value of 100 pounds if paid 
in gold coin of the United Kingdom of or equal to the 
standard, etc."7 
Gold value clause (clause valeur-or, Goldwert-Klausel). 
Earlier American contracts expressly provided for payment 
alternatively of gold coins or of the amount in paper neces-
sary to purchase the gold at the place of payment.8 In 
modern practices, the same result, thus reached directly, is 
generally obtained by a promise to pay a quantity of money 
determinable according to the value of gold coins of a cer-
tain currency: gold pounds, gold dollars, etc. These ex-
pressions and the implied meaning of gold coin clauses just 
mentioned have dominated the documents of loans and in-
surance in recent decades. Hence, the often emphasized dif-
ficulty of discerning the exact nature of a gold clause has no 
longer any considerable practical importance. 
Commonly the unit referred to in the first place belongs 
to a certain currency, English pound, Argentine peso, etc., 
but during the German crisis of 1923 the clause was usually 
based on a purely imaginary unit, t_he "gold mark," equal to 
10/42 United States dollars. It was held that this clause 
was not linked with the American currency and that there-
fore after as well as before the devaluation in the United 
States, it meant an obligation to pay a sum of German money 
equivalent to the value of the original gold dollar.9 
7 Feist Case, wpra n. 6, per Lord Russell of Killowen, at 172. 
8 NUSSBAUM, Money 229 f. 
DRG. (Dec. 14, 1934) 146 RGZ. I, s; (July s. 1935) I48 RGZ. 42. 44; 
Clunet 1936, 412; cf. STOEBER, sz Z.int.R. ( 1938) 240. 
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Analogous decisions were rendered in other countries.10 
Gold bullion clause. The early protective clauses, as well 
as recent attempts to avoid the dangers of money claims, 
resorted to plain obligations to pay a quantity of fine gold. 
In an American case of 1936, an ancient contract of long 
term lease fixed the yearly rent at 5571280 grains of pure 
unalloyed gold. The court held that this clause did not fall 
within the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, since no refer-
ence was made to American currency. As delivery of gold 
bullion was impossible, the equivalent in paper dollars was 
awarded as damages.H The Supreme Court of the United 
States, however, dealing with another lessee's promise to 
pay "a quantity of gold which shall be equal to $1500 of 
:.the gold coin of the United States, etc.," held the Joint 
Resolution applicable on the ground that the contract in-
tended the payment of money rather than the delivery of a 
commodity. The lessor was a corporation which had noth-
ing to do with gold transactions and wanted simply a safe 
amount of moneyP This decision, despite the difference in 
the clauses, overrules the first case and leaves open, as mere 
commodity obligations, only those stipulations of a quantity 
of gold that treat gold as merchandise for industrial or 
dental purposes, or presumably, those concluded between 
gold dealers. 
The French Code and several followers have recognized 
loans given in bars ( lingots) as independent of money 
10 Belgium: PrRET, Les variations monetaires et leurs repercussions en droit 
prive beige ( 1935) 256 ff. 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Oct. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 467. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (April 27, 1935) 33 Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 278. 
Italy: App. Milano (July 19, 1934) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 201, but contra: 
Cass. (Jan. 10, 1936) 34 Riv. Dir. Com. (1936) II 386. 
11 Joint Resolution of June s, 1933, 48 Stat. 112, 31 U. S. C. § 463; Emery 
Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1936) rs F. Supp. 
938. 
12 Mr. Justice Cardozo in Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing 
Paper Co. (1936) 300 U.S. 324, 336. 
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changes.13 Apart from this special and rare case, no author-
ity in Europe is known to treat the question. In the writer's 
opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States has evi-
dently found the right solution.14 
Other clauses. Commodities such as wheat, rye, coal, and 
kalium have temporarily been used as objects not susceptible 
of devaluation by monetary depreciation.15 More important 
are the clauses establishing sliding prices.16 -
3· Legislation against Protective Clauses 
(a) Gold clauses of all kinds are destined to be swept 
away in one way or another in time of crisis. In the wake 
of the First World War and of the depression, gold coin 
clauses not frustrated by the disappearance of gold suc-
cumbed, like the pure gold value clauses, to emergency 
legislation in all but a few countriesY The exceptions in-
clude England, where it has been held that gold value 
clauses are not affected by public policy ;18 and no statute has 
affected their force. It is known, however, that gold clauses 
13 French C. C. art. 1896; Italian C. C. (1865) art. 1823, repealed in C. C. 
(1942); Spanish C. C. art. 1754 (2); the Netherlands C. C. art. 1795-
14 See supra n. u. Contra: as it seems, MANN, Money (ed. 2) 59 n. 2; M. 
WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 467 n. 3· 
15 On these expedients in Germany in the 192o's, particularly the rye 
mortgage bonds, see NUSSBAUM, Vertraglicher Schutz etc., supra n. 3, 75· 
Promises of lessees to pay the rent in grains have been held valid in France, 
even by CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33, who was a rigorous advocate of 
the nullity of protective clauses, and by NooARO, Revue Trim. D. Civ. 1925, 
5 at 8. 
16 See NuSSBAUM, Money 302; DAWSON and COULTRAP, "Contracting by 
Reference to Price Indices," 33 Mich. L. Rev. (1935) 685; HUBERT, "Observa-
tions sur Ia nature et Ia validite de Ia clause d'echelle mobile," 45 Revue 
Trim. D. Civ. (1947) I (inclining to invalidity) and TOULEMON, "L'indice-
or," I Revue Trim. D. Com (1948) 364 (for validity); MEZGER, "Der Kampf 
urn die Indexklauseln in Frankreich," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 437; DUDEN, Wert-
sicherungsklauseln, 40. Deutscher Juristentag (Hamburg 1953) Vol. x, pp. 
1-64. 
1 7 For the other countries, see NussBAUM, "Comparative and International 
Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) 53, 6o, 
61; MANN, Money ( ed. 2) u8 n. 6. 
18 Feist Case, supra n. 6; cf. MANN, Money (ed. 2) 126. 
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are uncommon in England and therefore offer no threat to 
the currency. Other countries in which devaluation did not 
affect gold clauses are Czechoslovakia19 and Switzerland.20 
(b) French doctrine.21 From the I 8th century, the French 
writers protected the monetary maneuvers of the kings by 
a theory that all stipulations evading prescriptions of legal 
tender are void. When a Law of August 12, I 870, invested 
the notes of the Banque de France with cours legal and freed 
the bank of its obligation to cash the notes ( cours force), 
the Court of Cassation held previous stipulations for pay-
ment in gold or silver coins to he void, because they would 
impair the "liberating effect of the paper money" and thus 
conflict with the compulsory legal tender of the paper bills.22 
During the continuous downward trend suffered by the 
French franc after the First World War, this practice was 
maintained and fortified. In the whole range of domestic 
contracts, clauses protecting the creditor against the depre-
ciation of the French currency are regularly declared 
ineffective. 
This doctrine, however, has not been extended to "inter-
national payments," to be discussed with the international 
scope of gold clause restrictions. 
The French theory that a compulsory legal tender is 
necessarily opposed to protective clauses, is not shared any-
where else. Its effect distinguishes the French law in the 
twofold respect that, in the domestic field, gold clauses are 
retroactively invalid without express legislative provision, 
while, in the international field, their validity is maintained 
without restriction. 
19 S. Ct. (Dec. 10, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 54; (June n, 1937) Prager-
Archiv 1937, 2088. 
20 GUISAN, 56 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1937) 26oa, 276a, 295a; BG. (Feb. 1, 
1938) 64 BGE. II 88, IOI. 
21 MESTRE et ]AMES, La clause-or en droit franc;ais (1926); SCHKAFF, La 
depreciation monetaire (ed. 2, 1926) j CAPITANT, D. H. 1926, Chronique 33. 
1927, Chronique 1; NussBAUM, Money 262. 
22 Cass. civ. (Feb. 11. 1873) D. 1873·1.177. 
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B. FOREIGN MONEY DEBTS 
Rules concerning the payment of debts expressed in terms 
of foreign currency are of two categories.· English courts 
have developed rules of procedure tending to exclude awards 
of foreign money; in the United States these rules have 
generated effects in the field of substantive private law. 
Continental codes have determined the extent to which a 
party may modify a contractual promise to pay in foreign 
money, in rules of a purely substantive character. 
No consideration will be given here to emergency laws 
which go so far as to annul contracts for payment in foreign 
money, as for instance, the French Law of April 17, 1942, 
prohibiting resident individuals and juristic persons estab-
lished in France from signing insurance contracts in foreign 
money. 
1. Right to Conversion 
If foreign coins or notes are bought, either in specific 
pieces or as unascertained goods, they are a commodity. But 
when foreign money is the object of a debt, it is not a com-
modity, as was sometimes believed by American courts.23 
The obligation is "a monetary obligation couched in terms 
of a foreign currency."24 
The debtor, however, in an old commercial tradition,25 
enjoys the option (facultas alternativa) of paying the debt 
in equivalent units of the local currency in force at the place 
23 See Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F. 
(2d) 160, 166; NUSSBAUM, Money 341. 
24 German B.G.B. § 244; 106 RGZ. 77· 
25 SCACCIA, Tractatus de commerciis et cambio ( ed. 1669) § 2 gl. 5 Nos. 
185, 188; L. GoLDSCHMIDT, Handbuch des Handelsrechts (1868) 1153 n. 35; 
AsCARELLI in Riv. Dir. Com. 1923 I 447, and in his book, La Moneta 24. 
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of payment.26 This rule has been elaborated in the Geneva 
uniform laws on bills of exchange and on checks.27 
This unilateral privilege of the debtor, however, may 
be waived by agreement of the parties, ordinarily expressed 
by the clause of "effective" payment.28 
Business conceptions in the United States agree with these 
rules.29 
A great controversy, however, has often arisen with re-
spect to the date determining the rate of conversion from 
the foreign into the domestic currency. In theory and in 
practice in civil law countries the just view prevails: con-
version must be made with reference to the time of actual 
payment, in order to give the creditor the exact value of 
his claim, no more and no less.30 Uhfortunately, the language 
of the Geneva Uniform Law on negotiable instruments 
26 E.g., All g. Wechselordnung (I 848) art. 37; German BGB. § 244; Swiss 
C. Obi. art. 84 par. 2; Scandinavian Law of Bills of Exchange, of 1880, art. 35· 
See the list of laws in F. MEYER, Weltwechselrecht 290; VIVANT!!, 4 Trattato 
Dir. Com. § IS66 n. I06. 
2 7 Treaty on Bills of Exchange, art. ·4I; on Checks, art. 36. 
28 E.g., art. 4I sub III, supra n. 27; BGB. § 244 par, .I cit.; "lending'' of 
foreign money implies a sufficient agreement, I 53 RGZ. 385. 
29 See the proposal of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, National Con-
ference Handbook (1933) I6o. 
30 Argentina: App. Buenos Aires Comm. (Oct. I5, I924) IO Revue Dor 72. 
Austria: OGH. (April 25, I922) 5 Rspr. no, 295; (Feb. 27, I934) id. 1934, 
64. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June 8, I921) Pasicrisie I92I.2.II I. 
Egypt: Mixed App. Alexandria (Jan. 8, 1930) 23 Revue Dor 279· 
France: Cass. req. (Nov. 8, I923) Clunet I923, 576; civ. (Dec. 5, 1927) id. 
I928, 66o; req. (March 19, I930) id. I93I, I082j civ. (July 8, 1931) id. 
I932, 72I, but contra: for the date of maturity, Cass. req. (Feb. I3, 1937) 
C!unet I937, 766. The latter solution with the additional damages for default 
is advocated by HAMEL, 2 Banques 470. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, I92o) 98 RGZ. I6o; Plenary Ct. (Jan. 24, I92I) 
IOI RGZ. 312. 
Italy: Cass. (July 27, I939) Taccone v. Uff. Bottonieri, Dir. Int. I940, 267. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 27, 19I8) 44 BGE. II 2I3i (May 23, I928) 54 
BGE. II 257; (Feb. n, I931) 57 BGE. II 69. When speaking of the date of 
maturity, the court has awarded damages for debtor's default between 
maturity and payment, see NussBAUM, Money 425 n. I4-
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points to the date of maturity.31 An older laborious attempt 
by the International Law Association to unify the views on 
this question failed.32 
2. Judicial Conversion33 
In contrast to most civil law courts, English and Ameri-
can courts do not allow themselves to order payment of 
foreign money.34 The date for determining the rate of con-
version into the domestic currency raises difficult questions. 
It has been settled by the House of Lords that damages in 
tort should be converted as of the date of wrong,35 and a 
similar rule prevails with regard to damages for breach o~ 
contract.36 The case of a liquidated debt was doubtful,37 but 
has been decided as of the date when the debt matured.38 
The Supreme Court of the United States has developed 
81 See German RG. (July I, I924) I08 RGZ. 337; (March I7, I925) no 
RGZ. 295, commenting on the identical German provision. 
82 Vienna Rules I926, Report of the 34th Conference (I927) 543 ff., 7I8 ff.; 
STOURM, I4 Revue Dor (I926) S2j IS id. IS. 
33 See McCoRMICK, Damages I90 and cited literature; Note, 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. ( I927) 6I9; also 2 BEALE I34I ff. 
84 England: Manners v. Pearson & Son [I898] I Ch. s8I, 587; Graumann 
v. Treitel [ I940] 2 All E. R. I88. 
United States: Statute of April 2, I792, c. I6 § 20, I Stat. 2so, 3I U. S. C. A. 
§ 371: " ... all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had" (in dollars). 
Canada: Rev. Stat. I927, c. 40 s. IS (I). 
35 Celia, S. S. v. The Volturno, S. S. [ I92I] 2 A. C. S44, s63 f. per Lord 
Wrenbury, as interpreted in several cases, last, Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian 
[I930] A. C. 277-P. C. 
36 Di Ferdinanda v. Simon, Smits & Co. [ I920] 2 K. B. 704, aff'd [ I92o] 
3 K. B. 409-C. A.; Barry v. Van den Hurk [ I920] 2 K. B. 709; Lebeaupin 
v. Crispin and Co. [ I920] 2 K. B. 7I4-C. A.; Madeleine Vionnet et Cie. v. 
Wills [ I940] I K. B. 72-C. A.; Privy Council in Ottoman Bank v. Chakarian, 
supra n. 35· 
Australia: McDonald v. Wells (I93I) 4S Commw. L. R. so6-High Court 
of Australia. 
37 See the discussion by MANN, Money (ed. 2) 318 ff. 
38 Lloyd Royal Beige v. Louis Dreyfus & Co. ( I927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 288; 
Graumann v. Treitel [ I94ol 2 All E. R. I88; cf. ibid. editorial note; 
CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 709. Also for promissory notes and bills of exchange, 
Salim Nasrallah Khoury v. Khayat [ I943l A. C. so7. 
Scotland: Macfie's Judicial Factor v. Macfie (I932) Scot. L. T. 460. 
Canada: Simms v. Cherrenkoff (I92I) 62 D. L. R. 703. 
Australia: In re Tillam Boehme and Tickle Pty., Ltd. [ I932] Viet. L. R. I46. 
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this theory into a rule of substantive law by which an obli-
gation expressed in foreign currency is converted ipso jure, 
at the rate in effect on the day of breach or default of the 
debtor, so as to give the creditor an optional right to be 
paid in dollars.39 This automatic transformation by Ameri-
can law, however, depends on the fact that the obligation 
is governed by American law and, in the case in which it 
was proclaimed, seems to have been grounded in addition 
on the fact that the place of payment was in the country. 
In another case, where just to the contrary German law 
governed and the debt was payable in Germany, Mr. Justice 
Holmes, speaking for the rna jority, subjected the obligation 
to conversion only "at the moment when suit was brought," 
or as this should be understood, at the date of the judg-
ment.40 The courts of New York have a different theory,41 
that under ordinary circumstances the rate on the date of 
breach would control the effect of the breach on foreign 
debts, but th~y admit exceptions in favor of the rate of ex-
change at the time of the judgment.42 
The mystic power of territorial law in the theory of 
Mr. Justice Holmes, the doubts and, above all, the hard-
ships caused by all these premature conversions have been 
sufficiently criticized.43 It follows that calculation according 
to the rate at the time of judgment is the lesser evil, so 
long as no satisfactory machinery is found for leaving the 
conversion to the enforcement officer or a supervisory court. 
39 Mr. Justice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness ( 1925) 269 U. S. 71, even in a 
case of an account stated. 
40Deutsche Bank Filiale Niirnberg v. Humphrey (1926) 272 U. S. 517; 
see FRAENKEL, "Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts," 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 
360, 385. 
41 Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank ( 1923) 235 N. Y. 37, 79, 138 N. E. 497; 
Comptoir Commercial d'lmportation v. Zabriskie (1926) 127 Misc. 461, 216 
N. Y. Supp. 473, aff'd, 222 App. Div. 736, 225 N. Y. Supp. 8o8; Sokoloff v. 
National City Bank (1928) 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745· 
42 See FRAENKEL, supra n. 40, at 389. But see Transamerica General Corp. 
v. Zunino (1948) 82 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 595, 604. 
43 NussBAUM, Money 370; MANN, Money ( ed. 2) 325; M. WOLFF, Priv. 
Int. Law (ed. 2) 461 § 447· 
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C. INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
Numerous American bonds, like the shares of certain 
American corporations, circulate all over the world, but 
their legal characteristics are untouched by any foreign htw. 
Indeed, neither the fact that they are bought in mass and 
quoted on foreign stock exchanges,44 nor still less that a 
loan is floated in a country other than that of the debtor/5 
alter the purely domestic character of the bonds. The nor-
mal distinctive characteristic of an issue relevant for interna-
tional consideration is the alternative fixation of the money 
amount in two or more currencies, by a "multiple currency" 
clause, at the option of the bondholder. Such clauses, how-
ever, are of different classes. Their two main types, known 
under their French names, may be termed here option of 
currency and option of collection. 
I. Option of Currency (Option de Change) 
In the typical international loan which is to be offered to 
the capital markets of several countries, the sum of interest 
and principal is fixed from the start in the currencies of all 
participating places and payable, at the option of the holder, 
at any of these places. Thus, the bonds and coupons of a 
loan of the municipality of Vienna in I 902 expressed the 
principal sum as IOO kronen-85 marks-I05 francs-4.3 
pounds sterling-20 dollars of the United States, in gold 
coin.46 Here there are several obligations, each independent 
of the others, as alternative obligations are. Devaluation of 
one or more of the currencies does not affect the right of the 
44 On the contrary tendency of certain courts, see infra ns. 49, 91. 
43 In discussions of the International Law Association on suretyship for 
international loans, the reporter, B. VAN NrEROP, contended that just this 
was the criterion of an international loan, 4oth Report ( 1938) 19z, also 
Nouv. Revue 1940, 368. This view may be exact from a purely financial 
point of view, but is misleading in legal respects. 
46 u6 RGZ. 196, zo8. 
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creditor to ask payment at the place where the money has 
full value. Although this clause is intended to induce the 
prospective investors of a certain place by offering payment 
also at this place, no restriction to the original subscribers 
of this place or their successors is attached, because the 
bonds, are also intended. to be negotiated throughout the 
world. This makes it possible for all holders to claim the 
sum at the place of least devaluation. 
The loan, in fact, despite the currency option is "indi-
visible, " 47 granting every holder exactly the same rights. 
Whether the Joint Resolution of the United States Con-
gress, of June 5, I 933, affected multiple currency clauses, 
ts controversial. 48 
2. Option of Collection (Option de Place) 
The American loans of the 1920's to European corpora-
tions usually contained a clause that both principal and inter-
est of the bonds as well as any premium on the principal 
shall, in addition to being payable in Manhattan, also be 
collectible at the. option of the holders, at the city office 
of a New York bank in London, and at certain indicated 
banks in Amsterdam, Zurich, Stockholm, etc., in each case at 
the then current buying rate of the respective banks for sight 
exchange on New Y ark. This means that the amounts are 
not only primarily expressed in, but based on, the American 
currency, which is therefore decisive in all future events. 
The holder has the choice of several places for his con-
venience, to obtain substantially the same value at all times. 
47 United States: McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co. (D. C. N. D. Cal. I93S) 
Io F. Supp. 953. 
Austria: OGH. (June I, I937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. (I937) 245. 
France: Cass. civ. (June I9, I933) Clunet 1934, 939· To the same effect: 
Germany: RG. (July I, I926) JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, I927) 27 
Bankarchiv I62. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet I929, 497· 
48 See cases infra ns. I04-108. 
32 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
This situation has been universally recognized with respect 
to many loan issues49 despite numerous objections drawn 
from forced interpretation of stipulations or code pro-
visions, or from an ambiguous wording of certain contracts. 50 
But a few courts have, indeed, incorrectly attempted to help 
creditors evade the American Joint Resolution by contend-
ing that any place of issue suffices to subject the debt to the 
locallaw.111 
The character of the option of collection, just explained, 
is not only certain if the bonds are issued at one place, but 
also in case the bonds are issued in several countries when 
an identical external form of the bonds is employed.112 Even 
though several u tranches'' (divisions of the issue) may be 
formed, the languages being different, the collection clause 
exclusively decides the rate and therefore the content of the 
obligation. Such view alone, "giving deciding weight to the 
wording of the clause, conforms to the significance of bonds 
as incorporating rights and to the needs of international 
intercourse. " 53 
II. CoNFLICT OF LAws 
A. LEX PECUNIAE 
By indicating the currency of a state, the parties refer, 
or the law refers, to the legal prescription defining certain 
units of measurement. What a French franc is, is decided 
49 Publications Permanent Court (1929) Series A, Nos. zojz1 at 35; App. 
Haag (Jan. 14, 1935) N.J. 1935, 119. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1936 II 52, 54· 
France: Cass. (Feb. 24, 1938) Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323. 
Italy: App. Napoli (Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 498. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. J. and W. 1936, No. z8o, 
34 Bull. Inst. Int. ( 1936) 304 (Royal Dutch case). 
50 The ambiguous formulations would fill a voluminous chapter. See Nuss-
BAUM, Money 455 ff.; MANN, Money (ed. 2) 158 ff. 
51 Infra ns. 85, 90, 91. 
52 This refutes the main defense argument based on the nationality of the 
holder. See the convincing reasoning of the Plenary Opinion of the Austrian 
Supreme Court (1935) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 899. 
53 RG. (July 1, 1926) JW. 1926, 2675; (Dec. 22, 1927) 27 Bankarchiv 162, 
against former decisions; see RABEL, 10 Z.aus!.PR. ( 1936) sos. 
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at any time according to the French legal provisions then 
in force, that is, under the principle of nominalism, those of 
the numerous French currency laws which are in force at 
the time of the payment or judgment respectively, including 
the provisions determining legal tender.54 
This reference, however, indicates the only importance 
of the foreign currency laws as such. Even provisions on 
legal tender do not affect the obligation except by the fact 
that they are a part of the law governing the mode of 
performance. 
A contrary theory, establishing a veritable "law of cur-
rency" (Wahrungsstatut), i.e., a conflicts rule providing 
that the fate of an obligation should be decided by the 
changes of the monetary system referred to, has been sug-
gested. 55 The discussion of this problem took place with par-
ticular respect to revalorization (see infra B 3). 
B. LEX CONTRACTUS 
The copious discussion of the law governing money debts, 
and notably bonds, has developed a wholesome unifying 
tendency, in ascribing to one law the great bulk of prob-
lems. What local connection serves to determine this law 
depends on the nature of the contract-which would seem 
trite if it were not torgotten all too often.56 As shown 
before, in the case of bonds, this is the law of the country 
of the financing institution and the principal market. We 
54 Great Britain: Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Chakarian [1938] A. C. 260, 
270, per Lord Wright-P. C. 
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. 
[1928] 4 D. L. R. 542. 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Jan. 19, 1934) (Dec. u, 1934) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 
172· 
55 Theory of NEUMEYER and NUSSBAUM, see infra n. 65. 
56 Even a recent book by GuTZWILLER, Der Geltungsbereich der Wahrungs-
vorschriften (Freiburg 1940) 92 If. looks for a law applicable to "obligations 
expressed in a determinate currency" (p. 103) without distinguishing the 
nature of the contracts. He believes that "currency debts" do not show a 
lex causae in numerous cases (p. 107). This makes for more uncertainty 
( pp. 107 If.) than is conceded in the present book. 
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are thereby enabled to deal shortly with a variety of subjects 
to which the principle ought to extend. 
1. Content of Debt 
Currency in which the debt is payable. 51 Whether a clause 
is meant as option of place of payment or only as option of 
collection, and what amount of money is ain obligatione" 
(money of account, monnaie de compte) depends on the 
law of the contract. 58 What constitutes payment sufficient to 
discharge the obligation is an almost identical question and 
is certainly not to be decided under any other law. 59 English 
cases, after hesitation, have taken the same view when after 
accord and satisfaction, the question was whether an offer 
for nonliquidated damages has a basis in a still-existing 
obligation.60 Also the faculty to deposit the sum due with 
the court follows the governing law.61 
2. Default 
The qualification and effect of default is governed by the 
same law. This extends to the question whether damages on 
the ground of default are awarded in excess of interest; 
whether damages are granted because of a loss through 
devaluation of the currency in which the obligation is ex-
pressed;62 how unliquidated damages are to be measured ;63 
57 RG. {July I3, I929) Leipz. Z. I930, 306, cf. MELCHIOR 28I, 284. 
58 MELCHIOR 277 ff.; MANN, Money (ed. 2) I 58; BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 
68o n. 48. 
59 DICEY ( ed. 7) 804; CHESHIRE ( ed. 6) 2 54-2 ss, but incorrectly at 708 (lex 
fori). 
60Ralli v. Dennistoun {I8SI) 6 Exch. 483, ISS Eng. Re. 633. Not contrary, 
Lord Maugh in The Baarn [I934l P. I7I, ISs-C. A.; see MANN, Money (ed. 
2) 294· 
61 United States: Zimmermann v. Sutherland ( I927) 274 U. S. 2S3· Prob-
ably to the same effect, The Baarn [I933l P. 2SI-C. A. 
62 United States: Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino (1948) 82 N. Y. 
Supp. (2d) S9S, 604. 
England: Scrutton, L. J., in Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plage v. 
Cummings [ I922l I K. B. 45I, 461. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 8, 1930) IPRspr. I930 No. 48 and others. 
63MANN, Money (ed. 2) 238, 2s3; contra: CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 708 (lex fori). 
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and whether rescission may be based on the diminution of 
the purchasing power of the money equivalent. 
3· Revalorization 
Evidently, the law of the contract also governs the ques-
tion whether a subsequent statute or judicial equity adjusts 
depreciated money debts.64 In a contrary isolated opinion, 
the law of the currency rather than that of the obligation 
applies.65 Hence, French rules would decide against any 
revaluation of a debt couched in French francs, although the 
debt a~ises from a German contract and its amount under 
the German rules is transformed into certain percentages 
of the new currency. An English debt of German marks 
would have to be revalorized in American courts. The cur-
rency, however, in which a debt is expressed, has nothing 
to do with the equitable increase of the debt to a higher 
content. 65a · 
64 Prevailing opinion adopted by the courts in: 
England: Anderson v. Equitable Assurance Society of the United States 
(1926) 134 L. T. R. 557, 565, 566-C. A.; see also Re Schnapper [1936] r All 
E. R. 322, cf. MANN, Money 205 ff. 
Austria: OGH. (Sept. II 1 1929) JW. 1929, 3519, Clunet 1930, 750; (March 
12, 1930) JW. 1930, 2480, Clunet 1931, 196 (Austrian law on mark debts); 
{April 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 1899 {German law on a German debt). 
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Nov. II, 1924) JW. 1925, 574; (Jan. 19 and Dec. 
r6, 1934) ro Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 172. 
Germany: II9 RGZ. 259, 264; 120 id. 70, 76; 121 id. 337; ·see MELCHIOR 
294 and constant practice. The currency reform in the Western Zone of 
Germany has raised new questions; on the municipal problems, see VON 
CAEMMERER, 3 Siidd. J ur. Zeitg. ( 1948) 497· 
The Netherlands: See 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 856; H.R. (Jan. 2, 1931) W. 
12259· 
Sweden: S. Ct. {May 27, 1930) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1930, 507; (Oct. r6, 1930) 
id. 513 1 as cited in MICHAELI 321 f. 
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 303; 53 id. II 76; and constant practice. 
as RG. (March 5, 1928) 120 RGZ. 277, 279; {Feb. 9, 1931) JW. 1932, 583; 
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. III 368 ff.; NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 254· 
Contra: ScHLEGELBERGER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 869 and the overwhelming 
majority of German writers. 
a;a Cf. BACH, "Influence de Ia depreciation monetaire sur les rapports de 
droit international prive," in Durand, (ed.), Influence de Ia depreciation 
moneta ire sur Ia vie juridique privee (Paris 1961) 3 II. 
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4· Gold Clause 
The law applicable to the obligation in general naturally 
determines the existence and construction of a gold clause ;66 
its character as a gold coin or gold value clause ;67 and the 
legislative measures upholding or impairing the clause.68 
The last-mentioned application gave an excellent method 
for treating the very numerous intra-European transactions 
in which gold dollars were promised merely for the reason 
that the American currency appeared the most constant 
measure of value, without any thought of submitting to 
American law. In these cases, the American Joint Resolu-
tion was correctly discarded.69 In other categories of cases, 
however, the application of the general law of the contr;ct 
has encountered various obstacles, particularly in the ex-
traordinarily wide repercussions of the Joint Resolution. 
The international scope of the Joint Resolution. The 
66England: St. Pierre v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd. 
[ 1937] 3 All E. R. 349, 352, 354-C. A. 
61 Denmark: S. Ct. (Dec. 13, 1934) 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 280. 
Finland: Helsingfors (Dec. 23, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 280. 
68 England: International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A. G. 
v. The King [ 1936] 3 All E. R. 407; [ 1937] A. C. 505 (Lord Wright's judg-
ment), reversed on other grounds, H. L. [1937] A. C. 500. 
Canada, Ontario: Derwa v. Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. 
[1928] 4 D. L. R. 542· 
Austria: OGH. (Sept. 11, 1929) Rspr. No. 332; (July 8, 1935) Rspr. No. 
164; (Dec. 5, 1935) Clunet 1937, 127: (June 1, 1937) 37 Bull. Inst. Int. 
(1937) 245· Opinion (Nov. 26, 1935) Clunet 1936, 442, 717. 
Denmark: See decisions supra Ch. 34 n. 49, and this Ch. n. 67. 
Egypt: App. Mix. Alexandria (Feb. 18, 1936) D. 1936.2.78. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 6, 1933) JW. 1933, 2583. 
Italy: Trib. Torino (July 7, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934·1.1351; App. Napoli 
(Feb. 21, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936.1.498. 
Norway: S. Ct. (Dec. 8, 1937) 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 71, Revue de 
sciences et de legislation financiere 1937, 646. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 13, 1936) Case of Bataafsche Petroleum 
Co., N. J. 1936, 506. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) 36 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 327, II Z.ausi.PR. 
(1937) 286. ENGLISH in 3 Guldklausulmalet (Stockholm 1937) 130. 
69 Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (Oct. 22, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (1938) 467: the 
clause serving only to protect against a devaluation of the Czecho-crown 
does not justify the payment of a reduced amount in Kc in case of a dollar 
decline. 
Germany: Cf. supra n. 9 on "goldmark" clauses. 
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Congressional Act of June 5, 1933, was evidently intended 
for the broadest conceivable application. According to its 
text, it extends to all gold clauses attached to obligations 
payable in money of the United States; no mention is made 
of the law governing the debt, nor is a domestic place of 
payment1° or a domestic domicil of the parties required. 
This wide scope has been recognized by the courts. 71 At-
tempts repeatedly made in foreign courts to claim the full 
gold value of a debt on the ground that the Joint Resolu-
tion was not meant to cover bonds issued or payable in a 
foreign country, were futile. 72 
It would seem that Congress, without considering the 
problem closely, intended to give the Act the largest possible 
territorial scope, without, however, wishing to transcend 
the traditional limits of sovereignty.78 In fact, no such trans-
gression has been committed in judicial decisions. In the 
outstanding New York case of a loan between foreign par-
ties, where the court declared the broad domain of the Reso-
lution, the loan had been floated and the bonds were payable 
in New York; it was expressly stated that the law of New 
York governed the obligation.74 
Another unfounded attempt has sometimes been made to 
bar the Joint Resolution from the applicable American law 
because the parties did not contemplate the possibility that 
the apparently safest currency of the world would be depre-
ciated by such an extraordinary measure, and their intention 
therefore was restricted to the American law previous to 
the Resolution. But since the parties definitely excluded the 
European laws as unreliable, they could not limit the Ameri-
70 But see the obiter dictum by Learned Hand, J., in Anglo-Continentale 
Treuhand, A. G. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1936} 81 F. (2d) u. 
11 Campania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank 
of Finland ( 1935) 269 N. Y. 22, 198 N. E. 617, cert. denied, 297 U. S. 705. 
Notes, 45 Yale L. J. (1936} 723, 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 726. 
72 Such arguments have been rejected in Germany, OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept. 
26, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 93 (b); RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058. 
73 RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1936) at 507. 
74 Supra n. 71. 
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can law to certain cases and leave the others without appli-
cable law. 75 
Exceptional statutes. In two countries, gold clauses have 
been invalidated if the law of the currency so stated. 76 A 
National Socialist German law even declared that all bonds 
issued abroad for sums expressed in a foreign currency, 
should be devaluated according to the devaluation of the 
foreign currency, irrespective of a gold clause attached.77 
The German state thus undertook to invalidate a gold clause 
valid under all foreign laws involved, merely because a 
domestic court was seized of the matter. The law was a 
countermove against a questionable judgment of the Reicbs-
gericht excluding the application of the Joint Resolution to 
American bonds circulating in Germany, on the ground of 
alleged National Socialist principles,78 but is itself guilty of 
an outrage. It has rightly been refused recognition in 
Switzerland.79 
French doctrine of international payment. Despite the 
practice of considering gold clauses void as offending the 
cours force of French bank notes, the French Supreme Court 
in 19 20 held the New York Life Insurance Company bound 
to the contractual gold value promised in an insurance policy 
to a Frenchman. The cours force based on French national 
interest should not prevent the importation of gold from a 
foreign debtor into France.80 The courts subsequently have 
elaborated a doctrine of "international payment," which is 
75 RABEL, IoZ.ausi.PR. (1936) at 509; for English dicta, see MANN, Money 
(ed. 2) 266; Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 395· 
76 Austria: Law of April 4, 1934, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 267, Clunet 1937, 
643, cf. KOESSLER, id. 496. 
Poland: Law of June 12, 1934, 1 Z.osteurop.R. ( 1935) 499; 2 id. 439· 
77 Law on Foreign Currency Bonds, of June 26, 1936, RGBI. I 575 and 
Decree of Dec. 5, 1936, RGBI. I 1010; 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 391, 666. This 
law is also technically defective. 
78 RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058, see infra n. 89. 
79 BG. (Feb. x, 1938) 64 BGE. II 88. 
8° Cass. req. (June 7, 1920) D. 1920.1.237, S. 1920.I.I93, Clunet 1920, 654, 
Revue 1921, 452. 
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two-sided so as to obligate also a French debtor to a foreign 
creditor, at least in theory. An international payment has 
been defined as a double transfer of funds between France 
and a foreign country; the contract must "produce, as a 
movement of flux and reflux across the frontiers, reciprocal 
consequences in either country. " 81 The Court of Cassation 
considers "the nature and elements of an operation" rather 
than the place of payment, or the domicil of the parties, 
and inquires whether the scope of domestic economy is sur-
passed. 82 The currency laws have expressly recognized gold 
and similar clauses in such cases.83 The validity of the clauses 
concerning the money of account, thus, does not depend on 
the law governing the debt.84 
Law· of place of payment. In many foreign courts, among 
other attempts to bar the application of the Joint Resolu-
tion, creditors contended that the question belonged not to 
the law governing the contract but to the law of the place 
of payment as governing the mode of performance. In the 
meaning of the Restatement it would even be categorized 
as a problem of di~charge of the obligation, and therefore 
be subject to the lex loci solutionis (§ 358 d). 
The courts, in general, have resisted this theory. Among 
inconclusive exceptions, the English Court of Appeal has 
enforced a Canadian mortgage bond, payable in London in 
sterling gold coin of Great Britain, despite the abrogation 
of gold clauses by the Canadian Gold Clauses Act, 1937.85 
81 Att. Gen. Paul Matter, opinion in Cass. civ. (May I7, I927) D. I928.I.25, 
S. I927.I.289, Clunet I93I, 6, commonly quoted. Cf. MAITER in Etudes de 
droit civil a Ia memoire de Henri Capitant (I939) I, 4 ff., also in Nouv. 
Revue I943• 209. 
82 Cass. civ. (Feb. I4, 1934) D. 1934.1.73·78, S. 1934.1.297· 
83 Monetary Law of June 25, I92S; Monetary Law of Oct. I, I936, and 
Feb. IS, 1937. 
84 BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 6S1. For a discussion of recent cases see MEZGER, 
supra n. 16. 
85 British and French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [ I937] 4 All 
E. R. 516, Note in IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 220. 
40 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
Although the justices relied on the lex loci solutionis for 
the "mode" of payment, their opinions were probably more 
influenced by the text of the clause in the contract at bar, 
which could be read as entitling the bearer to British, in 
contrast to Canadian, money, if ever there should be a dif-
ference. This would amount to a partial reference of the 
parties to a special law, a construction occurring also else-
where ;86 but it is a forced construction. The House of Lords 
avoided the problem, but Lord Romer approved the wrong 
theory.87 
The judgments of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the cases of the Serbian and Brazilian loans88 
stressed somewhat the place of payment, but in reality 
applied the law governing the loans which was identified 
with that of the borrowing government.89 This view follows 
tradition but does not satisfy modern needs. 
Public policy (situs of the bond). In the above-mentioned 
lawsuit which attracted great attention in Germany, the 
Reichsgericht decided that the American Joint Resolution 
did not apply to such American-governed bonds as were in 
German circulation at the time when the Act came into 
force.90 This decision, if it had remained in effect, would 
have caused an impracticable discrimination and violated 
the equality of the holders of bonds belonging to the same 
issue. The German government's repudiation of the decision 
was justified, although as noted above the repudiation decree 
itself was highly objectionable. 
86 Austria: See decisions in 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 891, 897; ro id. 68o; II 
id. 269. 
87 New Brunswick Ry. Co. v. British and French Trust Corp. [1939] 
A. C. I, 43 f., criticized by CHESHIRE (ed. 6) z66. 
ss Publications Permanent Court (1929) Series A, Nos. 20j2r. 
89 Correctly so, MANN, Money (ed. 2) 262. 
eo RG. (May 28, 1936} Kreissparkasse Aachen v. Deutscher Sparkassen & 
Giroverband, JW. 1936, 2<:158, Clunet 1936, 951; ro Z.ausi.PR. (1936} 385 
(suppressed in the official collection) overruling OLG. Dusseldorf (Sept. 26, 
1934) IPRspr. 1934, 300, 302; OLG. Koln (Sept. 13, 1935) JW. 1936, 203, 204. 
An opinion by EDUARD WAHL which seems to have influenced the decision is 
published in 9 Z.int.R. (1935) 779· 
PROBLEMS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS 41 
Public policy (place of collection). The Dutch Supreme 
Court, too, resorted to public policy when it denied effect 
to the Joint Resolution with respect to bonds of the Royal 
Dutch Company which showed a promise "to pay" in New 
York and the promise of "collectibility" in Amsterdam at 
the dollar rate of exchange, the suit seeking to recover 
florins in Amsterdam.91 The court maintained its view even 
after the Nether lands had legislated against gold clauses.92 
The courts of other countries have rejected specious argu-
ments of such kind.93 Neither the physical presence of a 
bond instrumen~ in a country nor the mere facility of collec-
tion are sufficient contacts for the use of the public policy 
doctrine, which, moreover, should be excluded when the 
devaluation is due to a currency reform for assumedly 
cogent reasons and carried out without discriminating 
against foreign creditors.94 It is inconsistent with the very 
nature of international loans that any material differences 
should be made between the holders of identically shaped 
instruments. No sound public policy is served by disturbing 
this necessary machinery. 
91 H. R. (March 13, 1936) N. J. and W. 1936 No. 280, 34 Bull. Inst. Int. 
(1936) 304. 
92 Cf. Dutch Law of June 24, 1938; H. R. (April 28, 1939) W. 1939, No. 
895, French tr., 41 Bull. lnst. Int. (1939) 291 (Canadian law, but Canadian 
Gold Clauses Act, 1937, criticized as too restricting); H. R. (May 26, 1939) 
W. 1939 No. 896, German tr., 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (19-39) 90 (Osram loan, 
under German law; but gold clause prohibition, the law of 1936 on foreign 
currency restriction, and the currency transfer restrictions are against Dutch 
public order). 
93 Austria: OGH. (Nov. 26, 1935) 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 891, 897; (July 10, 
19-36) Rspr. 1936, 114. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, 19-36) S. I937·4·I; aff d, Cass. (Feb. 24, 
1938) 64 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) 323. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 30, 1937) 36 Bull. Inst. Int. (1937) 327, 18 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1937) 215, 217; cf. the report by MICHAEL! 305-311. 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE. II at 36o; BG. (July 7, 1942) 
68 BGE. II 203, also in I Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1944) 168. 
94 This is the prevailing opinion of German writers, cf. MANN, Money ( ed. 
2) 269-270, but see NUSSBAUM, Money in the Law (1939-) 393, regarding the 
Royal Dutch case as "not arbitrary." NussBAUM, Money in the Law, National 
and International (revised ed. of Money in the Law, 19-50) 43o-431 takes a 
view more like the one advocated above. 
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C. SCOPE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS 
On the strength of the settled special rule that the law 
of the place of performance governs the "mode" of per-
formance, that law decides what money is legal tender. It 
is also reasonable to include the question whether, in the 
absence of a party agreement, the debtor of foreign money 
may, at his option, pay in the currency of the place where 
the obligation is to be discharged. This is a recognized rule 
in Switzerland95 and, with certain doubts, in Germany.96 It 
is included in the numerous, often too broad, French refer-
ences to "the mode of payment, particularly the money."97 
It also seems to lie within the theory of the English cases.98 
Finally, the Restatement with reason refers the question of 
which of several debts payable in the same state should be 
deemed discharged by a payment, to the law of that state.99 
The same, however, cannot be said of the next question, 
whether the parties may agree on effective payment in 
95 Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 84, speaking of money not being legal tender 
at the place of payment. 
96 Germany: BGB. § 244 par. 2, providing that the debtor can pay in 
domestic currency if the place of payment is in Germany, contains a con-
cealed conflicts rule, as the literature recognizes. For the literature, see 
MELCHIOR 287 n. I. This conflicts rule should be construed as characterizing 
the question as one of the mode of payment. See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 259. 
But the rule has been said to yield to any foreign law of the contract 
(ENNECCERUS, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse (ed. 1927) § 231 p. 21 n. 4) or 
to the foreign law of the contract, if the place of payment is outside Germany 
(M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) 156) or, on the contrary, to belong to public policy 
(MELCHIOR 285 § 190). The Reichsgericht, which seemed to adopt the normal 
rule (Sept. 29, 1919) 96 RGZ. 270, 272, strangely deviated in the Plenary 
Meeting of the Civil Chambers of Jan. 24, 1921, 101 RGZ. 312, 316, where 
the place at which the payment is made rather than that in which the payment 
is due is regarded as decisive, following the isolated view of NEUMEYER, 3 
Int. Verwaltungs R. II 318. 
97 WEiss, 4 Traite 397; RADOUANT in Planiol et Ripert, 7 Traite Pratique 
( ed. 2) 598 § II93 and n. 2; 2 ARMIN JON § 132; BATIFFOL, Traite ( ed. 3) 
679 n. 46. 
98 See infra n. 101. 
99 Restatement § 368. This rule has been extended to the apportionment of 
income as between successive life beneficiaries, in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. 
of Baltimore v. Woodbridge (1945) 184 Md. 560, 42 Atl. (2d) 231, 159 
A. L. R. 580, criticized by HENDERSON, }., ibid. dissenting. 
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foreign money, nor of all other questions determining the 
quid rather than the quo modo of the obligation. The law 
of the place of payment should only come in, if at all, on 
the ground of public policy. 
The adequate scope of lex loci solutionis has so far been 
discussed critically by only a few writers.100 A special point 
has found more attention. During the long periods when 
sterling currency indiscriminately obtained in the British 
Commonwealth and the Latin Monetary Union dominated 
many countries, contractual obligations of money were often 
expressed simply in pounds or francs. How to construe 
stipulations couched in pounds after these had been devalu-
ated to different levels in the various territories, was an 
issue in several decisions of the House of Lords and the 
Privy Council. The decisions were of uncertain argument 
and difficult to reconcile with each other.101 They made it at 
least certain, however, that on one hand the local money 
at the place of payment was decisive, but on the other, that 
this was a ·specia~ function of the lex loci solutionis, the use 
of which had to serve only a restricted purpose. 
Where payment in "francs" and "dollars" becomes an 
ambiguous indication, courts have often referred to the 
currency of the place of payment.102 But equitable considera-
100 MELCHIOR 277 ff.; WEIGERT, supra ns. I, 2, 20; MANN, Money ( ed. 2) 
I94·204, 287·289. 
1°1 Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v. Prudential Assurance Co. [ 1934] A. C. 
I22, ISI-H. L. (the law of the place of ·performance should regulate the 
discharge of the contract by performance); Auckland Corporation v. Alliance 
Assurance Co. [ I937] A. C. 587-P. C. (bonds made payable by option of 
the holder in London, English pounds payable); Mount Albert Borough 
Council v. Australasian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Soc., 
Ltd. (I937) [I938] A. C. 224-P. C. (bonds considered as governed by New 
Zealand law; the statute of Victoria reducing interests is inapplicable). 
1o2 Canada, Saskatchewan: Simms v. Cherrenkoff ( I92I) 62 D. L. R. 703. 
Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Lim. v. La Ville de 
Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. I92I) 59 Que. S.C. 550. 
France: Cass. req. (Mar. I, I926) Clunet I926, 66I; (April IS, I926) Clunet 
I926, 970. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257. 
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tions have also led to judgments awarding a creditor pay-
ment only in his own lower currency,103 or a specification was 
inferred from premium payments in insurance contracts.104 
D. OPTION OF CURRENCY 
An option de change granting the creditor choice of the 
currency in which he may recover a sum fixed in the con-
tract, such as one pound sterling or five United States 
dollars, constitutes a promise independent of the factual 
relation of the currencies involved at the time of suit. Each 
alternative right remains unaffected if all other currencies 
are devaluated or the protective clauses with regard to them 
are abrogated by the laws of the countries to which the 
currencies belong. This view rests, of course, on the law 
governing the contract inasmuch as it sanctions the inten-
tion of the parties. This, however, does not answer all 
doubts. 
In the United States, it has been held that on a bond 
payable in dollars in New York or guilders in Amsterdam 
a bondholder of any nationality, including that of the United 
States, is entitled to sue for the full value of guilders pay-
able in Amsterdam, irrespective of the existing prohibition 
to sue for gold dollars payable at any place.105 However, 
subsequently another federal circuit court with reference to 
the same loan decreed that dollars could not be demanded 
for the value in guilders.106 Opinions were divided also on 
103 Canada, Alberta: Sheppard v. First International Bank of Sweet Grass 
[ 1934] 1 D. L. R. 583. 
104 See the list of cases, NUSSBAUM, Money 379 n. II. 
105 Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. 
(C. C. A. 3d 1936) 81 F. (3d) n, by Judge Learned Hand, cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 655. 
Analogous, for restrictive interpretation of the Belgian decree and law on 
gold clauses as an exorbitant measure, Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (April 
7, 1936) 35 Bull. Inst. Int. (1936) 13o; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 17, 1936) 
36 id. (1937) 399· 
1oa Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Henwood (C. C. A. 8th 1938) 98 F. 
(3d) 160. 
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the occasion of another loan.107 The Supreme Court of the 
United States took the more rigorous stand.108 In its ap-
praisal, promises in alternate currency were not separate 
and independent contracts or obligations, but were parts of 
one and the same monetary obligation of the debtor "which 
was under American law· and fell within the terms of the 
Joint Resolution: 'obligations payable in money of the 
United States.' " This decision may be regarded as an un-
warranted extension of the Joint Resolution which does not 
mention foreign currency debts.109 In any case, the Court 
ignored the faculty of the parties to stipulate in a contract 
governed by American law obligations subject to a special 
law. 
In fact, foreign courts have taken a different view of such 
clauses. The problem, of course, is directly concerned with 
the amount of the debt. It would be a mistake to include 
the right in question in the domain of modalities of pay-
ment belonging to. the law of the place of performance. 
Nevertheless, the former German Commercial Supreme 
Court and the Reichsgericht have entertained a theory that 
the contract with its alternative currency clause submits the 
obligation conditionally to the law of the place the creditor 
should select for presenting his bond for payment.U0 In the 
case of the Viennese Investment Loan, the Reichsgericht 
held Austrian law to govern the debt but Swiss law to gov-
ern the payment in Swiss francs in Ziirich so as to discard 
an Austrian legislative act authorizing the city of Vienna to 
107 The judgment of Learned Hand, J., was followed in Ziirich Gen. Ace. & 
Liability Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1939) 279 N. Y. 495, 18 N. E. (2d) 
673; Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. Bethlehem Steel Co. ( 1939) 
279 N. Y. 790, 19 N. E. (2d} 89; contra: City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Co. (1935) 244 App.Div. 634, 280 N.Y. Supp. 494· 
108 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood ( 1939) 307 U. S. 247; Bethlehem Steel 
Co. v. Ziirich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. and Anglo-Continentale 
Treuhand A. G. (1939) 307 U.S. 265. 
109 WEIGERT, supra n. I, at 33· 
110 24 ROHGE. 388; RGZ.: r, 59, 61; 5, 254; roo, 79; u6, 196. 
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pay exclusively in valueless Austrian crowns.111 Similar con-
structions have been adopted in other countries.U2 Some 
related arguments have also been used by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and the English Court of 
Appeal.113 
This reasoning has been acutely criticized.114 However, 
all these cases point to the intention of the parties. The 
problem may demonstrate the opportunity of recognizing 
an appropriate sphere, not of the law of the place of per-
formance, but of the choice of law by the parties. It seems 
a sound case for conceding that the parties may agree on 
the applicable law under condition subsequent. A multi-
lateral currency clause constitutes the right to recover a 
money value despite depreciation of the other currencies 
and should not be frustrated by subsequent statutes of the 
states controlling these currencies. Judge Learned Hand's 
opinion mentioned above115 is entirely agreeable to this 
construction. We might submit, therefore, that a genuine 
multiple currency clause includes an implied choice of law 
under the condition of its exercise. This small corner of 
refuge in the international field ought to be left to the 
victims of the governmental money manipulators. 
111 RG. (Nov. I4, I929) 126 RGZ. I96; considered representing German 
law in Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp A. G. ( I938) 6 N. Y. 
Supp. (2d) 993· 
112 Canada, Quebec: La Corporation des Obligations Municipales Limitee 
v. La Ville de Montreal Nord (Super. Ct. I92I) 59 Que. S. C. 550. 
Switzerland: BG. (May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257, Clunet I929, 497· 
In France, a similar decision was wrongly rendered in a case of option 
of place, Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. I6, I938) Mouren et Comite de Ia Bourse 
d' Amsterdam v. Soc. des Services Contractuels des Messageries Maritimes, 
Gaz. Pal. I938 II 728, 40 Bull. In st. Int. ( I939) 98. 
113 Publications Permanent Court (I929) Judgment No. I4, Series A, Nos. 
20j2I (see supra n. 5 at p. 44, cf. Judgment No. IS, id. p. I22); British and 
French Trust Corp. v. New Brunswick Ry. Co. [ I937l 4 All E. R. SI6 (see 
supra n. 85). 
114 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 26I; NussBAUM, Money 420: "bad law," citing 
decisions in his favor. Contra: WEIGERT, supra n. I, 37, basing the decision 
on the "law of the currency," which is also questionable. 
115 See supra n. IOS. 
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E. MORATORIUM AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 
(a) Moratorium. 116 Moratorium is a temporary statu-
tory postponement, for all debts, or those of a certain kind, 
of the date when payment is due. Such exceptional defer-
ment may be so short that its effect can be assimilated to 
the "terms of grace" of the law merchant, traditionally sub-
jected to the law of the place of payment or of the forum. 117 
Otherwise, the matter is controversial.118 
In England, it has been held that the law of the place of 
payment as such is decisive, 119 because the matter relates 
to the mode of performance. Beale120 advocates this view 
despite a contrary decision of New York,121 which applied 
the law of the place of contracting. M. Wolff supports this 
opinion by the equitable consideration that a debtor should 
not be required to pay in a country where he cannot collect 
his own claims.122 
In civil law countries, the French Law of 1870 granting 
prorogations to the p'ayment of bills of exchange and notes, 
expressly claimed extraterritorial force. 123 This law once 
gave rise to a widespread but unsuccessful debate and to 
conflicting decisions in numerous countries. A frequent doc-
trine limited any statutory moratorium to the territory of 
the state issuing it, even though it was intended to be applied 
to debts payable abroad. In a similar view, public policy is 
116 GHIRON, "Moratorie e regressi nel diritto internazionale privato," 9 
Rivista (1915) 152. 
111 DEZAND, ro Repert. 176 § 25. 
118 Cour Paris (June 25, 1931) Clunet 1932, 993 declares inapplicable the 
French moratorium to a bill of exchange accepted in Switzerland for a pay-
ment in Paris. The decision is approved by PRUDHOMME, ibid., but questioned 
by BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 678 n. 44-
119 Rouquette v. Overman (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 525, 535; In re Francke and 
Rasch [ 1918] I Ch. 470, 482. 
120 2 BEALE 1270. 
121 Taylor v. Kouchaki ( 1916) 56 N.Y. L. J. ( 1916) 813. 
122 Priv. Int. Law 479 § 455· 
123 GHIRON, supra n. II6, at 161. 
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always repugnant to the defense of a foreign moratorium.124 
But the French statute, in fact, merely prohibited the 
making of protests, an entirely special matter regarding 
enforcement of obligations flowing from negotiable in-
struments.125 
Recent cases of moratoria, decreed in close connection 
with exchange restrictions, depend on the treatment of such 
restrictions. We may say that the character and motivation 
of the individual statutes relaxing the strict observation of 
contracts have always influenced consideration of such 
statutes in other countries. 
(b) Exchange restrictions.126 The main principle, again, 
must be that the law of the contract decides the force of 
any restriction. This includes two rules : (a) where the 
governing law itself sets up an obstacle to the discharge of 
money obligations, the parties are bound to it, irrespective 
of where the payment is to be performed and where the 
suit for payment is brought, and (b) restrictions by a state 
whose law does not govern the contract are immaterial. 
This natural principle seems to have become the accepted 
basis of the international literature of the 1930's and 1940's. 
The emphasis, however, has not been on the principle at all 
but on the possible exceptions. These are varied and the 
over-all picture is confused. 
Procedural theory. One of the arguments supporting the 
disregard of foreign restrictions has been their allegedly 
territorial nature. Assets within the forum, it has been said, 
cannot be exempted from enforcement by virtue of a foreign 
prohibition. Sometimes it has been added that the German 
restrictions especially, despite their immense scope and 
124 GHIRON 176 ff.; contra: 2 FRANKENSTEIN 242 n. 27. 
125 2 MElLI 351. 
126 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. x, 30 (informative on problems); 
much material is collected by RASHBA, "Foreign Exchange Restrictions and 
Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws," 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 777, 1089. 
Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank [1948] 2 All E. R. 1025-C. A. 
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ruthless elaboration, expressly refrained from affecting the 
substance of the creditor's right, in that they limited them-
selves to the temporary prevention of payment, either volun-
tary or enforced. Thus, enforcement in England would only 
be a procedural matter, dependent on Engli'sh rules/27 Ger-
man and other compulsory systems, however, if allegedly 
not cancelling the obligation, in fact vitally impair its sub-
stance. On the other hand, it is of cardinal importance that 
we should not extend jurisdiction, based merely on the 
local situation of an asset, so as to impregnate a foreign-
governed obligation with local policy.128 
Public policy. Foreign legislation on currency exchange 
has very often been discarded as "political," as confiscatory, 
or as penal-a rather vague approach.129 Moral indignation 
repudiating the foreign restrictions has been embarrassing 
when statutes of the forum resorted to similar methods. 
The best support of a reaction against such foreign meas-
ures is afforded by the argument that they pursue in a 
unilateral manner economic purposes of a state to the detri-
ment of foreign interests. On this ground, rather than on 
all others alleged, German, Austrian, and Swiss courts 
have correctly rejected debtors' excuses based on Hun-
garian, Yugoslavian, and German currency restrictions, 
respectively .130 
127 Thus, MANN, Money ( ed. 2) 366 ff. A new surpnsmg position in 
recognizing Czechoslovakian restrictions has been taken by the English Court 
of Appeal in Kahler v. Midland Bank [1948] r All E. R. 8n. Although 
vigorously criticized, this decision has been affirmed by the House of Lords 
in Kahler v. Midland Bank b950) A. C. 24, discussed by MANN, "Nazi 
Spoliation in Czechoslovakia," 13 Mod. L. Rev. (1950) 206. 
128 An unwarranted objection to this proviso has been raised by RAsHBA, 
supra n. 126, who warns against exaggeration of the principle that substantial 
contact with the forum is indispensable for the application of the local law 
considered as public policy. 
129 See for details, RASHBA, 41 Mich. L. Rev., supra n. 126, at ro89 If. 
130 Germany: KG. (Oct. 27, 1932) JW. 1932,3773, IPRspr. 1932 No.9; LG. 
Berlin I (Feb. 19, 1932) JW. 1932, 2306, IPRspr. 1932 No. ro. 
Austria: OGH. (Dec. ro, 1935) 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 398, Clunet 1937, 
333; cf. WAHLE, 9 Z.ausi.PR. (1935) 779· 
50 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
This view, advocated in the United States,131 is better 
suited than a rigid condemnation of all extraordinary for-
eign measures for the safeguard of national economy. It is 
also superior by far to a third view which holds the debtor 
responsible for not being able to pay, since his own state has 
caused his inability; he should bear the risk of damage 
occasioned by such legislation while he enjoys the benefits 
procured by the national economy of which he is a part.132 
Is the law of the place of payment influentialf This ques-
tion carries us back to the pretended importance of illegality 
under the law of a foreign place of performance. By aban-
doning this dogma, a court may easily defy a foreign cur-
rency restriction imposed in an incompetent state. 
On the other hand, no one can reasonably be expected to 
pay English pounds in Chile while this is prohibited there.133 
In the two Baarn cases, the court did not resort to the 
Chilean law of obligations and had no need to do so for 
the purpose of excusing the debtor.134 The law governing 
the contract, whatever it is, will provide for the effect of 
nonpayment as well as for the question whether payment 
in local money is to be accounted for at the exchange rate. 
Switzerland: 6o BGE. II 294, 310; 62 id. 242, 246; 62 id. II I08. The rejec-
tion extends to the case where the debt is governed by German law, see BG. 
(March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42. In its decision of July 7, I942, 68 BGE. II 
203, supra n. 93, the court agreed with an American judgment because of 
analogous policy. 
In the Swedish case, S. Ct. (June 10, I942) Nytt Jur. Ark. I942, 389, 394, 
as cited in MICHAELI 311 f., Bagge applied the same ap·proach, whereas the 
majority resorted to Swedish law as the law of the contract. 
131 FREUTEL, 56 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. I, at 58. Cf. DoMKE, The Control 
of Alien Property (I947) 206, 313. 
132 Repeated from "Situs Problems," II Law and Cont. Probl. (I945) at I23. 
The International Monetary Fund Agreement art. VIII sect. 2 (b) now 
expressly provides for the unenforceability in the member countries of certain 
contracts which violate exchange control regulations of a member. See 
NussBAUM, Money 541 ff.; HJERNER, Friimmande Valutalag och Internationell 
Privatriitt (1956) 37 ff.; MANN, Money (ed. 2) 378 ff.; for further refer-
ences, see bibliographies in 4 International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers 
(I954-SS) 337; 6 id. (I957-58) 474-
133 This against MANN ( ed. 2) 299 ff. 
134 The Baarn (No. I) [ I933l P. 2SI; (No. 2) [ I934l P. I7I. 
CHAPTER 36 
Sales of Movables1 
I. LAWS AND DRAFTS 
r. Inadequate Proposals 
(a) Application of general conflicts rules. Codes, restate-
ments,. and most court decisions as well as the great majority 
of writers have treated sale of goods as the main example 
for what they conceive to be the conflicts rule for all, or at 
1 Special treatment has been given to this contract in the following treatises: 
LAURENT 192-229 §§ 126-158; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. I ff.; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 295; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 269-271; BATIFFOL 161 ff.; 2 ScHNITZER (ed. 4) 
683 ff.; 2 REsTREPO HERNANDEZ 69-76; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 517; KEGEL, Kom. 
(ed. 9) 572 f.; DICEY (ed. 7) 819 ff. 
In addition, see BAGGE, "Les conllits de lois en matiere de contrats de vente 
de biens meubles corporels," Recueil 1928 v I27; BoERLIN, "Die ortliche 
Rechtsanwendung bei Kaufvertriigen nach der Rechtprechung des Bundes-
gerichts," 33 Z.Schweiz.R. (N. F.) (1914) 199; HERZFELD, "Kauf und Darle-
hen im internationalen Privatrecht," 4 Basler Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft 
( 1933) ; GUTZWILLER, "Das Kaufrecht," in Gutzwiller & Niederer, Beitriige 
zum Haager Internationalprivatrecht, 1951 ( 1951) 3-104; FREDERICO, "La 
vente en droit international ·prive," Recueil 1958 I 7; VON SPRECHER, "Der 
internationale Kauf," 24 Zurcher Studien zum lnternationalen Recht (1956); 
PASCHOUD, Les perspectives d'unification des regles de conflit en matiere de 
vente d'objets mobiliers corporels (Thesis) (Lausanne 1949). For further 
publications on the subject, see bibliography in Conference de !a Haye, Actes 
et documents de !a neuvieme session, vol. r, pp. 321 ff. 
Abbreviations in citing international drafts: Vienna Draft 1926-Inter-
national Law Association, Draft of an International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Conflict of Laws. Contracts of Sale, 
Contracts for Work, and Contracts for Services. 34th Report (1927) 509 ff. 
Hague Committee Drafts 1928-Three drafts on the conflict of laws con-
cerning sales; see Actes de Ia sixieme conference pp. 310 ff., 344 ff., 375, 395 ff. 
(discussion), 376 ff. (texts). 
Hague Draft 1931-Draft of Convention on the Conflict of Laws in the 
Matter of Sales of Corporeal Movables, pre·pared by a Special Committee 
appointed by the Sixth Hague Conference, in their meeting of May 28 to 
June 2, 1931, Documents relatifs a Ia septieme session pp. 4 f. On this draft, 
see the report by ]ULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, id. at 5 ff. 
Hague Draft 195r-Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Inter-
51 
52 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
least for bilateral, contracts.2 Indeed, not one of the numer-
ous decisions in the United States, dealing with the law 
applicable to sales of goods, expresses any doubt on this 
point. In appearance, the court always chooses the law of 
the place of contracting,3 or that of the place of perform-
ance, 4 following some fixed or casual axiom. The truth, 
however, is that often the real reasons behind the choice 
of law, notably as they appear in the more recent cases, are 
much superior to the pretended schematic rule. 
In countries of the Latin group, the law of the nationality 
common to the parties5 or the law of the place of contract-
ing, have been applied mechanically as a matter of course. 
Innumerable German6 and a few old Swiss decisions7 have 
indulged in their weird theory, splitting the problems accord-
ing to whose obligations should be fulfilled at what place.8 
The law of the place of performance is automatically applied 
national Sales of Goods, adopted by the Seventh Hague Conference, held from 
Oct. 9 to 3I, I9SI; see Actes de Ia septieme session pp. 382 ff. and the 
English translation in 1 Am. J. Comp. Law (I9S2) 27S· 
Hague Convention I9SS-Convention on the Law Applicable to International 
Sales of Goods; see Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I9SS 
No. S3. The text of this Convention is identical with the Hague Draft I9SI. 
For the status of signatures and ratifications of the Convention, as of March 
I, I964, see Revue Crit. I964, at 163. 
2 For the United States, this has been stated by STUMBERG (ed. 2) 402 f. 
3 Carver-Beaver Yarn Co. v. Wolfson (I924) 249 Mass. 2S7, I43 N. E. 
9I9; Montreal Cotton v. Fidelity Co. (1927) 261 Mass. 3Ss, ISS N. E. 795; 
Youssoupoff v. Widener (I927) 246 N. Y. I74, ISS N. E. 64; Willson v. 
Vlahos (I929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 4oS; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn and 
Co. (C. C. A. nt I933) 67 F. (2d) 4S9; Northwood Lumber Corp. v. 
McKean, et al. (C. C. A. 3d I946) IS3 F. (2d) 753· See lists by 2 BEALE I2I5; 
BATIFFOL I7I n. I, I72 ns. I·3· 
4 BATIFFOL I74 § I93· 
5 France: Trib. Dreux (July 22, I92S) Clunet I926, 643; French law would 
have been better justified by the seller's French domicil than by the London 
buyer's French nationality. 
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. n, I937) 36 Revue Dor 335, 4 Riv. Dir. Mar. 
(I93S) II S9, IOO (a contract c. i. f.). See now Disp. Pre!. (1942) art. 25 
par. I. 
The Netherlands: Hof Noordholland (Oct. 12, 1S4S) W. IOI9. 
6 See the surveys by LEWALD 249 ff. and by STAUB-KOENIGE in 3 Staub 765, 
Anhang zu § 372, Anmerkung 9· 
7 Notably, BG. (Nov. 7, IS9o) I6 BGE. 790. 
s See Vol. II ( ed. 2) pp. 469 ff. 
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under the Treaty of Montevideo and the codes agreeing 
with this Treaty.9 
All these overgeneralized rules do not serve the purpose 
of locating the great bulk of international and interstate 
sales of goods with adequate assurance. 
(b) Cases without a problem. The American cases, in 
which conclusion and "performance" are centered in the 
same state, 10 according to the usual standards, offer no 
conflicts question. This observation may stand as a starting 
point, although there arise doubts when the various duties 
of the parties have to be complied with at different places. 
What we doubtless may recognize as a settled principle 
is that the local law governs all sales executed and fulfilled 
at once in one place by both parties, such as in shops and 
open markets. This also accounts for the usual invocation 
of the lex loci contractus for market bargains in recent 
formulations.U The analogous rule for transactions in fairs12 
has been criticized and was eliminated from the last inter-
national drafts and from the Hague Convention 1955/8 
because in modern industrial fairs delivery or payment is 
as often postponed as in other business.18a 
However, it should be likewise regarded as well settled 
9 See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 465 f. 
10 Northrup v. Foot (N. Y. 1835) 14 Wend. 248; McKee v. Jones (1890) 
67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348; Texarkana Pipe Works v. Caddo Oil and Refining 
Co. (1921) 228 S. W. 586; Hooker v. McRae (1923) 131 Miss. 809, 95 So. 
744; Bird & Son v. Guarantee Const. Co. (C. C. A. ISt 1924) 295 Fed. 451; 
Midland Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Brothers Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1925) 
46 F. (2d) 87o; Montreal Cotton etc. Co. v. Fidelity Co. (1927) z6r Mass. 
385,158 N. E. 795; Hollidge v. Gussow, Kahn & Co., Inc. (C. C. A. ut 1933) 
67 F. (2d) 459; Frankel v. Johns-Manville Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1958) 257 F. 
(zd) soB. 
11 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 8, 1; Vienna Draft 1926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th 
Report (1927) 5ro; Hague Draft 1931, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 957i Hague 
Draft 1951 and Hague Convention 1955, art. 3 (3). 
12 Vienna Draft 1926, supra n. r, art. I, B (c) r. 
13 See 2 FRANKENSTEIN 318 j SCHOENENBERGER-JAEGGI, Nos. 264, 265, 268 j 
Hague Draft 1931, art. 4, see 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) at 958; Hague Draft 1951 
and Hague Convention 1955, art. 3· In addition see VON SPRECHER, supra n. 
r, at 84 f. 
13a KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 564 f. j JULLIOO' DE LA MORANDIERE, supra n. 1, at 27· 
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that when both parties, seller and buyer, are domiciled in 
the same state, where they undoubtedly make the contract, 
no foreign law is called for, unless stipulated for in their 
agreement.14 
Illustration. Two Swiss firms made a sales contract in 
Switzerland for delivery f. o. b. Porto or Lisbon and pay-
ment by letter of credit on banks in Lisbon. Although the 
goods were to be imported into Switzerland, the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal, balancing the "criteria" of the presumable 
intention of the parties, pronounced that Portuguese law 
should prevail. Neither the parties nor the lower court had 
thought for a moment of such a possibility, and the federal 
court itself ended up without reversing the decision because 
the lower court would nevertheless apply Swiss law as the 
"presumable Portuguese law."15 
This conception is consistent with the idea slowly emerg-
ing from the international drafts16 that in doubtful cases the 
choice of law is restricted to the two domicils of the parties 
to the sale. Nationality, of course, has no claim in this 
matter. 
The main problem, hence, is presented by executory sales 
contracts, where the domicils of the parties are situated in 
different countries, especially when other local connections 
are established by the acts necessary for the fulfillment of 
the contract. 
(c) Special considerations. Certain American cases, ap-
uSee, for instance, the sales contract in Handelsg. Zurich (Sept. 3, 1943) 
2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1945) 161, made in Switzerland by two Swiss firms, 
dealing with goods stored in Cadiz, Spain, and to be delivered there. That 
the price was payable in Switzerland was mentionable under the theory of 
presumable intention. See, moreover, Pound v. Hardy [ 1956] A. C. 588-H. L., 
a case of a sales contract between two English firms which was decided under 
English law, although the contract dealt with Portuguese turpentine to be 
delivered f. a. s. the buyer's ship at Lisbon. The same result would be reached 
under the rule in § 346g (2) Restatement (Second), ,Tent. Draft No. 6 
( 1960) ; see comment id. at 1o6. 
15BG. (June 22, 1944) 2 Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. (1945) 163; GUTZWILLER, 
ibid., notes his doubt on the right "balance." 
16 See n. I supra. 
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plying the lex loci contractus, are dominated by the par-
ticular lines of thought to be found in the treatment of the 
statute of frauds,17 liquor prohibitions/8 Sunday contracts/9 
and other exceptional subject matters. 
2. The Important Contacts 
In view of the nature of ordinary sales contracts, three 
local connections have been advanced: the seller's domicil, 
the buyer's domicil, and the place of the most significant 
performance. The place of contracting has lost favor. 
(a) The law of the seller. The most recent and best 
prepared proposals, although not yet many enacted laws, 
subsidiarity subject obligatory sales contracts concerned with 
goods to the law of the seller's domicil.20 The Hague Con-
vention 1955, in accordance with the Hague Draft 1951, 
provides in article 3 ( I) : 
In default of a law declared applicable by the parties, under 
the conditions contemplated in the preceding article, a sale 
is governed by the internal law of the country where the 
17 DaCosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch (I8S4) 24 N. J. Law 3I9; 
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I886) IS R.I. 380, 5 Atl. 632; D. Canale & 
Co. v. Pauly and Pauly Cheese Co. (I9I4) ISS Wis. S4I1 I4S N. W. 372. 
Cf. Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 503 n. 6s. 
18 Smith v. Godfrey ( 1854) 28 N, H. 379, 6I Am. Dec. 617; Bliss v. 
Brainard (186o) 4I N. H. 2S6; Keiwert v. Meyer (I878) 62 Ind. S87, 30 
Am. Rep. 206; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Bond (C. C. A. 8th 1895) 
66 Fed. 6S3· 
19 See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. s6s ff. 
20 Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. 3: contracts concluded in retail business 
are subject to the law of the place where the seller is established. The Polish 
Draft 1961, art. IS § 2 No. I subjects all sales of movables to the law of the 
vendor's residence. 
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 46 No. I: sales in carrying on trade or 
manufacture ... are subject to the law of the place where the seller's trade 
or manufacture is established. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (I889) art. 34, (I940) art. 38: 
domicil of the promisor of unascertained or fungible goods. 
Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (d); Draft Nolde, B 
(f), 33 Annuaire (1927) III 198; Vienna Draft I926, Int. Law Ass'n, 34th 
Report (I927) 509 B (a); Hague Drafts at the Sixth Conference, Actes p. 
376, and Hague Draft 1951. 
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vendor has his habitual residence at the time when he re-
ceives the order. If the order is received by an establish-
ment of the vendor, the sale is governed by the internal law 
of the country where this establishment is located.21 
In a considered argument, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, too, 
has found the seller's law to be suitable to the entire sales 
contract, neither the place of payment22 nor that of destina-
tion and receipt of the goods being regarded as having any 
substantial importance.23 This view finds its main justifica-
tion in the dominant nature of the seller's promise to pro-
vide the buyer with the specific goods needed, while the 
buyer's obligation to pay the price has nothing distinctive 
among all the manifold money obligations. 
Less impressive is the argument that the seller is in a con-
siderably more insecure legal and factual situation than 
the buyer, since he bears the risk inherent in the supply and 
storage of the goods and in the capital investment involved 
and he carries extensive legal responsibilities, among other 
things for unknown defects of title and quality. Common 
law goes even further in extending his liability for damages. 
The laws cumulate an amplitude of remedies and options for 
the buyer. However, they do so because the economic power 
and organization of the seller make him prevailingly the 
stronger party. Moreover, the present laws do not help buy-
ers to escape stipulations that nullify their legal advantages. 
Hence, the conclusion that the seller should af least be sure 
of the applicable law and not find himself open to some 
21 See English translation of the Convention in I Am. J. Comp. Law (1952) 
275, from which the above translation differs in only one respect; see infra 
p. 72. 
22 Swiss BG. (Dec. 13, 1932) sS BGE. II 433, 435, cf. NIEDERER, 6o 
Z.Schweiz.R. (N. F.) 257a. 
23 Swiss BGE., 32 II 297. 39 II I67 j cf. HOMBERGER, Obi. Vertrlige so; 
SCHOENENBERGER-]AEGGI No. 266. More recent decisions confirm the principle 
that in the absence of a choice of law by the parties the seller's law shall 
govern: BG. (March 22, I9SI) 77 BGE. II 83, (Feb. 12, 1952) 78 BGE. II 
74, (July 4. 1953) 79 BGE. II x6s. 
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surprising foreign severity,24 is unconvincing. Besides, such 
argument is open to the general objection that a party is 
not necessarily better off with his domiciliary law and should 
not enjoy domestic privileges in international deals. 
Emphasis on the seller's establishment is sufficiently justi-
fied by his complicated and characteristic duties in the nor-
mal development of interstate or international business. 
It is at the same time consistent with the need of any firm 
exporting goods to various countries, to be able to fix sales 
conditions on the basis of one central law. Where sellers 
deal in mass sales, as mail-order houses, automobile manu-
facturers, fruit growers, textile dealers, and many others, 
the central law cannot conveniently be 'Other than that of 
the domicil. 
(b) The law of the buyer. Suggestions that the domicil 
of the buyer should be taken as the decisive contact, are 
infrequent. Certain of these proposals were manifestly un-
founded.25 But a new effort in this direction has been made 
for a particular purpose. The international committees 
working on conflicts rules for sales made several successive 
attempts to complement the primary rule calling for the 
seller's law by elaborate exceptions for the benefit of the 
buyer. In the drafts of the International Law Association 
and of the Hague Conference, the law of the buyer has 
24 HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen ss-96. 
25 The most surprising contention was expressed by CLAUGHTON SCO'IT, 
British delegate at the Sixth Hague Conference, who asserted that the British 
government would preferably agree to the application of the buyer's law if 
to rigid rules at all. He was moved mainly, however, by the idea that the bank 
of the buyer must examine the documents sent by the seller and should be 
able to do it according to the buyer's law. Due objections were made to this 
muddled argument by ALTBN, }ULLIOT DB LA MORANDIERB and USSING. But 
the argument is wrong in the first place because the legal points to be 
examined by any bank are regulated by general conditions and customs rather 
than national laws. See moreover infra Ch. 37 p. 100. 
Another advocate of the buyer's law, KRONSTBIN, 2 Bl. IPR. (1927) 126, 
133, argues that the seller has sufficient opportunity to ask the buyer to submit 
himself to the seller's law, and if he does not use it, he should be judged 
according to the law of the other party! 
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been declared applicable to the entire contract under certain 
circumstances : 
Vienna Draft, I926, B (b) : 
The law of the buyer ... shall, however, apply in the 
following cases: 
I. Where the seller or his agent or representative con-
cludes the contract during a visit in the country of the buyer. 
2. Where the agent or representative of the seller has 
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the 
contract, in the country of the buyer and the agent or repre-
sentative concludes the contract in his own name. 
3· Where the agent or representative of the seller has 
his office, whether principal or branch, which concludes the 
contract, in the country of the buyer, and the movables at 
the date when the contract is concluded are situate in the 
country of the buyer. 
This drafting is superlatively careless.26 If an agent sells 
in his own name, there is no sales contract other than his; 
if the contract of a casual visiting agent is subject to the 
local law, it is incomprehensible that contracting by a per-
manently established representative should not have the 
same effect; the mere presence of a supply for the seller 
has no relevant influence on the treatment of a sale of un-
ascertained goods, at least not if delivery is to be made in 
another country, etcetera. 
The eminent lawyers working at The Hague finally 
reached the following formulation: 
Hague Convention I 9 55, article 3 ( 2) : 
Nevertheless, a sale is governed by the internal law of 
the country where the purchaser has his habitual residence, 
or where he has the establishment that has given the order, 
if the order has been received in such country, whether by 
26 See the criticism in Int. Law Ass'n 34th Report (1927) 498 (ERNST 
WOLFF, MIITELSTEIN, BARRATT). 
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the vendor or by his representative, agent, or travelling 
salesman. 
What idea inspired the formulation of this exception? 
During the Sixth Hague Conference some delegates found 
the ground in a recourse to the lex loci contractus as iden-
tified with the lex domicilii of the buyer.27 Others rejected 
the lex loci contractus on principle, but explained that the 
exceptional rule was due to the situation of small buyers 
contracting with travelling agents and unable to ascertain 
the foreign seller's law.28 It was generally emphasized that 
the result should not depend on the extent of an agent's 
authority to sell, but a practical test should be preferred: 
when the seller or his agent of any kind, including one who 
may only solicit orders or merely accept an order as a mes-
senger, is present at a place in the country of the buyer and 
the latter addresses his order to him, the domestic law 
governs. 
The resulting requirements combine the buyer's domicil 
with one condition of the conclusion of the contract, viz., 
the arrival of the buyer's contractual declaration at an 
address in the same country. This is a rather strange rule. 
If the place where the contract is made is immaterial for 
the choice of law, as has been rightly assumed, why should 
a fragment of the making suffice to localize the contract ?28• 
How can we hold that a contract be subject to the law of 
27 BAsDEVANT, Actes de Ia sixieme session 315, followed by a Belgian and a 
Polish orator. 
28 BAGGE and ALTEN, id. 291 If., 312, 317 n. 2, 318. 
28a This view is shared by DOLLE, "Die 7· Haager Konferenz," 17 RabelsZ. 
(1952) 161, 175. Contra: VON SPRECHER, supra n. I, at 82, who takes the 
position that art. 3 of the Hague Convention 1955 as a whole is based on the 
principle of lex loci contractus (with only two exceptions) and that this is 
especially true of art. 3 (2). But VON SPRECHER overlooks that art. 3 (2) 
even applies to the case where only the offer is declared in the buyer's 
country, whereas the acceptance is made in the seller's country. In this case 
it is very doubtful where the place of contracting is situated; see Vol. II (ed. 
2) pp. 455 If. Therefore art. 3 (2) cannot be justified as a plain consequence 
of the lex loci contractus rule, not to speak of the objections to this rule itself. 
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one party, although the contract is made and entirely to be 
performed in another country? However, if it is only in-
tended by this simple device to avoid the difficulties of 
searching for the legendary place of contracting, the most 
essential objection to the lex loci contractus remains; the 
external circumstances of concluding the contract have no 
necessary relation to the character of the contract.28b 
Again, why should the mere presence of a selling agent 
in the country of the buyer influence the choice of law, if 
the order itself, for instance, specifies that the goods are 
deliverable at the principal's factory or at a vessel in a 
distant port? The problem of agency is not so simple. As 
explained in another chapter, we must distinguish (I) the 
authorization of the agent-the extent of which is, in fact, 
governed by the law of the place where he acts on the 
authority; ( 2) the contract between the principal and the 
agent, which follows its independent conflicts rule; and ( 3) 
the contract of the agent with the third party, in our case 
the sales contract. We cannot always subject this sales con-
tract to the local law of the place where the agent happens 
to act. Much less is the same tendency justified when a mere 
messenger intervenes or an agent simply receives an order. 
(c) The law of the shipping place. The experts at the 
Sixth Hague Conference took no account of the well-known 
fundamentals of international trade. Very probably, this 
happened intentionally.29 But in contrast it should be noted 
that English and American courts have given consideration 
2Sb The exception in art. 3 (2) of the Hague Convention 1955 has also 
been criticized in a well-grounded opinion expressed by the German Council 
for Private International Law, of Feb. 29, 1956; see 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 151, 
156, and for a French translation: Conference de Ia Haye, Documents relatifs 
a Ia huitieme session pp. 234 ff. This opinion aiming at a modification of the 
Hague Convention 1955 was submitted to the Eighth Hague Conference 
(1956) by the German Federal Government. However, the majority of 
delegations to the conference refused to discuss the German objections because 
the Convention had already been signed by five countries. See Actes de Ia 
huitieme session 37-43, and PETERSEN, "Die 8. Haager Konferenz," 24 
RabelsZ. ( 1959) x, 8 f. 
29 See infra n. 48. 
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to mercantile habits, and, as a matter of course, have ap-
plied the law of the place at which the seller is bound to 
make shipment of the goods.80 
F. o. b. contract. Thus, it is the practice of English31 and 
American courts to apply the law of the seller's state to the 
entirety of rights and duties flowing from the contract, 
whenever the seller, under the contract; has to deliver f .o. b. 
at his factory,82 or to a carrier,88 cars,34 railway express,35 
or at a shipping point.86 Correspondingly, the law of the 
buyer's place applies when delivery is due at the buyer's 
place.87 
A perfectly justified exception is made when, contrary to 
the prevailing usage, in an inexact, though not rare, lan-
guage, the clause f. o. b. is meant only to fix the price. When, 
for instance, two lumber dealers in Pittsburgh contracted 
for a car of lumber "f. o. b. Montreal," but the seller ful-
filled his obligation by shipping the goods in Ohio, the court 
correctly applied not Quebec but Ohio law.88 
30 Shohfi v. Rice (1922) 241 Mass. 2n, 135 N. E. 141. More cases to the 
same effect will be cited in the following notes and on various occasions in 
Ch. 37· 
Likewise, e.g., Switzerland: Trib. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932, 
523 (place of loading and furnishing of a letter of credit). In addition, see 
the cases cited in Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) 107. 
31 Ben aim & Co. v. Debono [ 1924] A. C. 514. 
32 Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp. (1937) 93 
Utah 414, 73 Pac. (2d) 1272; In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works 
(D. C. W. D. Pa. 1910) 179 Fed. 151. 
83 Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (1908) 8o Conn. 509, 69 At!. 
15; Denio Milling Co. v. Malin (1917) 25 Wyo. 143, 165 Pac. III3· 
34 Nortllwestern Terra Cotta Co. v. Caldwell (C. C. A. 8th 1916) 234 Fed. 
491; State of Delaware, for Use of General Crushed Stone Co. v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (D. C. Del. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 467: moratory 
interests on the price are due according to Pennsylvania law, not because tile 
"entire contract" was to be performed in Pennsylvania as headnote 13 asserts, 
but because seller has "accepted" the contract in his place in Pennsylvania 
and his responsibility ceased with delivery f. o. b. Harrington, Pa. 
35 Willson v. Vlahos (1929) 266 Mass. 370, 165 N. E. 408. 
36 Griffin v. Metal Product Co. (1919) 264 Pa. 254. 107 At!. 713. 
37 Price v. Burns ( 1902) 101 Ill. App. 418; York Metal & Alloys Co. v. 
Cyclops Steel Co. (1924) 280 Pa. 585, 124 At!. 752. 
asward Lumber Co. v. American L. & M. Co. (1915) 247 Pa. 267, 93 
At!. 470. The contract was made in Ohio, cf. infra Ch. 37 p. 83 n. 17. 
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A recent decision of the highest Swiss court applies the 
law of the place of f. o. b. delivery as a matter of course.39 
In Germany, this question has been neglected, although 
there is a distinguishable controversy regarding jurisdic-
tion. In commercial forms and regulations, the f. o. b. place 
has frequently been indicated to be the "place of perform-
ance," and this has sometimes been understood to include 
a stipulation for submission to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this place.40 According to a contrary view, such clauses 
are merely concerned with the passing of the risk of loss!1 
C. i. f. contract. As the clause of "cost, insurance, freight" 
is essentially a modified f. o. b. clause, we may consider the 
importance of the shipping places in both instances to be 
analogous. The tendency of business is equally strong to 
regard the place of shipping, at the f. o. b. place or to the 
c. i. f. place, as the "place of performance." The courts 
have known this for a long time. It is true that former 
Illinois decisions declared that in a sale c. i. f. Antwerp 
with shipment in New York, the seller's damages for non-
performance were to be measured according to Belgian law 
as that of the place of "delivery."42 But these decisions were 
"in violent contrast with the general rule in other juris-
dictions."43 A much-noted English decision concluded from 
this phenomenon that English jurisdiction over a contract, 
89 BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 411: sale "wagon Tanger"; in this 
case, it is true, the goods were also to be examined and accepted in Tangier, 
but the court treats this acceptance as merely provisional. In -another case 
the Federal Tribunal applied Swiss law in spite of an "f. a. s. Antwerp" 
clause, finding that this clause in the case at bar only meant to fix the price 
and did not designate the place of delivery, which was found to be Switzer-
land; BG. (July 4, 1953) 79 BGE. II 165. Thus the Federal Tribunal fol-
lowed the same principle as the court in the above mentioned Pennsylvania 
case, supra n. 38. 
40 See HEUER, "Von der Fob-Kiausel," Leipz. Z. 1925, 26; DURINGER-
HAcHENBURG (ed. 2) Anhang zu §§ 355, 358. 
41 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, t:Jberseekauf I8I-I90. 
42 Staackman, Horschitz & Co. v. Cary (1916) 197 Ill. App. 6ox. 
43 L. 0. VAN DoREN, The Law of Shipment (1932) 498, citing Seaver v. 
Lindsay Light Co. (1922) 233 N. Y. 273, 135 N. E. 329, disapproving the 
Staackman case. 
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based under Order XI r. I (e) on the place of performance, 
was to be denied where goods were shipped from Hamburg 
c. i. f. Tyne on the Thames.44 German trade forms and 
general conditions of mercantile organizations have widely 
identified the shipping place in c. i. f. contracts with the 
"place of performance."411 Again, this usually implies that 
risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are shipped 
at the port of dispatch. But it means also, in my opinion, 
that where the shipping place is in the seller's country, the 
parties intend that the courts of his country should have 
jurisdiction.48 • 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SHIPMENT AND ANALOGOus AcTS 
I. The Concept of Delivery to the Carrier 
In the most usual types of international commerce, ship-
ment is included among the obligations of the seller, al-
though he is not obligated to bear the risk of loss during 
the travel of the merchandise. The English and Uniform 
Sales Acts have accepted this old and universal conception, 
stating that where, in pursuance of a contract, the seller 
delivers the goods to a carrier for the purpose of trans-
mission to the buyer, property and risks presumably pass to 
44 Crozier, Stephens & Co. v. Auerbach (19o8) 2 K. B. 161-C. A., cor-
rectly criticizing Barrow v. Myers and Co. (1888) 4 T. L. R. 441. 
Another, definitely wrong, view was again taken in an obiter dictum by 
Lord Phillimore, inN. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay & 
Co. [1927] A. C. 604, 609-H. L., where the goods had to be shipped from 
Java to Bombay c. i. f. and the learned Judge asserted that normally lex loci 
solutionis would dictate the application of the law of the place of delivery, 
i.e., of Bombay. 
45 GROSSMANN-DOERTH, tl'berseekauf 245: "outright official formula" (in 
business). 
46 As to risk, see GROSSMANN-DOERTH, id. 247, 361 ff. As to jurisdiction, the 
same author, id. 245 ff., 362-364 construes the German clauses determining 
the "place of performance" to the effect that a seller in Hamburg stipulating 
for "f. o. b. Amsterdam" does- not want to submit himself to the Dutch 
courts, and therefore any clauses fixing "the place of performance" should 
not be referred to jurisdiction, unless they say so, or the case is exceptional. 
Similarly BRANDLE II9· But the conclusion is wrong in the case where the 
shipping place is in Germany. 
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the buyer.47 In traditional and widespread commercial think-
ing, much emphasis is laid on this act of the seller, because 
it forms the pointed end to all the multiple activities of the 
seller and indicates the time and place at which the goods, 
although not yet in the physical power of the buyer and 
very often not yet in his ownership, leave the custody and 
risk of the seller. 
The types of commercial sale contracts are very diverse, 
however. They differ according to the peculiarities of vari-
ous kinds of goods and according to the habits of the various 
trading centers and commodity exchanges. It has often been 
contended that the variety is too great to allow legal rules, 
or even uniform proposals for drafting individual sales 
conditions, to comprehend commercial sales in general. 
This objection, despite its annoying repetition by some 
lawyers, has not prevented the Scandinavian Sales of Goods 
Act of 1906, the Warsaw-Oxford C. I. F. Rules (1932) 
and the various drafts of an International Sales Act from 
establishing comprehensive regulations for sales in general, 
as a basis which may be modified for the various types of 
contracts. These generalizations, however, were only pos-
sible on the ground that the entire distribution of rights 
and duties in sales contracts rests on the determination of 
the place where the goods are expected to arrive at a certain 
time and to leave the seller's orbit. Manufacturers most 
often sell their products, within the country and in export 
trade, to be taken at the factory yard or at the station of 
the factory. The many cases, in themselves somewhat differ-
ent, where the seller's obligation of active dealing with the 
goods extends to the dispatching of the goods from a sea-
port, as in most overseas transactions, form a group to-
gether with the others where the seller has to bring the 
47 Sale of Goods Act, s. IS rule s (z); Uniform Sales Act, § I9 rule 4 (z); 
Uniform Commercial Code,§ z-so9 rule (I) (a). 
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thing sold to a river port, to barges, or to cars at a point 
on the way. On the other hand, the contract may promise 
to have the goods at the disposition of the buyer at his own 
place or station. The act of providing the goods at the 
seller's place of shipment, at an intermediate place, or of 
rendering them at the buyer's place or at any other place, 
has been technically termed delivrance (delivery) in the 
drafts of an International Sales Act. But since the American 
Uniform Commercial Code does not accept this technical 
meaning of delivery, we have to speak of shipment and 
tender of delivery. A possible name would be u surrender'' 
of the goods by the seller.47• 
Delivery or surrender in this sense is doubtless the center 
of the relationship created by sale between parties of dif-
ferent countries. In a c. i. f. contract, for example, the seller 
procures the contracts of freight and insurance up to the 
port of destination, but he bears responsibility and risk of 
loss only until shipment. This means that, if he sends goods 
conforming to the contract from his place to the port of 
shipment and the goods perish or deteriorate on the way 
with or without his fault, he has to substitute other goods 
in time or be in default. So soon, however, as he delivers the 
goods to the carrier and they are loaded or possibly when 
they merely reach the custody of the carrier, events beyond 
the control of the parties are at the risk of the buyer. Ac-
cording to the American draft of a sales law, such delivery 
would include transfer of title, which, in the prevailing opin-
ion, rather, occurs when the documents, such as the invoice, 
47• This term had been adopted by the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft 
No. 6 (1960) 101, 108, with explicit reference to the first edition of this book; 
but "delivery" was substituted for "surrender" at the 37th Annual Meeting 
of the American Law Institute on May 18-21, 1960, by a vote of 30 to 25; 
see Proceedings 548. On the possible differences between the concept of 
"dili<Urance" in the drafts of an International Sales Act and the meaning of 
"delivery" see HoNNOLD, "A Uniform Law for International Sales," 107 U. 
of Pa. L. Rev. (1959) 299, 317 If. 
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bill of lading, bill of exchange, and insurance policy, are re-
ceived by the buyer or his bank. But delivery includes the 
extremely important act of specification (identification, 
specialization) by which specified goods take the place of 
the unascertained goods described in the contract. In the 
correct solution, warranty of quality is directly dependent 
on the conditions existing at the time of surrender. 
This concept of surrender has a variable element, since 
according to the different basic types used in commerce, the 
seller may tender the goods in any one of the places to be 
touched by the goods. In every case, it indicates the salient 
point in the course of any individual transfer. The activities 
of concluding the contract and preparing delivery, as well 
as the subsequent happenings when the goods travel, are un-
loaded, tendered, examined, accepted or refused, and stored, 
and when the documents are sent and received, are none of 
these so significant and distinctive of the contract in the 
estimate of average parties, as delivery to the carrier. 
2. Shipment and Conflicts Law 
Curiously enough, very rarely has the possibility been 
envisaged of connecting sales contracts with the law of the 
place of delivery to the carrier, except under the heading 
of lex loci solutionis, which, however, could refer to any 
act and in particular the physical reception of the goods.47b 
Even the writers especially devoted to the study of the 
commercial facts have neglected, if not definitely argued 
against, employment of this contact. 
In the first place, it has been emphasized that the parties 
47b The significance of the place of delivery is emphasized by DICEY (ed. 
7) Szx and by BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 653. Following these authors and the 
first edition of the ·present book, the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 
(x96o) § 346g ( 1) subjects sales of movables to "the local law of the state·· 
where under the terms of the contract the seller is to surrender the chattel." 
Apart from the substitution of "to deliver" for "to surrender" (see supra n. 
47a), the American Law Institute at its 37th Annual Meeting (1960) has 
approved of this rule; see Proceedings 545-548. 
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select the f. o. b. point within the travel of the goods accord-
ing to such facts as the tariffs of carriers, timetable of 
vessels, suitability of ports to the kind of merchandise sold, 
rates of transshipment, and business connections with trans-
portation and insurance personnel.48 However true this may 
be, when the parties agree on such point, they do connect 
the contract with this place more than with any other. That 
the intention of the parties is not really directed toward any 
determined law, is no valid objection, so long as they have 
not specifically agreed on a different law. 
Furthermore, it has been stressed that separate important 
local connections exist at the places where the documents 
are endorsed, or dispatched, or received.49 But if any rule of 
conflicts is needed to take care of these accompanying rela-
tions, it must be a special rule. 5° 
Shipment in a third country. Much more weight is attrib-
utable to the obvious consideration that the shipping point 
may be situated elsewhere than in countries of the parties. 
Neither the hypothetical intention of the parties, nor an 
objective evaluation of such cases can refer the determina-
tion of the applicable law merely to the place of shipment. 
We have seen how instinctively the American courts have 
applied the law of the seller or of the buyer according to 
the situation of the f. o. b. point in the state of either. Again, 
there are American cases concerning an f. o. b. point in a 
third jurisdiction, that may help to find our way, although 
these decisions are objectionable on other grounds. 
In a recent case, a firm in New York, dealing in malt and 
hops, through its commission broker in New Jersey, re-
ceived an order of a New Jersey company for Polish hops, 
to be imported f. o. b. Philadelphia docks. The New Jersey 
court ascertained the acceptance of the order in New York 
and for this customary flimsy reason applied the law of 
~8 BRANDLE 120. 
~9 BRANDLE II9. 
so See infra Cb. 37 pp. roo-ror. 
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New York as the lex loci contractus/a Despite the formalis-
tic approach, it was correct to disregard the f. o. b. place 
in another state, which resulted incidentally from the im-
portation. 
Where a conditional sale was made in Massachusetts, the 
domicil of the buyer, and the seller was a Pennsylvania 
corporation, the shovel sold was to be delivered "f. o. b. 
Manchester, New Hampshire." The decision of the Massa-
chusetts court has often been criticized because of its failure 
to satisfy the law of the situs, New Hampshire, with regard 
to the retaking of possession.52 The court, however, was 
right in holding the delivery in New Hampshire immaterial 
for determining the law of the obligatory contract, even if 
no doubt had existed about the length of time during which 
the shovel should stay there. That the law of the forum was 
chosen could be justified by the domicil of the buyer in 
addition to the circumstance that delivery f. o. b. Manches-
ter was stipulated at the buyer's request and for his con-
venience. He wanted the shovel there and used it there, 
though not for long. 
The English courts, too, are correct in applying English 
law to a contract made between English firms for delivery 
c. i. f. London, although the goods are to be shipped from 
New York. 53 The real justification is that the shipping point 
in a foreign country appears immaterial for the legal re-
lationship between the parties. Lex loci contractus, resulting 
in the application of English law, was incidentally harmless 
in one case/4 where hops were to be sent from the Pacific 
51 Manhattan Overseas Co. v. Camden County Beverage Co. (1940) IZS 
N. J. Law 239, 15 At!. (2d) 217, aff'd (I94I) I26 N. J. Law 42I, I9 At!. 
(2d) 828. 
52 Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. (1933) 282 Mass. 469, ISS 
N. E. 369, 87 A. L. R. I298. See Ch. 37 p. 86 n. 25. 
53 Manbre Saccharine Co., Ltd. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [ I919] I K. B. 
198. 
54 Bid dell Bros. v. E. Clemens Horst Co. [ I9II] I K. B. 2I4; [ I9II] I K. B. 
934-A. C.; reversed [1912] A. C. IS-H. L. 
SALES OF MOVABLES 
Coast to England, since the selling corporation was estab-
lished in London as well as in San Francisco and the buyer 
in Sunderland, England. Had the seller been domiciled only 
in San Francisco, the courts would have inconveniently sub-
jected him to English law, as also the Hague Convention 
1955 does, merely because the order was given in England. 
On the other hand, where a machine is to be installed at 
the place of the buyer, it follows that the buyer's place is 
the only decisive connection. 55 
III. CoNCLUSION 
The international drafts have achieved a great progress 
in supplanting. the lex loci contractus and the lex loci solu-
tionis, the two mechanical and ill-fitted rules, by the law of 
the seller's domicil. Most decisions are really sustained by 
actual circumstances including this fact of domicil. But it is 
erroneous to formulate exceptions for the law of the buyer 
either on the basis, again, of the lex loci contractus or of a 
fragment of the process of contracting. International sales 
in which the goods move from one country into another, 
gravitate toward the side of the buyer only if "delivery" is 
due at a place in his orbit. 
There can be no doubt of this when delivery, always in 
the meaning explained before, has to be effected at the 
buyer's residence, factory, station, or pier. A buyer expecting 
the goods to be brought and offered to him in his own 
country quite as if they came from a domestic seller, can 
reasonably expect to have his domestic law applied. Nor 
would any other solution suit the situation of the seller. 
He may have his own storehouse in the country from which 
he intends to take the merchandise, or his agent may win 
him customers by promising local delivery. He also may 
55 Canada, Ontario: Linderme Machine Works Co. v. Kuntz Brewery, Ltd. 
(1921) 21 0. W. N. 51 (right to reject). 
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send his wares to his correspondent on a bill of lading to 
his own order, retaining full title until subsequent delivery 
by the agent against cash. These are cases clearly requiring 
the application of the local law. To implement the vague 
ideas of the parties or the general conditions annexed to a 
sale, as respects primary obligations, default, excesses, sub-
stitute goods, and warranty, the law at the place of delivery 
has real advantages that have been too generally attributed 
to the law of the place of performance. 
Between the extreme cases where delivery is to be made 
either at the seller's or the buyer's place, the intermediate 
points usually emphasized in trade can most often be counted 
within the sphere of one or the other. When an American 
or Canadian merchant ships goods on a through bill of 
lading by rail with subsequent transshipment to an ocean 
vessel, the transfer to the initial carrier, of course, points 
to his state's law even though the first stage of the carriage 
may end beyond the state line. It should not make any 
difference that in other countries no such genuine through 
bills are in use. Generally, whether the goods are shipped 
at a point in the seller's state or, in an overseas transaction, 
in a foreign state on his side of the ocean-as a Canadian 
seller f. o. b. New York, or a Swiss exporter c. i. f. New 
York with shipment in Amsterdam-the contract is still 
centered nearer to the seller. Nor is there a valid reason 
to abandon the seller's law if the Rotterdam agent of an 
Argentine exporter in the latter's name sells grains c. i. f. 
Rotterdam, shipment Buenos Aires, to a Swiss importer. 
Such persons domiciled and contracting in Europe know 
that the most important part of the transaction must occur 
overseas. 
Illustration. In a case decided by the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal (July 20, 1920) 46 BGE. 260, a London firm through 
a Swiss agent sold to a Swiss firm in Switzerland Orange 
Pekoe tea from Ceylon c. i. f. Marseille. Swiss law was 
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applied because both parties invoked it. That the foreign 
firm "had to expect that the acts of its representative would 
be determined under Swiss law," should have bearing only 
on his authority. If the court had not been bound by stipu-
lations of the parties on the applicable law, English rather 
than Swiss law ought to have determined the issue. 
On the other hand, the situation is substantially different 
when the goods travel overseas at the risk of the seller and 
must be presented to the buyer at some place on the conti-
nent where the buyer's domicil is located. Where a Japanese 
trader sells silk to a manufacturer in Lyons according to the 
standard conditions of Lyons, in which the chapter on "ship-
wreck and other risks of transportation" annuls the contract 
in case of loss-one of the "avoidance" clauses usual in sales 
for arrival-the parties concentrate the effect of the con-
tract in the port of arrival in Europe. As the natural contact 
therefore is not at the seller's place, it is at the buyer's place. 
It deserves consideration whether the division of the 
countries into legal systems does not offer an analogous 
contrast. Suppose a United States seller ships goods from 
New York to Panama for a Colombian buyer, with the clause 
"to arrive" in Panama, would the buyer not expect to have 
his law applied rather than that of the United States? With-
out a profound difference in legal systems, where, for in-
stance, goods are to be sent from a seller in Michigan f. o. b. 
Duluth, Minnesota, to a buyer in Chicago, no such im-
portance can be attributed to the f. o. b. clause. 
Apart from these uncertain enlargements, we may sum-
marize as follows. The seller's law should be resorted to in 
all doubtful cases, with the exception that the internal law 
of the buyer governs the contract where the goods are to 
be surrendered at a place situated within the buyer's country. 
In other words, we may say that the law of the buyer's 
place should govern only if the parties have agreed on it, 
or if the contract is for surrender in the country of the 
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buyer or at a place fixed at his request outside the seller's 
orbit. 
What is a party's place. The Vienna Draft defined "the 
law of the seller" by the following provision: "If the sale is 
effected by an individual in the course of commerce carried 
on by him, or by a firm, association, or corporation, the law 
of the seller shall be the territorial law of the country 
where, at the date when the contract is concluded, the office, 
whether principal or branch, which concludes the contract, 
is situate."56 
As already pointed out, the Hague Convention I 9 55 de-
clares applicable "the internal law of the country where the 
vendor has his habitual residence at the time when he 
receives the order. If the order is received by an establish-
ment of the vendor, the sale is governed by the internal law 
of the country where this establishment is located. " 57 
The Convention refers to the place where the "order" is 
received so as to eliminate the vexatious question of where 
the contract is made.57a Moreover, the Convention uses the 
word hablissement, which is meant to include headquarters 
as well as branch offices and even offices without commercial 
character.57b In this regard the translation of the Conven-
tion in I American Journal of Comparative Law ( I952) 
27 5 is not quite correct, since it translates hablissement by 
"branch office." 
Illustration: A has his habitual residence in country X 
without doing business there, and has a place of business in 
country Y. He enters into a sales contract with B, who has 
56 Int. Law Ass'n, Report 34th Conference (I927) 509, B (a) (I). Cf. 
Poland, Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. 4: domicil of a merchant with respect to 
the course of his business is the seat of his enterprise; if he has several 
enterprises, the seat of that enterprise with which the transaction has been 
concluded, is decisive. 
57 See supra n. 2I and accompanying text. 
57 a See JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, supra n. I, at 26 j VON SPRECHER, supra 
n. I, at 78; DoLLE, supra n. I, at I7S n. 3· 
57b See ]ULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, supra n. I, at 26. 
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his habitual residence and is doing business in country Z. 
The order is received by A at his office in Y. According to 
the French text of article 3 ( I ) , second sentence, Hague 
Convention I955, it is clear that the law of Y governs the 
contract. 
Therefore the term "establishment," uncommon though 
it be in this context, should be preferred in order to cover 
the broad meaning of the rule in question. In other cases 
also the French text may raise doubts. 
Illustration: Assume the same facts as in the preceding 
illustration except that A does not receive the order at his 
office but rather at a hotel in another city of country Y. 
Thus the order is not received ccpar un hablissement" 
though it is received in the ((pays ou est situe cet hablisse-
ment," and not in the ((pays ou le vendeur a sa residence 
habituelle ." Considering that there is less contact with the 
country of the vendor's habitual residence than with the 
country of his establishment, it seems to be more appropriate 
to apply the latter's law. 
IV. SPECIAL KINDS oF MovABLEs 
I. Sales on Exchange 
Sales of commodities in the course of transactions in an 
authorized exchange, like sales on a stock exchange, 58 are 
subject to the usages of the institution. They are, more-
over, subject to many administrative provisions and are 
executed in forms not used in ordinary business. From all 
these reasons, it has been concluded that such contracts are 
tacitly submitted by the parties to the local law,59 or ob-
jectively expressed, that this is the only adequate law.60 
68 BATIFFOL I82 § I99· 
69 See Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 387. 
eo Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 45· 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No. I, and Draft I96I, art. I4-
Hague Convention I955, art. 3 (3). 
BRANDL, Int. Borsenprivatrecht 59; NIBOYET in Recueil I927 I IOI ff., 33 
Annuaire (I927) III 2I3i FREDERICO, suPra n. I, at 57 f.; VON SPRB'CH.BR, supra 
n. r, at 82 f. 
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2. Other Sales under Administrative Control 
For similar reasons, sales are considered localized when 
they are made "by auction, by judicial process, by order of 
the court, or under an execution. " 61 
Registered chattels-ships. In view of the significance 
of registration, in a widespread opinion, the sale of regis-
tered vessels is governed by the law of the place of registra-
tion or of the flag. Thus, the Vienna Draft states: 
As regards contracts of sale of ships, vessels and air-
craft which are registered, the law applicable shall be the 
territorial law of the country where the ship, vessel, or 
aircraft is registered.62 
This rule has been likewise suggested by Judge Hough 
in a dissenting opinion of I 92 I, where the court followed 
the lex loci contractus, on the ground that registration only 
gives advantages to the purchaser and is not essential for 
the passing of the title between the parties.68 The register 
publicizes the legal situation of the vessel for the informa-
tion of presumptive buyers, whose rights relating to third 
persons are more or less strongly influenced by the entry 
in the register. 64 
In many countries, this situation is complicated by pro-
hibiting sales of registered vessels to aliens65 and prescribing 
61 Text of Vienna Draft, art. I, B (c) ( 1), following an American proposal, 
Int. Law Ass'n, 34th Report (1927) 506. 
62 Art. I, B (c) (2): a simplification of a proposal of the Int. Chamber of 
Commerce (34th Report 1927, p. 506). Similarly most writers, see NIBOYET, 
Recueil 1927 I 102; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 496 § 1228. 
63 Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner (C. C. A. 2d 
1921) 272 Fed. 56, 66. 
In the old case, Lynch v. Postlethwaite (1819) 7 Mart. (La.) 69, 12 Am. 
Dec. 495, the lex loci contractus (Mississippi) was applied, to satisfy La. 
C. C. art. 10. 
64 This is admitted by BATIFFOL 173 § 192 who nevertheless insists on le:~& 
loci solutionis. 
ScERNI, 77, cf. 195 recognizes the ordinary test of lex loci contractus. 
65 E.g., England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 1. 
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that sales be concluded before their consuls for the purpose 
of registration.66 The parties, of course, may disregard a 
registration existing at the time of sale, if the buyer is not 
interested in maintaining the previous nationality of the 
vessel.67 They can agree on any other law of the contract. 
But the seller would be responsible to his home authorities, 
and possibly the contract would be considere~ invalid in 
other countries as well. 
3· Patent Rights68 
The relation of a patent right to the territory of the 
country where it has been created, and the registration re-
quired for transfer of such rights, have also sometimes been 
taken as suggesting a choice of law for sales promising such 
transfer.60 But as very often inventors acquire patents in 
fifty states and may dispose of many of them in one contract, 
this would imply the application of dozens of private laws. 
Little authority is to be found on the sale of patent rights, 
and this only if we include contracts for the granting of 
licenses. But there is no obstacle to extending the conflicts 
rules whatever they may be, to such contracts, whether 
they are construed as sales or otherwise. The few cases in 
point apply the common tests rather than localizing the 
sale at the patent roll. 
Illustrations: (i) In an English case, a German firm, 
evidently under German law, granted a license under an 
66 E.g., Peru: C. Com. art. 591; certain privileged debts must be paid before 
the sale, id. art. 863. 
Cuba: C. Com. art. 578. 
67 This suffices to render justice to BATIFFOL's desire, 174 n. x, to recognize 
the sale of a Norwegian vessel in Japan to be brought into Japanese 
ownership. 
68 It may be remembered that the assignment of a patent right is co-
ordinated to a sales contract quite as a transfer of title to a sale of a 
tangible thing. Exclusive licenses are also bought, although agreements on 
nonexclusive licenses may be better compared with leases. 
69 Thus recently, BATIFFOL 183 § zoo. 
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English patent to another German firm, but subsequently 
infringed this agreement by giving another license to a 
third person in an English contract. The court recognized 
the application of German law to the obligations of the 
grantor of the license.70 The case, of course, did not lend 
itself to a different choice of law. 
( ii) Where two patented machines were sold in St. Louis 
with the option to purchase the patent rights for several 
countries and the right to have the machines patented in 
any European country, in an action for breach of contract 
the court considered the statute of frauds of the place of 
contracting and of the forum, but did not even mention the 
states in which the objects had been or might be patented.71 
The German practice, a little richer,72 brings out the same 
point somewhat more clearly. In addition to various cases 
where two domestic parties contracted with respect to for-
eign patents, 73 the Reichsgericht also applied German law 
to the assignment of the exclusive exploitation of an Aus-
trian patent, by a German chemist to a Viennese firm. 74 The 
German seller of an invention to be patented by him in Italy 
is, of course, obligated under German law to take all the 
steps prescribed by Italian patent law.75 
4· Copyright 
The modern right of authors to their literary or artistic 
products is not fixed in the territory for which protection is 
granted. It is distinguishable from the physical thing-manu-
1° Actien Gesellschaft fiir Cartonnagen Ind. v. Temler and Seeman (1900) 
I8 R. P. c. 6. 
11 Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Lax and Shaw, Ltd. (C. C. A. 8th 1926) II F. 
(2d) 240. 
72 See NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 338 n. 2. 
73 E.g., RG. (Oct. II, 1911) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 254; (July I, 
1931) 31 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 534, IPRspr. 1931, 197. 
14RG. (June 10, 1933) Leipz. Z. 1933, 1325,'IPRspr. 1933, 44· It was also 
stressed that the price was fixed in marks and the parties invoked German 
law. 
75RG. (Julys, 1911) II Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 142. 
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script, painting, blueprint, film, etc. But it is not a mere part 
of the right of personality as one influential theory con-
strued it.76 It is a privilege accorded by law as an absolute 
right to the ideal content embodied in the work. Hence, 
when transfer of a copyright is promised, there is no fixed 
local connection necessitating conflicts rules different from 
those referring to tangible objects. The agreement for 
transfer can be distinguished from the transfer itself quite 
as well as in the case of chattels. In fact, there are many 
formalities prescribed for the assignment of an author's 
right, 77 but they do not, as a rule, affect promises to assign it. 
In this light, the German Supreme Court analyzed a con-
tract of publication concluded between Viennes~ authors of 
an operetta with a publisher of Stuttgart, Germany, accord-
ing to the presumable intention of the parties, as in any 
other contract for work. The interpretation in favor of the 
place of the publisher, however, is doubtfuJ.78 My own sug-
gestion, in the absence of agreement by the parties on the 
applicable law, is that the ordinary rules advocated above 
for chattels should apply. 
Indeed, when a writer or artist himself promises to trans-
fer-totally or partially-his right in the work to the extent 
that he has the power to do so,79 his own domicil is a fair 
point of connection. And where licenses are issued in mass, 
as to movie theatres, the place of the vendor again is an 
appropriate contact. 
76 Theory of Orro GIERKE, abandoned by most writers. 
77 SeeP. 0LAGNIER, 2 Le droit d'auteur (1934) 292. 
7SRG. (Oct. 29, 1927) uS RGZ. 282, see Vol. II (ed. z), pp. 436, 437· 
711 Cf. RABEL, 27 N. F. Griinhut's Zschr. (1899); MICHAELIDES-NOUAROS, 
Le droit moral de !'auteur (Lyon 1935); Inter-American Convention on the 
Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, of July 22, 
1946, art. XI. 
CHAPTER 37 
Sales of Goods : Scope of Rule 
I. CoNTRACT AND PROPERTY 
I. Translative Effect of Contract 
CLEAJ7AGE of municipal systems.
1 As is well known, 
in the group of laws following the Roman model the 
sales contract creates obligations only. Title is trans-
ferred by a distinguishable act of conveyance, which, in its 
more refined form, is also considered a "contract," but one 
restricted to the declarations of giving and accepting owner-
ship. If the Roman pattern is strictly observed, such trans-
fer needs, in addition to this specific consent, the surrender 
and acquisition of physical possession (traditio) 1 or at least 
a substitute therefor, such as brevi manu traditio (the buyer, 
tenant of possession for the seller, becomes possessor), 
constitutum possessorium (the seller makes himself the 
buyer's tenant of possession), cessio vindicationis (the seller 
assigns his claim to possession). When a chattel is bought 
1 See RABEL, x Recht des Warenkaufs 28 ff.; VAUTHIER, "Le transport de la 
propriete en cas de vente internationale d'objets mobiliers corporels," 29 
Revue Dr. Int. Comp. (1952) 143; UsSING, "Le transfert de Ia propriete en 
droit danois," 4 Revue international de droit compare ( 1952) 5; GO'ITHEINI!&, 
"Zum Eigentumsiibergang beim Kauf beweglicher Sachen," 18 RabelsZ. 
(1953) 356; LAGERGREN, Delivery of Goods and Transfer of Property and 
Risk in the Law on Sale (1954); SOVILLA, Eigentumsiibergang an beweglichen 
korperlichen Gegenstanden bei international en Kaufen ( 1954); LALIVE, The 
Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws (1955); J. C. SCHULTSZ, 
Eigendomsverkrijging bij koop van roerende goederen in bet Westeuropees 
internationaal privaatrecht (1955); ZAPHIRIOU, The Transfer· of Chattels in 
Private International Law (1956); PASCHOUD, "Le projet de Convention de la 
Haye sur Ia loi applicable au transfert de Ia propriete en cas de vente a 
caractere international d'objets mobiliers corporels," 4 Nederl. Tijds. Int. R. 
(1957) 254; FREDERICO, "La vente en droit international prive," Recueil 1958 
I 7, 68 ff.; KRusE, "What Does 'Transfer of Property' Mean with Regard 
to Chattels? A Study in Comparative Law," 7 Am. J. Comp. Law (1958) 500. 
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in a shop and taken home, the two contracts, obligatory 
and translatory, are simultaneous. 
The last-mentioned type of transaction is called "sale" 
in the still-maintained terminology of the common law, re-
calling ancient Germanic law ( sala). In the Anglo-American 
sales acts as well as in many codes of the Latin group, this 
appears as the basic kind of sales contract. The sales acts 
and many civil codes even continue to make it appear as 
though in principle any sales contract concerning a movable, 
would transfer ownership to the buyer. Within this group 
of conservative formulas, there is, however, a certain divi-
sion. The American Uniform Sales Act, section I91 rule I, 
presumes that the parties intend the property to pass to the 
buyer when the contract is made. The Code N apoteon, arti-
cle I 138, makes the buyer of the chattel the owner "at the 
moment when it ought to have been delivered," which was 
commonly, against occasional protest, construed as meaning 
only the time of contracting; the text has been taken· more 
seriously in recent comment. Yet, en fait de meubles, la pos-
session vaut titre, Civil Code, article 2279; the prevailing 
doctrine, therefore, restricts the translative effect of a sale 
without transfer of possession so as to give the buyer title 
only as between the parties. Some modern French scholars 
seem inclined to recognize that such property, not effective 
against third parties, is no property at all.2 
In daily application to modern life, all these contrasts 
are not nearly so acute as they seem in theory. There is no 
difficulty in dividing, whether in common law3 or French-
Italian law,4 an executed sale into an executory contract 
and its performance by transfer of money and property. 
2 This was the view of HENlll CAPrrANT, as orally told to the writer. He 
preferred the Roman system. The interpretation of C. C. arts. n38 and 1583 
with respect to the transfer of property will be discussed in more detail in 
Vol. IV, Ch. 54· 
a Cf., for instance, B&NJAMIN, On Sale 315. 
4 See GoaLA, La Compravendita S-Io. A practical argument sometimes used 
in civil law for distinguishing the sale of movables from an executory con-
So SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
Even the cash-and-carry transactions, with which the over-
aged concept of "sale" continues to agree and which are of 
course still frequent in daily retail commerce, can thus be 
analyzed as double acts. In all important commercial deal-
ings, the dualistic approach is indispensable. In fact, it has 
been followed in this country with slowly increasing aware-
ness through the Uniform Sales Act to the most recent 
American Uniform Commercial Code. The French doctrine 
has cumulated exceptions to article I 138, until the principle 
that the sales contract passes title has been hollowed out. 
And for the great majority of commercial sales, business 
practice has largely overcome the differences in the legal 
systems. 
Classification. Therefore the municipal divergencies men-
tioned above really cause only limited. conflicts. N everthe-
less, the question remains what law should determine 
whether the contract transfers title. Some answers suffer 
from the traditional undue influence of the municipal sys-
tems themselves. Under the one-sided impulse of the French 
and Italian codes, the law governing the contract, which is 
by another mistake usually identified with the law of the 
place of contracting, decides also whether title passes by 
contracting.5 Others have restricted the application of the 
law of the contract to the so-called passing of title between 
the parties; effects in relation to third persons would depend 
on the law governing title.6 Fortunately, on the Continent 
a third view has come into ascendance, namely, that obliga-
tion and title are to be thoroughly segregated with the 
tract is that the buyer having paid cash in a shop should not be forced to 
prove his payment. But why should there not be a presumption of payment 
where contract and delivery are proved to have occurred in the shop and 
the buyer has no charge account? 
5 VELLA, Obbligazioni 1095, cited by FEDOZZl-CERETI 741 n. I. 
6 7 LAURENT §§ 222 tf., z83, 8 id. § 130 j ROLIN, z Principes §§ 912 tf., 3 id. 
§§ n67 tf.; DESPAGNET u36 § 395· Contra: DESBOlS, Clunet 1931, zh, z90; 
BATIFFOL 395 § 475 and cit.; Fwozzx-CERETI 740 tf.; DIENA, z Dir. Com. Int. 
36 § I06. 
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understanding that the law of the situs also covers the rela-
tionship of the parties with each other respecting the title.7 
The same view prevails in England. 8 The lex situs remains 
predominant whether the transfer of property is to be 
accomplished by contract or ((traditio." This proposition 
has been confirmed by the Institute of International Law9 
and by the Hague Convention 1955, which by virtue of arti-
cle 5, number 3, does not apply to the transfer of owner-
ship.9• 
In the United States, the bewildering confusion of con-
tract and title doctrines in the sales acts for a long time 
obscured the problem, and still seems to create great un-
certainty. Prevailingly, courts have erred in the direction 
of extending the law of the place of contracting to the 
transfer of title.10 Minor even approved the theory that a 
conveyance, assignment, or sale, if valid where made, should 
be upheld in every jurisdiction as between the parties.11 
Beale disputed this approach. He explaineq the fact that 
most cases apply the law of the place of contracting to the 
7 For instance, VALERY § 99 s; RAAPE, IPR. ( ed. 5) 590 f.; 2 AllMUlJON 63 
I 28; NIBOYET 633 § so6; KEGEL, IPR. 229· 
8 FALCONBIUOOE (ed. 2) 440 ff., DicEY (ed. 7) 599 ff., and M. WoLFF, Priv. 
Int. Law (ed. 2) 532 f., who should be consulted against the recent theories 
of SCHMITTHOFF (ed. 3) 198 and CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 474 ff. These theories 
have also met with profound criticism in the books of LALIVE, supra n. x, at 
74-83, 133 If., and of ZAPHIRIOU, supra n. I, at 31-38. 
9 Art. 2 par. 3 of the decisions of Madrid, 24 Annuaire (1911) 368, 394, cf. 
the article by the reporter, Dn!NA, in Revue 19n, s6r-s86, at 564. 
9• The Eighth Hague Conference, held from Oct. 3 to 24, 1956, adopted a 
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to the Transfer of Ownership in 
International Sales of Goods; see Actes de Ia huitieme session pp. 340 ff. and 
the English translation in 5 Am. ]. Comp. Law (1956) 650 If. To date this 
Convention has been signed by Greece and ratified by Italy; see Revue Crit. 
1964. 164- For comments, see PASCHOUD, supra n. 1, FREDERICQ, supra n. I, and 
PETERSEN, "Die 8. Haager Konferenz," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) I, u If. as well as 
the other reports on the Eighth Hague Conference which are mentioned in 
the bibliography in Conference de Ia Haye, Actes et documents de Ia 
neuvieme session, Vol. I, pp. 32I If. 
10 See PARMELE in I Wharton 681 § 3II a; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 400, cf. infra 
n. 22. 
11 MINOR 293 § uS and n. I. 
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title question, by the coincidence that in the particular cases 
the movables were situated in the state of contracting and in 
this state "the transfer of the title depended on the validity 
of the contract."12 To the same effect, Goodrich describes as 
typical a case where "the court stressed the law of the place 
of contract, quoted approvingly a statement that the domi-
ciliary law governed, and rendered a decision which applied 
in fact the law of the situs of the property."13 At present, 
the Restatement has made it clear, and the point seems 
undisputed that in sales no less than in other contracts, the 
validity of the transfer of title and the nature of the inter-
ests created by the "contract" are exclusively governed by 
the law of the place where the chattel is at the time of con-
tracting. ( § § 257, 258 )13• 
Consequences. This universally and rightly accepted opin-
ion needs comment where the obligatory contract is gov-
erned by a law other than that of the situs. Attention is 
drawn in this respect to a paragraph in Beale's treatise: 
"The question whether a sale can be avoided because of 
the insolvency of the buyer depends on the law of the state 
of situs at the time of sale, though the goods have been taken 
into another state. By that law must be determined the 
validity of the consideration, whether a parol sale passes 
title, and whether a sale is voidable for fraud.m4 
Since § 257 of the Restatement, on which this paragraph 
is based, exclusively deals with the validity of conveyances, 
including legality of the transfer and transfer in fraud of 
third persons, a reader might think that rescission on the 
12 2 BEALE 978 § 255.J. 
13 GOODRICH 408 § I SO n. 84. 
lSa Furthermore, the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 5 ( 1959) § 254a 
submits "the effect of the occurrence upon interests" in chattels to the law of 
the situs. ' , 
14 2 BEALE 982 § 257.1. 
In Continental law, the complications in case of insolvency and bankruptcy 
were discussed as early as 1913 by DE BoEcK, Revue 1913, 289 ff., 793 ff. 
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ground of insolvency of the buyer, invalidity of considera-
tion and voidability for fraud are always considered incidents 
of the conveyance rather than of the contract. However, 
this cannot be the meaning, since it would not be borne 
out by the cases alleged in support. Apart from some de-
cisions cited but which are not in point,15 the cases concern 
the rescission of the sales contract on the ground of initial 
insolvency of the buyer, 16 and are prompted by the par-
ticular statute of Pennsylvania allowing rescission by seller 
only when a trick, artifice, or deception has been practiced 
by the buyer, whereas other laws are more favorable to the 
seller. The decisions are clearly based on the ordinary con-
tractual tests and not on the situs of the chatte1.17 The 
courts, thus, do not disregard the contractual element but, 
on the contrary, neglect the possible significance of property 
law. 
15 Bulkley v. Honold {1856) 19 How. 390, deals with breach of warranty 
in the sale of a vessel the situation of which is only one of s'evera] elements, 
see infra Ch. 37 p. 95 n. 68. Arnold v. Shade ( I858) 3 Phila. 82, applies the 
law indicated by contracting, performance, and seller's domicil to the transfer 
of title to an insolvent buyer. Madry v. Young {183I) 3 La. I6o, applies Mis-
sissippi law as lex situs to the title in a slave, but the same law to the 
contract, because not only were the slaves there but also the contract was, 
made there. 
16 This is also true of the case cited by BEALl!, supra n. 14, for validity of 
consideration. 
1 7 In the order of BEALE's citation: Parker v. Byrnes {D. C. Mass. 1871) 
18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,728 (I Lowell 539): lex contractus, based on place of 
contracting, seller's domicil and delivery, all in Boston. Mann v. Salsberg 
( 190I) 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 28o: lex loci solutionis, as the contract (before the 
Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Pennsylvania in I9I5) is presumed to be 
a contract for arrival (in Pennsylvania): Perlman v. Sartorius (1894) 162 
Pa. 320, 29 Atl. 852: the Pennsylvania court applies Maryland law to which 
locus contractus, locus solutionis, and seller's domicil point. Lowrey & Co. v. 
Ulmer (1896) I Pa. Super. Ct. 425: the Pennsylvania court applies the law 
of New York where the goods were shipped f. o. b. Whiting Mfg. Co. v. 
Bank ( 1900) 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 419: exactly like the Perlman case. W. G. 
Ward Lumber Co. v. American Lumber & Mfg. Co. (1915} 247 Pa. 267, 93 
At!. 470: the Pennsylvania court applies the law of Ohio, because the contract 
was made and, by delivery to carrier, was performed there. Kline v. Baker 
( 1868) 99 Mass. 253: applies Pennsylvania law indicated by the places of 
contracting and performance (through delivery to the carrier) and domicil 
of the seller. 
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The difference in the systems was sensed in the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals when they had to decide which party 
was affected by the seizure or loss of goods that had been 
sold before World War I and were in transportation he~ 
tween countries having different rules for the transfer of 
title. Thus, goods sold by a German to a Belgian buyer and 
requisitioned by the German government while still on 
German soil, were in the seller's ownership, according to 
the principle of traditio ( BGB. § 9 29) ; therefore, it was 
not the Belgian buyer who was expropriated by the war 
measure.18 In other instances, these tribunals shared in the 
confusion so frequent in English and Latin doctrines, by 
applying to the transfer of ownership the law intended by 
the parties as though title questions were included in party 
autonomy.19 Section I 8 of the English Sales Act and sec-
tion 19 of the Uniform Sales Act19a allow the intention of 
the parties to determine at what time the title shall pass, hut 
this is only a municipal law governing goods in its own terri-
tory.19b The parties have no power to choose this law of 
situs, although they may choose the law for the obligatory 
contract. In case of goods sold and sent from Germany to 
England and which arrived in English territory, the Tri-
bunal correctly stated that property had not passed in Ger-
many under the German law of property, hut held that the 
goods although in England were not transferred because 
a German seller accustomed to his own law was not sup-
18 Germano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 30, 1923) 3 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 274. The Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (June u, 1926) Charles 
Semon & Co. v. German Government, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 75, Clunet 
1926, 1033, may also have applied the English Sales Act, s. 17, as lex situs 
in shipping the goods to the claimants' agents in Germany. 
19 Germano-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib. (June 16, 1925) 5 Recueil trib. 
arb. mixtes 200, Revue 1927, 97; contra: NIBOYET, ibid. at 108. But see 
EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 620 § 236 n. I, who advocates party autonomy even 
with regard to transfer of title; contra: KEGEL, IPR. 228, 232. 
loa Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-401, the ·parties' intention is 
less significant in this respect. 
lDb Cf. DICEY ( ed. 7) 820. 
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posed to have intended to transfer until the buyer acquired 
possession.20 This fiction amounted to an extension of the 
German property law to England; it was also out of place 
because the question of risk was in issue and should have 
been solved irrespective of all these problems. 
2. "Conditional Sales" (Sales with Transfer of Title on 
Condition of Payment) 20a 
The difficulty of distinguishing transfer of title and prom-
ise of transfer again has been felt in common law and Latin 
countries in sales retaining full title in the seller until pay-
ment. In Germany, under romanistic legislation, the state-
ment is obvious that in a sale with reservation of title the 
contract is absolute, and merely the title is conditional.21 
In conflicts cases, American courts, treating conditional 
sales as a unit, have applied the lex loci contractus to the 
questions affecting the title (at least as between the par-
ties) 22 or, sometimes, the lex situs to certain obligations, 
instead of separating obligation from the do~ain of lex 
situs. The result, however, has been harmless to the extent 
that in many cases where the lex loci contractus was applied, 
the chattel was in the state of contracting, and that the 
lex loci solutionis was resorted to when the seller promised 
to deliver the chattel in a certain state. In both cases, the 
law applied was identical with· the law of the situs, either at 
20 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (April 7, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes g45, criticized by RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 62., 67. . 
20& For a detailed discussion, see LALIVE, supra n. r, at rso ff. and ZAPHIRIOU, 
supra n. r, at 186 ff. 
21 BGB. § 455, and commentaries, for instance, KUHN in 2. RGR. Kom. 
(ed. 10) § 455 II; PALANDT (ed. 20) § 455, 3· 
22 STUMSE.IlG ( ed. 2.) 399 j 2 BEALB 1001 § 272.3; LEE, "Conftict of Laws 
Relating to Installment Sales," 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1943) 445; Restatement U 
273, 277, and WILLISTON, 2 Sales § 339 only refer to "transfer of title." 
In Louisiana, where the seller's privilege takes the place of conditional 
sale, lex loci contractus is applied to foreign-concluded conditional sales, ex-
cepting evasion. Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley (1922.) 152 La. 622, 94 
So. 138. 
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the time of the contract, or at the critical time of delivery 
into the power of the buyer.28 
More recently, a vivid discussion has been devoted to the 
treatment of the seller's right to repossess and the buyer's 
right of redemption. Again, the courts have qualified these 
rights either as contractual or as interests subject to the 
law of the situs.24 In the Massachusetts case arousing most 
of the debate,25 the question whether the buyer had a right 
of redemption when the seller failed to give him notice of 
foreclosure, was regarded by the majority of the court as 
an incident of the contract and subjected to the law of the 
place of contracting (Massachusetts). The dissenting vote, 
on the contrary, emphasized the buyer's interest in the 
chattel, created at the situs and governed by the lex situs 
(New Hampshire). The latter view has been widely in-
dorsed26 and adopted in the Restatement, § 281. It needs a 
sounder motivating force. Although the right to retake and 
the right to redeem are fair matters of property, there are 
corresponding rights and duties within the "contract." Yet, 
since it would be unsound to recognize two laws for the two 
sides of the same matter, the lex situs must be estab-
23 25 A. L. R. at u62; WHARTON § 416 f.; 87 A. L. R. 1309 at 1314; 
LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. ]. ( 1921) 60-62; 2 BEALE 1002 § 272.4; WILLISTON, 
2 Sales § 339 n. II; 13 A. L. R. (2d) 1312 ff.; A. L. R. (2d) Supplement 
Service (1960) 944 ff. 
24 See Note, "Determination of Law Governing Power of Redemption in 
Conditional Sales of Chattels," 43 Yale L. J. (1934) 323. 
25Thomas G. Jewett v. Keystone Driller Co. (1933) 282 Mass. 469, 185 
N. E. 369; critical Notes, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) 128; 33 Col. L. Rev. 
( 1933) 1061; II N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. ( 1934) 281; 18 Minn. L. Rev. (1934) 
431, 474; 43 Yale L. J. (1934) 323. 
26 Thus in all Notes cited supra n. 25; LORENZEN, Cases 643; 2 BEALE 1001 
n. 6; GooDRICH 418 § 153 and n. uo. However, in Shanahan v. George B. 
Landers Construction Co. [(C. C. A. 1st 1959) 266 F. (2d) 400] the court 
accepted the contract characterization of a conditional buyer's right to re-
demption; but unlike the court in the Jewett case it applied the Jaw of the 
buyer's state rather than the lex loci contractus; the fact that the chattel 
sold had been delivered in a third state was considered "immaterial." For 
an analysis, see CAVERS, "The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-
of-Law Process-Some Notes on Shanahan," 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. (1960) 
II26. 
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lished as a special subsidiary law to cover the problems of 
repossession. 27 
This suggestion extends to a series of problems not in-
cluded in the current American discussion. For instance, the 
municipal laws vary with respect to the relation of repos-
session by the vendor to rescission. In the United States, 
despite some peculiar doctrines, 28 the tendency is to allow 
the conditional seller in case of nonpayment to retake pos-
session in order either to collect the price from the proceeds 
or to rescind the contract; apart from statute and agree-
ment, reclaiming the goods is deemed to be an election to 
rescind the contract, which frees the buyer.29 German pre-
vailing opinion assumes that retaking without attaching 
the chattel does not necessarily mean rescission, although 
it may, and some writers have stressed the unfairness of 
repossession without cancelling the contract.30 The Austrian 
Supreme Court, in fact, has rejected this right.31 The Swiss 
Code eliminates both remedies involved in conditional sales, 
if not stipulated.32 It would be entirely impractical to decide 
this question under any other law than that of the situs, 
which determines the right of retaking. 
Therefore, although the questions concerning rescissiOn 
and the effect of conditions upon the existence of the con-
tract are legal incidents of the contract, those obligatory 
problems closely connected with the property in the chattel, 
27 I understand GOODRICH ibid. to the same effect. 
28 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a series of cases, has assumed 
that it is "inconsistent" for a seller to stipulate in the agreement reservation 
of title and recovery of the price; he may base his claim of price only on an 
absolute sale with reservation of a mere security interest which amounts to 
a mortgage or a lien. See Atkinson v. Japink (1915) x86 Mich. 335, 152 
N. W. 1079; Peter Schuttler Co. v. Gunther ( 1923) 222 Mich. 430, 192 
N. W. 661. For a more exact expression, see GEORGE BOGERT, 2A U. L. A. 8 
§ 8, 169 § 124, 172 § 126. 
29 Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §§ 21, 23; WILLISTON, 3 Sales § 579b. 
so See GuNTER STULZ, Der Eigentumsvorbehalt im in- und ausliindischen 
Recht ( ed. 3), and Law on Installment Contracts, of May x6, 1894, § S· 
3l Austria: OGH., GIU. N. F. Nos. 2656, 28ox (installment payments). 
32 C. Obi. arts. 226, 227 par. z, cf. 214 par. 3· 
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in the absence of a party agreement, are decidedly influenced 
by this connection, and thus indirectly governed by the law 
of the particular situs. In the prevailing view, this law is 
that of the state in which the property was delivered rather 
than that in which the vendor retakes the chattel or which 
regulates procedure and subsequent events.33 It seems con-
fusing that many conditional sales contracts include the 
vague clause that "the terms shall be in conformity with the 
laws of any state wherein it may be sought to be enforced."34 
3· Unpaid Seller's Privilege 
The existence and extent of a lien or security title for 
the vendor's claims as regards price and damages are deter-
mined in the Restatement by the law of the place "where the 
chattel is at the time when the pledge or lien is created."35 
Since, however, the nature of a lien as a pure right in rem 
is not settled in all instances, the law of the contract has not 
been generally excluded. 36 
In particular, does the French privilCge du vendeur really 
depend only on the lex situs1 Beale seems inclined to favor 
this view.37 In a comparable gesture, the authors of the 
Hague Convention 1955, article 6, excluded from its scope 
33 See particularly, GOODRICH 418 § 153 n. II9 and Auffenberg Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Wallace (1958) 318 S. W. (zd) 5z8. If the buyer removes the 
chattel to another state, and resells it there, the new lex situs has to determine 
whether the second buyer acquires title; see Traders Finance Corp. Ltd. v. 
Dawson Implements Ltd. [ 1958] z6 W. W. R. 561 and Note, "Conditional 
Sales and the Conflict of Laws," I U. B. C. L. Rev. ( 1960) Z97; whereas the 
lex situs at the time of the first transaction governs insofar as the require-
ments of a valid reservation of title are concerned; see Hannah v. Pearlman 
[ 1954] I D. L. R. 28z, criticized in Note, 3Z Can. Bar Rev. ( 1954) 900. In 
addition, see Note, "Conditional Sales, Chattel Mortgages, and the Conflict of 
Laws," 1956 U. Ill. L. F. 633; and infra Vol. IV Ch. 56. 
84 See, for instance, Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) do 
Tenn. 137, 172 S. W. (2d) 8tz, 148 A. L. R. 370, 375· 
85 Restatement§ Z79, practically unchanged in Restatement (Second), Tent. 
Draft No.5 (1959) I37· 
86FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 470 and n. (i) citing Note, 64 
L. R. A. (1904) 831 f. 
37 2 BEALE 1008 § Z79·3; definitely so, NmOYET, 4 Traite 463. 
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not only rights in rem and creditor actions for fraudulent 
alienation but also the seller's privilege.374 The nature of 
this legal prerogative accompanying the sales contract is 
very controversial in France, and the problems have been 
inherited by Louisiana. 38 Rights of third persons protected 
by the law of the place where the goods are at a given time, 
of course restrict the effect of the privilege, if this law so 
decides. 39 But which law creates the privilege? 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has developed a doc-
trine in which it restricts the privilege granted in the Civil 
Code to sales contracts executed in the state.40 But some 
local "completion" of a foreign-negotiated contract has 
been held a sufficient basis for applying the domestic .law 
including the privilege.U The gist of the doctrine42 seems to 
be that the privilege attaches to contracts governed by 
Louisiana law, the test being fixed by the lex loci contractus. 
"A common law contract cannot claim the vendor's privilege 
given by the Civil Code of Louisiana."43 The drawbacks 
of this theory are climaxed by the curious application of 
Louisiana law even though the goods may be in a foreign 
state at the time of contracting. A Dutch court has recog-
nized the unlimited application of the law of the contract 
so as to recognize the Belgian court's refusal of priority for 
the seller's claim in Dutch bankruptcy proceedings.44 
87a The supplementary Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to the 
Transfer of Ownership, supra n. 9a, provides in art. 4 (r) that the applicable 
law is the internal law of the country where the goods sold were situated at 
the time of the first claim or attachment concerning such goods. 
as Louisiana C. C. (1870) art. 3227 par. r; B. MARGOLIN, "Vendor's Privi-
lege," 4 Tul. L Rev. ( 1930) Z39· In Quebec the institution has been refused 
adoption, C. C. art. 1012. 
39 7 LAURENT 267 § 2IZ; ROLIN, 3 Principes 477 § 1446, 490 § 1457• 
40 H. B. Clallin & Co. v. D. A. Mayer (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. 139. 
41 Mcilvaine and Speigel v. Legare (1884) 36 La. Ann. 359. 
42 See the cases cited by 2 BEALE 1008 § Z79·3· 
43 G. A. Gray Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron-Works Co., Ltd. (C. C. A. sth 
1894) 66 Fed. 686, 689. 
44 App. Hertogenbusch (June u, 1909) Heijmans v. Bolsius, Clunet 1912, 
6or. 
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However, neither the lex situs alone nor the law of the 
contract alone can be decisive. The correct view was laid 
down by the Institute of International Law in 1910: the 
lex situs has the power "to limit or exclude ... the effects 
of privileges established by the law governing the legal 
relationship to which the privilege is attached."45 
There is a third law to be considered in an analogous 
manner: the law governing bankruptcy proceedings involv-
ing assets of the buyer. It is neither to be ignored nor ex-
clusively to be observed. Conflicts have been caused in the 
three neighboring states, France, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands, through different rules on the treatment of the pre-
rogative in bankruptcy.46 Public policy has been unneces-
sarily invoked,47 and the Dutch Supreme Court has rendered 
a most erroneous decision by resorting to the exclusive use 
of the lex fori. 48 The court went so far as to grant the ven-
dor a preference under Dutch law which he would not have 
enjoyed under the Belgian laws of the contract. 
The effect of rescission on third persons and their status 
in bankruptcy proceedings are questions which require ref-
erence to very different connections. 49 
45 Madrid 1910, 24 Annuaire (1911) 394 art. 3· 
46 Effect in bankruptcy is denied in France, C. Com. art. 550 par. 6, al-
lowed in the case of certain machines in Belgium, C. Com. art. 546 and 
Law of Dec. 16, 1857, art. 20, and generally granted in the Netherlands, BW. 
arts. n8o, n85(3), n90. 
47 In a case of a bankrupt buyer where the apparatus sold was in Belgium, 
Trib. com. Seine (Sept. 6, 1906) Clunet 1907, 366, Revue 1909, 582 applied 
French law as that of the place of contracting and at the same time as 
prescribed by public order. The Belgian Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. 14, 1907) 
Revue 1909, 961 denied exequatur to this French judgment on the theory of 
lex situs and on the ground of Belgian public order. Cf. Note, LACHAU, Revue 
1909, 588; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 91 n. 187; 8 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 1287. 
48 Rb. Amsterdam (Oct. 29, 1915) W. 9935 applied the Belgian law of 
the contract but was reversed, Hof Amsterdam (Nov. 3, 1916) W. 1oo69, 
and H. R. {June 15, 1917) W. 10139, I VAN HASSELT 137. See the criticism by 
TRAVERs, 7 Droit Com. Int. I 423 § 11432. 
49 See for such a discussion, TRAVERS, id. §§ 11435, 11438 If. and FEBLOT & 
MEWER, "Eigentumsvorbehalt und Riicktrittsklausel bei Lieferungen nach 
Frankreich," 20 RabelsZ. (1955) 662. 
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4· Risk of Loss 
The buyer hears the "risk of loss," when he has to pay 
the price despite destruction, seizure, theft, or deterioration 
of the goods occurring without the fault of either party. 
In the old doctrine, which still appears in the English and 
American sales acts as a principle, though susceptible of 
exceptions, risk of loss passes with the title.494 Many writers 
still naively repeat the slogan of the doctrine of liability for 
tort, casum sentit dominus, as if it indicated the doctrine 
of risk. 
Based on this tradition, reputed French writers have 
thought that since in French municipal law risk is bound 
together with property, its transfer must be governed in 
French courts by the statute real, whereas German courts, 
according to their different characterization, would have to 
apply the law governing the contract.50 Such characteriza-
tion, in this case, would not he determined by the law of the 
forum hut by the law governing the contract.51 However, 
the premise is wrong in all respects. Neither in France nor 
anywhere else, despite traditional pronouncements, is it true 
that risk passes necessarily with the title. In the case where 
the seller has to ship the goods and his obligation ends with 
the shipment (sale for shipment), which is the great rule 
of all sales not confined to one town, risk passes with the 
shipment in all laws and systems. In overseas commerce, 
the risk is regularly shifted to the buyer through delivery 
to the vessel, although ownership is, with the exception of 
the United States, ordinarily transferred through the arrival 
of the documents of title. The distribution of risk of loss 
49& The Uniform Commercial Code fortunately abandons this title concept 
of the sales acts; cf. §§ 2-509 and 2-401. For comment, see Vow, Sales (ed. z) 
225 If.; LATTY, "Sales and Title and the Proposed Code," 16 Law and Cont. 
Probl. (1951) 3· 
60 DESBOIS, Clunet 1931, 281, 295 approved by BATIFFOL 399 § 479; cf. 
EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique §§ 412 If. 
U DESBOIS, id. 296 n. 17 par. 2. 
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is felt to be an essential part of the contract; it is the most 
conspicuous item in commercial offers and forms. Property, 
on the other hand, is a legal matter, practically always left 
by the parties to subsequent consideration by the lawyers 
in cases of divergence. 
There was unanimity in the Committee on the Interna-
tional Sales Act that risk and title can and must be sepa-
rated ;51• the same view was held by all but three govern-
ments answering the Dutch questionnaire for the Sixth 
Hague Conference52 and by the Committee of I93 I which 
established the draft that with only a few changes became 
the Convention of I 9 55 on the conflicts rules for sales. 
Scarcely worth mentioning are other suggestions of special 
laws for the problem of risk. 58 
If we neatly isolate the question of who bears the risk of 
casual events after the seller surrenders the goods, or what 
casual events burden the buyer, we have no doubt that the 
question belongs to the law governing the contract.54 This 
solution has been expressly adopted by the Hague Conven-
tion I955 155 and appears indispensable, because the passage 
5la See RABEL, 2 Recht des Warenkaufs (I958} 292 ff. § III; RIESE, "Der 
Entwurf zur Internationalen Vereinheitlichung des Kaufrechts," 22 RabelsZ. 
(I957) I6, I09; HoNNOlD, "A Uniform Law for International Sales," I07 U. 
of Pa. L. Rev. (I959) 299, 3I7. The last Draft of a Uniform Law on Inter· 
national Sales (I956} contains provisions concerning the transfer of risk 
(art. I08 ff.) completely independent of the property question which the Draft, 
as explicitly stated in art. I2, does not regulate; see text in 22 RabelsZ. ( I957) 
IZ4 (French and German) and in 7 Int. Comp. Law Q. (I958) 3 (English). 
52 Only Hungary, Japan, and Spain wanted to have risk of loss excluded 
from the convention because of its connection with property. Inclusion wai 
approved by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem• 
burg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
Cf. ]ULLIOT DE LA MORANDtERE, supra Ch. 36 n. I. 
53 For the application of the law of the defendant party, 2 BAR I6, Io7;. 
ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 55· Contra: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 42· 
§ I07. Another strange proposal by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 299 has had no appeal. 
54 To the same effect, e.g., BAGGE, Recueil I928 V 20I; Fmozzr-CERETI 74I; 
LALIVE, supra n. I, at 97 ff. 
55 Art. 5 No. 3 provides: "The present Convention does not apply •.. to 
the transfer of ownership, it being understood nevertheless that the. various 
obligations of the parties, and especially those which relate to risks, are sub-
ject to the law applicable to the sale pursuant to the present convention." 
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of risk, the duties of delivery, the duty of taking delivery, 
and certain collateral duties116 are essentially interwoven. 
The unhappy German method of attributing the duties 
of either party to the law of his domicil requires determina-
tion of the question whose obligation is concerned in the 
passing of the risk. One decision declared it an obligation 
of an English merchant who had sold f. o. b. Hamburg to 
bear the risk so long as it did not pass to the buyer under 
his own, viz. English, law.111 But other cases have shifted 
the emphasis to the question whether the buyer owes the 
price, so as to call for the buyer's law.58 The first argument 
is evidently wrong, although the result is desirable. The 
second produces strange results, when the law of the buyer's 
domicil has more exigent conditions for the passage of risk 
than the law of the seller.59 If, for instance, a Frenchman 
by correspondence sells a specific lot of silk to a German 
who is to take delivery in Lyons, risk passes in France at the 
time of contracting, whereas under German law it would 
not yet pass. If the silk is burned in the meantime by acci-
dental fire, should the buyer be liberated from his debt, 
although French law entitles the seller to the price? This 
is a queer solution in view of the fact that German law is 
not considered to govern the entire contract.60 Only one law 
can conveniently govern both parties. 
Again, the variety of substantive rules concerning the 
transfer of risk is by far less conspicuous in international 
Ge Infra II, 2, p. xoo. 
51 OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, 1907) 21 Z.int.R. 6S, Clunet 1909, 217. 
GS OLG. Kiel (July 2, 191S) Schleswig-Holsteinische Anzeigen 1919, 27, 
cited by LEWALD, ro Repert. 8J No. 47· 
G9 Such a case was construed as between Germany and England, RABEL-
RAISEJt, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1929) 77, 7S; I should consider it, however, certain that 
present English courts ought to recognize the passing of the risk by shipping 
(as suggested at p. So n. 1 ibid.) irrespective of reception or proof of arrival 
of the goods. 
60 See RABEL-RAISER, id. So; approved by RAAPE, IPR. (ed. s) s:n against 
HAVDEK 84. Cf. NEUNEJt, 2 Z.ausl.P.R. (192S) 123 ff. 
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trade than in the civil codes. There is an impressive bulk 
of uniform usages and rules beyond any national law. In 
addition, modern insurance largely diminishes the burden 
of risk. Yet some differences remain. An example is pre-
sented by the English principle that, if goods, shipped in 
the time prescribed by the contract, perish on the voyage 
overseas, the seller may nevertheless tender the bill of lad-
ing to the buyer with full effect. 61 The seller may do this 
even knowing that the goods are lost.62 French courts do 
not allow such tender except when the seller is ''in good 
faith. " 68 German courts require transmission of the docu-
ments or notice of shipment of the goods appropriated to 
the contract, before risk can pass, thus excluding retroactive 
effect of the tender of documents upon the risk.64 It would 
seem self-evident that the choice of law among these solu-
tions can only be made for any individual type of contract, 
irrespective of the passing of the title which depends on 
valid tender and acceptance of the documents or is accom-
plished by shipment, according to the theory adopted. 
II. VARIOUS INCIDENTS 
1. Warranty of Quality 
(a) American decisions. Stumberg65 has reviewed the 
cases which for the most part antedate the time when the 
Uniform Sales Act unified the law of warranty. He finds 
that the courts applied the law of the state where the con-
tract was made, or made and performed. But he wisely 
61 Atkin, J., in C. Groom, Ltd. v. Barber [I'}I5] I K. B. 316, 324-
62 Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products Co., Ltd. [ 1919] I K. B. 198: 
S. S. Algonquin, carrying starch and syrup c. i. f. London, was sunk by sub-
marine or mine. Cf. KENNIIDY, C. I. F. Contracts (ed. 3) 117. WILLISTON, 2 
Sales 106 n. 13; VoLD, Sales ( ed. 2) 245 f. 
68 See Note, AUBRUN, to App. Paris (Jan. 21, 1920) D. 1921.2.101 and 
HEENEN, Vente et commerce maritime (1952) 149 ff. 
6' 88 RGZ. 389; 92 id. 128; 93 id. r66. 
65 STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 404-408. 
SALES OF GOODS: SCOPE OF RULE 95 
warns against such "metaphysical arguments" and recom-
mends referring all questions concerning the undertaking 
of the vendor to the state into which the goods are sent. 
The real impulses behind the decisions collected by Stum-
berg, however, seem exactly to follow the recognition of 
the place of "delivery" usual in commerce and emphasized 
here. Thus, the standard of quality was determined for 
branded potatoes, delivered by the seller who was in Mary-
land to the carrier f. o. b. Maryland, according to the 
standard of that state.66 The trade terms and usages of 
South Carolina were held to control a shipment of sheep 
manure from Chicago to South Carolina, because delivery 
had to be made at arrival against payment of the draft 
accompanying the bill of lading.67 The option between 
rescission and price reduction, adopted in Louisiana from 
the civil law model, was accorded to a buyer of New Or-
leans when a New York vendor sold a ship, then in port 
at New Orleans, and delivered it there to a buyer there 
residing.68 Merchantable quality of two pianos was required 
under the law of Pennsylvania where the selling manu-
facturer resided and where he delivered the objects, as 
Stumberg adds, apparently to a carrier.69 Finally, in the 
case of strawberries shipped from Arkansas to Massa-
chusetts, Arkansas law was applied to the effect that accep-
tance of the goods by the buyer was not a bar to an action 
for breach of an express warranty,70 which was correct if 
the sale was for shipment in the ordinary manner. 
However, these decisions, applying the law of the con-
tract and determining correctly this law, all deal with prob-
lems certainly belonging to its general scope. No special 
66MiJes v. Vermont Fruit Co. (I924) 9S Vt. I, 124 Atl. 559· 
67 Markey v. Brunson (C. C.-A. 4th I923) 2S6 Fed. S93. 
68 Bulkley v. Honold (IS 56) I9 How. 390. 
69 Snow v. The Shomacker Mfg. Co. (ISh) 69 Ala. III, 44 Am. Rep. 509. 
70 Willson v. Vlahos (I929) 266 Mass. 370, I65 N. E. 40S. 
g6 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
conflicts rule, hence, is noticeable.70a But some rule of such 
kind may be suggested by the European discussion to which 
we now turn. 
(b) Ci'Vil law doctrines. Agreement has been reached 
that the law of the contract determines, on one hand, the 
extent of the buyer's examination of the goods as to quan-
tity, weight, and quality, and on the other hand, the remedies 
for breach of warranty of quality, such as rescission, recoup-
ment, damages, and substitute delivery. Considerable 
doubts, however, have been caused by certain particulars of 
the law of warranty. What law should decide on the activity 
necessary for the buyer to avail himself of the remedies for 
breach of warranty? This concerns in the first place the 
form and time of an examination of the goods, the duty of 
giving notice of defects, and the period in which action must 
be brought. In the second place, the discussion involves the 
effects of omissions in these regards as well as the duty of 
the buyer to take care of goods rejected by him. 
The buyer has no duty of examining the goods, but only 
a "burden": his failure of examination leaves him ignorant 
of defects discoverable and therefore subject to notice. For 
this activity the agreement of the parties or the usages look 
to a certain place according to the circumstances, such as 
consignment to the buyer, to his agent or subpurchaser, or to 
the buyer for immediate transshipment to a purchaser with-
out inspection, et cetera. 
The Hague Convention of 19 55, article 4, answers the 
question in the most satisfactory manner as follows: 
70a The Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 ( 1960) § 346, comment at 
67 f. therefore subjects the question of whether there is a warranty by a 
vendor of movables to the law which governs the contract, i.e., in the case of 
a sales contract, to the law of the place of delivery ( § 346g, as amended at 
the 37th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute; see supra Ch. 36 
n. 47a). Contra: EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 497, 587 ff., who takes the view that 
breaches of implied warranties should be treated in analogy to tort claims for 
negligence. 
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In the absence of an express clause to the contrary, the 
internal law of the country where inspection of goods de-
livered pursuant to a sale is to take place, applies as respects 
the form and the periods within which inspection must take 
place and the notifications concerning the inspection, as well 
as the measures to be taken in case of refusal of the goods.71 
(c) Duty of giving notice. The imposition on the buyer 
placed by§ 49 of the Uniform Sales Act that he should give 
notice of a breach of promise or warranty within a reason-
able time after the buyer's knowledge of breach has unified 
the once greatly varying state laws. Correspondingly, no 
cases affecting the problem seem to exist. 
The situation abroad is very different.72 In most countries 
having separate codes for civil and commercial laws, non-
mercantile buyers have generally been under no duty of 
giving notice but must only observe the period of limita-
tion of actions for breach of warranty, commonly six months 
after delivery.78 In the United States, a somewhat related 
discrimination against merchant buyers has recently been 
included in the Uniform Commercial Code.74 
Three opinions have been advanced, suggesting ( 1) the 
law of the contract ;75 ( 2) the law of the place where the 
buyer has to perform his duty of taking delivery against 
payment;76 and (3) the law of the place where he has to 
71 See I Am. J. Comp. Law (1952) 276; for a comment see VON SPRECHER, 
supra Ch. 36 n. I, at 86 ff. To the same effect, Benelux Draft art. I9 (2). 
72 The assertion by HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 98, that this duty is 
known in all countries in the same manner, is very wrong. See FIKENTSCHI!R, 
Die Miingelriige im deutschen, ausliindischen und internationalen Recht 
(I956) and RABEL, 2 Recht des Warenkaufs (I958) 2o6 § 94· 
73 See, e.g., German BGB. §§ 459 ff. in contrast to HGB. § 377· 
74 Uniform Commercial Code§§ 2-603 and 2-605 (I) (b). 
75 Former German decisions cited by LEWALD 254, also HI!RZFELD, Kauf 
und Darlehen 98 ff.; the German government wanted this rule, contrary to 
the views of all other Notes of governments at the Sixth Hague Conference. 
Switzerland: BG. (Mar. 5, I923) 49 BGE. II 70 (buyer's domicil as locus 
solutionis); BG. (Dec. 3, I946) 72 BGE. II 405, 411 (lex loci solutionis for 
delivery, examination, and acceptance). 
76 Germany: 46 RGZ. I93; 73 id. 379 (rescission); 8I id. 273 (damages); 
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provide for examination of the goods.77 The second test was 
adopted by the German Supreme Court in abandoning 
former attempts to enforce its theory of splitting the con-
tract.78 The court felt that a unified and special approach 
was needed. 79 But its stand is too much influenced by the 
doctrine of locus solutionis. The place where the goods are 
tendered to the buyer is not necessarily the place where he 
is supposed to inspect them. Therefore, the third opinion, 
which has been literally accepted by the Hague Convention 
1955, quoted above, is preferable.79• 
Fairness, in fact, seems to demand that a buyer should 
not be compelled to study the rules of a distant country for 
his own proceeding, provided that the contract does not 
explicitly prescribe the conditions of his claim, which it does 
very frequently. 
(d) Method of examination. If goods are to be ex-
amined in France, obviously the judicial expertise prescribed 
there must be carried out. In Eastern Asia, where certain 
practices of "survey" are usual for certain kinds of goods, 
expert merchants or a consulate officer intervening, these 
forms are contemplated by the parties, or by the usages 
binding them, even though they are in Europe. Generally, 
it is considered that if different formalities are prescribed 
at the various places, the law of the place where the goods 
see also LEWALD 254, 255 (aa) and (bb); BGH. (Jan. 10, 1958) Lind.-
Mohring Nr. 2 zu § 480 BGB.; BGH. (Feb. 14, 1958) Lind.-Mohring Nr. 3 
zu Art. 27 EG. BGB.; FIKENTSCHER, supra n. 72, at 29. 
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 3, 1946) 72 BGE. II 405, 413 (form and time for 
examination and notice of defects; place where the goods are at the time of 
examination). To the same effect: BG. (March 22, 1951) 77 BGE. II 83, Bs; 
BG. (Feb. u, 1952) 78 BGE. II 74, So. 
77 BAGGE, Recueil 1928 V at 167; FEDOZZI-CERETI 741 n, 3; ALTEN in Sixth 
Hague Conference, Actes 327. 
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 16, 1930) 56 BGE. II 38, Clunet 1930, n68. 
78 RG. (Feb. 4, 1913) 81 RGZ. 273; dictum (April 21, 1925) 17 Warn. 
Rspr. (1925) 240; HElNICHEN in 3 Staub (ed. 14) 551, Anhang zu § 372 n. 9· 
79 See LEWALD 254 f. 
79a To the same effect: VON CAEMMERBR, Note, JZ. 1959, 362, 363, and 
RAAPE, IPR. ( ed. 5) 519. The drafts of an International Sales Act also have 
adopted this solution; cf. RABEL, 2 Recht des Warenkaufs (1958) 2o6. 
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are to be inspected is preferable to the law of the contract; 
this is recommended in the interest of the buyer, but some-
times also that of the seller, for instance, where he turns 
to a lawyer of the place prescribed for examination, who 
knows only the local law. It is, hence, a settled rule that the 
methods and proceedings of the place in which the examina .. 
tion is to occur must be observed. This might be expected 
to be recognized under any law, but the above provision of 
the Hague Convention, which assures the same result 
through a special conflicts rule, may be advisable. 
{e) Time for notice of defects. An attempt to have the 
law of the forum determine the time in which the seller must 
be notified of a defect in quality or quantity,80 has been 
commonly rejected. Another controversy concet:ns the ques-
tion whether such provisions pertain to the form or the 
substance of the matter. But whatever the answer, pro-
visions regarding notice are so closely connected with those 
requiring examination that it has been declared impracticable 
to choose them from different laws.81 This seems justified, 
if we have in mind an agent of the buyer at a remote place 
(but, of course, a place within the contemplation of the 
parties). The law of this place should determine for all 
practical purposes the diligence that the buyer owes to the 
seller. 
(f) Custody of rejected goods. To the described scope 
of the local law the Hague Convention of 1955 has added 
only the buyer's duty to preserve goods that he has rejected. 
The Convention has not extended the local law to the 
legal consequences of the buyer's failure to give notice, not 
even insofar as such omission is deemed to deprive the 
buyer of certain or all remedies, by presumed waiver or by 
force of law. The silence of the Convention is too prudent; 
so App. Amiens (Feb. u, 1905) Revue 1907, 216, approved by VALERY 991 
§ 687. 
BI ROLIN, 3 Principes 200 § u86, referring to numerous Belgian decisions. 
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it is intended to empower a judge to resort to the local law, 
should he find a necessary tie between the legal effects of 
omitting the notice and the prescribed time of notice.82 An 
express conflicts rule would be preferable. 
2. Collateral Duties 
Although most collateral duties are, as a matter of course, 
controlled by the law of the contract,83 doubt may arise 
about the classification of the seller's obligation to tender 
the documents and of the buyerls obligation to furnish a 
letter of credit. 
(a) Tender of documents. The vendor's liability with 
respect to the dispatch and arrival of the bill of lading, 
invoice, insurance policy, and other documents required by 
custom or the terms of the contract has been neglected. Of 
course, what documents are required, is in the last resort 
answered under the law of the contract. 
Is the same true, for instance, with respect to the ques-
tion mentioned before,84 whether the seller may tender the 
documents after destruction of the goods, or even when he 
knows of their loss, and yet fulfill thereby his obligation, 
so as to transfer the risk retroactively? And if the docu-
ments are regularly dispatched, may they reach the buyer 
after the arrival of the vessel in the port of destination and 
after unloading is commenced, as agreed in common law,811 
or not, as in France ?86 An English writer has presumed that 
the documents ought to be tendered at the buyer's place of 
business or residence.87 Another English lawyer has, indeed, 
82 Report of }VLLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, supra Ch. 36 n. 1, at 28. 
8s Swiss BG. (March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 166. 
84 See supra p. 94· 
85 Brett, M. R., in Sanders Brothers v. Maclean (1883) II Q. B. D. 3:t7, 
337-C. A.; BENJAMIN, On Sale 776 ff. 
88 France: GEORGES SCHWOB, Les contrats de Ia London Corn Trade 
Association (1928) 251. 
87 KENNEDY, C. I. F. Contracts ( ed. 3) no f., against the authoritative doubt 
of Atkin, J., in Stein, Forbes & Co. v. County Tailoring Co. (1916) us 
L. T. R. 215. 
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postulated that the law of the buyer's domicil should apply 
to the entire sales contract because of the duty of getting 
the documents to the buyer. 88 
It does not appear in the English cases applying English 
law as a matter of course, that the buyer must presumably 
receive the documents at his domicil; still less is that a 
universal rule. At any rate, the choice of law is better di-
rected toward the law of the contract, which is usually the 
seller's law and which must consider the usage at the port 
of arrival. 
(b) Furnishing letter of credit. The problem is illus-
trated by a case decided by a court in Geneva. The contract 
was made in Calcutta where the seller was domiciled, and 
where the bags of jute sold were to be delivered c. i. f. 
Piraeus, Greece. The buyer, seemingly in Athens, had to 
furnish a letter of credit, and offered a credit letter issued 
by a London city bank. The court held in effect that the 
seller could expect exchange of the Q.ocuments against pay-
ment in Calcutta without the delay required by transmitting 
the documents to London, and that by application of Indian 
law, as law of conclusion and performance, the buyer was 
in default.89 The holding is right but the argument is wrong. 
In this case, Calcutta, in addition to being the place for the 
buyer's performance, was the place of the seller's domicil 
and of shipment. Hence, the contract was fully centered 
there. On the other hand, if the contract had been satisfied 
with a credit by the London bank not made payable at a 
bank in Calcutta, there would nevertheless be no reason why 
English law should enter into the picture. 
The lex contractus suffices in all these cases. 
The Warsaw-Oxford Rules, Rule 16, in an otherwise complete statement, 
fails to indicate the place at which the documents should be "presented" 
(presentes) to the buyer. Int. Law Ass'n, 37th Report (1933) 429· 
ss CLAUGHTON ScO'IT in Sixth Hague Conference, Actes 288. See suPra Ch. 
36 P· S7 n. 25. 
ss App. Geneve (March 4, 1932) Sem. Jud. 1932, 523, 527. An arbitration 
clause for the Bengal Chamber of Commerce was found ineffective. 
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3· Measure of Damages 
Excluding the law of the forum, the law of the contract 
governs damages. This is the present view of the American 
courts,90 and the Restatement confirms it, although it identi-
fies this law with the law of the place of performance.91 
The same is true with respect to the right and duty of a 
party to ascertain the measure of general damages through 
resale or repurchase, and with respect to analogous trans-
actions for the purpose of minimizing the damage. Only 
the forms of procedure and the intervention of officials in 
such cases depend on the law of the place where the trans-
actions occur. 92 
4· Specific Performal).ce 
In an old decision the German Supreme Court argued 
that the disability of a seller of goods at common law and 
under the English Sale of Goods Act to sue the buyer for 
payment of the price before the passage of the title was a 
90 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 544· See recently, State of Delaware, for Use of General 
Crushed Stone Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. (D. C. Del. 1943) 
49 F. Supp. 467 (interest) ; Pennsylvania law was correctly applied not 
because the entire contract was performed in that state, as the headline ( 13) 
falsely asserts, but because the responsibility of the selling company ceased 
with the delivery of stone to the carrier in Pennsylvania. 
91 Restatement § 413, adopted by a few decisions and WILLISTON, 3 Sales 
275 § 589d. Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) §§ 346c, 346d, 
declares applicable "the law selected by application of the rules of §§ 33a-
332b"; in the case of a sales contract, the law referred to is the law of the 
place of delivery (§§ 332b (a), 346g, as amended at the 37th Annual Meeting 
of the American Law Institute, see supra Ch. 36 n. 47a). For criticism, see 
EHRI!NZWEIG, Conflict 504-5u §§ 19·2-195· 
92Jtaly: Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) Foro Ita!. Rep. 1938,2080 No. 457, Giur-
Ital. Rep. 1938, 789 No. 130: as it seems, the Italian buyer bought goods ia 
Germany, then sued in Italy for rescission and damages for breach, which 
were allowed in principle. In a separate suit he demanded the balance after 
resale by him of the defective goods; in accordance with German law. Held 
that Italian law applied for competence and forms of the resale. 
Switzerland: BG. (March 8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 161, 167; Cologne was the 
place of performance for delivery and payment, expressly stipulated. Hence, 
German Jaw governed the resale made in Cologne. 
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part of English procedural law and therefore not applicable 
in a German court. 93 
This result may be questioned, insofar as English law, 
if applicable to a sales contract, in principle should be 
applied as a whole, including the so-called "remedies." But 
since judicial discretion under the equitable jurisdiction of 
specific performance, not to mention the sanction of im-
prisonment for contempt, can scarcely be reproduced in a 
civil law court, the procedural part of the English institu-
tion may be considered important by a foreign court. This 
is the more acceptable, because in the inverse case an Eng-
lish or American court can not help but resort to its custom-
ary practice, although it may be inclined to favor specific 
performance when an applicable foreign law grants an 
action for satisfaction in kind.'14 
5. Special Kinds of Sales 
A painting was sold in England and delivered there. 
Therefore English law applied to the contract. As the 
seller reserved his right to repurchase under certain circum-
stances and the painting was brought to Pennsylvania, he 
would have had to pay the repurchase price in that state. 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, declared that 
the law governing the main contract also applied to the 
repurchase agreement.95 This decision is obviously correct 
and a memento against the splitting of contract stipulations. 
The same may be said, for instance, of a sale on approval 
and of a sale with a condition for return or approval, dis-
tinguished in civil law as sales under suspensive condition 
of approval and under resolutive condition of disapproval. 
83 RG. (April 28, 1900) 46 RGZ. 193, 199; cf. OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 31, 
1924) 34 Z.int.R. ( 1925) at 450 f. 
94 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 238. Comparative aspects of specific 
performance are discussed by SzLADITS, "The Concept of Specific Performance 
in Civil Law," 4 Am. J. Comp. Law (1955) 208, and by DAWSON, "Specific 
Performance in France and Germany," 57 Mich. L. Rev. (1959) 495· 
85 Youssoupoff v. Widener (1927) 246 N.Y. 174. 158 N. E. 64. 
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There is no reason why the ordinary tests should not extend 
to the accessory agreement.86 
III. PARTY AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
In the discussions of the international committees work-
ing on the conflicts rules concerning sales of goods, the prob-
lem of public policy has had a very big place. Finally, the 
many objections raised against party agreements on the 
applicable law, violating the various "imperative" rules, 
were overcome with the result that clauses designating the 
applicable law, either express or undoubtedly implied, are 
valid, and this law includes the conditions of the consent 
of the parties.87 It is, then, left to each participant state 
to deny "for reason of public order" application of the law 
determined by the Convention, that is, either that agreed 
upon or in the absence of agreement, that directly prescribed 
by the Convention.98 
If the courts would accept these simple rules and restrict 
the public policy of the forum to the limits earlier advo-
cated,88 all desires would be fulfilled. 
An illustration of fundamental conceptions of the forum 
justifiably intervening is afforded by a German case. of a 
conditional sale on the installment plan, supposedly gov-
erned by Dutch law. A stipulation for the forfeiture of the 
paid installments in case of default, allegedly valid under 
Dutch law, was refused enforcement as offending the pur-
pose of a German provision prohibiting such clauses.100 
118 Otherwise, HERZFELD, Kauf und Darlehen 99 and n. n8 who stresses 
the precarious situation of the seller. 
97 Cf. Hague Convention I955, art. 2. The requirement that the choice of 
law must "unambiguously result from the provisions of the contract" is 
awkward. See the above mentioned observations of the German Council for 
Private International Law, supra Ch. 36 n. z8b, at IS2-ISS· 
liS Hague Convention I9SS, art. 6. 
1111 Vol. II (ed. 2) Ch. 33 pp. s8z-s8s. 
10o RG. (March 28, I93I) 85 Seuff. Arch. zoo, Clunet I933, I62. C/. German 
Law of May I6, I894, §§ I, 6, concerning sales on installment payments. 
This decision has been approved in Italy by FI!OO'LZI-CERBTI 740 n. I and in 
Brazil by ESPINOLA, 8 Tratado 6I3. 
CHAPTER 38 
Sale of Immovables 
I. WHAT LAw GovERNS THE CoNTRACT 
CONCERNING the characterization a~ immovable, the old traditional rule that lex situs determines 
what rights are immovable, continues universally 
despite the doctrinal objections of a few followers of the 
"qualification according to lex fori. 111 This auxiliary con-
flicts rule on characterization promotes uniformity in the 
domain of property as well as in that of contract. 
In other respects, the picture is not so bright, and espe-
cially not in the United States. Here, the inconsistency 
apparent in choice of law for contracts in general, repeats 
itself in the special field of contractual promises to transfer 
land or an interest in land. After many vain efforts to 
extract a coherent law from the decisions,2 the best way is 
to recommend the rule approved by the majority of modern 
legislation and literature. 
1 Restatement § 208; Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law ( 1889) art. 26, 
(1940) art. 32 ('Verbis "as to their quality"); C6digo Bustamante, art. n2. 
See SCHOENENBERGER-]AEGGI No. 261; N!!UNER, Der Sinn 130. For the adver-
saries, see Vol I (ed. 2) p. sS n. 30 and Vol. IV Ch. 54· 
2 "When we look behind the decisions in relation to specific questions for 
the formulation of a general and comprehensive criterion which will satis-
factorily and consistently account for the results actually reached . • . dis-
appointment generally ensues," Note, "Governing Law of Real Property 
Contracts," L. R. A. 1916A, IOII at rors. "There is confusion in the 
authorities upon the subject," GooDRICH, "Two States and• Real Estate," 89 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1941) 417 at 420 n. 15. To the same effect HERZOG, "The 
Conftict of Laws in Land Transactions: The Borderland Between Contract 
and Property Matters--A Comparative View," 8 Syracuse L. Rev. (1957) 
191, 202, who, on the basis of ·a comparison between American, French, and 
Austrian law, reaches the conclusion "(1) that there is a considerable degree 
of uncertainty as to the law applicable in the case of land transactions, and 
(2) tha.t this uncertainty exists in various countries, regardless of the method 
used to transfer title to land." · 
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1. Lex Situs Compulsory 
In the old doctrine, the law of the place where the land 
is located, extended to all parts of the transaction by which 
two parties sold and purchased any interest in land.2a Story 
shared in this tradition3 and his close follower, Foelix, 
wrote that the lex rei sitae governs "the obligations flowing 
from the sale of an immovable, the causes operating its 
nullity and its cancellation or rescission."4 
This clearly was the starting point of English and Ameri-
can conflicts law. Although its influence in the individual 
cases is difficult to evaluate, the principle is certainly applied 
when a court construes the contract, termed with character-
istic vagueness "relating to land," as a single undivided 
entity, subject to the lex situs. The Iowa court followed 
this view in a decision diSCUSSed in the second volume, II aS 
it applied the statute of frauds of the situs without further 
investigation. 
In this country, however, the simplicity of the old doctrine 
was efficiently shaken by the famous judgment of Holmes, 
then a Massachusetts judge, in Polson v. Stewart. 6 The 
court recognized as valid a contract made by a married 
woman in North Carolina, although she promised to con-
vey land in Massachusetts where she lacked capacity. In 
other words, the state of the situs recognized the obligatory 
contract of North Carolina as it stood. Theoretically at 
least, it would seem that at present the ancient doctrine has 
2a A Turkish court even took the position that it had no jurisdiction in a 
contract case concerning the cancellation of a sale of immovables in Syria, 
although the agreement had been made in Turkey; the Court of Cassation 
(Oct. 28, 1950) Clunet 1957, 1047 rightly rejected this view emphasizing that 
the contract to sell property must be distinguished from the conveyance. 
3 STORY §§ 372 ff. 
4 FoELIX (ed. 3) no § 6o. Similarly, FIORE §§ 215, 224, often criticized in 
the literature, see as to Italy, FJIDOZZI 251. 
5 Vol.II (ed.z) PP·491 f. 
6 (1897) 167 Mass. 2II, 45 N. E. 737, 36 L. R. A. 771; LORENZEN, Cases 593· 
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been abandoned in the United States,7 as well as in most 
countries. The Restatement fully recognizes the distinction 
between conveyance or transfer of land and contract to 
transfer or to convey land, and submits the validity of the 
latter promises to the law of the place of contracting.8 
Remainders exist in Spain11 and some other jurisdictions10 
to the extent that the domestic law is prescribed with re-
spect to domestic immovables, in a one-sided public policy. 
Again, the Treaty of Montevideo reaches the same 
result as the old doctrine under the theory of lex loci solu-
tionis, forcibly applied to all contracts promising_ interests 
in any property.U 
2. Lex Loci Contr.actus 
Beale and the Restatement postulate the law of the place 
of contracting with respect to the validity of the contract, 
7 See, for instance, II Am. Jur. ( 1937) 335 § 38 n. 2; 2 BEALE §§ 340.1, 346.6. 
8 Restatement § 340 and comment. 
9 See the Note of the Spanish Government to the Sixth Hague Conference, 
Document 143; cf. also EcHAVAllRI, 3 Cod. Com. 465. 
10 Brazil: (Requiring writing and registration, App. A! ago as (March 3, 
1944) 27 Direito 404.) Former Introd. C. C. art. 13 § un. III, cf. 2 PONTI!S de 
MIRANDA 243, criticized by ESPINOLA, 8 Tratado 547 § 157 citing BEVILAQUA, 
1 C. C. Com. (ed. 6, 1940) 136. The new art. 9 § 1, however, seems to refer 
only to formalities, cf. EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado 1813 § 156. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 No. 3· The Polish Draft 1961, art. 13, subjects 
all transactions relating to immovables, not only those concerning domestic 
immovables, to the law of the situs, thus completely excluding party autonomy. 
To the same effect: Czechoslovakian Law of 1948 on private international 
law,§ 44· 
Switzerland: SCHOENENBERGER-]AEGGI No. 189 and cited authors j 2 SCHNITZER 
( ed. 4) 689 f.; Swiss law is the presumable law of contract, but if another law 
applies to the contract, Swiss public policy governs the obligatory promise to 
convey Swiss immovables. 
Uruguay: C. C. art. 6; GUILLOT, I C. C. 123. 
In Italy, some authors believed that a "vendita immobiliare" as a whole had 
to be solemn. See Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 492 n. 19, and for an application to the 
sale of aircraft, LOMONACO 86 § 14. The contrary and correct view has been 
confirmed by the wording of C. C. (1942) art. 1350, corresponding with old 
art. 1314 (1865). 
11 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civ. Law (1889) art. 34 par. un., (1940) art. 
38 par. 1 (note the words "En consecuencia"). 
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whereas the lex situs operates in matters of performance.12 
Others have undertaken to harmonize the cases to the same 
effect by the distinction that "executory contracts" to trans-
fer real property are under the lex loci contractus, while 
executed contracts follow the lex loci solutionis.18 
Misled by the theory of the last act in completing a 
contract, a few decisions have applied the law of the place 
where the deed of conveyance was delivered, determining 
thereby such problems as the measure of damages for breach 
of contract.14 This seems to mean that the entire obligatory 
portion of the contract is under this law. It is uncertain 
whether the same scope was intended in a decision deter-
mining the measure of damages for nondelivery of a deed.16 
The land was ~n South Dakota but the deed was promised 
and to be delivered in Iowa. The court applied Iowa law. 
This could mean a special conflicts rule for the isolated 
duty of delivering the instrument, hut probably does not 
mean it. According to the Restatement, § 341 (I), the law 
of the place where a deed of conveyance of an interest in 
land is delivered determines "the contractual duties of the 
grantor," which proposition seems to clash with every other 
rule respecting contracts recognized in the Restatement. 
Delivery of the deed is a condition of conveyance. That 
the place where it is actually made, or for that matter, 
where it is to occur, should determine the legal effects of 
a conveyance, partly dislodging the significance of the situs 
of the land, is a possible idea. But that the place of that 
delivery should also localize the duty of the seller, to make 
good a defective title to the land, cannot be reasonably 
explained. This is a mere product of an obsolete concept of 
breach of warranty. 
12 Restatement§ 340; 2 BEALl! II90, 1216. 
13 MINOR 31 § 11; L. R. A. 1916A, 1027 i this formulation seems to stem 
from the wor:ding of STORY § 363, first sent. 
H Atwood v. Walker (1901) 179 Mass. 514, 61 N. E. 58. 
15 Clark v. Belt (C. C. A. 8th 1915) 333 Fed. 573· 
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These theories share in general the defects of emphasiz-
ing accidental localities, and some of them add the disadvan-
tage of splitting title and obligation where no separation is 
required by the nature of the transaction. 
J. Subsidiary Rule of Lex Situs 
In the opinion prevailing in the world, obligations to 
transfer land or interests in land are governed by lex situs, 
where no other connection appears definitely required. This 
law is regarded as presumably intended by the parties or 
as the law most naturally competent. This is the undoubted 
English doctrine ;16 it is taught in France, 17 Italy, 18 and most 
countries,19 shared in Germany in consequence of the pre-
dominance of the lex loci solutionis/0 and has been adopted 
by international proposals.21 There is also American au-
thority for complying with the intention of the parties, for 
which the location of the land may be important,22 but 
classification of the individual cases is difficult.23 
16 England: Lloyd v. Guibert (x86S) L. R. I Q. B. us, 122; Rex. v. Inter-
national Trustee [1937] A. C. soo, 529; WESTLAKE 269 § u6; DICEY (ed. 7) 
8141f.; CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 598 If.; FALCONBRIDGE (ed. 2) 609; M. WOLFF, Priv. 
Int. Law (ed. 2) 434, 533· 
1T France: NIROYI!1' in 2 Repert. 251 § 63; 'LER.EBOURs·PIGEONNIERE, D. 
1931.2.33; LEREBOURS·PIGI!ONNIERE, Precis ( ed. 7) 584 f.: BATIFFOL 108 §§ 122 
If., 393 §§ 471 If.; BATIFFOL, Traite ( ed. 3) 645 § 593· Contra: BAR TIN, 2 
Principes 65 n. 5 without argument. 
18 FIIDOZZt·CERETl741. 
18 The Netherlands: KOSTERS7S6; MULDER (ed. 2) 170. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No.2. 
Switzerland: SCHOENENBERGER·}AEGGI No. 261; BECKER in 6 Gmiir Vorbemer-
kungen zu arts. 184·186 No. 27. 
Austria: OGH. (Jan. x6, 1952) Clunet 1955, 180. 
Contra: RoLIN, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1908) 602 (in contrast to leases 
of immovables). 
20 RG. (Oct. 14, 1897) JW. 1897. S81j (Dec. 7, 1920) IOI RGZ. 64; Nuss-
BAUM, D. IPR. 232· 
2llnat. of Int. Law (Florence), 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (b); IIIt. 
Law Ass'n, Vienna Draft 1926, art. 1, A, in 34th Report (1927) 509. 
22 STORY § 363; GooDRICH 394 § 145; n Am. Jur. 335 § 38; STUMBI!RG (ed. 
a) 377 If. and the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) § 346e. 
za See, to the same effect, Note, L. R. A. 1916A at 1021 If. The decisions 
referred to by 2 BEALE 1190 § 340, I at n. 4 for the le;; situs mostly concern 
capacity, although Hamilton v. Glassell (C. C. A. sth 1932) 57 F. (.ad) 1()52, 
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Exceptions to the subsidiary rule of the situs have been 
claimed, apart from a contrary agreement of the parties,'1• 
for land situated on a border,25 and land that is only a small 
part of an estate.26 Certainly an exception must also be 
admitted when both parties are domiciled in the same 
country and there contract with respect to foreign land. 
Illustrations. (i) An English decision applied English 
law to the purchase of a share in a decedent's estate, includ-
ing real and personal property in Chile, where the parties 
were three brothers, all of them domiciled in England, and 
the purchaser residing in Chile.27 Presuming that the court 
correctly found Chilean law unsuitable to the contract, the 
lex loci contractus had so many relations to the case includ-
ing the domicil and residence of the vendors, that its appli-
cation was justified.27a 
1033 is based on presumed party intention. LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 307 Nos. 129, 
130 does not regard lex .ritu.r as governing all phases of the contract, as 
BATIFFOL no § 123 has understood; LORENZEN discusses the problem on 
p. 324 No. 206. 
The often cited decision in the New York case, Hotel Woodward Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1919) 258 Fed. 322 belongs to the several 
cases where lex fori coincides with lex loci solutionis; in addition both 
parties were domiciled in New York. The judge would personally have 
preferred the law of Georgia where the deed was executed. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Selover etc. v. 
Walsh (1912) 226 U. S. n2 only confirms the constitutional power of a state 
to apply the law of the place of contracting without deciding whether it 
should do so under a sound conflicts rule. 
For an analysis of the American cases under the aspect of the so-called 
Rule of Validation, see EHRENZWEIC, Conflict 612 ff. § 233 (c) and WILLIAMS, 
"Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Lex Situs: Rule or Exception?" 
II Hast. L. J. ( 1960) 159. 
24 England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 127 L. T. R. 209. 
United States: Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (r96o) § 346e (r) 
declares the lex rei sitae only applicable "in the absence of an effective choice 
of law by the parties." 
25 British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consol. Mines [ 1910] I Ch. 354; 
2 Ch. 502, C. A.; [ 1912] A. C. 52. As to problems of land situated on a border, 
see 37th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (r96o), Proceedings, 
pp. 544 ff. 
26M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. z) 434 § 415. 
27 Cood v. Cood (r863) 33 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 273, 278, criticized by M. 
WoLFF, supra n. 26. 
27a In a case where two Swiss citizens with domicil in Switzerland entered 
into a contract relating to land in France, the agreement being made with 
the assistance of a French notary public but the price being fixed in Swiss 
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(ii) When a contract on the installment plan for the 
purchase of Colorado land was made in Minnesota and the 
Minnesota court applied its domestic statute prescribing 
a certain notice to be given before forfeiture of the paid 
installment sums, the court invoked the principle that the 
lex loci contractus applies when the price is to be paid in 
the state.28 But not only was the seller a corporation char-
tered and domiciled in Minnesota but the buyer was a citizen 
of that state. For this reason it was a domestic contract. 
(iii) Other cases are more doubtful.29 Where a contract 
was made in California for the purchase of mining property 
in Mexico with the price secured by notes and mortgages in 
California, 80 the court failed to state that the California 
connections were strong enough to sustain a tacit agreement 
for California law. It should, then, not have applied this 
law to the question of rescission. 
Such subsidiary localization of the contract at the situs 
is preferable to the artificial method of identifying the place 
of contracting with the situs. An offer for the purchase of 
land in Maryland was mailed from England and the accept-
ance mailed back; the deed should have been delivered in 
England, but was not. The Maryland court invoked the 
settled method of applying its own law qua lex situs, but 
conceived this as an extension of the real property rule and 
thought it should corroborate the result by an auxiliary 
construction in the course of which the place of delivery 
of the deed was discarded because no English town had 
been named.81 Neither approach was correct; the law of 
currency, the Federal Tribunal held French law applicable; BG. (Nov. u, 
1956) 82 BGE. II 550, criticized by GUTZWILLER, Schweiz. Jahrb. I. R. 1957, 
z8o. If the court had followed a rule similar to that of the new Restatement, 
Swiss law would probably have applied; see Restatement (Second), Tent. 
Draft No. 6 (1960} 93, and REESE in 37th Annual Meeting of the American 
Law Institute (196o), Proceedings, pp. 542 f. 
28 Finnes v. Selover (1907) xoz Minn. 334, II3 N. W. 883. 
29 See BATIFFOL II x ff. on American cases; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 232 on 
certain decisions of lower German courts. 
30 Loaiza v. Superior Ct. (1890) 85 Cal. n, 24 Pac. 707, 9 L. R. A. 376. 
The parties were English and Mexican nonresidents. 
81 Latrobe v. Winans (1899) 89 Md. 636, 43 Atl. 829. 
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the forum could simply be assumed to be the most closely 
connected law. 
In this prevailing view, obligatory and real property 
transactions are distinguished, not only when they appear in 
separate agreements or instruments as happens in many 
countries, but also when they are closely knit together in a 
deed of conveyance. The obligatory part of the entire trans-
action depends on the real property law of the situs only 
insofar as no effect on the title or interests is possible with-
out the consent of the state of situs. The situs prescribes the 
kind and conditions of the transferable interest, the for-
malities of the transfer and capacity to alienate and acquire 
such interest. 
Equitable remedies. On the other hand, the subject has 
become slightly complicated in common law because of the 
intervention of equity jurisdiction.82 The Court of Chancery, 
by assuming a constructive trust and in other ways, under-
took to right wrongs done by an English defendant with 
regard to foreign land. In particular, the practice has been 
settled that on a contract for selling or charging land, where 
the land is outside the jurisdiction of English courts, an 
action in personam is allowed to enforce the execution of a 
correct sales instrument sufficient under the lex situs.88 The 
lex situs is thereby respected to the extent that no interest 
in the land is deemed to be validly promised that does not 
conform to the law of the situs. The promise to convey a 
recognized interest, however, is effective irrespective of the 
validity of the contract under the law of the situs. No Anglo-
American peculiarity of international bearing is noticeable 
in this practice, as confined to the problems of taking juris-
diction and of administering the local equity procedure. 
Only when the domestic law is applied despite the closer 
32 BEALE, "Equitable Interests in Foreign Property," 20 Harv. L. Rev. (z907) 
382; 2 BEALE 953 ff.; GOODRICH, supra n. 2, 425 ff.; GOODRICH 398 § 147• 
33 Lord Cottenham in Ex parte Pollard (1840) Mont. & Ch. 239· 
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connection of the contract with the situs, as has occurred 
in some cases just for the purpose of taking jurisdiction 
otherwise not obtainable, do these courts deviate from nor-
mal jurisprudence. 
II. FoRM AND CAPACITY 
I. Form 
Whether a contract promising to transfer an interest 
in land must be written, authenticated, registered, or in the 
form of a deed, is usually determined under the general 
conflicts rules concerning formality.34 In the doctrine pre-
vailing throughout the world, this means that the contract 
may comply either with the law of the place of contracting 
or with the law governing the substance.35 In this special 
application, this optional variant of locus regit actum is also 
recognized in England, if not clearly by judicial authority, 
at least by the writers.86 The American approach, uncertain 
between lex loci contractus and lex situs, would seem to 
suggest a correction toward the same view.87 The Treaty 
of Montevideo, however, applies the lex situs under the 
guise of lex loci solutionis.88 
In some countries, the lex situs is applied, either openly 
or as a matter of public policy, to formalities when domestic 
immovables are involved.89 
It will be discussed separately whether these rules extend 
to the manifold provisions prescribing formalities for 
84 France: Lex loci contractus is emphasized by Cour Paris (June 6, r889) 
Clunet 1889, 826; NIBOYET 634 § 507, 2, but this can scarcely be meant as a 
compulsory rule. 
Germany: EG. BGB. art. u; cf. WALKER 332 n. r:z; see Vol. II (ed. :z) 
p. 492· 
The Netherlands: 0FFERHAUS, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 117. 
Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 253. 
I BAR 62o; GIE!l.KE, I D. Privatrecht 231 n. 61; :z MElLI 67. 
u Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 489. 
36 CHESHIRE ( ed. 6) 6oo, referring to In re Smith, Lawrence v. Kitson 
[1916] 2 Ch. 2o6; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (2 ed.) 524; DICEY (ed. 7) 817. 
37 GooDRICH 272 § Io6; BATlFFOL III § 125. 
88 Supra n. u. 
89 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 ( 3) ; and others, supra n. ro. 
II4 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
authorizing agents to make a contract for the transfer of 
land.40 
2. Capacity 
Although capacity to transfer an immovable, of course, 
depends on the conflicts law of the country where it is situ-
ated, capacity to promise such transfer is distinguishable. 
It was a question of the capacity of a married woman on 
which Mr. Justice Holmes formulated the contrast between 
personal covenants and the incidents of the lex situs.41 
In conformity with their general attitude, common law 
courts will prefer the law governing the contract,42 whereas 
at civil law the personal law governs.43 The latter is also 
sporadically applied in the United States.44 
If the promise is valid under the law of the contract, 
but the promisor is unable to fulfill it because of incapacity 
under the law of the situs, he at least owes damages for 
not conveying the interest,45 except in the state where the 
land lies and in other states where he is regarded as in-
competent. 
III. CovENANTS FOR TITLE 
At common law, agreements in deeds of conveyance are 
distinguished as those "running with the land" and those 
40 Infra Ch. 40 p. 175. 
41 Polson v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 2n, 45 N. E. 737; see Vol. II (ed. 2) 
p. 492 n. 17. 
42£ngland: Bank of Africa, Ltd. v. Cohen [1909] 2 Ch. 129 (lex situs); 
CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 6oo f.; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 523 § 499; DICEY 
( ed. 7) 769, 817. 
United States: 2 BEALl! 1!77; GOODRICH 383 § 145; STUMBI!RG ( ed. 2) 241 f. i 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) § 333· 
43 Germany: EG. BGB. art. 7· For the authority of guardians, see OLG. 
Miinchen (Sept. 8, 1938) H. R. R. 1939, No. 81. 
The exceptions for transactions by foreigners who would have capacity 
under the domestic law, are applicable, whereas they do not apply usually 
to capacity for disposing of foreign real property by act within the forum. 
See Vol. I (ed. 2) p. 202; German EG. BGB. art. 7 par. 3; Ita!. C. C. Disp. 
Pre). ( 1942) art. 17 par. 2, etc. 
44 Vol. I (ed. 2) pp. III n. 7, 198 n. 19. 
45 CHESHIRE ( ed. 6) 6or. 
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not running. The former category includes promises creating 
under certain conditions a benefit for, or a burden on, the 
successors of the purchaser without, however, establishing 
encumbrances that would benefit or burden any owner of 
the land in the manner of a jus in re. (It is misleading, 
therefore, to call these agreements "real covenants.") Also 
the grantee may promise, for instance, restrictions on build-
ing binding his successors in title. 
Interstate conflicts exist mainly with respect to covenants 
deemed to be implied in some states but not in others. For 
instance, some states, by statutory or judicial construction, 
interpret the words "grant and bargain" used by the grantor 
as implying promises of good title, quiet enjoyment, and 
freedom of encumbrances, in favor of the purchaser and all 
persons acquiring from him through similar conveyances. 
In the traditional view, covenants running with the land 
are governed by the lex situs.46 Consequently, it is assumed 
in the Restatement that this law decides whether and under 
what conditions a covenant runs with the land. 
For the agreements not running with the land, opinions 
are divided. In one view, the lex situs again applies.47 In 
another, followed in a series of cases, these agreements 
being "merely contractual" and without connection with 
the land, are declared to he governed by the law of the 
contract, that is, commonly the lex loci contractus.48 The 
Restatement places them under the law of the place where 
the deed of conveyance is delivered.49 There is considerable 
46Restatement § 341 (2) and comment; Platner v. Vincent (1921) r87 Cal. 
443, 202 Pac. 655; LORENZEN, Cases 587; for other cases, see GoooRICH § 146 
ns. 28, 29, 30; MINOR 457 § rSs; LBFLAR, Con1iict of Laws 278; 17 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 1094; L R A. 1916A, 1027 n. 49, and for the municipal doctrine in 
question, WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title (ed. 5, r887) 301 § 205. 
4 7 Lyndon Lumber Co. v. Sawyer (1908) I3S Wis. S2S, II6 N. w. zss; 
Alcorn v. Epler (1917) 206 Ill. App. 140. 
48 Bethell v. Bethell (1876) S4 Ind. 428, LoRENZEN, Cases sss; other Indiana 
cases, see GooDRICH § 146 n. 33; other cases, Note, L. R. A. 1916A, 1027 n. 48; 
WHARTON§ 276 (d). . 
49 Restatement § 341 (I). 
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opposition to this treatment, though termed logical, on the 
ground that the distinction is questionable or difficult, or too 
technical for the purpose of conflicts law. In this view, 
covenants should fall under one law, the lex situs, avoiding 
the confusion caused by the distinction of groups and division 
of opinions.60 
There is much force in this proposition but more pre-
cision is needed as to the ground and scope of the lex situs. 
Legal history may help. The cases extending lex situs to all 
covenants evidently have been influenced by the old broad 
scope of that law which comprehended the entire contract 
by force of sovereignty. If the choice of law resorts to lex 
situs only for convenience, it has to consider any contrary 
agreement of the parties as well as the special situations 
in which the contract is centered elsewhere. Do these con-
siderations not apply to covenants running with the land? 
On the other hand, what is the relationship in nature be-
tween covenants for title and veritable iura in re, the proper 
field of lex situs? 
That so much is unstable and controversial in the matter 
of covenants for title in common law, in contrast with the 
romanistic systems which sharply distinguish obligation 
from right in a thing, must be a residue of legal history. 
Traditionally, in England, as almost everywhere except in 
classical Rome and derivative systems, real rights were 
rights to possession and consisted in the better claim between 
two persons. The abstract and absolute character inherent 
in the developed Roman dominium and jus in re aliena was 
absent or less marked. Moreover, until the nineteenth cen-
tury, formal certainty, as assured by public land registers 
in Central Europe, did not exist, and surrogates were 
needed, quite as in ancient times. Covenants and title records 
5°Note, 9 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) at 3Si 10 id. (1922) 174; LoRENZEN, 20 
Yale L. J. (1911) 427, and in 6 Repert. 308, 131; HEILMAN, "Confiict of Laws 
Treatment of Interpretation and Construction of Deeds in Reference to 
Covenants," 29 Mich. L. Rev. (1931) 277; GOODRICH 397• 
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are derived in the last instance from the universal custom 
of instrumenta antiqua-so termed by the Roman jurists 
contemplating the Eastern usages, and by the Italian lawyers 
in considering the Lombard practice,-a chain of convey-
ances transmitted from each vendor to his purchaser, 
together with the deed embodying the actual sale. Each 
document contained a comprehensive stipulation of war-
ranty against the vendor, his family, and successors infring-
ing the alienation, and promising protection or penalties 
in case of attacks by strangers. 
The usage in England was almost exactly the same, al-
though with great legal elaboration. The extended convey-
ance clauses beginning to appear in the thirteenth century 
regularly expressed the promise of warranty to the feoffee, 
his heirs and "assigns," which granted a remote successor 
direct claim against the original feoffor.51 These warranties 
of title formed the transition from a merely relative concept 
of a claim to possession to the absolute right in real prop-
erty. Where a legal system is ready to accord the buyer 
independent possession and full ownership by derivation 
from the former owner, there is no necessity for promises 
of the vendor that he himself or persons on his behalf shall 
not disturb the buyer's right, although the French Civil Code 
(article 1628) still contains the doctrine of fait du vendeur, 
and a certain usefulness may be found in it. 52 Clauses cover-
ing eviction by third parties on the ground of the vendor's 
defective title lose importance with the introduction of 
means providing public knowledge of the true legal situation 
of the land. 
n See the excellent article by S. J. BAILEY, "Warranties of Land in the 
Thirteenth Century," 8 Cambr. L. J. (1944) 274; 9 id. 82. 
52 The present writer has repeatedly dealt with the subject and refers in 
particular to his book, I Haftung des Verkiiufers wegen Mangels im Recht 
(1902) 33 ff. (Roman Law and papyri), 169 ff. (Germanic laws); and 
various articles, esp. KATAGRAPHE, 54 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, Rom. 
Abt. (1934) 189, 198; "Die eigene Handlung des Schuldners und des 
Verkiiufers (Fait du debiteur; fait personnel du vendeur)," 1 Rheinische Z. f. 
Zivil· und Prozessrecht (1909) 187. 
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In the light of these short observations, it is instructive 
to comment on two outstanding judicial statements. 
Geiszler v. De Graaf. 58 This New York decision de-
scribes the nineteenth century distinction between two types 
of covenants for title. Covenants in which the grantor of 
land promises quiet enjoyment to the purchaser or declares 
warranty of title, were distinguished from those in which 
he declares that he has lawful seisin or the right to convey 
or that the land is free of encumbrances. 
In the former type of covenant, the breach was construed 
to occur only on eviction, actual or constructive.54 The bene-
fit of this covenant runs with the land and any subsequent 
purchaser in an uninterrupted chain of conveyances contain-
ing such a covenant ("privity of estate") may sue any 
predecessor for the breach of warranty. A breach of the 
latter type of covenant occurred, if at all, upon delivery of 
the deed and therefore the right of the grantee became a 
chose in action which did not run with the land. This rule, 
probably based on the ancient impossibility of assigning 
choses in action was abandoned by the New York court. 
With respect to the first group it seems never to have 
been doubted, either in New York or elsewhere in America, 
that the traditional stipulations of warranty were within 
the scope of the lex situs, although in Europe this has only 
been assumed by Foelix and one other writer.55 But this 
treatment is only convenient, not necessary. Of course, the 
contractual bond between the parties to each of the succes-
sive contracts is insufficient to justify the "running"; there 
must be an agreement "touching and concerning the land" 
and "privity of estate. " 56 Nevertheless, the warranty of 
5a Dictum by Brien, J., (I901) I66 N.Y. 339, 59 N. E. 993· 
54 WM. RAWLE, Covenants for Title ( ed. s, I887) § 202. 
55 I FOELIX (ed. 3) no § 6o; MASSE, I Droit Comm. (ed. 2) 546 § 637, as 
cited by 8 LAURENT 22.2. Contra: the editor of FoELIX (ed. Demangeat) /oc. 
cit.; LAURENT loc. cit. 
56 CLARK, Covenants ISO· 
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good title or the promise to indemnify the purchaser and 
his successors, creates a contractual obligation, necessary 
and significant for the situation. The unconscious reason 
why this institution is attributed to the law of the situation 
is the same which once suggested the so-called "jumping 
recourse."57 The succession of auctores of old and the series 
of written documents since the Middle Ages form the mecha-
nism to secure the legal position of the possessor; they 
furnish the only practical evidence of title, until prescrip-
tion is realized. Since conflicts law has only to ponder the 
social importance of local connections, it may reasonably 
connect the complex of such warranty relations with the 
situs of the land, which is where the records of title are 
held and the only fixed contact of the entire chain. 
As to covenants of lawful seisin, or right to convey the 
land, and against encumbrances, since they were said to be 
broken upon delivery of the deed, they were subjected to 
the law of the place of this delivery. The modern construc-
tion, followed in an English statute of 1881,58 is now shared 
by most American courts. In the absence of contrary agree-
ment, the grantor is presumed to give his promise to every 
successor in the chain so that the right is assigned with the 
land to the subsequent purchaser. This assignment is inde-
pendent of any "nominal" breach said to be committed by 
delivery of the deed with the false statement. Hence, all the 
mentioned types of covenants run with the land. Presumably 
they are under the lex situs. 
We may, then, finally appreciate the desirability of treat-
ing all covenants under the same law, and therefore of 
determining the nature and effects of the promises by the 
law of the state where the land is. 
But there can be a difference in conflicts law between 
~ 7 Haftung des Verkaufers, supra n. sz, Z44-Z49· 
~8 44 & 45 Viet., c. 41, s. 7· 
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covenants for title and veritable encumbrances. In the field 
of obligation, and only in it, the parties enjoy autonomy in 
the true sense, so that they may at their pleasure vary the 
qualification of the rights created by their stipulations. 
They must as well be able to choose the applicable law. 
Likewise, in a case such as Good v. Cood,59 where the con-
tract relating to foreign land is made at the common domi-
cil of the parties, the contract is centered there and covers 
all obligations of warranty. 
Smith v. Ingram. Another point is illustrated by the doc-
trine neatly presented in Smith v. Ingram and often re-
peated since.60 Two effects of covenants of warranty were 
distinguished. One is that the vendor is estopped from 
claiming the land against any purchaser in the proper chain 
of transfers. This effect, subject to the law of the situs, 
was denied in the instant case under the law of North Caro-
lina where the land was, the seller being a married woman, 
whose contract was valid under the law of her domicil in 
South Carolina. The other effect is that an action on the 
covenant arises for breach of warranty, as a purely per-
sonal contact, sounding in damages only, and this would be 
determined by whatever law governs the obligatory contract. 
To a comparatist this reasoning appears very attractive. 
A parallel may support it and suggest its adoption in civil 
law courts. In fact, the doctrine of estoppel has produced 
a perfect analogy to the Roman exceptio rei venditae et 
traditae-not noted thus far by historians, as it seems.81 
In the just-mentioned ancient stipulations, and in later 
periods by the legal force of sales contracts, the vendor 
o9 Supra n. 27. 
60 ( 1903) 132 N. C. 959, 44 S. E. 643, 61 L. R. A. 878; WHARTON 630 and 
n. 15 § 276 (d); 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094. The decision in the particular case 
of Smith v. Ingram had an odious result, pointed out in the dissenting vote 
by Walker, J., but this phase was due to the old doctrine concerning the 
capacity of married women. 
61 I do net mean to say that the Romans knew covenants running with the 
land; see BucKLAND and McNAIR, Roman Law and Common Law (1936) 91. 
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promised that both he and his successors should not disturb 
the purchaser and the successors of the latter. Under 
Roman law, however, where the vendor sold and delivered 
land (or a slave) to the buyer but either failed to proceed to 
the formal act ( mancipatio) required for transferring the 
ownership at law ( dominum ex jure Quiritium) or had only 
subsequently acquired the title, the seller was entitled at 
law to enforce his "Quiritarian" ownership by vindicatio. 
But because he was obligated to transfer title to the buyer, 
he encountered the praetorian defense that he had sold and 
delivered. This exception was a part of the mechanism by 
which the praetor recognized an interest of the buyer, which 
under the name of "in bonis habere" closely approached 
ownership and by the Greek interpreters was called boni-
tarian ownership. Thus, the purchaser and his successors 
in title were protected against the owner or one from whom 
he derived title, on the ground of an obligatory right trans-
formed into a kind of property. This defense against the 
nominal owner pertains to the law of the situation. 
Apart from estoppel, the law of the contract, generally 
but not necessarily the law of the situs, covers the creation 
and effect of all covenants.62 This result is simple and satis-
factory. 62a 
Our discussion has no bearing on such agreements as a 
62 Just for the historical interest connected with warranty for title, we may 
note the controversy in the old French doctrine regarding the law determining 
the vendor's duty to furnish security against possible eviction. Certain post-
glossators, reading GArus' Lex si fundus, Dig. u, z, 6, interpreted the con-
suetudo eius regionis in qua negotium gestum est, as the law of the vendor's 
domicil rather than the lex situs, and BoULLBNors, z Traite de la personnalite 
et de la realite des loix (1766) 461 explained the former as presumably 
intended by the parties. In the nineteenth century, this warranty was not 
distinguished from the other incidents of a sale of immovables, see 8 LAURENT 
223 § 153· 
62aThe Restatement {Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 346f submits 
"the contractual duties imposed upon the grantor by a deed of transfer of an 
interest in land" to the lex rei sitae except if otherwise provided by the parties, 
and except as to minute details of performance. This rule, which is intended 
to take the place of original § 341, is said (id. at roo) to have the express 
support of the first edition of the present book (RABEL, g Conflict of Laws 
122 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
promise to convey,68 or a promise by the vendor of a manu-
facturing plant not to enter into competition with the 
purchaser. 64 
IV. LAESIO ENORMIS (INADEQUACY OF CoNSIDERATION) 
In conformity with French law,65 the Civil Code of Louisi-
ana66 allows a vendor of an immovable estate sold for less 
than half the value, to demand rescission, unless the pur-
chaser chooses to make up the just price and keep the thing 
sold. This remedy, abolished in Quebec,67 and most other 
countries, developed out of an institution going back to the 
legislation of the early Byzantine Empire.68 In common 
law, a shocking insufficiency of valuable consideration in a 
bilateral agreement is likely to be treated as a presumptive 
fraud69 and as such has been paralleled with the laesio 
enormis of civil law. 
In conflicts law, the subject has been interestingly dis-
cussed, notably by French writers. A number of authors 
have construed, from a purely French point of view, every 
lesion as a defect of consent and therefore subject to the 
national law of the damaged party.70 In another theory, the 
no-17 (1950)). But according to Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. S 
(1959) § 222, Comment b, the lex rei sitae forcibly determines "whether a 
covenant runs with the land, and what the effect of its running may have on 
other interests in the land." Consequently, the scope of § 346£ is narrower than 
that of the rule advocated here. 
63 MINOR 4S8 § 18S. 
84 Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co. (C. C. A. 4th 1904) U7 Fed. 804-
65 France: C. C. arts. 1674·1685, "of rescission of the sale on the ground of 
lesion." 
Austria: Ailg. BGB. § 934 has preserved the general remedy of lesion. 
66 Louisiana: C. C. (1825) arts. 2567-2578; (1870) arts. 2589-26oo. 
61 Quebec: C. C. arts. 6so, rou. But it still exists in Italy: C. C. (1865) 
arts. 1529-1537; ( 1942) art. 1448. On South Africa, see infra ns. 78, 79· 
68 Cod. Just. 4, 44, 2, proved to be interpolated by GRADENWITZ, 2 Bulletino 
dell'istituto di diritto romano ( 1889) 14; see ]OLOWICZ, "L'origine de Ia 
laesio enormis," in 1 Introduction a !'etude du droit compare (ll:tudes Lambert 
1938) 185. For the connections between Justinian's compilation and the modern 
doctrines, see DAWSON, "Economic Duress etc.", II Tul. L. Rev. (1937) 345, 
364 ff. 
69 Coles v. Perry. (1851) 7 Tex. 109, I34· 
TO 8 LAURENT 212·216; BARTIN, 2 Principes 66 § 243 j AUDINET in S. 
I931.2.145; LAPRADELLE in Revue 1932, 295. 
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lex situs applies directly or as intended by the parties.71 But 
the lex situs has also been supported on another ground. 
Maury, 72 after an elaborate historical study, states separate 
legislative motives for the six different cases of genuine 
lesion at present founding rescission in French law. With 
respect to the vendor's lesion, he discards the idea of de-
ficient assent or moral coercion and he doubts whether the 
purpose of protecting vendors or owners has been decisive. 
Finally, accepting the latter idea, he restricts the French 
provision to French immovables. This places the problem 
under the lex situs. BatiffoF8 objects that the true thought 
of the French legislator is not so much to care for an Ameri-
can owner of a villa in Cannes on the Riviera, but to favor 
a French family owning immovables wheresoever. His con-
clusion is to apply the law of the contract. But Capitant has 
authoritatively stated that it is impossible to say which 
among the mingled ideas from the Byzantines to the present 
can be termed the true foundation of this institution. When 
Maury replied that "Certainly it is very difficult to choose, 
but since we place ourselves in the point of view of private 
international law, we are forced to do it," Capitant an-
swered: "But this is arbitrary."74 
For the law of the vendor as the party possibly obligated, 2 BAR 43; 2 
FRANKENSTEIN 302. 
The personal law of the vendor in combination with other laws has been 
advocated by RoLIN, 3 Principes 210. 
71 Cour Paris (Feb. 9, 1931) D. 1931.2.33, S. I931.2.145, Clunet 1932, 109, 
Revue 193 r, 348 (lex rei sitae for lesion of a contract in Paris for sale of a 
German immovable, notwithstanding lex loci contractus applied to the con-
tract in general); Cass. req. (June 29, .1931) S. 1932.1.289, Revue 1932, 295 
(on the ground of a Morocco law); see attempts to harmonize at least the 
second decision with the theory of lex loci solutionis by BATIFFOL 343 n. s, 
351 n. 1. C6digo Bustamante, art. r82: "territorial law" for rescission in 
general also seems to mean the lex situs. 2 BRocHER § r8s; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, 
Revue 1932, soB. 
72 MAURY, "La lesion dans les contrats," Revue Crit. 1936, 344, 352 ff., and 
in 3 Travaux du comite frant;ais de droit int. prive (1936) 70-104. 
73 BATIFFOL1 Revue 19341 630 and BATIFFOL 351 § 405 n. 4• 
74 3 Travaux du comite frant;ais, supra n. 72, roo, 102. 
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It is not exact that conflicts law should depend on a 
doubtful intention in the legislative background of the 
domestic and still less of a foreign legislation. Nor are 
Maury's results good enough. He himself notes a "crying 
injustice" in deducing that when a sale is made under French 
law with respect to German immovables, French law would 
not be applicable because it refers to French immovables 
only, whereas the general remedy of German law against 
usury, the nullity of a contract violating good morals ( BGB. 
§ 138), would not apply because it refers only to contracts 
governed by German law. 75 Why should a remedy be severed 
from the contract? The problem is not one of real property 
although it has been claimed as such most recently by 
Niboyet.76 On the other hand, the lex loci contractus as 
such77 has no more justification than usual. The law of the 
contract must govern, and this is ordinarily, but not always, 
the law of the place where the land is.78 
Illustration. A contract was entered into in the Transvaal 
Republic for the sale of land situated in the Cape Province. 
Lesion was a valid defense under Transvaallaw,79 although 
such defense has been repealed by the law in the Cape 
Province.80 The court applied the law of the place of con-
tracting, which was also the law of the forum, on the argu-
ment that lesion like fraud must be judged in considering 
the place where the vendor committed it.81 In our view the 
situs of the immovable is not "an immaterial incident," as 
the court assumed, but (in the absence of closer connections 
in particular cases) it is the center of the entire transaction, 
as it also furnishes the data for appraising the "just price." 
75 MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936 at 382. 
1s NmoY&T, 4 Traite 243 § uss. 
77 FEDozzz-CF.RF.TI 732j 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 72 § IIU. 
78 LEREBOUR~-PlGEONNlERE, Note, D. 1931.2.33 j BATIFFOL 350 § 404. 
79 Transvaal: See R. W. LEE, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law ( ed. 
4, 1946) 234 n. 3· 
so Cape of Good Hope Prov.: Act No.8 of 1879, § 8. 
s1 De Wet v. Browning [1930] S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov. Div. 409; 
BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 668 § 615. 
CHAPTER 39 
Representation 
I. DEPENDENCE ON MuNICIPAL DocTRINES 
1. Three Main Doctrines 
I N SURVEYING the present laws of representation in the world it is unfortunately still necessary to insert a 
few historical notes. The stages of evolution have left 
too manv marks on this doctrine in numerous countries. 
J 
Originally, nowhere was it imagined that one person 
(Agent, A), by making a contract with a third party (Ter-
tius, T), could create obligatory rights and duties between 
the third party and a principal (P). The official law of the 
Roman Empire, the classical Greek law, the Germanic laws, 
and the English law during the whole Middle Ages, were 
no exceptions. Needs of daily life, of course, required make-
shift arrangements to approach the purposes of representa-
tion, surrogates sometimes coming very near to the legally 
barred result. In the seventeenth century, representation 
was finally recognized. Yet, as late as the nineteenth cen-
tury some notable writers asserted that representation in 
creating obligations was logically impossihle.1 To make 
the strange phenomenon conceivable to the reluctant mind 
of the lawyers, various awkward attempts were made of 
which some shadows may he detected in the doctrines of 
conflicts law. Only at the cost of much pain was the simple 
truth learned that conclusion of a contract through an 
agent produces a threefold relationship, corresponding with 
the three persons involved. What happened to conflicts law 
1 THOL, I Handelsrecht ( ed. 6, 1879) 234· 
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when uncouth doctrines insisted on seeing the three-dimen-
sional phenomenon in two dimensions, may be seen in the 
two theories dominating French and American laws, re-
spectively, which are briefly described as follows. 
(a) Doctrine of mandate. An old doctrine, widely main-
tained in Latin countries, is that of the two-sided "mandate." 
On one hand, article I984 of the French Code states that: 
"Le mandat ou procuration est un acte par lequel une 
personne donne a une autre le pouvoir de faire quelque chose 
pour le mandant et en son nom."2 
On the other hand, "mandate" is at the same time character-
ized as a contract (art. I984 par. 2) creating obligations 
between principal and agent (arts. I 99 I, I 99 8) . Broadly 
speaking, this is the same method of dealing with the prob-
lems of representation as that originally used in common 
law; the contract of "agency" between principal and agent 
at the same time includes the grant of powers to represent 
the principal. Speaking only of the case where the agent is 
to perform a legal transaction, "mandate" or "agency" 
and "representation" are conceived as one sole legal insti-
tution producing two relationships: one internal between 
the principal and the agent, the other external between the 
principal and the third party. The internal relationship 
extends to the conditions under which A, by contracting with 
T, causes legal effects for and against P. Consequently, these 
conditions are included in the law governing the contract 
of "mandate," which again is most frequently identified 
with the law of the place where the contract of "mandate" 
is completed. 
(b) Incident of main contract. In an American decision 
2 In Louisiana, the Supreme Court, in one of its most drastic moves, has 
declared the' words "in his name" of the analogous art. 2985 C. C. "not 
essential " so as to abandon the civil law definition and to adopt the com-
mon Ia~ concept of power of attorney. See Sentell v. Richardson (1947) 
2II La. 288, 29 So. (zd) 852; ]ONES, Note, 7 La. L. Rev. (1948) 409; 
YIANNOPOULOS, "Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana: Civilian 
Tradition and Modern Practice," 19 La. L. Rev. (1959) 777, 778 n. 8, 795· 
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of 1841, in order to find what law governs the effect of an 
authority, an elaborate attempt was made to answer the 
question, "what law determines whether the act (of the 
agent) constitutes a contract, with whom and to what 
effect."3 In other words, there is but one external relation-
ship in which the power of the agent to affect the principal's 
legal situation is a mere incident. As the contract with the 
third party is governed according to the orthodox doctrine, 
by the law of the place where it is made, this also covers 
the agent's authority. 
It has never been stated, but it appears almost certain 
to the present writer that the continuous American practice 
ultimately laid down in the Restatement comes from that 
decision. \Vhile in the first mentioned theory the lex loci 
contractus of the agency contract applies, in this view the 
lex loci contractus of the third party contract governs the 
extent of the agent's authority. 
(c) Modern theory. The German, and to a certain de-
gree the English, courts have recognized that the power of 
an agent to affect the rights and duties of the principal con-
stitutes an independent institution and ought to have its own 
proper law, not necessarily coincident with those governing 
either of the two other relationships. 
Notwithstanding other propositions advanced in this field, 
these three conflicts doctrines demonstrate their intimate 
connection with the development of representation in the 
municipal systems, or more exactly, in the general science of 
private law. 
2. Agency (Mandate) and Authorization 
The Roman ius civile did not progress to a true concept 
of representation in obligatory contracts, although business 
life, protected by the praetors, furnished an increasing num-
s Carnegie v. Morrison (1841) 43 Mass. 381, 397 (issuance of a letter of 
credit by the agent of London bankers in Boston), 
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her of auxiliary institutions and Justinian's compilation pre-
sented a treasury of scattered remedies.4 The Continental 
commentators, sometimes unable to continue adequately the 
ancient development, clung to the contract of mandatum, 
which was recognized in classical and Byzantine times as 
one of the four orthodox contracts concluded by consent and 
enforced by corresponding civil actions. Discarding all the 
more helpful possibilities that the Corpus Juris richly offered 
from oriental and occidental practice, the doctrine preferred 
the pattern of the classical mandatum. In Rome mandate 
was a contract between principal ( mandans) and agent (is 
cui mandatur, later mandatarius) imposing on the agent 
an obligation, originally gratuitous, to perform a factual 
work or to conclude a legal transaction in the interest of 
the mandator or of a third person. The agent, in making a 
contract with another party in performance of his obligation 
to the principal, necessarily entered alone into the contract 
with the third party. The effects of this contract had to be 
transferred within the internal relationship from the m.an-
datarius to the mandans. On this ancient foundation, the 
main line of doctrinal tradition took its orientation toward 
the agency contract rather than toward an institution of 
representation. When, finally, on the Continent, during the 
seventeenth century, as a result of various previous im-
pulses, representation by free persons was formally recog-
nized in law, the old formulations were nevertheless 
retained, and the legal doctrine mirrored life in a curiously 
distorted picture. Thus Puchta taught: 
The effect of the mandate is partly the constitution of 
representation with its effects, in this respect the mandate 
is called authority, partly an obligation between the man-
dant and the mandatary from which the former acquires 
the actio mandati directa, the latter the contraria.5 
4 RABEL, Grundziige des Romischen Privatrechts (I9IS} 507-5I2, and in 
subsequent articles, mostly followed in the literature. 
11 PtJCHTA, Pandekten § 323. 
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This doctrine was in force as late as I 87 I, when its critic, 
Laband, described it as follows: 
Wherever someone acts instead of another upon his au-
thority, a mandate is assumed to exist; the principal is called 
mandant and the agent mandatarius; agency, mandate, con-
tract of authorization are words used synonymously by the 
lawyers. Those distinguishing more exactly, refer the term 
agency to the relationship between mandant and manda-
tarius, authority to the relationship between the mandant 
and the third party; agency indicates the internal, authority 
the external side of the relationship.6 
Conflicts law has experienced many strong influences 
of this conception. The writers, viewing representation from 
the angle of "mandate," without thinking assumed that the 
law governing this contract also determines whether and to 
what extent a transaction made by the agent in any country 
constitutes rights and duties for the principal. Hence, pro-
vided that the main contract is effective in all other respects, 
it binds the principal if the law governing the contract of 
agency (mandate) so determines. 
The law thus specified was, moreover, schematically iden-
tified with the lex loci contractus of the mandate. Again, to 
ascertain the place of contracting of the mandate, the tradi-
tional opinion held the mandate to be completed at the 
place where the agent "accepts the charge,"7 that is, in 
general, where the agent lives. But counterpropositions pre-
ferred the place where the mandant "receives the accept-
ance" from the agent, 8 or where the mandant is established,9 
8 LABAN», 10 Z. Handelsr. 183, 203 with respect to the German part of the 
literature. 
1 CASARI!GIS, Discursus de commercia, disc. 179, §§ I, 2 n. 191 followed by 
HERTIUS, 1 Opuscula de Collis. Leg. 147; BURGE, 3 Commentaries, pt. 2 ch. 20 
p. 753; STORY§ 285; FIORE (ed. 2) §§ U!} ff.; DESPAGNET 894 § 300 (reserving 
contrary intention); ROLIN, 3 Principes § 1390; WAHL in Baudry-Lacantinerie 
et Saignat 266 n. 1 § soo. 
8 7 LAURENT 541 §§ 452 f. 
e Assn-Rmn, Elements § 97· 
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which both come down to localizing it at the domicil of the 
principal. 
This awkward theory has still some followers,10 especially 
in Italy11 and in Latin America.12 
Not until Laband's famous article from which I have just 
quoted, was it clearly understood that a sharp distinction 
is needed. ( I ) Principal and agent are connected by a re-
lationship producing a right or a duty, or both, of the agent 
to act on account of the principal. This relationship may 
be based on a contract without consideration, as the Roman 
mandatum was a gratuitous promise. But in modern times 
it flows normally from such contracts as agency or partner-
ship, or from an appointment of an administrator or guard-
ian by a court, or directly from law. ( 2) Authority is the 
power of the agent to conclude a contract with a third 
party. 
Employment, partnership, and the like may exist without 
authorization, and the latter may be conferred without im-
posing any contractual duty. Authority may exist contrary 
to internal directions by the principal to the agent; formali-
ties may be prescribed only for the underlying contract or 
only for the authorization; death or revocation may termi-
nate the former only, et cetera. 
The distinction was fully carried out in the German 
doctrine and elaborated in the German Civil Code of I 89618 
and the subsequent literature. At present, it prevails in the 
modern currents everywhere in civil law countries, including 
10 Probably for the same reason, the Draft submitted by BARON NOLDE to 
the Institute for International Law, 33 Annuaire (z9z7) III ZI9, speaks 
merely of mandate as governed by the domiciliary law of the principal, and 
ignores the problem of authority. 
11 FEDOZZI-CERETI 740 ff., with the only concession to the local law that it 
ought to safeguard its own imperative provisions. 
12 E.g., Argentina: ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. 109 ff. 
Brazil: EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 572 § 242; SERPA LOPES, 2 Lei Introd. 360. 
1s BGB. §§ 164 ff. on "representation" and "authority" are included in the 
general part, separated from the sources of obligations. 
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the views of the leading French writers of private law14 
and, although not too apparent, in most Latin-American 
legal literature. Numerous recent codes/5 among them the 
Italian Civil Code of 1942/6 have changed the former sys-
tem and separated the doctrines of representation and 
agency. 
This dualism so slowly perceived in the Continental doc-
trine was equally obscured in the late and difficult beginning 
of true representation in England. The doctrine of Principal 
and Agent started from that of Master and Servant and 
never could be entirely separated from it. Command and 
ratification were the first grounds for making the master 
liable for the contract or tort of the servant.U Authority 
remained until recently such a ground, a condition of vi-
carious liability, and hence a part of the doctrine of agency 
rather than a clearly autonomous subject. In our times, how-
ever, despite some antiquated arrangements of encyclo-
pedias and inappropriate definitions/8 English and Ameri-
can writers have been fully aware of the significance of 
14 France: I COLIN et CAPITANT (ed. II) 9I, cf. 2 id. (ed. 10) 863, 865; 
DEMOGUE, I Obligations §§ 89-155; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 6 Traite Pratique 
(ed. 2) 6I § 55· 
1 5 The Swiss C. Obi. ( I88I) arts. 394·406 on mandate followed the French 
model, C. C. arts. 1984-2010. The Rev. C. Obi. adopts the division in repre-
sentation and authority, arts. 32·40, and the sources of obligations, especially 
mandate, arts. 394 ff. 
Poland: C. Obi. arts. 93 ff. on representation, arts. 498 ff. on mandate. 
The same distinction is made in the Scandinavian countries. 
As to these laws and for further references, see MuLLER-FREIENFELS, "Law 
of Agency," 6 Am. J. Comp. Law (1957) 165, 172 f. 
1 6The Italian C. C. (1865) arts. 1737-1763 is similarly replaced by C. C. 
( 1942) arts. 1387-1400 on representation and authority, arts. 1703 ff. on 
mandate and related contracts. 
1 7 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, 2 History of English Law (ed. 2, reprint 1952) 
528 f.; HoLDSWORTH, 8 History of English Law (1922) 222, 227 f., 252 f. See 
also HoLMEs, Agency, in Collected Legal Papers ( 1920) at 96. 
18 In such a modern English book as CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, The Law of 
Contracts (ed. 5, 1960) 386 f., agency and authority are still not called by 
their names but described as "the two aspects of the contract of agency." 
What we call authority is circuitously defined "as leading to privity between 
principal and third party." 
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authority.18a They even share in two theoretical develop-
ments of the German doctrine that bring the conceptual dis-
tinction to a climax. 
The German Civil Code frankly admits that the principal 
may declare his grant of authority directly to the third party 
( § I 70), or by public notification ( § I 7 I), and treats him 
in the same manner, if he embodies his authorization in a 
written instrument and the agent shows it to the third party 
( § I 72). These cases are plainly recognized in the American 
Restatement of Agency as "apparent authority" ( § § 8, 9). 
Another characteristic feature of the modern system is 
that authorization is conceived as a unilateral act of the 
principal,19 in full contrast to the contract of agency. This 
construction, formulated in the German Civil Code, § I67, 
is likewise laid down in the Restatement of Agency.20 It has 
also not been considered too subtle by the English courts 
in which the point has been recently reaffirmed in a case of 
conflict between English and German law.21 
There is, of course, a fundamental difference between 
the two great systems. In civil law, representation requires 
that the agent should be authorized to act, and in fact 
should openly act, in the name of or at least on behalf of the 
IBa The distinction between the agent's power to bind the principal in legal 
transactions and the underlying relationship is especially emphasized by 
;MECHEM, Agency (ed. 4) II § 23 and by FERSON :us ff., 239 ff., whereas the 
treatises on agency by HANBURY 3 ff. and by PoWELL (ed. 2) 35 f. are rather 
vague in this regard. 
19 It is another question whether this act is "abstract," that is, may operate 
irrespective of the validity of the agency contract. N a tiona! Socialist writers, 
in denying this effect, which is debatable, attacked the entire doctrine; for 
example, HERBERT MEYER, 2 Z. Ak. deutsches R. (1935) 53. But here Swiss 
law recognizes one of the rare cases of abstract acts; see OsER-SCHOENEN-
BERGER art. 32 n. 27. 
2 0 Restatement of Agency §§ zs, z6, :z6 comment a; unchanged .in the Re-
statement of Agency (Second) (1958). The separation is felt but not quite 
correctly expressed as late as in TIFFANY, Agency 9· 
21 Lewis, J., in Sinfra AG. v. Sinfra, Ltd. [1939] :z All E. R. 675, 682: "A 
power of attorney is not a contract. It is a onesided instrument." Lindley, L. J., 
in Chatenay v. The Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. [1891] I Q. B. 
79 at 85. 
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principal, so as to make him from the beginning the exclu-
sive party to the contract. 
At common law, when an agent acts in his own name and 
the other party does not know him to be an agent, the agent 
becomes the party to the contract, but the "undisclosed" 
principal may be sued by the third party, or may sue the 
latter under certain conditions.22 Accordingly, the concept 
of authorization must be defined broadly enough to cover 
the manifestations by which the person in whose interest, 
though not name, the act is to be done makes himself the 
principal. It is essential for our purposes that authorization 
be therefore understood in a double sense: the one for civil 
law consisting in the agent's power to act in the name of 
the person represented; and the other for common law 
consisting in the agent's permission to act either in the prin-
cipal's name or as an undisclosed agent, or both. This con-
ception is no more difficult than the common law doctrine 
itself, but precise terminology is not available to cover this 
large ground. 
Terminology. The Restatement of Agency chooses to 
speak vaguely of the power "to affect the legal relations of 
the principal" ( § 7) .228 If authorization be defined as assent 
of the principal that the agent should contract in his name 
"or on his behal£,"23 this identification would go counter to 
the common significance of "on behalf" as indicating dis-
closed principals, named and unnamed, or only the latter.24 
22 See GOODHART and HAMSON, "Undisclosed Principals in Contract," 4 
Cambr. L. ]. (1932) 320, conclusion at 356, and more recent articles by 
MiiLLER-FREIENFELS: "Die 'Anomalie' der verdeck:ten Stellvertretung (Undis-
closed Agency) des englischen Rechts," 17 RabelsZ. (1952) 578; 18 id. (1953) 
12; "The Undisclosed Principal," 16 Mod. L. Rev. ( 1955) 299; "Comparative 
Aspects of Undisclosed Agency," 18 id. (1953) 33· 
228 In England, the same definition is advocated by DOWRICK, "The Rela-
tionship of Principal and Agent," 17 Mod. L. Rev. ( 1954) 24, 36 f. 
23 Thus BRESLAUER, 50 ]urid. Rev. (1938) at 308 n. 7· 
24 See, e.g., BOWSTEAD, Agency art. 1.7, "in whose name or on whose behalf," 
with respect to ratification which is not permitted to an undisclosed principal. 
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Nor is "on account" a distinctive term, ·although it would 
admirably designate the representation of interests, since 
the word seems to be employed in the Agency Restatement 
sometimes also as a synonym of the term "for a disclosed 
principal."25 
For international purposes, we had better revert to an 
old terminology as follows: 
Acting in the interest of another person ("on account" 
of a principal in a proper sense) may be either: 
( 1) direct (open) representation, i.e., acting "on behalf" 
of a principal (disclosed agency), namely, either (a) in the 
name of another person, or (b) on behaif of whom it may 
concern (unnamed agency; Restatement: partially disclosed 
principal) ; or: 
( 2) indirect representation (representation of interest 
but not of right), i.e., acting in the agent's own name for an 
undisclosed principal. 
In order to embrace all these institutions, authority 
broadly defined may be termed as a power to act "on ac-
count" of the principal, which seems identical with the 
power "to affect his legal situation."26 
Conflicts law must adopt the distinction between agency 
and authorization. Authority originates or survives if its 
law so disposes, irrespective of an accompanying agency 
contract following its own law. An American food concern 
may send an employee to Guatemala to buy bananas, and his 
power to bind the firm may be construed under the law of 
that state. This, however, is no reason why his salary and 
25 See, e.g., §§ 7 comment d, 85 (1) and illustration I; cf. § 4· In § 199, 
however, "on his account" and "on account of the principal" expressly mean 
an undisclosed principal. The Restatement of Agency (Second) improved the 
wording of § 8 s (I) ; the ambiguous words "on account of" have been 
replaced by "for." 
26 Agency Restatement and Agency Restatement (Second) § 7: "Authority 
is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal •.. "; 
Conflicts Restatement § 345: "on account." 
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the right of the firm to dismiss him should not be subject to 
American law. 
Conflicts rules, on the other hand, may readily combine 
direct and indirect representation referring both to a na-
tional law which may or may not recognize t~e common law 
doctrine. 
3· Fiction of Identity 
Other sources of theoretical mistakes arose with the 
various primitive attempts to lay down the principle of open 
(disclosed) representation. The slogan, qui facit per alium, 
est perinde ac si faciet per se ipsum, much used in the medi-
eval development of the English master and servant doc-
trine,27 came to embody the idea that the represented and 
the representing persons. are deemed to be one, in a merger 
of personalities. That this fiction dominated the history of 
agency in England, is not an exact proposition according 
to prevailing opinion.28 But a distinct tradition of writers 
on conflicts law on the Continent took inspiration from some 
remarks of Casaregis. This jurist, who died in 1728, ex-
plained the transfer of property in goods sent from a seller 
to the buyer through delivery to a carrier, by the following 
construction (for which there were ancient analogies) : The 
seller, a "correspondent" of the buyer, is his commissioner. 
In complying with the buyer's order, he assumes a double 
personality, since in consigning the goods he conveys the 
property from himself as vendor to himself as the buyer's 
27 See for the early occurrences, SAYRE, "Criminal Responsibility for the 
Act of Another," 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 689, 690 n. 9· 
28 The sources collected by HOLMES, History of Agency, in 3 Select Essays 
in Anglo-American Legal History (190<}) 368, in the prevailing opinion do 
not support Holmes' hypothesis that modern agency doctrine in general, and 
the rules concerning the undisclosed principal in particular, originated from 
the fiction of identity. See PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, 2 History of English Law 
(ed. 2, reprint 1952) 532 n. r; YouNG B. SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. 
L. Rev. ( 1923) 444, at 452 and cited authors; WiiRDINGER, Geschichte der 
Stellvertretung (agency) in England (1933) 241, 
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agent. 29 This dictim was read together with the same 
author's doctrine-which Story qualified as "so reasonable 
in itself,"-that the principal's order for purchase plus the 
ultimate consent by the agent form the contract in loco in 
quo et ipse ( mandatarius) et venditor existunt.00 
In a long chain of subsequent writings these figures of 
speech led to the conception that the principal, represented 
by half of the agent's double personality, appears himself 
in the conclusion of the main contract. Among the various 
consequences derived therefrom in municipal law, it was 
contended by some outstanding Romanists that the contract 
with the third party is exclusively and immediately con-
cluded by the principal.31 In this radical view, all requisites 
of consent to the main contract, such as sanity of mind, 
serious intention, freedom from coercion, fraud, and mis-
representation, the significance of knowledge in such matters 
as warranty of title and quality, were exclusively referred 
to the principal.32 However, in other versions, less emphasis 
was laid on the principal's part, and in some the fiction had 
even a reversed effect of making the principal disappear 
behind his representative. 
In r828, the English chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst, adopted 
the obvious application of the fiction to conflicts law, by 
stating that: 
"If I, residing in England, send down my agent to Scot-
land, and he makes contracts for me there, it is the same as 
if I myself went there and made them."33 
Story found the same view accepted in two Louisiana de-
29 CASAREGIS, Discursus de commercio, disc. 38 § 51 (ed. 1737) p. 126. 
so Disc. 179 § IO (ed. 1737) p. 192; STORY § 285. 
31 DERNBURG, I Heidelberger Kritische Zeitschrift 18 as cited by LABAND, 
infra n. 32; UNGER, 2 System des osterreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts 
(ed. 3, r868) 136. 
32 Contra: LABAND, IO Z. Handelsr. 225 f.; THOL, I Handelsrecht (ed. 6, 
I879) 236 § 70. 
as Pattison v. Mills (I828) I Dow & CJ. 342, 363. 
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cisions.34 It has been approved in the case of Milliken v. 
Pratt35 and often since. The French and Italian literature 
followed largely the same trend.36 The person of the prin-
cipal merges, se confond, with that of the agent,-this 
dogma appears as late as in the work of Andre Weiss.87 
In his words, a French principal acting through an agent in 
Belgium, is considered "to be on the Belgian soil.ms 
These fictions are, like so many others, artificial and 
fallacious. As Bar pointed out, 39 how can the contract be 
regarded as made by the principal at the place of the agent, 
if the agent nevertheless decide:~ whether and on what terms 
the contract should be made? And moreover, with the logic 
employed in this traditional approach, why should we not 
reach the opposite conclusion, viz., that the contract is 
deemed made at the principal's real domicil? 
As to legislative policy, of course, the overemphasis laid 
on the external side of agency is certainly preferable to the 
overstressing of the internal side of which the mandate 
theory is guilty. But in many respects it is important not to 
forget that both principal and agent contribute to the effect 
of representation. Although they do so by no means on 
the same plane in concurrent acts of consent to the main 
contract, as was sometimes contended,40 they cooperate, the 
one by conferring authority and the other by making the 
contract. 
34 Mr. Justice Mathews in Whiston v. Stodder (18zo) 8 Mart. (La.) 95, 
134; Malpica v. McKown (1830) 1 La. 248, 254; STORY§ z8s. 
35 (1878) 125 Mass. 374-
36 See 3 FIORE § II so. 
37 Wxrss, 4 Traite 373· 
38 Exactly to the same effect, VALERY § 6sS: by charging his employee to 
go to France to represent him, the master transports himself in some manner 
to that country under guise of this representative ; hence the contract is 
formed as though the master were present. 
39 2 BAR § z68. Among recent Latin-American writers, 2 REsTREPO HER-
NANDEZ §§ 1294-6 has warned against the fiction. 
40 See HUPKA, Vollmacht 36 against Mrrnus, Die Lehre von der Stell-
vertretung 109, 182. 
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The merger theory was rather detrimental to the early 
formation of the American conflicts rules. As an illustration, 
we may remember the Louisiana case of 1830, in which a 
shipmaster entered into a contract in Mexico and the Mexi-
can law affirmed his implied authority and made the ship-
owner personally liable, contrary to the law of Louisiana 
where the owner was domiciled. The court applied the Mexi-
can law as the law of the place where the contract. with the 
third party was made, simply because if the owner had been 
personally present and had concluded that contract, the 
measure of his liability would be determined under Mexican 
law.41 That the principal was not present and did not make 
the contract, was forgotten under the spell of the fiction.42 
In Milliken v. Pratt/3 a case considered as leading in con-
flict of laws concerning both the place of contracting and 
agency, the fiction was extended in a particularly offensive 
way. A married woman who could not bind herself under 
her domiciliary law of Massachusetts, delivered a note to 
her husband, guaranteeing the debt. The husband sent it by 
mail to his creditor in Maine. The Massachusetts court, 
eliminating its own law, held her liable under the law of 
Maine, because "if the contract is completed in another 
state, it makes no difference in principle whether the citizen 
of this state goes in person or sends an agent, or writes a 
letter across the boundary line between the two states." 
This makes the place of the recipient of a letter a place of 
acting by agent, treating the mail as agent although it is 
only a messenger. And in all the innumerable situations 
covered by this broad definition, the party giving a declara-
tion is considered as quasi-present at a place where either 
the recipient is present or the contract is deemed to be made. 
41 Arayo v. Currell (1830) I La. 528, 20 Am. Dec. 286, 289. 
42 See the pointed refutation by Story in Pope v. Nickerson ( x844) 3 Story, 
U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports, 46 s, 480. 
43 (x878) 125 Mass. 374· 
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The real question had nothing to do with agenct4 and leads 
to the debatable question of the place at which a declara-
tion by letter is localized, in order to satisfy the devious 
test of the place of contracting. The true issue involved the 
territorial scope of the laws restricting or freeing the ca-
pacity of married women. 45 
4· The Developed Systems 
In many older and some quite recent treatises of con-
flicts law, all there is of agency is the eternal question where 
a contract through an agent is made. The question is idle, 
since the agent alone concludes the contract. 
The true problems of voluntary representation arise 
from its tripartite structure. In sum, we have to distinguish 
the contract (if any) creating obligatory rights and duties 
between principal and agent; the unilateral authorization by 
the principal empowering the agent to make a contract (or 
other transaction) with a third person; and this contract 
itself. 
It may also be recalled that civil law only considers acting 
on behalf of a principal as representation, and accordingly 
requires the principal's authorization to act on his behalf. 
In the best elaborated doctrine, the agent must make it 
clear to the third person that he acts not only in the prin-
cipal's interest but to make him immediately the exclusive 
party.46 Where the agency is undisclosed, the contract ex-
clusively regards the agent personally, and only the actions 
arising between agent and principal provide the means of 
transferring the effects of the external transaction to the 
44 Bell v. Packard (1879) 69 Me. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 251 presents a skillful 
argument and leaves the mail out of it. The contrary decision in Hauck 
Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe ( 1900) 83 Mo. App. 385 is equally tendentious. 
45 See infra Ch. 40 ns. 48 f. and ns. 99 f.; cf. 46 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1948) at 
634 and, most recently, EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 475 ff. § 178 with further 
citations. 
46 German BGB. § 164 par. 2. 
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principal. There are, however, important exceptions. Par-
ticularly in the case of a commission agent, claims acquired 
by the agent in his own name are deemed to belong to the 
principal as between these two persons or their creditors. 
The cautious provision of the German Commercial Code 
( § 392 paragraph 2) to this effect has been hesitatingly 
extended by judicial practice to other cases. Scandinavian 
law has definitely gone (to some extent) beyond the Ger-
man patternY These modifications of the logical antithesis 
between representation in law and representation in interest 
have given rise to a suggestive comparison with the common 
law doctrine which confers rights and duties on an undis-
closed principal. The two systems starting from opposed 
principles admit exceptions that diminish the contrast. They 
retain, however, their basically different outlooks and both 
leave notable gaps.48 Thus, they lend importance to the 
question what law governs. 
In the international field, the opposition of the systems 
was once incisively diminished by the common law rules 
presuming that the agent of a foreign, nonresident, or 
absent principal is not authorized to act on behalf of the 
principal, and that he is exclusively personally bound when 
acting in his own name. The usages of trade on w~ich these 
distinctions were based, have disappeared. 
A remarkable divergence exists also in the types of inter-
mediaries developed in commercial life and then constituted 
special legal institutions. In common law, the terms, agent, 
factor, broker, and commission agent have retaine.d much 
of their original colloquial meaning with overlapping con-
47 Scandinavian law as adopted in Sweden, Agency Law of April IS, 1914> 
§§ 57, 58, see CAPELLE, Das Aussenverhiiltnis bei der Vertretung fremder 
Interessen nach Skandinavischem Recht, in Festschrift fiir Leo Raape (1948) 
325, 330. 
48 See in the first place ScHMmT-RIMPLER, Das Kommissionsgeschiift, in 
Ehrenberg's Handb. V, 1, 479, 6xo; HANS R. HARTMANN, Das Ausfiihrungs· 
geschiift im deutschen und englischen Kommissionsrecht (Rostock 1935) re· 
viewed by ScHMIDT-RIMPLI!R, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 744·753· 
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notations. They are not identical with any nomenclature of 
a civil law country, in most of which the language equally 
Huctuates between commercial routine and legal exactitude. 
In Germany, such expressions as Prokurist, Handlungsbe-
vollmachtigter, Kommissionar, H andelsvertreter, and Fili-
alleiter, are most rigidly legal. 48a The language of conflicts 
law ought to be broad enough to embrace all such categories 
in a few rules. 
II. ANGLO-AMERICAN FoRMULATIONs OF THE CoNFLICTS RuLES 
I. Dicey 
The two rules of Dicey have been so often cited in the 
English courts that they must be mentioned, though with 
utmost disapproval. Rule I70 predicates under the headline 
of "Contract of Agency" that: 
"An agent's authority, as between himself and his prin-
cipal, is governed by the law with reference to which the 
agency is constituted, which is in general the law of the 
country where the relation of principal and agent is created." 
Does this section deal with authority or the contract 
of agency? With respect to the latter, the application of 
the general subsidiary criterion of lex loci contractus would 
be entirely wrong. However, the notes refer to the Ameri-
can cases dealing with the powers of a shipmaster and a 
partner. 
On the other hand, Rule I 7 I says that: 
"The rights and liabilities of the principal as regards 
third parties are, in general, governed by the proper law of 
the contract concluded between the agent and the third 
party." 
Taken literally, this rule, comparable to § 346 of the 
Restatement (Second), 48b only determines the scope of the 
48• As to terminology concerning commission agents, see STOLL, "Kollisions-
rechtliche Fragen beim Kommissionsgeschaft," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 6oi, 603 f. 
48b Cf. Restatement (Second}, Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) 66. 
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proper law of the contract. In this regard it is superfluous, 
because it plainly repeats what has been said in Rule I 54· 
But evidently Rule 171 is intended to include authority, 
which, though totally missing in the text of the rule, is sub-
ject of the comment. The seventh edition of Dicey's book 
has, in contrast with previous editions, refrained from the 
attempt to proclaim the lex loci contractus for these mat-
ters.49 However, the proposition of applying the proper 
law of the main contract cannot be endorsed either.49• 
2. Restatement 
The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, under 
the topic of "creation of a contract" establishes one rule 
( § 342) concerning the obligations of a principal and his 
agent as between themselves, 00 unfortunately calling for 
"the law of the place where the agreement was made." 
Authority is separated and treated in three bewildering 
rules, which can only be approximately understood in con-
nection with the Restatement of Agency. The latter Re-
statement, in an original attempt to break down the powers 
of agents into categories, distinguishes four classes: 
(I) "authority," short-named, created by manifestation 
of the principal to the agent ;51 
( 2) "apparent authority," created by manifestation of 
the principal to the third party ;52 
(3) estoppel, which on condition that the third party 
"changl!s his position," produces an action for him against 
the principal ;53 and 
49 On this point of the criticism, see BR.ESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev., supra n. as, 
at 303. See now the thorough criticism by the editors of DICEY (ed. 7, 1958). 
49a Cf. infra Ch. 40 p. I7I• 
so At the same time, the sections in question deal with partnership. It has 
been submitted before (Vol. II, Ch. 21) that this treatment is wrong insofar 
as the personal law of partnerships is ignored. Of course, partnership is 
also one of many sources of representation. 
51 Restatement of Agency and Restatement of Agency (Second) §§ 7, 26. 
52JJ. §§ 8, 12 comment a, 27. 
53Jd, §§ 31 (1) comment a. 
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( 4) unnamed "powers" arising in various situations,114 
which, for instance, include the acts incidental to, or usual, 
or necessary for conducting authorized transactions. 115 
While these classes, despite certain doubts, may be help-
ful for analytical purposes in municipal law, it is astonishing 
that the Conflicts Restatement should undertake to lay 
down three different rules for the three groups (I), ( 2), 
and ( 4), omitting ( 3). We shall look into the confusing 
results of this effort. 56 But we may take encouragement from 
the neat separation of authority from agency. 
3. Encyclopedias 
The various comments on the conflicts rules in practi-
tioners' works are unenlightening and full of contradictions. 
They ought to be radically reformed. 
III. THE THREE SUBJECT MATTERS OF CONFLICTS LAW 
The right categories of operating facts to be subjected 
to conflicts rules are easily found. The three distinguishable 
relationships among the three persons involved in agency 
require three independent conflicts rules, although, of course, 
they by no means necessarily have to refer to different laws. 
I. Authority 
The law or laws governing the power of an agent to act 
on behalf, or on account, respectively, of the principal have 
to comprehend creation, extent, modification, and termina-
tion of the power. Authorization by ratification must also 
be included, and all shades of manifestations to the third 
party or the public through which authority is either really 
constituted or only apparently but reliably asserted.117 There 
5•/d. § 12 comment b refers to §§ 161 ff., 194 ff. 
55 fd. §§ 161, 194-
56 Infra Ch. 40 p. 163. 
57 The subject of what in common law was shortly called implied authority, 
has been much discussed in the German doctrine. A full and critical report 
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is no sense in differentiating in conflicts law powers con-
ferred by the principal on the agent directly, or by declara-
tion or conduct on which the third party relies. For, in any 
case where any relations between the principal and third 
parties should arise, the third party may only rely on some 
manifestation, i.e., declaration, act, real or apparent acqui-
escence, not of the agent but of the principal. 
2. Underlying Relationship58 
The internal situation between principal and agent, 
whether based on a contract or not, extends to all their 
obligations toward each other, including the duty of the 
agent to follow the instructions of the principal and to 
notify all third persons concerned of modifications or termi-
nation of his authority. It would seem that also the fiduciary 
position of agents and the control by the principal to which 
they are subjected in American law, general as they appear,59 
are incidents of the underlying relationships, such as em-
ployment and partnership, rather than of the authority. 
3· External Relationship 
Where an agent concludes a contract with· a third party, 
or makes or receives a unilateral legal statement, in the 
principal's name, such transaction is the basis for all rela-
tionships imaginable between the principal or the agent on 
the one hand, and the third party on the other. 
on the not too happy formulations of the German Civil Code and the litera-
ture is to be found in THI!MISTOCLES D. MACRIS, of Athens, Greece, Die 
Stillschweigende Vollmachtserteilung (Marburg 1941). 
On the French doctrine, see the informative article by LEA UTi, "Le mandat 
apparent dans ses rapports avec Ia theorie generale de l'apparence," 45 Revue 
Trim. D. Civ. (1947) z88. 
58 Following the common law terminology but distinguishing as we do, 
FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 432, speaks of "authority," in 
opposition to "power"; this corresponds in the case of disclosed agency with 
what we call the internal instructions given within the underlying relationship. 
59 See Restatement of Agency and Restatement of Agency (Second) §§ xs, 
14-
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Due to the extraordinary confusion in this field, the 
assertion has sometimes been ventured in the United States 
that a contract made by an authorized agent is governed 
by the law of the agent's domicil or of the place where the 
agent exercises his authority.00 This is true of authorization 
but not of the third party contract. Nor is this contract 
subject to the lex loci contractus,61 any more than other 
agreements. The governing law is simply determined ac-
cording to the type or individual character of the contract 
itself, sale, bailment, loan, et cetera. 
The law governing the "main" or "third party" contract 
(or other transaction), whatever law it may be, decides 
whether a party to it can be represented by another person 
at all, or under what circumstances; whether, for instance, 
authorization must be given by a special act or in a written 
document62 and whether the agent must make known his 
authority to the third party.63 The particular common law 
doctrine regarding the rights to sue and be sued when the 
principal is not disclosed in the contract, also belongs to the 
effects of the main contract, which has not always been 
understood. 64 
60 •s C. J. S. 886, Confiict of Laws § II n. z8. 
61 2 C. J. S. 1038, Agency § 8 n. 83. 
62 With regard to the formal requirements, this is a delicate question; see 
infra Ch. 40, III, I, pp. 174 ff. 
6s 9 Repert. 21 No. 6. 
64 In Maspons v. Mildred, Goyeneche & Co. (•882) 9 Q. B. D. 530, 539 the 
Appeal Court correctly declared that the nature and extent of the authority 
given by a domiciled Spaniard to another in Havana, Cuba, was to be as-
certained under the Spanish law there in force but, when this was ascertained, 
the law governing the third party contract determined "the persons who can 
aue and can be sued on that contract." Wrongly, BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. 
(1938) 301, 309, 310 f. assumes that the latter question is the very question 
of authority, that therefore the decision. is inconsistent and that it proclaims 
the law of the place of the main contract for authority. Also DICEY (ed. 7) 
876 is not quite clear on the classification. REESE, "Agency in Confiict of 
Laws," XXth Century Comparative and Confiicts Law (1961) 409, 417, clearly 
supports the view taken here. 
In Germany, the doctrine is unsettled; see KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 552 and 
BRAGA, "Der Anwendungsbereich des Vollmachtstatuts," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 
337. 338. 
In Switzerland, the Cour de Justice Geneve (Nov. zs, 1952) Sem. Jud. 1954, 
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The same is also true, however, with regard to the effects 
of the contract, if the agent's authority is missing or in-
sufficient.65 In this respect again confusion is frequent.66 
The American courts are not in similar danger because they 
apply the law of the main contract to every problem of 
authority. Correct classification is assured, if we remember 
that in the best opinion liability of an unauthorized agent 
to the other party is based on his fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentation of authority.67 Common law has led the 
way in this construction, which is expressly formulated in 
the provisions of the Restatement of Agency on implied 
warranty of authority68 and has been consistently recog-
nized by the English courts. 69 
We shall deal next with authority (Chapter 40) and 
subsequently with the most typical contracts between prin-
cipals and agents. The transaction with a third party with all 
its just-mentioned incidents, is determined by its own nature. 
201, decided a case where the alleged agency was not disclosed, according to 
the Swiss law of the main contract, to the effect that the alleged principal 
could not sue the third party. PATRY, "A propos de Ia representation en droit 
international prive," Sem. Jud. 1954, 377, criticizes the court's approach 
without good reason. 
6 5 See RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR (1929) 824 (criticizing 2 ZlTELMANN 211, I 
FRANKENSTEIN 591) followed by RAAPE, IPR. {ed. 5) 502 f. See also FEDOOZl-
CERETI 751. 
66 Thus, RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. 2 is confused. See RABEL, supra n. 65, at S23. 
The tortuous ways of the doctrine since Casaregis are still reported by such 
authors as ALCORTA, 3 Der Int. Priv. 113. 
61 HUPKA, Die Haftung des Vertreters ohne Vertretungsmacht (1903) on 
the basis of comparative research. With meticulous consequence KoSTBU 771 
advocates with the Dutch H. R. (April 4, 1913) W. 9494 the law of the 
place where the agent warrants authority, to govern the liability of the 
agent to the third party. 
68 See § 329 Restatement of Agency and Restatement of Agency (Second). 
69 See Brit. Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook, Ltd. v. Ass. Newspaper, 
Ltd. etc. [1933] 2 K. B. 6x6-C. A. 
CHAPTER 40 
Authority 
AS EXPLAINED before, the present chapter is exclu-
..n_ sively intended to report on the conflicts concerning 
the authority of agents, that is, their powers to enter 
into transactions with third persons on behalf or on account 
of a principal. For the sake of simplicity, we shall suppose 
that the transaction with a third person is a contract in 
the technical sense which we have called the main contract 
or the third p'arty contract. The local connections between 
which the choice of law for the existence and the scope of 
authority must he determined are not numerous. The selec-
tion ought to he confined, roughly speaking, to two contacts, 
namely, the places where the principal is deemed to he situ-
ated and where the agent is deemed to act. We may call 
them the law of the princip'al and the local law. 
I. THE CoNFLICTs RuLES 
1. Policies of Conflicts Rules 
The influential theories of Story1 and Bar2 had a common 
merit. They emphasized the policy problem inherent in the 
choice of law governing the validity and effect of an agent's 
authority. Both eminent writers were in agreement that the 
protection of the principal's interest was of prevailing sig-
nificance. Although they realized the difficulty for a third 
party to obtain full knowledge of the existence and extent 
of the powers of a person acting on behalf of a foreign prin-
1 STORY§ 286 (b), and in Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3 Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. 
Reports 465. 
2 2 BAa 69. 
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cipal, they argued nevertheless that the latter could only 
be made liable under the law of his domicil. In this view, the 
third party must inform himself concerning the facts of 
the agency on which he relies, or else be satisfied with what 
liability an unauthorized agent may incur. It was though,t 
intolerable that one should, without having conferred the 
requisite power under his own law, incur liability by reason 
of another person's transactions. This might subject him to 
any law in the world I 
The Restatement, in its first section on the subject, § 343, 
approaches this appreciation of the problem by prescribing 
the law of the place where the agreement constituting au-
thority is made. 
An opposite view, however, has doubtless acquired su-
perior strength. Arguments and formulations vary, but 
the emphasis in all variants has shifted from the principal's 
place to that of the agent's activity. Lord Phillimore, in 
a much noticed brief remark, pointed to "the duty as well 
as expediency of upholding bona fide transactions with the 
subjects of foreign states," which he called the first prin-
ciple of private internationallaw.3 His many followers have 
concluded that security of commerce requires protection of 
the third party in assuming that the agent has the powers 
that he would have under the local law. In the case of 
"apparent authority," though for unknown reasons only in 
this case, the Restatement likewise refers to the law of the 
state where "reliance is placed" on the authorization 
( § 344) . According to another analysis, the state in which 
the transaction takes place is entitled to preference over 
the foreign law to which the principal may be subject.4 It 
is often argued that the creation of an authority is of less 
importance than its practical exercise by the agent in enter-
3 4 PHILLIMORE § 705; 2 MElLI 39; ROLIN, 3 Principes 420 ff. 
4THOL, I Handelsrecht (ed. 6, 1879) § 67 n. 3· 
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ing into a transaction with a third party. Accordingly, § 345 
of the Restatement proclaims the law of the place where 
the agent is to "act for the principal or other partners," 
and the German courts stress the law of the place where 
the authority "develops its effect."5 
Both basic theories have been recently attacked for con-
sidering the protection of interests instead of being content 
with a simple application of the law of the place of per-
formance.6 This idea, however, rests on the old, inadequate 
theory of mandate as containing a duty which is to be 
"performed." 
The debate has indeed suffered from a congenital defect, 
namely, an unwarranted generalization of reasoning. As 
will appear immediately below, Story and Bar dealt with 
special cases in which the powers of the agent were from the 
beginning limited by a law deserving universal effect. In 
pursuance of their arguments, we may contend that the law 
of the principal governs the powers of a shipmaster and 
those conferred on certain representatives directly by law 
or by public appointment. On the other hand, where a prin-
cipal constitutes authorization by an ordinary, private, vol-
untary act, intending its use in a foreign state, the law of 
this state is justifiedly considered competent to construe 
the validity and effects of the authorization. In the former 
cases the protection of the principal, in the latter cases the 
protection of the third parties, obtain preference. 
The two theories, thus, can be reconciled. Neither does 
Story's opinion mirror the present American law,7 nor is it 
completely obsolete,8 nor wrong because of unilateral con-
sideration of the risk of the principaP But it is no more 
5 See infra n. 74· 
6 BATIFFOL 282 § 3IS. 
1 KUHN, Comp. Com. 277. cf. Recueil 1928 I zsS. 
8 Blll!SLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. ( 1938) 307. 
9 2 BEALE 1196. 
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correct to harmonize, as does Wharton, 10 the theory of the 
principaPs law in Pope v. Nickerson and the proper law 
doctrine adopted in the Chatenay Case by the supposition 
that the intentions of the parties were different. 
We shall first discuss the special situations of authoriza-
tions recognized everywhere as constituted under the law 
with which the principal is connected. The rest of this 
chapter will be devoted to the domain, commonly the only 
one envisaged, of the powers of privately constituted agents. 
2. Authorizations Internationally Determined by Their 
Source 
(a) Shipmaster's powers. Story, in his treatise/1 dis-
cussed the common law rule that the master of a ship has 
a limited authority to borrow money in a foreign port and 
give a bottomry bond only in cases of necessary repairs and 
other pressing emergencies, while in some maritime coun-
tries the master has a broader authority, or at least a 
broader liability may attach to the vessel and the owner. 
Story approved the English practice restricting the master 
of an English ship according to the law of the domicil of 
the owner. 
Later, in the Massachusetts federal circuit court, Story 
applied this view in the case of Pope v. Nickerson12 in which 
a Massachusetts vessel, owned by a resident of that state, 
on a voyage from Malaga to Philadelphia, put in to Ber-
muda under stress of weather and was sold by the master 
with the whole cargo. The liability of the owners for the 
acts of the master was limited by the laws of Spain and 
Massachusetts to the value of the vessel and her freight, 
but was unlimited in Pennsylvania. 
10 WHARTON 875 § 408a. 
11 STORY§ 286 (b). 
12 Pope v. Nickerson (1844) 3 Story, U. S. Circ. Ct. Reports 465, 474, 19 
Fed. Cas. IOU No. n,274· 
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Story held13 that "if the ship is owned and navigated 
under the flag of a foreign country, the authority of the 
master to contract for and to bind the owners, must be 
measured by the laws of that country, unless he is held out 
to persons in other countries, as possessing a more enlarged 
authority .... If any person chooses to trust him under 
any circumstances, or beyond this-it is a matter of blind 
credulity, and at his own peril. ... If we were to resort 
to a different rule-to the laws of the different countries 
which the ship might visit, for the interpretation of his 
powers, while he was in the ports of that country-we should 
have the most extraordinary and conflicting obligations . . ,, 
ansmg .... 
To be sure, Story, while arguing about the force of the 
law of the flag, exclaimed that "No one ever imagined that 
in any other case of agency to be transacted in a foreign 
country, the principal was bound beyond the instructions 
or authority given to his agent .... The authority con-
fided (to him) by the principal is measured by the interpre-
tation and extent of that authority, by or according to the 
law of the place where it is given, by the lex loci and not 
by the laws of a foreign country .... " However, this is 
an entirely mistaken obiter dictum, whereas his decision in 
the instant case was perfectly correct. 
That a shipmaster's authority is to be measured once 
and for all according to the law of the flag, may indeed be 
called a universally settled rule.13a It has been adopted in 
England, clearly in Lloyd v. Guibert14 and probably in 
constant practice.15 It appears in the resolutions of interna-
13 I d. at 475 if. 
13a This statement is supported by FICKER, "Die Bestimmung des Voll-
machtstatuts in besonderen Fallen," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 330, 332. 
14 (I86s) L. R. I Q. B. us; CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 220. 
15M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 435 § 416,443 § 424· 
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tional congresses16 and in the C6digo BustamenteY It pre-
vails commonly.18 In this respect, it can be said therefore 
that legitimate reliance of the public may be based not on 
local laws but only on the law of the state to which the 
vessel belongs. 
Story and other common law jurists have spoken of the 
master's authority as interpreted under the law of the flag. 
On the Continent, it is often directly construed as a legal 
power. There is no substantial difference of meaning. The 
decisive consideration is the international preference en-
joyed by the law of the state where the vessel is registered. 
(b) Legal authority. To refute the application of lex 
loci contractus of the main contract, Bar contended that 
security of commerce, instead of requiring this application, 
on the contrary demanded the application of the law under 
which the authority was given.19 For illustrations, he re-
ferred to the directors of a corporation, the powers held 
in civil law on the ground of family relations, and those 
of a shipmaster. "What would be the use, for instance, for 
a stock corporation to limit the powers of a director by 
requiring assent of the board or of the assembly of stock-
holders, if he were not so bound in contracting abroad?" 
These are forceful arguments. But they support the lex 
domicilii merely in application to what are called in civil 
law countries legal representatives. Such include the father, 
mother, guardian, or curator of an individual, inasmuch as 
they are granted by law supervision over persons or property 
16 Congresses of Antwerp and Brussels, see I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 426. 
17 Art. 279· 
18 With the ill-reputed exception of a German case; see KEGEL, Kom. (ed. 
9) 551 n. 6; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 506; FICKER, supra n. 13a, at 332. 
For France, see citations in 3 Repert. 30 No. 45 and BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 
3) 663 § 609· 
Denmark: LANDO, Mellemmandens kompetence i internationale kontraktfor· 
hold (1956) 11-13. 
United States: EHRENZWEIG, Conftict 446 note 13 and accompanying text. 
REESE, supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 414 n. 2, seems to disagree. 
19 2 BAR 69. 
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and conclude legal transactions in the name of the child 
or dependent person, or assist in his transactions; the organs 
of legal persons; receivers in bankruptcy, administrators of 
decedents' estates and all other agents acting with legally 
defined powers for estates, without being the titular owner 
as common law trustees are. 
The principle extends to formally fixed powers which 
cannot be restricted with effect against third parties. Such 
powers are vested in many countries in the boards of cor-
porations,20 in commercial managers such as procura insti-
toria under Italian,21 or procura under German law,22 in 
guardians,23 and others. The investigation of such powers 
is reduced to a minimum of inquiry. 
This doctrine seems to be settled at present, clearly in 
Germany,24 and also in other civil law jurisdictions.25 It 
is the only view consistent with the principle of personal law. 
This law determines in what respect and by whom an indi-
vidual or association is represented by operation of law.26 
At common law, the situation is different. The category 
of "authority by law" is not unknown, but consists of few 
and doubted cases.27 Powers based on family relations are 
scarce. The personal law thus largely disaJ?pears behind 
20See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 17of. 
21 C. C. ( 1942) arts. 2203 If. 
22 BGB. §§ 49, so; see for other commercial dependent agents, § 54· 
23 French C. C. art. 450; German BGB. § 1793. 
24 When I suggested this approach in 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 809 If., the 
doctrine seemed insecure, but it has been commonly confirmed since. KEGEL, 
Kom. ( ed. 9) 550; RAAPI!, IPR. ( ed. 5) 502. 
2 'E.g., Hungary: Curia (Oct. 27, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 396; the 
manager of an Amsterdam shipping enterprise, a registered merchant in 
Vienna, had unlimited authority under Austrian law to hire there a 
Hungarian worker. The present" Hungarian law seems to be in accord 
with this case; see RECZEI 179, 282 f. 
26 Vol. I (ed. 2) pp. 342, 646; Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 168 If. 
27 MECHEM, Agency (ed. 4) 10, 26. 2 WHARTON 868 spoke of taking charge 
of the affairs of another "either by voluntary act of such latter person desiring 
to be relieved of care, or by act of the law, as in the case of guardianships 
and commissions of lunacy." EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 445 speaks of "legal 
authority." 
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the law of the place of contracting, or that governing the 
contract. 
However, in the broad domain of the law of corporations 
and other associations, we have found it highly advisable to 
recognize that the law governing the life of the organiza-
tion should extend to the powers of the principal officers 
or managing partners.28 This postulate, it is true, is often 
neglected. 
Illustration: An Ohio corporation owning land in West 
Virginia conferred on Porter, a real-estate broker (appar-
ently in Ohio), by formal action of its board of directors a 
power of attorney "to sell the property." In a subsequent 
lawsuit, the issue depended on the authority of a subagent 
in West Virginia appointed by Porter. The West Virginia 
court applied its domestic law, laid down in two preceding 
decisions of the court, in order to state that the board of 
directors-in Ohio !-had failed to comply with the for-
mality prescribed in West Virginia that the signature and 
the corporate seal be affixed.29 Although the law of the 
forum for several reasons was applicable to determine the 
subagent's powers, it should not have been extended to the 
original authorization except upon its questionable force 
as lex situs, which is not even mentioned in the report. 
Finally, the powers of all persons appointed by a court 
or an administrative agency, whether connected with a trust 
relation or not, are as a rule legally defined and therefore 
must be expected to be subject to the law of their creation. 
In all these cases, neglected in the treatises, the law under 
which a power is deemed to be constituted has a natural 
and overwhelming claim. Exceptions for protecting inno-
cent third parties will not be justified except in rare cases. 
Persons dealing with the alleged principal officers of an 
association or court appointees, indeed, should be charged 
with the knowledge of the existence and extent of their 
2s Vol. II ( ed. z) pp. 169-17Z. 
29 Gallagher v. Washington County Savings, Loan and Building Co. (1943) 
zs S. E. (z<P 914, 918. The court invoked § 345 of the Restatement. 
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powers. On the other hand, they may rely on the source of 
these powers. 
3· Authorization Determined by Local Law 
(a) Former views: Law of the princip'al. It is only in 
the field of authorization by private legal act that the law 
of the principal has been pushed into the background. For 
a time it was favored on the Continent.30 Some followers of 
the mandate theory supported it as the law of the place 
where the mandator receives acceptance.:n More writers 
have maintained the same device as a subsidiary test, as in 
the case of an agent sent to several countries.32 
(b) Local law. On the other hand, the fiction of identity 
was a strong factor in promoting the law of the place where 
the agent represents the principal. As late as 1917, the 
Appeal Court at the Hague applied Italian law to the 
authority of a Genoese broker with the justification that the 
Dutch principal was deemed to have traveled to Genoa.38 
The real grounds, of course, for preferring the law under 
which the agent "exercises his power"-or however else 
the courts express the local law-lie in the idea that third 
persons should be able easily to ascertain the powers of 
the agent. Most frequently, this consideration has been 
aided by presumptions concerning the intentions of the 
80 Belgium: 7 LAURENT 539 § 450 (place of the principal as the party 
making the offer of mandate). 
Germany: 8 ROHGE. 150. 
Italy: FI!OOZZI-CEltETI 751 and n. 3, reserving the law of the forum protecting 
bona fide parties. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 14, 1876) W. 4132. 
81 Supra Ch. 39· 
82 Thus, e.g., 2 WHARTON 869 § 406 (who confuses the case with that of a 
soliciting agent); DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 283; VALERY § 658; 2 SCHNITZER 
(ed. 4) 672 f. And see infra at n. 59. 
In Germany, the law of the principal has been recently advocated by KEGEL, 
IPR. 199 f.; KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 551 f.; contrary to the prevailing opinion, 
he recommends the application of the local law only in cases where it is 
necessary to protect the good faith of third persons. 
88 App. s'Gravenhage (June 8, 1917) W. 102o8, applying ltal. C. C. (1865) 
art. 376. 
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parties. For, so far as the principal manifests his will 
unequivocally and brings it to the knowledge of the third 
party, no problem arises. But when he is silent or negligent 
or relies on internal instructions or legal restrictions relating 
to the power conferred by him, which are unknown or un-
usual in the foreign country, construction of his conduct in 
the light of the local law is regarded as justified. Similar 
problems arise with respect to the validity and termination 
of authority. 
Other rationalizations are questionable. That modern 
writers should think (in Savigny's manner) of the principal 
as "submitting" himself to the foreign law only because he 
sends his agent there, 34 resurrects an antiquated emphasis 
on the volition of a party. It is also objectionable that Beale 
terms the question one of jurisdiction.35 Ultimately, Beale 
ascribes the principal's subjection to the foreign law to the 
fact that he causes the use of the authority in the foreign 
state.36 Not even this justification is accurate. 
Beale's main example is Milliken v. Pratt which we have 
not found to be a suitable part of agency law.37 Accepting 
its bizarre construction of the mail service as a regular 
agency, Beale concluded that Massachusetts law was ap-
plicable because the woman caused the postal delivery in 
that state.38 This amounts to saying that a person under a 
disability at his domicil, can render himself competent by 
directing his note to another state through the mail. Co~ 
monly, the same weird result has been reached under the 
law of the place where the contract is "completed." 
In another case39 adduced by Beale, a married woman 
34 2 BEALE u98; similarly e.g., RG. (Dec. 5, 1896} 38 RGZ. 194, whereli 
recent decisions stress the needs of commerce. 
35 2 BEALE II98 § 345.2. 
36 Restatement § 345 and comment c. 
37 Supra Ch. 39 n. 43· 
38 2 BEALE I 197 § 345.2. 
aD Union National Bank of Chicago v. Chapman (1902) 169 N. Y. 538, 
62 N. E. 672., 
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signed an accommodation note in favor of her husband's 
firm in Alabama, supposing that it would be discounted in 
Alabama. The note was, however, taken to Illinois. The 
New York court declared that she was not liable because 
of incapacity under her own law. But did she not "cause" 
the discount in Illinois, in the sense of a conditio sine qua 
non? She did, although it may be contended that she did not 
authorize such discount. Causation is the wrong word also 
for the reason that it raises the idea of some compulsion on 
the agent whereas authorization confers merely a power, 
and a duty of employing it flows only from an accompany-
ing contract. 
The true reason for the application of the local law is 
simply objective expediency, provided that the principal has 
contemplated acting in the foreign country. 
England. Among the approaches taken by the courts in 
various countries, the most impressive is illustrated by the 
English case, Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph 
Co. 40 While numerous other English decisions are elusive 
or confusing, this Court of Appeals decision is outstanding. 
A Brazilian executed in Brazil in the Portuguese language 
a power of attorney authorizing a broker in London to buy 
and sell shares of stock. The court had to decide under what 
law the extent of the authority was to be determined. Al-
though starting from the usual references to lex loci con-
tractus and lex loci solutionis, the Court of Appeal passed 
to the twofold consideration that ( 1) the true meaning of 
the authority was to be ascertained on the ground of all 
circumstances of the execution of the instrument including 
the Brazilian law, and (2) if the meaning was that shares 
were to be bought and sold in England, ''the extent of the 
authority in any country in which the authority is to be acted 
upon is to be taken to be according to the law of the par-
40 [ 1891] I Q. B. 79, 83 f.; CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 253 f. seems to interpret the 
case quite differently. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
ticular country where it is acted upon." The court, thus, 
emphasized two distinguishable requisites of representation, 
one to be determined with a certain regard to Brazilian 
law, and the other with an exclusive view to English law. 
Recent decisions follow the same line.41 
It has been said42 that a contrary opinion was expressed 
in 1933.48 An English insurance company, employed by 
a New York insurance broker through an English broker, 
insured a Canadian corporation residing in New York. The 
American broker cancelled the policy, and the question was 
whether he had authority and ground to do so. The court 
affirmed this question, applying New York law to determine 
the extent of the broker's authority. This decision was 
amply justified, since the power was considered conferred by 
the brokerage contract and therefore effective as against 
the insured. Lord Scrutton, it is true, invoked Dicey's Rule 
No. 179 and applied the law of New York as the place 
where the brokerage contract was made.48a But the learned 
judge would scarcely have followed this theory if the brok-
erage contract had been concluded somewhere else. This 
Appeal Court decision, scantily equipped, should not be 
regarded as overruling former considerations.43b 
Germany. Exactly the same approach as that manifested 
in the Ch'atenay Case was developed by the German courts 
in an elaborate system presently to be discussed.44 
41 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] z All E. R. 675; Apt v. 
Apt [ 1947] P. IZ7, aff'd, C. A. [ 1947] z All E. R. 677 at 68o: analogy for 
authorization of a proxy marriage. 
42 Note, s Cambr. L. J. (1934) zsx; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (ed. z) 
437; see SCHOCH, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. z9o. 
48 Ruby Steamship Corp. v. Commercial Union Ass. Co. ( 1933) 46 Ll. L. 
Rep. z6s, 39 Com. Cas. 48, 4 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 161. 
48& The former Rule No. 179 in DICEY's treatise is now Rule No. 170; see p. 
141 supra. 
43b This view is approved by REESE, supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 415. It is 
questionable whether it is also approved by EHREN ZWEIG, Conflict 446. 
44fnjra pp. 160 ff. On the Swedish views, see MICHAEL! 301 f. 
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France. The majority of French authors are led by the 
theory of identity of principal and agent to the application 
of the law of the place where the agent contracts with the 
third person. 45 
United St'ates. Likewise, despite Story, the American 
courts do not apply the law of the principal to an agent's 
authority. Nor is it true that they determine the validity 
and scope of an authority under the law of the place where 
the authority is constituted as has been asserted on the basis 
of one sole case,46 that of Freeman's Appeal.47 There, the 
Connecticut court was interested in applying the law of the 
forum to deny capacity to a married woman domiciled in 
the state, in opposition to the leading case of Milliken v. 
Pratt and all other cases in point.48 The woman, in her own 
state of Connecticut, had signed a note of guarantee for 
her husband and handed it to him, and he mailed it to 
Illinois. The decision was based on her incapacity to author-
ize him as her agent in Connecticut. What such an argu-
ment is worth, is shown by the previous decision of the same 
court validating a married woman's blank endorsement 
of an insurance policy, delivered to her husband in Connecti-
cut, on the ground that the husband filled it out in New 
Jersey.49 
The usual approach of the American courts is different. 
4 5 LAURENT 544; WEISS and VALERY, see supra Ch. 38 ns. 37, 38. Directly 
to the same practical effect, BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 662 § 609 and Cass. civ. 
(July 2, 1946) Gaz. Pal. (Nov. 30, 1946) cited by him; and App. Paris (May 
21, 1957) Revue Crit. 1958, 128, note FRANCESCAKIS. 
Contra: ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 412; ToMASI, "Les conflits de lois 
en matiere de representation conventionelle et l'opportunite d'une convention 
internationale," Revue Crit. 1958, 651, 655 ff. 
46 Thus 2 C. J. S. 1038, Agency§ 8 and n. 82; Restatement § 343· However, 
a recent case may be added with respect to formality. See infra n. 89. 
47 (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420. 
48 Supra Ch. 39 n. 43· 
49 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (1884) 52 Conn. 592. 
2 BEALE ng6 n. 3 places the case on a more convincing ground: the assign-
ment of the policy to the beneficiary was the act authorized by the woman. 
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They determine the powers of an agent according to the 
law of the place "where the agent exercises his authority," 
identifying this place with the place where the contract 
between the agent and the third party is made.50 It is not 
certain under what theory this law, the lex loci contractus 
of the main contract, is applied. The decisions often refer 
to the alleged general rule of Scudder v. Union National 
Bank51 that the validity of a contract is governed by the 
law of the place of contracting. But in almost every single 
case some additional connection has pointed to the same 
law, apart from the fact that most decisions are concerned 
with insurance contracts made by a local agent. If as sug-
gested before, 52 the rule goes back to a case of I 84 I, its 
significance is that the existence and extent of authority is a 
mere incident of the contract with a third party, quite as 
form and capacity have been so often treated in this country. 
What exact localization this theory furnishes if we aban-
don the tenet of lex loci contractus, will be discussed later.53 
Latin America. Despite the continued influence of the old 
mandate theory, Latin-American writers also seem to veer 
towards the law of the place where the agent "carries out 
his mandate."54 The hope is justified that authority may be 
given its own place in the conflicts law. 
(c) Limitations on the local law: Types of agents. The 
German doctrine applying the law of the place where the 
agent exercises his power, was first established in the case 
50 2 BEALE 1195; IS C. J. S. 886 n. 28 and Supp. 1948. This includes recent 
cases such as Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279; Paxson v. Com-
missioner of Int. Revenue (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 144 F. (2d) 772. 
51 (1875) 91 u.s. 4o6· 
52 Carnegie v. Morrison (1841) 2 Metcalf (43 Mass.) 381, supra Ch. 39 
n. 3· We exclude entirely the liability of stockholders for acts of directors 
in a state other than that of incorporation, often categorized under the 
subject of agency, as by Thomas v. Matthies sen ( 1914) 232 U. S. 221 and in 
England by BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. (1938) at 314. On the subject itself, 
see Vol. II ( ed. 2) pp. 82 ff. 
58 Infra II, I (a), pp. 169, 171. 
54 E.g., Brazil: EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 372 § 242; SERPA LOPES, 2 Lei Introd. 
360 § 261. 
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of an agent having a permanent and fixed place of business. 
Bar, the advocate of the law of the principal, conceded an 
exception for foreign domiciled representatives. 55 The Ger-
man courts, in fact, for a long time emphasized the agent's 
domicil only under a threefold limitation: namely, (I) the 
agent should be an individual or organization, established 
at a fixed place of business in a country other than that of 
the principal; ( 2) he should have concluded contracts in 
that country only; moreover, (3) the suit should arise from 
different interpretations of the scope of authority in the 
countries of principal and agent.'16 
The typical case, thus defined, presents the core of the 
matter and seems to be treated practically everywhere to 
the same effect. In the words of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
"the manifestation of the agent goes out from the territory 
of his law and is directed from there to the third person. "57 
The latter, as the Reichsgericht constantly states, has to 
rely on this law. 
This unanimity may partly be explained by the fact that 
in outstanding cases the solution is obtainable from both 
ends of the controversial line of thought. The courts often 
stress the necessity for the third party to depend on the 
local law. But where the agent is a branch or agency in the 
exclusive service of the principal firm, his place of business 
may be regarded as a special domicil of the principal him-
self. Such reasoning has inevitably prevailed when a foreign 
corporation carries on business in a state. Whether or not 
that state prescribes that an agent with full powers must be 
appointed and registered, the powers of any permanent 
55 BAR, in 1 Ehrenberg's Handb. 345 and n. 5; followed by HUPKA, 
Vollmacht 252; similarly, 2 WHARTON 867 § 405. 
56 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. 
Arch. No. 73; (Dec. 5, 1911) 78 RGZ. 55· 
57 Switzerland: Inspired by 2 MElLI 39, BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II 
648, 650 (validity of "procura" of a foreign branch); accord, (Dec. 14. 
1920) 46 BGE. II 490, 493 (branch manager); (March 5, 1923) 49 BGE. 
II 70, 74 (although concerned with agency in contracting, seems also con-
clusive for authority). 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
representative of the foreign corporation are conveniently 
measured by the local standard. 
The same solution is to be found where the agent is a 
domiciled independent contractor. When a Dutch firm 
through its branch in Cardiff, England, employed an Italian 
brokerage firm domiciled in Genoa, Italy, to sell coal, the 
Dutch court did not hesitate to apply the Italian Code of 
Commerce in construing its authority.58 
But, while modern followers of the law of the principal 
are forced to acknowledge concessions in the cases men-
tioned, some have insisted on their rule in the case of a 
traveling salesman having no fixed domicil.59 Neverthel.ess, 
the German courts which once proclaimed such a distinc-
tion,60 have enlarged their formulation of the rule in such 
generally expressed dicta that it is prevailingly understood 
to include the powers of any agent. 61 In the United States, 
it has not been doubted that when a traveling salesman goes 
from state to state selling goods, "the situs of the contracts 
he makes is where he exercises his authority."62 The recent 
English decision in the Sinfra Case has recognized that 
&BThe Netherlands: App. Haag (June 8, I9I7) W. IOZ08, with the argu-
ment that because authorization was given to a brokerage firm carrying on its 
business in Genoa, Italy, the contract constituting the authority was made in 
Italy. The court distinguishes sharply the contract made through the agent 
with the third party. Cj., e.g., Swiss BG. (July 20, I920) 46 BGE. II 26o, 263: 
the plaintiff, having a special agent in Switzerland, had to take into con-
sideration that the acts of its representative are determined under Swiss law. 
59 Supra n. 32. 
eo RG. (June xs, 1920) 76 Seuff. Arch. z, still followed by NusSBAUM, 
D. IPR. 263. But the decision was confused and has no authority; see for 
criticism, RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1929) 822. 
61 See the authors cited in 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 815 n. I; and adde LG. 
Berlin I (Oct. s, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 63 with comment by RABEL, 7 
Z.ausl.PR. ( 1933) Soz. For an excellent survey on the German cases, see 
VON CAEMMERER, "Die Vollmacht fiir schuldrechtliche Geschiifte im deutschen 
internationalen Privatrecht," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 201, based on reports by 
several authors, id. at 326-341 ; a French translation of the survey is repro• 
duced in Conference de Ia Haye, Actes et documents de Ia neuvieme session, 
vol. I, at 257· 
62 Succession of Welsh (1904) xu La. Sor, 35 So. 913 (for the purpose of 
applying the Louisiana law of seller's privilege); Kamper v. Hunter Land 
Co. (1920) 146 Minn. 337, 341, 178 N. W. 747· 
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where a power of attorney is issued for use in several coun-
tries, the scope of a copy for use in England is determined 
by English law;63 the English presumption is that any au-
thority given for several countries entitles the agent to act 
in each country in accordance with the laws thereof.64 
Kinds of problems. Since the differences of municipal 
rules concerning the extent of authority, and particularly of 
implied authority, are outstanding in judicial discussions 
everywhere, they appear also in the foreground of the 
literature from Story to the present time. But the rule that 
the law of the agent's act governs, nationally enlarges its 
own domain. Problems such as the effect of ratification and 
termination of authority cannot conveniently be solved in 
a different manner. The scope of the local law expands, and 
it becomes the general law governing voluntary authority. 
The American practice has never made a distinction among 
the problems. 
(d) The Restatement. In § 343, whether an agreement 
constitutes "authorization" is said to be determined by the 
law of the place where it is made, the lex loci actus. How-
ever, § 344 subjects "apparent" authority to the law of the 
state "where reliance is placed upon such apparent author-
ization." Finally, § 34 5, under the condition that there is 
authority or apparent authority for acting in a state, leaves 
it to this state to decide "whether an act done (there by 
the agent) on account of the principal imposes a contractual 
duty upon the principal." 
We know that Beale65 intended to consider the risks and 
rights not only of the principal, as Story did, but also of 
the third party, which he found protected in the cases. But 
we are faced once more with patently contradictory rules, 
since here less than anywhere else can creation and effects 
63 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675. 
64 Esher, M. R., in the Chatenay Case at 83, cited by DICEY (ed. 7) 875 f. 
65 2 BEALE II96 § 345·1• 
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of the legal relationship be submitted to different laws. If 
§ 343, for instance, says that the state where an agreement 
is made determines whether it constitutes an authorization, 
does this not include the requirement of personal capacity 
to appoint an agent? Yet, illustration 2 to § 345 states that 
a married woman's promissory note signed and handed to 
her husband in X is valid if the wife is responsible under 
the law of Y where it was to be, and was, discounted. Cer-
tainly this is the solution prevailing in the courts. But this 
practice clashes with the broad language of § 343· To read 
Beale's own comment to § 345,66 it seems that he endorsed 
the cases in many other respects. Is, then, § 343 i~ reality 
restricted to the question whether P in X sends the agent 
to state Y to act on his behalf ( cf. § 34 5 comment c) ? This 
would make sense, but does not exhaust the meaning of the 
section. 
For comment a to § 345 of the Restatement assigns to 
§ 343, viz., the lex loci actus, the "extent" of authority. 
However, illustration 3 to § 345 calls for the law of the 
place of acting to determine, according to § 34 5, implied 
authority. 
The place of reliance ( § 344) must be something differ-
ent from the place where the agent "acts" ( § 345), and the 
difference might reflect a diversity of opinion about the 
selection of convenient contacts. But what this place of 
reliance exactly is, why the rule is changed from § 344 to 
§ 345, and what is meant by the agent's "act," is nowhere 
explained. The suspicion seems justified that the reliance 
rule for apparent authority intends to satisfy some scholas-
tic need for a symmetrical contraposition of the manifesta-
tions to the third party in contrast to manifestations to the 
agent. 
The confusion is due in the first place to the stereotyped 
66 22 BEALE ll95· 
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use of lex loci contractus and, in the second place, to the 
erroneous belief that the distinctions proposed in the Agency 
Restatement could support differentiated rules of conflict. 
Leaving these obscure riddles unsolved, we may remark 
with satisfaction not only, as noted before,67 that agency and 
authority are neatly distinguished but also that the local 
law receives a significant role with the express purpose of 
protecting the expectation of third parties. 67a 
(e) International Drafts. The International Law Asso-
ciation (I. L. A.), at the Conferences of r 9 50 (Copen-
hagen) and 1952 (Lucerne), approved two Draft conven-
tions concerning the conflict of laws in matters of agency, 
elaborated by a committee under the chairmanship of Algot 
Bagge. 
The Copenhagen Draft of 195067b contains conflict rules 
for any kind of agency with only some general exceptions in 
article 1. The Lucerne Draft of 1952,67e on the other hand, 
deals exclusively with conflict of laws regarding agency in 
matters of sale of goods to which the Hague Convention of 
1955674 is applicable. Both drafts define the agent as a per-
son uqui accomplit des actes pour le compte d'un autre,"61e 
and the Lucerne Draft expressly adds that the act may be 
87 Ch. 39 p. 143. 
87&The Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) neither contains 
the above criticized rules of the first Restatement nor any other conflict rules 
concerning authority. But the reporter in charge of the Restatement (Second) 
of the Conflict of Laws dealt with the subject in two articles, the position of 
which is virtually in agreement with the views here taken; see REESE, supra 
Ch. 39 n. 64, at 409, and REESE & FLESCH, "Agency and Vicarious Liability 
in Conflict of Laws," 6o Col. L. Rev. (1960) 764-
87bi.L.A., Report of the 44th Conference (Copenhagen 1950) 192-197; see 
the explanatory comments by GUTZWILLER, id. at 183-192. 
87ei.L.A., Report of the 45th Conference (Lucerne 1952) 309-314; see notes 
id. at 304-308. · 
874 See supra Ch. 36 n. r. 
878 In the English version of the Copenhagen Draft the words "Pour le 
compte de" are translated by "on behalf of," whereas the English version of 
the Lucerne Draft speaks more accurately of acts "for the account of" another. 
As to these problems of terminology, see supra p. 133. 
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done in the agent's own name as well as in the name of the 
principal (article 2). Thus the drafts are intended to in-
clude cases of undisclosed agency. In article 3, both drafts 
lay down the principle of the autonomy of the parties to 
determine the law governing the relationsthip between prin-
cipal and agent; and the following articles 4 of both drafts, 
respectively, contain conflict rules for those cases in which 
the parties did not designate any law. But the law applicable 
according to these provisions obviously does not determine 
the agent's authority, i.e., his power to bind the principal 
by legal acts involving third parties, especially by contracts 
with them. This follows from article 7 of the Copenhagen 
Draft and from article 8 of the Lucerne Draft. Both pro-
visions, differing from each other only as to their wording, 
subject the agency, as between the principal and the third 
party, to the law of the place where the agent has acted. 
The Eighth Hague Conference on Private International 
Law ( 1956) discussed the two drafts which were submitted 
to it by the International Law Association.67f The Confer-
ence decided that the problem should be studied by a special 
committee.67g But before such committee was appointed, 
it became obvious that the countries participating in the 
Hague Conferences are not very much interested in a unifi-
cation of the conflict rules concerning the relationship be-
tween principals and third parties. The main reason for 
their reluctance seems to be that there are only a few cases 
in which difficulties in this regard arose. Apart from this, 
certain regional groups of countries are endeavoring to 
elaborate uniform laws on agency; and so is the Interna-
tional Institute for the Unification of Private Law in 
Rome.67h For these reasons the Ninth Hague Conference 
s1t See Conference de la Haye, Actes de la huitieme session 223-229. 
67gJJ. at 356. 
67h See Year-Book 329 ff. 
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on Private International Law ( 1960) decided not to take 
any further steps at the moment.671 
4· Consideration of the Principal's Law 
In applying the local law of the place where the agent 
"exercises" his authority, the English and German courts 
expressly presuppose that the principal has agreed that the 
agent should act for him in the specific country. With a 
similar intention, though less correctly, the Restatement, 
§ 345, requires "causation" by the principal for the agent's 
acts in the foreign country (supra pp. 156 and 163). The 
American courts require "some conduct of the principal ... 
warranting a legal presumption of agency."68 
Does all this mean a preliminary conflicts rule referring 
to the law of the principal's domicil or of the place where 
he constitutes the authority? In my own former proposal 
I suggested that the law of the principal's domicil ought to 
determine "whether the principal has declared his assent 
that the agent should act for him in the specific foreign 
country."69 The Restatement takes a similar position, as 
§ 343 subjects the question whether an authorization to 
671 See Conference de Ia Haye, Actes et documents de Ia neuvieme session, 
vol. I p. 283. For a discussion of the I.L.A. Drafts and of the advisability of 
an international convention on conflict of laws in matters of agency, see 
TOMASI, supra n. 45, at 663. 
68 KUHN, Comp. Com. 277, cf. Hauck Clothing Co. v. Sophia Sharpe (1900) 
83 Mo. App. 385. The mother in Missouri sent her note to the son in Indiana 
"without legal restriction and with legal authority to sell it, where and to 
whom he wanted," at 392. ' 
69 RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 835, cf. 7 id. ( 1933) 8o6. 
Cf. the English Sinfra Case, supra n. 63; the judge contrasts extent and 
revocability with "formation," and leaves a question open as to formality 
and capacity. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 18, 1895) 16 Hans. GZ. (1895) HBI. 
139: the law of the flag decides whether the shipowner could be bound "at 
all" by the signing of the bill of lading, whereas the law of the port of 
destination under German practice governs the rest of the problems. OLG. 
Hamburg (March 3, 1914) 35 Hans. GZ. (1914) HBI. 131: the Italian agent 
was not at all authorized to contract for the Hamburg firm, hence no 
question of the extent of authority arose. 
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act in the foreign country exists, to the law of the place 
where the agreement is made. This is usually the domicil of 
the principal. 
However, this reservation has been criticized as too 
subtle,70 and it would be consistent with the point of view 
preferred in discussing consent by silence and analogous 
question, 71 here also to abandon insistence that the above 
formulated question should be determined by any special 
law.71a In the Chatenay Case, the court required the ascer-
tainment that the Brazilian principal by his power of attor-
ney under the circumstances prevailing in Brazil intended to 
authorize selling and purchasing in England. But this ques-
tion was not expressly assigned to Brazilian law; the judg-
ment may be read as applying English law in prescribing 
an investigation of the Portuguese language, the Brazilian 
usages, and the legal knowledge of the principal in order to 
construe his intention. This is probably how the English 
commentators understand the case. 72 
An express intention of the principal to submit his author-
ization to the law of a certain country is extremely rare. 
But a tacit selection of the applicable law has sometimes 
been correctly assumed when the powers were given for 
the purpose of proceeding in the courts or government 
offices of a foreign country.73 By the same reasoning, the 
English rules providing for strict interpretation of powers 
70 BATIFFOL 282 n. 5 j BRESLAUER, supra p. 149 n. 8, at 312. 
71 See Vol. II ( ed. 2) p. 524. 
naTo the same effect, VON CAEMMERER, supra n. 61, at 21o; whereas REESE, 
supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 412-414, submits that the forum, before applying the 
local law, should determine (1) if there is a relationship between the prin· 
cipal and the agent of a sort that makes appropriate the .imposition of 
responsibility upon one for the act of the other and ( 2) if the principal has a 
sufficient connection with the local law. But REESE does not suggest deciding 
these questions according to the principal's law; instead, he urges the forum 
to "apply its own conceptions" ( id. at 414). 
72 See CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 247· 
To a similar effect, probably RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 503, speaking of 
simultaneous application of the law of the principal. 
73 LG. Berlin I (Oct. 5, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63 at 135. 
AUTHORITY 169 
of attorney, 74 apply where a sealed deed of authorization 
is conferred in England. 
II. THE DEFINITION OF LOCAL LAW 
1. Various Views 
Although the distinct trend of the courts in the United 
States, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and probably 
most other countries has veered toward the local law, no 
agreement has resulted in the exact definition of this law. 
Usually there is no reason for doubt, because a permanently 
established agent of a foreign principal concludes a con-
tract with a third party in the country of his domicil. Thus, 
the extent of the general authority of a London ship broker 
to make a charter party for a foreign shipowner or charterer 
certainly is subject to English law.75 But which of the three 
involved connecting factors, viz., the conclusion of the con-
tract, the domicil, or the agent's part in the conclusion, pre-
vails if these factors do not coincide? 
(a) Lex loci contractus of the main contract.76 The 
French authors and the American cases are probably to be 
interpreted to the effect that authority is governed entirely 
by the law of the place where the main contract is made. 
If we do not believe in the force of the lex loci contractus, 
this rule may be transformed into either of two possible 
variants. It might be concluded that authority should be 
determined by whatever law governs the main contract. 
This agrees with an approach sometimes suggested in 
Europe.77 
74 See BOWSTEAD, Agency 49 art. 36. 
75 E.g., the Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, 1930) W. 12345, N. ]. 
1934, 631· 
76 KOSTEII.S 769 advocates this law when it is more favorable to the third 
party than the law of the principal's domicil. 
77 BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev. (1938) at 308 optimistically contends that 
this is the true doctrine to be drawn from the English cases. 
CASSONI, "La procura nel diritto internazionale privato," 14 Dir. Int. (196o) 
256, 264 f., asserts that according to Italian conflict of laws, authority is 
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Or the place where the agent does the act embodying his 
consent to the main contract might be emphasized. This 
would bring the American tradition into a near relation to 
the following attempts at localization. 
(b) Law of the agent's domicil. Whenever the local law 
has been applied in view of a permanent domicil of an 
agent, his place has been contemplated as that where he 
exercised his powers or acted in the interest of the principal; 
the law of this place governed his transactions. In par-
ticular, the German and Swiss highest courts have con-
stantly had such a situation in mind.78 
(c) Law of the place of operation. A few American 
decisions mention, among coincidental facts, the place where 
a power of attorney was to be exercised. Thus, a power of 
attorney to lease Mexican land was subjected to Mexican 
law because, among other contacts, it was "to be exercised 
in Mexico."79 The termination by death of an authority to 
sell Texas land was declared to be governed by Texas law 
with the justification that attempts had been made to carry 
out the power in the state.80 Commonly, it is true, such 
language seems to mean nothing else than the place where 
the main contract is made.81 
The German courts have constantly used the same lan-
guage in the formula that the power conferred by authoriza-
tion is governed by the law of the place where that power 
is to take effect or "deploys its force,"82 for instance, the 
governed by the law of the main contract, but his reasoning is predominantly 
based on Italian internal law of agency. 
78 All the cases supra ns. 56, 6x, and n. 57 are conclusive on this point. 
79 Merinos Viesca y Compania v. Pan American P. & T. Co. (D. C. E. D. 
N.Y. 1931) 49 F. (:zd) 352; cf. 2 C. J. S. 1038 at n. 83. 
80 Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) 121 S. W. 545· 
81 This is the impression given by 12 C. J. 451; 5 R. C. L. 934; II Am. 
Jur. 395 § II2 n. II; Succession of Welsh (1904) III La. Sox, 35 So. 913; 
Kamper v. Hunter Land Co. (1920) 146 Minn. 3371 340, 178 N. W. 747· 
82 See in particular RG. (Dec. 5, 1911) 78 RGZ. 55; (June 14, 192.3) Recht 
1923, No. 1222; KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No. 9; BGH. (July so, 
1954) IPRspr. 1954-55, No. x, at 4· 
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place where the agent and the third party meet.83 It is 
identical with the place of "reliance" according to § 344 of 
the Restatement and its illustration, in the case of an agent's 
showing his written power of attorney to the third party. 
The contract may be concluded subsequently at any place. 
If A sends T an offer with notice that he is authorized by 
P to transact with him, he may be considered as using the 
authority at his own place, while the contract may be con-
sidered completed by the mailing ofT's acceptance. It may 
also be said in such a case that the agent "acts" at his own 
place (Restatement § 34 5), although T places his "re-
liance" on the letter when he receives it. Or vice versa, the 
agent may visit the other party and show his authority 
while he subsequently writes the decisive letter from his 
own domicil. It is true that the other party is supposed to 
rely on the authority at the very moment of contracting, 
whether he sees a written authority at this moment or not 
at all; but the formulation here in question stresses the act 
of the agent in which he leans on the authorization.88• 
Also an English judge has stated that the place where 
an authority is "operated," determines the law.84 
2. Rationale 
Ad (a) The proposition of applying the law governing 
the main contract is manifestly wrong, despite its adop-
tion in the courts of this country. If A in London, agent of 
a Bombay firm P, sells toT in New York roo bags of jute, 
deliverable f. o. b. Bombay, the sale is governed by the 
Anglo-Indian Sale of Goods Act. To determine for this 
sa RG. (March 23, 1929) Leipz. Z. 1929, u68 No. 3· 
ssa REESE, supra Ch. 39, n. 64. at 415, recommends somewhat vaguely, in 
cases of the kind mentioned, the application of the law of the state where 
the agent's action was centered. 
84 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd., suPra n. 63, at 682; in Apt v. 
Apt [1947] 2 All E. R. 677-C. A. at 679, Cohen, L. J., refers to the law of 
the intended place of performance, which was a sufficient formula in the 
instant case. 
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reason the power of the London agent under the same law, 
would defy the very idea from which the argument starts. 
The applicable law would be that of the principal instead 
of that on which T may rely. 
On the other hand, in Maspons v. Mildred,85 the English 
Court of Appeal held that the extent of an authority given 
and accepted in Havana, Cuba, between firms there domi-
ciled was governed by Spanish law, then in force in Cuba. 
Nevertheless the main contract concluded with the third 
party, a firm in England, by correspondence, was declared to 
be under English law, probably according to the party's in-
tentions. It would have been grotesque to determine the 
extent of the agent's power by English law. · 
Again, suppose that A, the local agent of a foreign finance 
corporation P, makes a loan toT and the printed loan form 
includes a stipulation for the law of P's home state. Does 
this clause extend to the question whether the agent was 
entitled to waive some forfeiture clause of the printed 
form? The courts are unanimous in subjecting this question 
to the local law. 
Ad (b) In the narrower, but by far most important, case 
of a permanently established agent, the law of his place 
offers a sound compromise. The business place of a branch 
manager or a servant of the foreign principal, amounts to 
a secondary seat of the latter. If the contract is made in 
the jurisdiction where the agent resides, which is the regular 
case, no practical doubt disturbs the courts. It would be 
pedantic to search for another place of reliance. Indeed, 
the locality in which the agent shows the written power of 
attorney to the third party, or where the principal orally 
tells him that he authorizes A, is immaterial in such a 
situation. 
Illustration. P of New York at a convention in Chicago 
tells T of Arizona that he has a new district manager A for 
85 Supra Ch. 39 p. 145 n. 64. 
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several states with headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and 
hopes that Twill patronize him. According to § 344 of the 
Restatement, this "apparent authorization" would be deter-
mined by the law of Illinois. If subsequently, A makes an 
offer by letter to T in Arizona and T accepts by letter, 
according to § 345 of the Restatement, the "effect" of the 
authorization would be determined by the Arizona law 
which conflicts with § 343 and § 344, but in this case agrees 
with the decisions. Under the German rule for agents with 
fixed domicil, the Colorado law governs the acts that the 
agent is entitled to make. It is submitted that this agrees 
with the presumable intentions of all three parties. 
Ad (c) The place where the agent "acts" (Restatement 
§ 345) may be any place in the course of his activity from 
his assertion that he is authorized to the completion of the 
third party contract. 
In American decisions, it is true, this exact point has 
never been raised. In one case, 86 the district manager of the 
Firestone Corporation in Oklahoma went to Texas for the 
purpose of concluding a contract and at the same time made 
an oral promise to a third beneficiary. But since the federal 
court in Texas stated that "the foreign corporation sent its 
district manager to this state," the possibility was not consid-
ered that his implied authority might have been governed 
by the law of Oklahoma; under the circumstances, the agent 
was not functioning as district manager but as a special 
envoy. 
Conclusion. The law of the principal has lost its claim to 
govern generally the conditions and effects of authority. 
A logical solution would always point to the place where 
the agent warrants his authority expressly or impliedly. But 
it might irt some cases be doubted where this place is. More-
over, if he or the principal manifests the authorization dur-
ing the negotiations, the ultimate consent by the agent to the 
contract is the more important event. 
88 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Tire Co. (C. C. A. Texas 1935) 
87 S. W. (ad) 794· 
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While such doubts challenge a single rule, judicial ex-
perience has furnished, instead of one, two rules. 
If an agent, acting for a foreign principal, carries on 
his function from a fixed place of business, the law of this 
place governs. 
In all other cases, the law of that place should govern, 
in which the agent manifests (declares or dispatches) his 
consent to the main transaction. 
The law of the principal's domicil is not even applied 
when it is more favorable to the third party than that just 
mentioned. When a Danish city, having contracted with 
a domiciled agent of a German firm for the purchase of 
certain goods, resorted to a provision of the German Com-
mercial Code, § 91, paragraph 2, authorizing third persons 
to address notice of defects and rejection of goods to the 
agent, the Reichsgericht refused the plea. Because security 
of commerce requires that persons dealing with the agent 
should be able easily to examine and ascertain the scope of 
his authority, for this purpose, they must rely on the law 
at the place of the agent. A larger extent of powers under 
the law of the principal is not necessarily more favorable 
to the third party. "It may be disadvantageous to him, for 
instance, where it is in question whether his declaration 
to the agent binds or obligates him. In no case should the 
application of any law depend on its being or not being 
favorable to him."87 This, in my opinion, is convincing. 
III. ScoPE oF THE LocAL LAw 
1. Validity of Authority 
(a) Form. Although the rna jority of American cases 
apply the lex loci contractus of the main contract,88 there 
is no firm rule. When a power of attorney was signed in 
81 RG. (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73· All these propositions made 
in a Z.ausi.PR. ( 1929) 835 seem to me still the best. 
88 2 BEALE§§ 332·4. 342·1· 
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Italy before a vice-consul of the United States without a 
seal being affixed, the act was recognized as formally valid 
in accordance with Italian law, and hence declared sufficient 
to support the execution by the agent of a sealed instrument 
in the United States.89 This agrees with the first Restate-
ment rule rather than with the traditional rule, although 
it is not clear why an American consul should be supposed 
to act under Italian rules of formalities. 
Municipal laws include many formal requirements for 
authorizations. The rule of the common law just alluded 
to requires that an authority to execute a deed must also 
be under seal.00 In many states of the United States author-
ity for an agent to contract for the sale of land91 requires an 
instrument satisfying the statute of frauds, like the sale 
itself.92 In a widespread doctrine, authority is generally sub-
jected to the same formalities as the authorized contract.98 
The German law has taken the contrary viewpoint; al-
though a contract to transfer title to land requires solemni-
zation by court or notary,94 authorization to conclude such 
contract is formless ;95 however, increasing exceptions have 
been stated.96 
89 In re Everett Estate (I94I) II2 Vt. 252, 23 At!. (2d) 202. · 
90 BowsTEAD, Agency 3 I art. 24; Restatement of Agency and Restatement of 
Agency (Second) § 28. But this Restatement § 29 notes that if an oral 
authorization is insufficient to make a deed of conveyance effective, it suffices 
to maintain the deed regarded as a memorandum of a contract to convey. 
91 Authority to transfer land or rights in immovables is another thing and 
always is governed by lex situs. 
92 MECHEM, Agency {ed. 4) II ff., I7i PowELL 20 f. For a recent example 
of a contrary West Virginia statute under which oral authorization to con-
tract for real estate is permitted, see Gallagher v. Washington County Savings 
Loan and Building Co. (I943) 25 S. E. (2d) 914. 
93 Restatement of Agency and Restatement of Agency (Second) § 26 and 
§aS (I) with exceptions in§ 28 (2). 
Georgia: C. C. (I9IO) § 3574; a "broad and sweeping rule," Byrd v. Piha 
(1927) 165 Ga. 397, 141 S. E. 48; Oellrich v. Georgia R. R. (1884) 73 Ga. 
389. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 1392. 
9* BGB. § 313. 
91 103 RGZ. 295, 300-302, and many other decisions. 
98 See comments to § 313 of the BGB. 
176 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
The conflicts question has scarcely been treated with 
special reference to authority. The repeatedly mentioned 
German conflicts rule, in its latest broad formulation, seems 
to extend to formalities the law of the place where the 
agent exercises his authority; this place is identical with 
the situs when the agent sells an immovable at the place of 
its location. 97 
The American practice, on the other hand, ought to be 
crystallized to the effect that the law governing the third 
party contract should determine the form in which the power 
must be conferred upon the agent.97a This result logically 
and conveniently includes the closely connected problem 
whether the agent needs a special authorization for the 
intended transaction, this being under all circumstances an 
incident of the main contract.98 
On the optional theory of locus regit actum, finally, an 
authorization would also be sufficient if its form complies 
with the law of the place where the principal constitutes it. 
How far this theory may be carried, seems to deserve future 
investigation.98a 
(b) Cap'acity. In the United States, this problem has 
been lost in the game of searching for the place where a 
married woman makes a contract when she sends a note 
through correspondence, agents, or messengers.99 
In civil law, the personal capacity of a principal to 
authorize an agent is in practice governed by the law of 
the former's domicil rather than his nationality.100 
97 See ZWEIGERT, "Die Form der Vollmacht," 24 RabelsZ. (1959) 334 and 
cases cited by him. To the same effect, the Draft of a Uniform Law on 
Agency, supra n. 67h, art. 5, requires the formality prescribed by the law of 
the country where the agent's act is to be accomplished. 
9 7& See REESE, supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 417. 
98 Supra Ch. 39 p. 145. 
98& See ZWEIGERT, supra n. 97, at 335· 
99 Supra pp. 138, 159· 
100 On the ground of the older theory (STORY and BAR, supra ns. 1, z) 
the domicil of the principal determines all of the authority. Consistently, 
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If we eliminate lex loci contractus and avoid confusion 
with the main contract, the problem reverts to the question 
of policy, whether a principal, incompetent by his domi-
ciliary law, should be deemed capable if the law of the place 
where his authorization is used so provides. According to 
the conclusions reached in Volume One, capacity to establish 
obligations should be determined under their proper law, 
if not accorded by the personal law. The law governing 
authority to create obligations, therefore, should be able 
to grant capacity.100a 
(c) Intrinsic requirements. American as well as German 
courts do not hesitate to determine such questions as nullity 
and revocabilitf01 of a power of attorney according to the 
local law. 
2. Implied Authority 
Modern laws abound in usages, customary constructions, 
legal presumptions, and legal rules, defining the acts which 
agents of certain classes or under certain circumstances are 
authorized or not authorized to do on account of the prin-
cipal. Some codes, particularly the German Commercial and 
Civil Codes, have elaborated various categories of such 
commonly called "implied" authority, and the Restatement 
of Agency also distinguishes "authority," "apparent author-
ity," estoppel, and unnamed other "powers." The C6nflicts 
Restatement, § 344, it is true, singles out "apparent" au-
thority for applying the law of the place where the third 
party places "reliance" upon such authority. To the con-
only domicil, not nationality, remains a possible test for determining the 
capacity of authorizing, which I adopted in 7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 8o6. But in 
the following text I give up even this restricted role of the personal law. 
tooa The German doctrine seems to prefer the law of the principal's 
nationality; see BRAGA, "Der Anwendungsbereich des Vollmachtstatuts," 24 
RabelsZ. (1959) 337 f. Cf. also MAKAROV, "Die Vollmacht im internationalen 
Privatrecht," in 2 Scritti in onore di T. Perassi (1957) 37, 43 f. 
101 ln/ra sub (3) and (4). 
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trary, it has become evident in considering the case law of 
German courts that there can be no distinction on the inter-
national plane among constructions, presumptions, and 
rules, or among court interpretation, legal rules of construc-
tion, and subsidiary legal rules, as well as between state-
ments or conduct of the principal toward the agent and 
toward the third party, or between directly obligating dec-
larations and estoppeP02 They are not neatly separable even 
in the most elaborate municipal laws, and in fact not distin-
guished in many jurisdictions. They must be of equivalent 
significance in the conflict of laws. Neither English nor 
American courts, to my knowledge, have shown any inclina-
tion to classify in heterogeneous compartments what is 
distinguished as express and apparent authority, and in the 
latter category, as authority to do what is usual in a particu-
lar trade or what agrees to local usage, authority extended 
by statute, etc. The idea of estoppel in its broadest meaning 
appears to Continental observers of the English theory as 
present more or less in all parts of the doctrine of implied 
authority.108 
Illustrations. (i) P in state X hands to A his written 
authorization to purchase goods on P's account in state Y. 
A shows this statement to T in Y. P is bound to T according 
to the law of Y without respect to internally declared re-
strictions. The Restatement, § 344, illustration, expressly 
decides this case under the law of Y, because the authority 
is apparent and T relies on it in state Y. The substantive 
rule, however, is exactly the same in the German Civil Code 
( § 172) which expressly says that where the principal has 
handed the agent a written authorization and the agent 
shows it to the third person, the agent is authorized in 
1o2 I refer for details to my repeatedly cited article, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 
at 825 f. As to American law, REESE, supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 413 f., seems 
to be in agreement with the position here taken that there should be only one 
conflict rule for the various cases of apparent authority an·d the like. 
1os Cf. MACRIS, supra p. 144 n. 57, at 278 ff., 293· 
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relation to this person. Although thereby a true authoriza-
tion is recognized, the German conflicts rule simply applies 
the law of Y as that of the place where the agent acts 
upon his authority. The right conflicts rule naturally covers 
this case. 
(ii) Whether a traveling salesman is entitled to sell 
for cash and to grant deferment of payment, is a question 
of the extent of his power, regulated in Germany by a legal 
rule and in France by an implied agreement ( mandat tacite). 
In the case of a French salesman traveling in Germany, 
the German Reichsoberhandelsgericht once decided the ques-
tion under the French law of the principal,1°4 whereas it 
would be determined at present according to the German 
Commercial Code ( § 55, paragraph 2). Even the authority 
of a commercial agent under the German Commercial Code 
( § 91, paragraph 2) to accept certain statements of third 
persons, although considered a "legal authority," has been 
refused to the Danish agent of a German firm acting in 
Denmark.105 English and American courts decide to the 
same effect. 
(iii) An agricultural producer in Silesia sent eggs for 
sale through an agent on the market of Berlin. The sender 
was to be deemed to have "submitted" to the usages of 
the Berlin market. As Willes, J., said in Lloyd v. Guibert, 
"whoso goes to Rome, must do as those at Rome do. 11108 
The Reichsgericht, criticized for having ignored this rule,107 
amended its practice immediately.108 
This resort to the local laws is also supported by the 
differences in the usual national types of agents. An English 
factor, operating in England, cannot be conveniently treated 
like a Brazilian commercial agent in Brazil. The legal pre-
sumptions and usual constructions defining what the author-
ized broker or clerk or traveling salesman may and may not 
104 ROHG. (Dec. 4, r872) 8 ROHGE. rso, Clunet r874, Sr. 
lOll RG. (Jan. 14, r9ro) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73· 
106 (1865) 6 Best & Sm. roo, 13r Eng. Rep. II34· 
1 0 7 RG. (June 26, 1928) JW. 1928, 3109, IPRspr. r928 No. 39, criticized 
by DovE, }W. ibid. 
1os RG. (Oct. 13, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 40· 
x8o SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
do on the account of the principal, are commonly intended 
merely for agents carrying on business within the state and 
for all such agents. 
The American decisions show similar tendencies. Most 
of those in point/()9 it must be noted, do not deal with our 
general problem but concern insurance agents, a very special 
matter, the local sphere of the state where the insured lives 
being much emphasized in constitutional and conflicts prac-
tice of the courts. With this reservation, the cases may be 
cited regarding the authority of local insurance agents to 
issue a policy,110 to waive conditions, 111 or to give binding 
information.112 The law of the insured person's residence 
has been applied under the theory that the contract was 
made, or in the case of insurance of immovables, the object 
was situated113 in that state. 
No separate rule is apparent with respect to general 
agents.114 General powers are the main subject of the cus-
tomary and legal definitions of implied authority. Whether, 
of course, the particular main contract can be made by a 
general agent, or whether special powers are needed for 
such purposes as contracts relating to land, lawsuits, com-
promises on litigious matters, or gifts, is a problem of the 
main transaction itself. 
109 Perry v. Pye (1913) 215 Mass. 403, zoz N. E. 653 (cf. z BEALE II95 
n. 6) does not offer any problem. 
110 Gallagher v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. (Tex. 1918) 206 
S. W. 2I2; Grant v. North American Benefit Corp. of Illinois ( I928) 223 Mo. 
App. I04, 8 S. W. (2d) I043· 
111 Cohen v. Home Ins. Co. (I9I6) 6 Boyce 207, 97 At!. IOI4i American 
Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co. (I9I7) 74 Fla. I30, 77 So. 168; 
Keesler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. of New York (I9I9) I77 N. C. 394. 
99 S. E. 97; Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Newsom (1920) 14% Ark. 153, 
219 S. W. 759 (including estoppel); Springfield Mtl. Ass. v. Atnip (1935) 
169 Ark. 968, 279 S. W. IS (false indication of age by the agent). 
112 McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. N. D. I a. I897) 78 Fed. 33· 
England: Pattison v. Mills ( 1828) I Dow and Cl. 342. 
ua Cases of American Fire Ins. Co., Gallagher, Keesler, supra ns. no, ru. 
lH Contrarily to NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 264, see the decisions of LG. Berlin I 
and KG., supra n. 97· 
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3· Ratification 
The old conflicts literature was affected by the theoretical 
mistakes of doctrines which involved "ratification" and 
"confirmation" of contracts made by an unauthorized agent 
and unnecessarily bothered about distinctions between lack 
of and transgression of authority.115 The modern view is 
very simple; it accepts the Roman idea of ratitication. 
M andat et qui ratum habet means that ratification is an 
authorization subsequent to the main contract. Its nature is 
identical with a precedent authorization. This idea operated 
in indirect representation in the internal relationship be-
tween principal and agent,116 but its effect on the agent's 
power is confined to disclosed agency, even in the common 
law doctrine. 
Opinions are divided only with respect to the permissi-
bility of such belated confirmation. Thus, in the United 
States, three solutions depend upon whether ratification is 
allowable at all, or after a reasonable time, or so long as 
the other party does not cancel the contract.117 
From the nature of ratification as a true authorization, 
it follows that its effect is retroactive, and this, too, is com-
monly settled. Hence, there is no reason why the law of the 
place where the agent acts should not extend to this inci-
dent. No fiction of "submission" of the principal to the 
foreign Ia w118 is needed.118• 
115 See, e.g., 7 LAURENT S46 § 4S7· 
118 The latter is meant in CASAREGIS, Discursus 179 §§ 20, 64, 76, 89 and 
his followers including 3 FIORE § IISI. 
117 HUNTER, "What is the Effect of a Ratification of an Agent's Un-
authorized Contract?" s La. L. Rev. (1944) 308. 
118 BEALE, "The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 
( 1923) 241, 258; assumption of a renvoi is tentatively construed by GRISWOLD, 
"Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) n6s, 1200. 
118• REESE, supra Ch. 39 n. 64, at 416, takes the view that the forum "should 
use its own conceptions" in order to decide whether the principal's conduct 
could fairly be thought to amount to a ratification. About such an additional 
test, see supra pp. 167 f. and n. 71 a. 
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(a) Normal rule. The rule, therefore, is that the law of 
the place where the agent acts as a representative governs 
the validity and effect of a manifestation of the principal 
allegedly consenting to the agent's transaction.119 The 
Restatement, § 33 I (I), accedes to this rule saying, as is 
habitual, that this place is "the place of contracting.11120 
Since there is no material difference between acting with-
out any authorization, and acting beyond authorization,121 
it does not matter, contrary to certain older doctrines, 
whether principal and agent before the ratification were 
bound by contract or whether the agent acted as a nego-
tiorum gestor. This result was reached by Story, speaking 
for the Supreme Court of the United States, in I832, al-
though he operated with an imaginary lex loci solutionis.122 
(b) Soliciting agent. It is well settled that when an 
agent, sent out to solicit orders, transmits an order to his 
principal and the latter declares his consent to the customer, 
the contract is made by the principal himself.123 The reason, 
however, is not as is sometimes confusedly assumed, that 
the agent has no authority to contract. Whether he has or 
119United States: Dord v. Bonnaffee (1851) 6 La. Ann. 563; Golson v. 
Ebert (1873) 52 Mo. 260; Pugh v. Cameron (1877) II W. Va. 523; Hill v. 
Chase (1886) 143 Mass. 129, 9 N. E. 30; WILLISTON, I Contracts § 278; 
2 BEALE 1076. 
Canada: Quebec: Trudel v. Assad (1912) 14 Que. Pr. 202. 
See also art. 8, as it appears in the two drafts of the I.L.A., supra ns. 
67b and 67c. 
12o Is the objection to this rule by STUMBERG ( ed. z) 230 not influenced by 
the theory of the last act of completing a contract, of which he himself is 
rather critical? 
121 Restatement § 331 says: "beyond or contrary to his instructions," which 
confuses the relationships. 
122 Boyle v. Zacharie (1832) 6 Pet. S. C. 635, 8 L. Ed. 527· The consignee 
of a cargo in New Orleans furnished suretyship and paid when the ship 
was attached there. The shipowner recognized the intervention, and Story 
localized his duty in Louisiana, because if he had contracted with the 
defendant (Story says: "authorized" him) to advance money there on his 
account, this contract would have been performable there and the lex loci 
solutionis would be applicable. 
123 GOODRICH 264 n. 24 j 7 LAURENT § 456 in fine i I FIORE. § 133 j 2 RESTREPO 
HERNANDEZ§ 1297· 
AUTHORITY 
not, the material point is that he does not purport to con-
clude the contract. The place of the agent is immaterial in 
this case, as also his powers are. The result, that the princi-
pal makes the contract, is recognized by the American courts 
also for the purpose of ascertaining in what state a corpora-
tion does business by such a contract;124 whether Louisiana's 
privilege of the vendor applies ;125 and under what law 
title is reserved, incidentally to the contract.126 
But the main contract, in reality, has its own law, accord-
ing to its nature and this law governs offer and acceptance. 
(c) A. bnormal solution. Suppose that in the case of a 
liquor sale a soliciting agent in Iowa (where the sale would 
have been invalid) went beyond his authority and made a 
sale as if he were empowered to conclude the contract 
without reserving the approval of his principal in Illinois 
(where the sale would have been valid). But he sent the 
order to the principal who confirmed it to the buyer. Accord-
ing to the normal rule, since the agent sold the liquor in 
Iowa, the contract, as governed by the law of Iowa, would 
be invalid and not subject to approval by the principal, 
although the latter, of course, might have made a new offer. 
This self-evident result seems to agree with the two deci-
sions of the Iowa Supreme Courtl27 which have subsequently 
l24Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895) 68 Fed. 467; 
State Mutual etc. Ins. Co. v. Brinkley (1895) 6r Ark. r, 35 S. W. 157· See 
also State v. Colby (1894) 92 Iowa 463, 61 N. W. 187; Kling v. Fries (1876) 
33 Mich. 275· 
1 25 Claliin v. Mayer (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1048, 7 So. I39· 
126 Barrett v. Kelley (1894) 66 Vt. 515, 29 At!. 809. 
127 In Tegler v. Shipman (1871) 33 Iowa 194, zoo, the court stated as the 
general rule, that, "if the agent simply took an order from defendant upon 
his -principals in Rock Island, which they might till or refuse at their option, 
it was a Rock Island contract, and the plaintiff can recover unless it is 
shown that they sold the liquors with intent to enable the defendant to violate 
the provisions of the act .... " The decision in Taylor v. Pickett (1879) 52 
Iowa 467, 3 N. W. 514, concerning the territorial scope of a license to sell, 
upheld instructions to the jury saying that "it would be a sale at the house," 
if the agent took orders subject to final acceptance by the principal, whereas 
the sale would be illegal if orders were taken "not subject to approval." 
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been invoked for a contrary view by a federal circuit court. 
This court decided in Shuenfeldt v. Junkerman, an Iowa 
case, that although the contract was concluded in Iowa by 
an unauthorized agent, the confirmation by the principal, 
the firm in Chicago, constituted an acceptance of the order 
and completed the contract in Illinois, hence validly. When 
the validity of the contract is in question, as in liquor and 
Sunday contracts, the court considered "the very time and 
place where and when the act was done that gave life to the 
contract."128 Incautious commentators have tentatively ex-
tracted the recognition of a ratification having no retro-
active effect.129 The Restatement finally takes from this 
isolated decision the impulse for an astonishing general 
rule.130 The individual decision in the Shuenfeldt Case may 
be condoned as an instance of extraordinary favor extended 
by the courts to interstate contracts affected by the crude 
sanctions of Sunday and liquor laws. Moreover, as usual, 
the belief in lex loci contractus promoted extravagancies. 
But it is a grave mistake to disturb the international func-
tion of the normal rules by such arbitrary exceptions. 
Illustration. Suppose an ammunition manufacturer in 
Illinois sends a soliciting agent to Bolivia, who, pretending 
to be authorized to sell, accepts an order from an unlicensed 
dealer for delivery in a Bolivian port. While the buyer, 
violating Bolivian laws, must know that the contract is void, 
American courts, according to the Restatement, should 
argue that the manufacturer supplementing his authoriza-
tion concludes the contract under American law and there-
fore makes a valid contract. Every part of this argumenta-
12s Shuenfeldt v. Junkerman (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1884) zo Fed. 357; HAilPEI. 
et al., Cases 374-
129 II Am. Jur. 394 § II2. 
130 § 331 (2): "If by the law of the place where the agent acted, there is 
no contract as a result of the ratification, the ratification is regarded in the 
state where it is made as the acceptance of an offer made to the agent and 
transmitted by him and if the acceptance completes a contract, the contract 
is there made." 
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tion is wrong. A unilateral confirmation of a void agreement 
is ineffectual. That the traditional theory of illegality at 
the place of performance is defied, would not matter so 
much as that the contract is really governed by Bolivian 
law, because of all the circumstances. 
The liquor cases could have been approached differently. 
Shuenfeldt, by the order, had delivered the goods at a rail-
way station in Chicago, his own city. The sale, for this 
reason, and for this alone, could have been governed by 
Illinois law. Equally, in the hypothetical case of an arma-
ments sale in Bolivia, if the goods were to be delivered 
f. o. b. New York, the buyer would be rightly supposed to 
comply with the laws of the United States, when sued in 
an American court; the decision would depend on the court's 
conception of international policy. 
4· Termination 
Death of the principal and revocation of authorization 
have been controversial matters in the municipal laws. From 
the old point of view of a merely two-sided relationship, 
rights and obligations between master and servant, man-
dator and mandatary, naturally ended with such events, and 
the powers of the agent, too, were automatically ended. 
But the Roman praetor granted actions against a master 
during a year after he withdrew the peculium from a 
slave.131 A shop manager had the powers of an institor so 
long as his name was not canceled in the shop.132 Modern 
systems have prolonged either the underlying contract, or 
at least the authority, beyond its original termination, in 
the interest of third persons, or even of an innocent agent. 
(a) Death of principal. A general power of attorney 
conferred in California for sale of land in Texas was ended 
131 Actio anna/is de peculio, LENEL, Edictum Perpetuum 277, 282 ff. 
132 ULPIAN, D. I4-3·II § 3· 
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under Texan law by the death of the issuer, although it · 
would have been valid until notice to the agent under Cali-
fornia law. The court in Texas based this decision on the 
attempt to carry out the powers in Texas.133 
This represents the universally prevailing and recom-
mendable conflicts rule/34 alone consistent with the appli-
cation of the local law to apparent authority. That the 
continuation of the power should require the consent of two 
laws, or even three/35 is strictly objectionable. 
(b) Revocation. An irrevocable general power of at-
torney was signed by an American in New York for any 
transaction on his behalf regarding his German assets. Un-
der the law of New York, this authorization, nof coupled 
with an interest of the agent, was revocable. German courts, 
under a questionable rule, have treated irrevocable general 
authorizations as void, at least for the purpose of transac-
tions contemplating transfers of rights in immovables. This 
German rule was applied to the case on the theory that 
authority is subject to the law where it is exercised.136 If, 
conversely, a German authorization were used in New York, 
its revocability would doubtless have to be determined un-
der New York law. 
The identical solution has been recently followed in an 
English case,137 and may also be advocated as a universal 
rule. 
183 Gilmer v. Veatch (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) 121 S. W. S4S· 
1 34 Thus, against STORY § 286 d: 4 PHILLIMORE 571 § 705; 3 FIORE § IIS4j 
ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. n6; cf. 2 WHARTON 871. 
135 Thus, 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ§ 1306. 
136 LG. Berlin (Oct. s, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, No. 63, discussed as to the 
questionable municipal rule and the pioneering conflicts rule in my article, 
7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 797, evidently unknown to BATIFFOL 282 n. 6. To the same 
effect, KG. (Dec. 14, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, No.9· 
137 Sinfra Aktiengesellschaft v. Sinfra, Ltd. [ 1939] 2 All E. R. 675, 68a. 
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Employment and Agency 
I. THE SUBJECT MATTER 
W HILE voluntary authorization operates in the re-lation between the agent or, in common law, the 
principal, and the third party, the internal relation-
ship between principal and agent rests upon a contract com-
monly termed contract of agency, although this word is also 
used differently. This includes, for instance, a contract of 
brokerage for buying securities, and excludes a sales contract 
made by a buyer intending a resale, or any other party con-
tracting on his own account. To embrace, however, the con-
tracts for a factual work, generally the word "employment" 
is added which really has no recognized legal meaning and 
overlaps the scope of agency; brokerage may also be called 
an employment.1 Although these two terms do not express 
a neat contrast, there is a distinction, important at least 
for conflicts law, between the two groups of contracts 
involved. 
Common law has an appropriate and significant termi-
nology: "Master and servant" is a broad old doctrine within 
the category of "principal and agent." Its criterion is the 
superior choice, control, and direction, by the master, of the 
servant's conduct and method in doing the work.2 In Europe, 
1 3S Am. Jur. 448 § s; 144 A. L. R. 740; 151 id. 1331. 
z This distinction was first suggested by z MEILI So to the extent that he 
advocated the law of the organization into which the employee integrates 
himself by his contract. The same result was recently proposed by 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 335 (inconsistent with 333 ff.) j 2 SCHNITLER (ed. 4) 711 ff.; BRESLAUER1 
so Jurid. Rev. (1938) at 293 (despite the vacillating English cases). No 
distinction has been made in the International Law Association, Vienna Draft 
1926, 34th Report (1927) 509 ff. 
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the same outstanding type of contract has emerged more 
recently from ancient narrow and modern broad concepts. 
In Romanistic tradition, locatio conductio operarum 
( louage de service, Dienstmiete), the hiring of services, was 
comparatively the most adequate analogue; the Institute 
of International Law spoke of conflicts rules for this type 
as late as 1927.3 But the full ground was covered only by 
the addition of locatio conductio operis (W erkvertrqg), the 
contract for performing work, and numerous special kinds 
of contracts. 
On the other hand, the modern term Arbeitsvertrag, con-
frat de travail, or contratto di lavoro, was sometimes ex-
tended to all types of contracts in which the obligation to 
work is outstanding. At present, however, this name is re-
served for the contract concluded with dependent employees, 
industrial and agricultural as well as white collar workers, 
including even high-placed employees. This contract of work 
is to be defined as the private law contract whereby a person 
obligates himself to work with a certain continuity in the 
service and according to the directives of another person 
for a salary.4 It is unnecessary to restrict this concept to the 
accomplishment of material acts as contrasted with the con-
clusion of legal transactions. 5 
The National-Socialist doctrine was eagerly at work to 
eradicate the very idea of this individual private contract 
of labor. But it has withstood totalitarian fanaticism. 6 
a Annuaire 1927 III 219. 
4 Germany: I HUECK & NIPPERDEY (ed. 6) 104. 
France: RouAST in Planiol et Ripert, n Traite Pratique ( ed. 2) 8 § 767; 
2 COLIN et CAPITANT ( ed. 10) 745 § II28. 
Italy: BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 348, and cit.; Notes in 37 Riv. Dir. Com. 
(1939) II 387 to Cass. (Jan. 23, 1939) 40 id. (1942) I 177· 
Switzerland: OsER-SCHOENENBERGER nt8 No.9· 
Brazil: CESARINO JUNIOR, 2 Direito social brasileiro (ed. 2, 1943) 132 § 228. 
s Thus RoUAST et DURAND, Precis de legislation industrielle ( ed. 3, 1948) 
316 § 262 and 321 § 268, excluding the contract of "mandat." 
6 At least these writers (SIEBERT, MANSFELD, etc.) tried to degrade the labor 
contract to an "auxiliary" position, see, e.g., RHODE, 3 Zeitschrift der 
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The thus established distinction of types is indeed of 
interest in conflicts law. In localizing the relations of an 
employer, there is a difference between his subordinates, 
bound to his business organization and instructions, and the 
professional persons lending him their services. Local con-
nections have an overwhelming influence on the activity 
of independent contractors, while their importance in the 
other case is conditional and limited, although by no means 
insignificant. To anticipate the tendency of the most ade-
quate decisions, we may observe that contracts of independ-
ent persons are governed by the law of their own domicil, 
and employment contracts with "servants" are governed by 
the law of that place of the principal's business to which the 
employee is attached. Usually, of course, servants live in 
the state 'vhere they are working, so as to make the laws of 
their domicil and of their working place identical. For this 
reason, the groups are often confused without any harm 
done. Moreover, the concept of servant in municipal law is 
for certain purposes sometimes reasonably extended beyond 
its usual scope. 7 But for analytical purposes and for the 
practical needs of individual cases the distinction is needed. 
Under this approach it is of minor significance that, in 
civil law, servants are supposed to make contracts as simple 
agents in the name of their principal, as for instance com-
mercial clerks (German H andlungsgehilfe), whereas mem-
bers of professions either act in their own name, such as 
the commercial "agents" (German Kommissionar) or, in 
appearing for their clients, exercise their own functions, such 
as attorneys. 
Our productive materials for the oonflict of laws regard-
ing the employment of servants are scarce and are further 
Akademie fiir Deutsches Recht (1936) 371. A good survey on the discussion 
is given by CESARINO, supra n. 4, 125 If. 
1 See infra n. 59· 
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diminished by the prevalence of workmen's compensation 
in the cases. This subject, for compelling reasons, requires 
special discussion. Only insofar as the law governing the 
employment contract is deemed to determine the question 
of indemnization for accidents may contributions be ex-
tracted from these cases. 
II. MASTER AND SERVANT8 
1. Lex Loci Contractus 
The law of the place of contracting has also been applied 
to employment contracts. 9 This has remained the declared 
rule in Italy.10 The same rule obtained in the earliest Eng-
lish case on the subject, 11 but other decisions reaching a 
seemingly similar result may be explained by additional local 
connections. The Dutch Supreme Court insisted on the rule 
in 1926 whenever the agreement fails to modify· itP In 
Austria the more recent practice applies foreign law where 
B RouAsT, "Les conllits de lois relatifs au contrat de travail," I Melanges 
Pillet 195; CALEB, "Contrat de travail," 5 Repert. 210 ff.; GEMMA, Dir. Int. 
del Lavoro; GAMILLSCHEG, lnternationales Arbeitsrecht; GAMILLSCHEG, "Les 
principes du droit du travail international," Revue Crit. 1961, 265, 477, 677; 
LANFRANCHI, Derecho internacional privado del trabajo ( 1955); SIMON-
DEPITRE, "Droit de travail et conllits de lois devant le deuxieme Congres 
international de droit du travail," Revue Crit. 1958, 285; KAHN-FREUND, 
"Notes on the Conflict of Laws to Employment in English and Scottish Law," 
3 Riv. Dir. Int. Comp. Lav. (1960) 307. 
9 FOELIX § 105; DESPAGNET § 300; 7 LAURENT § 454; WEISS, 4 Traite 374· 
10 Italy: C. C. Disp. Pre!. (1865) art. 9; C. Com. (1882) art. 58; C. C. Disp. 
Pre!. (1942) art. 25 par. I. GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 159 ff.; however, 
makes a meritorious attempt to apply the law of the place of performance on 
the ground of implied party agreement. Other Italian authors suggest· the 
forcible application of Italian law to all cases where the place of employment 
is situated in Italy, whereas, in their opinion, the remaining cases are gov-
erned by the law applicable according to the rules of C. C. Disp. Pre!. (1942) 
art. 25, par. I; cf. authors cited by GAMILLSCHEG 154-158 and MORELLI (ed. 7) 
I 54-156. 
11 Arnott v. Redfern (1825) 2 Car. & P. 88, per Best, C. J. 
12 The Netherlands: H. R. (Dec. 2, 1926) W. u6o6, N. J. 1927, 321. The 
facts are left obscure in the reports, and the tendency to favor the lex fori 
is all too transparent, though the Dutch branch manager seems to be 
prejudiced thereby. 
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the contract is made abroad with a foreignerY Before 1917, 
the Brazilian courts did the same where the principal was 
a foreigner.U 
It is scarcely necessary to mention again how often a 
decision asserts adherence to the lex loci contractus, while 
performance and all other fact elements point to the same 
result. This is particularly frequent in the United States.15 
More remarkable, however, are decisions contrasting the 
law of the place of hiring with the law of domicil, as when 
a minor Irishman comes to Scotland and is there regarded 
as having capacity to be hired, because he is emancipated 
through independent establishment, "forisfamiliated," al-
though not domiciled in Scotland.16 
Lex loci contractus is a convenient rule if both parties 
are domiciled in the same state where they make the con-
tract. There is no reason why an intended foreign place of 
work should be material in such a case. When Italian parties 
contracted in Italy for service in the German branch of the 
firm, a German court correctly applied Italian law.17 It is 
farfetched to say that a French industrialist establishing 
a new factory in Africa and hiring personnel in France to 
13 Austria: Allg. BGB. § 37; OGH. (Jan. 24, 1933) and (May 28, 1934) 
discussed by WAHLE, 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 788, overruling the former decisions 
cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 272 n. 2 and BATIFFOL 268 n. 5· 
14 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (June 20, 1896) Agr. No. 140, Jur. Sup. Trib. 
1896, 67, 0CTAVIO, Dicionario No. 266 against one dissident vote, which was 
followed in the C. C. 
15 For this and other reasons, the long case lists in 2 BEALE 1196 are in-
significant. 
16 M'Feetridge v. Stewarts & Lloyds [ 1913] Sess. Cas. 773, per Lord 
Salvesen, at 790. 
17 Germany: OLG. Miinchen (April 5, 1909) 23 ROLG. 245, 22 Z.int.R. 
(1912) 175. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (May 21, 1941) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1941, 350 No. So: contract 
between Swedish domiciled parties signed in Sweden for service in Johannes-
burg, South Africa; stipulation for restraint of competition validated under 
Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430. 
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 22, 1957) JBI. 1958, r86 note SCHWIND, Clunet 1959, 
872: contract between Austrian parties signed in Vienna for service in 
Hungary; the court applied Austrian law. 
192 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
take there, is contracting under an African law/8 or that a 
couple of American missionaries hiring a maid in the United 
States for their station in China, have Chinese law in mind. 
By itself, lex loci contractus is an inept rule, despite 
Dicey19 and Beale.20 
2. Law of the Master's Domicil 
Where a contract is made outside the principal's resi-
dence or place of business, considerable authority has never-
theless selected the latter place for choice of law. 21 This 
approach is wrong when the law of the place of the head-
quarters is applied to workers in foreign branches of a firm. 
But restricted to the cases where the servant is in fact 
attached to the central business place of his firm, the rule is 
excellent. It is corroborated in many instances by the com-
prehensive integration of modern employees into the par-
ticular business organization. Working conditions (whether 
determined by collective agreement or unilateral regulation), 
duties and benefits, discipline, hospitalization, and insurance, 
are in force for all affiliated persons without reference to the 
place where they sign the contract or where they live. 
Where no other local attachment is manifest, the main office 
of the firm is the natural center. 
This localization of the employment relationship natu-
rally also extends to: 
(i) Employees occasionally or temporarily sent out by 
their employers to perform services in another country ;22 
18 Thus, RouAST in Melanges Pillet at 203. 
19 DICEY (ed. 5) 724 or (ed. 7) 873; as to the inconsistency of his exposition, 
see BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid. Rev. (1938) 282. 
2o 2 BEALE 1192 f.; Restatement § 342. 
21 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 291, art. 2 (h). 
England: WESTLAKE 310 § 218. 
France: RoLIN, 3 Principes 418 § 1390. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5· 
The Netherlands: KOSTERS 756; MULDER (ed. 2) 169. 
22 United States: In the workmen's compensation cases, it has been often 
assumed that temporary work incidental to employment in a foreign state is 
no ground for the jurisdiction of the board. See Proper v. Polley (1932) 
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(ii) Traveling salesmen who have no fixed place of busi-
ness in the country or countries visited by them.23 
The combination of the master's domicil and the conclu-
sion of the contract between present persons, e.g., when 
the future employee was invited there to negotiate the con-
tract, has prompted several English decisions to apply the 
law of this place.24 This also seems a sound solution. On the 
other hand, the appointment of a soliciting sales agent for 
Michigan by an Ohio corporation certainly should not be an 
Ohio contract simply because the contract is consummated 
there by approval of the corporation.25 
3· Law of the Servant's Working Place 
Prevailing opinion may at present be stated to the effect 
that where the servant is attached to a place of business 
259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. E. 161; Darsch v. Thearle Duffield Fire Works Co. 
(1922) 77 Ind. i\pp. 357, 133 N. E. 525. For details, see infra Ch. 42 pp. 224 ff. 
England: South African Breweries v. King [1899] 2 Ch. I73; [Igoo] I Ch. 
273-C. A. 
France: RouAST in Melanges Pillet at 206. 
Germany: R. Arb. G. (April I, 1931) and (July I, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, 
Nos. 53, 54 (dicta as to private law). See, for further references, GAMILLSCHEG 
I27 f. 
Italy: GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro I62 f. 
Switzerland: Ob. Ger. Zurich (June 22, I933) 9 Z.ausl.PR. ( I935) 710: 
activity in various countries with possible change of domicil according to the 
orders of a Swedish principal governed by Swedish law, though uncodified 
and not known to the German agents. 
23 England: Arnott v. Redfetn, infra n. 24. 
Germany: ROHG. (Dec. 4, 1872) 8 ROHGE. I5o; cf. RG. (Dec. I, Igu) 
22 Z.int.R. (1912) 3II (German law of a German firm employing an Italian 
traveling salesman, as tacitly stipulated law). 
24 Arnott v. Redfern ( 1825) 2 Car. & P. 88: "English contract" between a 
London principal and a traveling Scotch sales agent on commission, made 
while the Scotchman was in London. In re Anglo-Austrian Bank [I920] I Ch. 
69: P, German corporation, A, manager in England, contract made and signed 
in Germany. 
Oppenheimer v. Rosenthal [ 1937] I All E. R. 23: P, German corporation, 
A, manager of associated business in England, contract made in Germany. 
Younger, J., emphasized that the agent was directed and controlled by the 
firm. 
United States: Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. (1939) 303 Mass. 
123, 131, 20 N. E. (2d) 458, 462. 
25 This against Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Holder (C. C. E. D. Mich. I895) 
68 Fed. 467; actually the decision sought to avoid invalidity of the contract 
because the corporation had no license for doing business in Michigan. 
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different from the main office, the local law is applicable. 
Manifestly, this view complements rather than replaces 
the theory that the law of the principal's place governs. The 
working place to which the employee is attached depends 
on the employer's organization. 
(a) Domestic working place. This approach has been 
preferred by many courts in favor of their own law. Some-
times they construct a "submission" of the principal to this 
law, sometimes it is claimed that private and public labor 
laws are interrelated and must be given territorial force. 
Such a rule, technically based either on lex loci solutionis or 
on public policy, in deviation from the regular test of the 
court, was applied in older Austrian decisions, 26 in Brazil 
under the Introductory Law of 1917,27 often in ltaly,28 and 
occasionally elsewhere. 
(b) Domestic or foreign working place. We may, how-
ever, at present presume that in most countries the rule 
26 OGH. (June x, 1929) and others, see WAHLE, xo Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 788. 
27 Brazil, on the general rule of Introd. Law of 1916, art. 13 I, cf. OCTAVIO, 
Dicionario No. 266 at the end. 
28 E.g., App. Genoa (April x8, 1904) Riv. Dir. Com. 1904 II 361: P, 
Berlitz school in Milan, A, Swiss in Switzerland where contract was made 
for teaching in Milan, Italian law applied restraining the teacher's activity 
after termination; Cass. (July 28, 1934) Foro Ita!. 1934 I 824, Rivista 1934, 
557: Belgian company employs an Italian, contract made in Belgium, work 
in Italy, Italian law prevails and invalidates the clause for Belgian arbitra-
tion. Against the latter conclusion, BALDONI, Rivista I 934, 566: at present the 
place of business decides, not the place of contracting. 
Hungary: Curia P II 4864 (1931): P, firm in Saloniki, A, Hungarian in 
Greece, Greek law; Curia P II 2214 ( 1933): P, foreign firm, A, Hungarian 
in Hungarian branch, Hungarian law. See SzA.szY, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 
175 Nos. 8, 9· As to the present Hungarian doctrine, see RECZEI 250. 
The Netherlands: Trib. Amsterdam (April 7, 1932) N. J. 1932, 1541, II 
Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 203 No. 31: P, stock company domiciled in Amsterdam and 
carrying on a branch in Netherlands India, A, Dutchman to serve there, 
Netherlands-Indian law; App. Amsterdam (May x6, 1935) N.J. 1935, 1335, 
II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 229 No. 133: P, shipowner in Netherlands India, A, to 
serve on ships based there, Netherlands-Indian law prohibiting attachment 
of the wages (apparently the principle of the place of work rather than 
that of the flag is invoked). MEIJERS, N. J. 1927, 323, Note: commonly the 
place where the work is to be performed is assumed (to decide). Further cases 
are cited by GAMILLSCHEG 165 f. 
Germany: GAMILLSCHEG 125 ff.; and BAG. (May 9, 1959) NJW. 1959, 
1702; BAG. (May 13, 1959) 7 BAGE. 362. 
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is bilateral. Even when the place of work is not within the 
country, the law of the employer's business place to which 
an employee or worker is permanently assigned as a matter 
of organization, governs his relations with his employer. 
This is true for the foreign systems.29 The same rule has 
been claimed with respect to the United States,30 and is 
supported, if not by an impressive array of decisions, at least 
by a promising trend.31 
29 Canada: Wilson v. Metcalfe Construction Co. [ 1947 J 3 D. L. R. 491, 
aff'd [ 1947] 4 D. L. R. 472: American domiciled in Canada employed by an 
American firm in the construction, in Alaska and Canada, of the Alaska 
Highway, law of Alaska. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92: both parties 
Belgian nationals, contract made in Belgium, but work abroad, hence foreign 
law for form and notice; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Jan. 26, 1935) Jur. Com. 
Brux. 361, 364: P, Swiss, A, English, contract made and entire performance 
in Belgium, Belgian law. 
France: Theory advocated by ROUAST in Melanges Pillet at 205; CALEB, 
5 Repert. 215 and BATIFFOL 270, who, however, states only two decisions not 
concerning workmen's compensation; of these claims, Cour Paris (Jan. 12, 
1900) Clunet 1900, s6o, favored "implicit" adoption of lex loci solutionis, 
whereas Conr Pau (Feb. 28, 1922) Clunet 1922, 406 would not deal with a 
true conflict of laws. In a recent case the French Court of Cassation affirmed 
the decision of a Court of Appeals, which had ruled that employment con-
tracts are normally governed by the law of the working place; see Cass. civ. 
(Nov. 9. 1959) Revue Crit. 1960, s66 note SIMON-DEPITRE. Another French 
court applied the law of Vietnam to a French citizen's employment contract 
to be performed in that country; see Trib. Seine (June 1, 1960) Revue Crit. 
1961, 198 note SJMON-DEPITRE. 
Germany: KG. (Nov. 23, 1910) 23 ROLG. 6r, 22 Z.int.R. (1912) 168: P, 
German firm, A, Warsaw employee, Warsaw-Polish law, hence no jurisdic-
tion of a German merchant tribunal. OLG. Hamburg (July 16, 1936) JW. 
1936, 2939, 2940: provision of agent, who has to serve in Hamburg, is 
governed by German law. R. Arb. G. (July 20, 1935) JW. 1935, 3665, 6 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. 353 No. 269: an American corporation, through an agent, en-
gaging an actor for performances in the United States, American law to 
decide whether the corporation can be sued on the agent's contract. For 
further cases, see GAMILLSCHEG 125 ff. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179 speaking of the activity 
of the agent as primary whence it is concluded that the court generally 
applies the law of the working place, see 2 ScHNITZER ( ed. 4) 712-714, cf. 
infra n. 63 on 6o BGE. !I 322. BG. (Dec. 22, 1916) 42 BGE. II 65o: branch 
manager. 
30 BATIFFOL 266, as law of the place of performance; Restatement (Second), 
Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 346 l. 
3 1 United States: Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) uS S. W. 998 
(statute of frauds); Denihan v. Finn-Iffiand (1932.) 143 Misc. 525, 256 N.Y. 
Supp. Sor (damages for unjustified discharge; contract held to be concluded 
in Pennsylvania, but subject to New York law as the place of performance); 
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4· Special Rules 
(a) Cases actually applying the national law common to 
the parties are isolated.32 Employment contracts have much 
more important local connections which overshadow this 
nationalistic criterion.33 
(b) Contracts of employment made by the state or other 
public entities for public constructions have often been said 
to depend on the law of the seat of the principal.34 This rule 
would better be reduced to the meaning of the general rule 
stated above.34a 
(c) Briefly it may be noted that the contracts by which 
master and crew of a seagoing vessel are hired, as a rule, 
are commonly governed by the law of the flag.35 
Vandalia R. Co. v. Kelley (1918) 187 Ind. 323, II9 N. E. 257 ("Indiana con-
tract," because the railroad employee is employed there); Roth v. Patino 
(1945) 185 Misc. 235, 56 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 853, 855 concerning workmen's 
compensation. Under the contract theory of most states, as well as under the 
quasi-contract theory of New York (infra Ch. 42), a workmen's compensation 
statute is not applied where a worker is a foreign resident and performs his 
work wholly outside the state. Thus, the claimants, in Cameron v. Ellis 
Construction Co. (1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622, a Canadian sand pit 
worker, and in Elkhart Sawmill v. Skinner (1942) III Ind. App. 695,42 N. E. 
(2d) 412, a Michigan timber cutter, were not regarded as having a New 
York or an Indiana employment contract, respectively. For further cases and 
comments, see ROTHMAN, "Conflict of Laws in Labor Matters in the United 
States," 12 Vand. L. Rev. (1958/59) 997 and Restatement (Second), Tent. 
Draft No. 6 ( 1960) 142-148. 
32 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 30, 1902) 6 ROLG. 5; R. Arb. G. (Aug. 
27, 1930) JW. 1931, 159 and in other decisions; contra: NUSSBAUM 272 n. 3, 
BATIFFOL 268 n. 2. 
Italy: App. Torino (April 6, 1934) Rivista 1935, 416. 
33 Against the special rule, Cour Paris (Jan. u, 1900) Clunet 1900, 569: 
two Americans in Paris, French law; German RG. (Mar. 16, 1895) 5 Z.int.R. 
(1895) 507; OLG. Dresden (Jan. 25, 1907) 14 ROLG. 345: only certain 
German provisions are public policy; Greek Supreme Court (1932) No. 131, 
43 Thernis 449· 
34 Institute of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290 art. 2 (e); Poland, Int. 
Priv. Law, art. 8 No.4; SzA.szv, Droit international prive compare (1940) '577· 
34a Accord, GAMILLSCHEG 175 with further citations in n. 196. 
35 United States: The City of Norwich (C. C. A. 2d 1922) 279 Fed. 687; 56 
C. ]. 925, Seamen § 7 on 46 U. S. C. A. § 564 n. 13; American prohibitions 
expressly made applicable to seamen on foreign vessels, see The Troop 
(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1902) 117 Fed. 557, aff'd, Kenny v. Blake (C. C. A. gth 
1903) 125 Fed. 672. 
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5. Public Law and Public Policy 
(a) Public law. In cardinal points, legal protection for 
workers has been beneficially unified under the conventions 
promoted by the International Labor Office. For the re-
maining differences, agreement seems to exist that the state 
policy over industrial, commercial, and agricultural labor 
as expressed in the compendious modern administrative law, 
has territorial force, prevailing over private law and ex-
cluding private international law.36 On the other hand, the 
public law is territorially restricted. It extends to working 
places within the jurisdiction and those occupations on 
foreign soil which have been termed radiations from a 
domestic center by the German Supreme Labor Court.36a 
Thus, where an engineer is sent by his employer, a machine 
manufacturer, to install a machine sold to a foreign coun-
try,37 or employees live in a neighboring town beyond the 
state border, laws concerning unemployment or social insur-
ance may extend to them. But when groups of German enter-
prises were organized in order to carry on important works 
England: Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 265 (subsidiarity). 
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Dec. 1, 1904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 
(1905) 934; Law of June 5, 1928, art. 17. 
France: Code du Travail Maritime (Law of Dec. 13, 1926) art. 5, with 
exceptions, see YERNEAUX, 8 Repert. 529 ns. 22-25. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, 1926) 39 Z.int.R. (1929) 276; Seemannsgesetz of 
July 26, 1957, § r. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. Navig. art. 9 (if the flag is not Italian, the law may 
be chosen differently by the parties). 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. x, 1932) W. 12533, I VAN HASSELT 
419 (preferring the English place of the principal to the Dutch place where 
the seaman was enlisted in the ship's crew). 
For further references, see GAMILLSCHEG 177-179. 
In Air Line Stewards Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (C. C. A. 8th 1959) 
267 F. (2d) 170 it was held that the law-of-the-flag doctrine does not justify 
the extension of the Railway Labor Act to employees of an American air 
carrier working completely outside the United States, because Congress did 
not intend to give extraterritorial effect to the act. 
36 See Vol. II Ch. 33· 
36a The term "/lusstrahlung" (radiation) has been adopted and analyzed 
by German legal writers: GAMILLSCHEG r8o-r82. 
37 Swiss BG. (March 4, 1892) r8 BGE. 354. 
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in France, for reparations after the First World War, the 
German laws on labor representation and the hiring of dis-
abled war veterans were held inapplicable, although the em-
ployment contracts were presumably governed by German 
law.38 
It has been held, on the same theory, in Austria, that the 
law regulating the legal situation of commercial servants 
is inapplicable to the employees of foreign enterprises,39 
and in Greece that the right of a worker injured abroad to 
compensation under the foreign law does not concern inter-
national public policy.40 
(b) Collective labor agreements. Labor contracts, nego-
tiated in collective bargaining between employers and labor 
unions, in the common opinion, are effective in the district 
in which the employer's working establishment is physically 
situated. The state in which this place is, determines all 
particulars. 41 But insofar as these contracts pertain to pri-
vate law, it is recognized that they may be extended through 
agreement of the parties to foreign-located branches.42 And 
the elements of private law contained in the standard agree-
ments on working and wage rules incorporated into the 
individual labor contracts,-which have been correctly de-
scribed in this country as third party beneficiary agreements, 
subject to the conventional law of contracts,43-may be ex-
pected to be enforced in courts of other states. 
(c) Public policy. Less well settled, however, is the ex-
38 Supreme Labor Court (April I, I93I) and (July 1, 1931) IPRspr. 1931 
Nos. 53, 54· 
39 OGH. (May 28, 1934) cited by WAHLE, Io Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 788. 
40 Aeropag (I932) No. I3I, 43 Themis 449· 
412 HUECK & NIPPERDEY (ed. 6) 359; BALDONI, "II contratto di )avoro nei 
diritto internazionale privato italiano," in 24 Rivista ( I932) 346, 362; 
GAMILLSCHEG 360 ff. 
42 2 HUECK & NIPPERDEY (ed. 6) 360; cf. C. GREGORY, Labor and the Law 
(I946) 385. 
43 MULROY, "The Taft Hartley Act in Action," IS U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
( I948) 595. 629. 
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tent to which the private law of the forum should intrude 
into a private employment contract governed by foreign 
law.44 The domestic private law in question includes the 
termination of employment by dismissal and the compensa-
tion in case of unwarranted or premature dismissal, restraint 
of trade on a former employee, duties of preserving the 
health and morals of servants, and presumably laws pre-
scribing place, time, and means of wage payments. The 
territorial character of all provisions on such matters is 
often in the mind of writers. 45 If the work is to be done in 
the forum, the domestic law would thus necessarily be 
applied. 
In the most appropriate view, 46 however, provisions of 
public labor law for the protection of employees are, of 
course, compulsory for the working conditions within the 
territory, but private interests safeguarded by protective 
provisions of local private law do not include relations gov-
erned by foreign law. The distinction is emphasized by the 
fact that public interests merely create duties of the em-
ployer towards the state, without giving the employee a 
cause of action, whilst contractual rights are enforceable 
against the other party. 
It is true that modern consideration for the worker has 
in part breached these confines. Private duties towards the 
employee may duplicate the public duties towards the state; 
public social protection may influence, directly or by con-
44 Cf. Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 562, 579· 
45 See for France, RouAST in Melanges Pillet at 2II ff. (with exceptions); 
CALEB, 5 Repert. 210 ff. (characterizing some of these problems as tort) ; fol-
lowing this lead, App. Bruxelles (Nov. 26, 1938) Pasicrisie 1940 II 92, Journ. 
des Trib. 1940, c. 87, even though the contract is made in Belgium between 
Belgian nationals, prescribes territorial application of the law of the foreign 
working place protecting the employees as to "paid furlough, form and effects 
of notice and discharge." Distinctions have been made by GEMMA, Dir. Int. 
del Lavoro 161 ff. 
46 This view has been developed against many other theories by KASKEL, 
see Kaskei-Dersch, Arbeitsrecht 258, and advocated by I HuEcK & NIPPERDEY 
(ed. 6) 125 ff, 
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struction, the contractual relationship. All this has been 
observed in Europe,47 and exactly the same development is 
occurring at present in the United States. 
Thus, the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly prescribes 
an action for the employee against the employer.48 
The New York Labor Law only provides that the wages 
to be paid upon public works "shall be not less than the pre-
vailing rate of wages, " 49 and the Appellate Division, accept-
ing the correct principle, specifically found that the Labor 
Law gave an exclusive remedy to be exercised only by the 
fiscal officer.50 The Court of Appeals, however, held that a 
laborer could enforce the provisions of the statute by com-
mon law action since they must be inserted in the contract.51 
III. INDEPENDENT AGENTS 
I. Rule 
More or less definitely, a part of the literature52 and 
the bulk of court decisions in many countries have decided 
that contracts made with attorneys, solicitors, physicians, 
or other persons exercising a public profession, as well as 
47 I HUECK & NIPPERDEY (ed. 6) 125 ff.; GAMILLSCHEG 185 ff. 
48 § I6 (b), 52 Stat. I069 ( 1938), 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b) ( Supp.). Applied 
to Bermuda Base in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell (1948) 69 S. Ct. qo. The 
effect of this decision was restricted by the legislature; see 29 U. S. C. § 213 
( Supp. V, 1958). Note the similarly restricted effect attributed to the Railway 
Labor Act in Air Line Stewards Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra n. 35· 
49 § 220 subd. 3, Cons. Laws, Book 30; cf. subd. 5 (c) and 7 on the 
enforcement by the fiscal officer. 
5° Fata v. Healy Co. (1941) 263 App. Div. 725, 726. 
51 Fata v. Healy Co. (1943) 289 N. Y. 40I, 405, 46 N. E. (2d) 339: "It can-
not be doubted that provisions requiring the contractor to pay such wages 
are also inserted in the contract, whether voluntarily or under compulsion 
of the public body which is a party to the contract." (Note that this does not 
mean public interest in every labor contract.) Cf. LENHOFF, "Optional Terms 
(Jus Dispositivum) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens) in the Law of Con-
tracts," 45 Mich. L. Rev. (1946) 39, 75· 
52 ROLIN, 3 Principes 416; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 253, 262 ff.; 
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 274; 2 ScHNITZER ( ed. 4) 712, 739 ff.; ARMIN JON, Droit 
Int. Pr. Com. 409 and n. I. KEGEL, Kom. (ed. g) 562 ff.; DELAUME, "Les 
conllits de lois et le contrat de commission," in HAMEL, Le contrat de com-
mission ( I949) 349 ff. 
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commercial orders to commission agents, factors, brokers, 
or any merchants acting in the interest of the principal, 
are governed by the law of the state where these persons 
have their permanent place of business. It has rightly been 
argued that no one can expect such persons, sought out at 
their domicil, to change their conditions according to the 
nationality or domicil of the client or customer; they exer-
cise functions within the social and cultural framework of 
their state; they are under legal rules and professional 
organizations governing a substantial part of their activity. 
It should be regarded as immaterial in this connection 
whether the acting person discloses his principal or not and 
whether his order is given from case to case or is a standing 
assignment. 
In opposition to this view, lex loci contractus retains a 
role in Italy and probably other Latin countries. Also Beale 
and the Restatement have turned the meaning of the cases 
to the stereotyped rule of the law of the place of contract-
ing.53 These are undesirable remainders. 
2. Public Professions54 
(a) Attorneys. The English Privy Council once decided 
a case where the plaintiff, an attorney of Quebec, was 
appointed to represent the British Government in an inter-
national commission between Canada and the United States 
on the payment for fishing rights. The contract with the 
attorney was perhaps made in Ottawa, Ontario, and the 
meetings were held in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The Canadian 
53 Restatement § 342; 2 BEALE 1192 § 342.1; Ita!. Disp. Pre!. C. C. ( 1942) 
art. 25; 7 LAURENT§ 454-; DESPAGNET 635. Contrary to the First Restatement, 
the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 346 lis in agreement 
with the view here suggested; see Illustrations 6 and 7, id. at 145 f. For 
criticism, see EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 529. 
54 Inst. of Int. Law, 22 Annuaire (1908) 291, art. 2 (g). 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 ( 6): notaries, attorneys, and other persons 
exercising a public profession; WESTLAKE § 218: barristers. The Polish Draft 
1961, art. 15, does not contain this, or a similar, provision. 
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courts and the Privy Council, however, selected the law of 
Quebec for determining the fees due to the plaintiff because 
this was the state where he normally exercised his profes-
sional functions. 55 The same view is held in other countries,56 
and is probably in the mind of American courts.57 
(b) Physicians. Cases are scarce, 58 but no opinion oppos-
ing the above view is known. 
3· Commercial Agents 
(a) Permanent agents. This term may indicate inde-
pendent merchants who place their activities at the service 
of a firm, either as exclusive distributors in an assigned 
territory or to administer buildings, buy or sell in continuous 
relationship, solicit orders, or cash money. The delimitation 
of these types from the field of master and servant is some-
times difficult to state. Wise courts have extended by analogy 
55 Regina v. Doutre ( r884) 51 L. T. R. 669, Clunet r886, 116-P. C. 
56 Austria:OGH. (Jan. 17, 1928) JW. 1929, r6o. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 25, 1935) 149 RGZ. 121: German attorney, as executor 
of will acting in the United States, fees according to the law of his legal 
domicil; RG. (March 20, 1936) 151 RGZ. 193: Austrian attorney for German 
party, "the law in force at the professional domicil governs the relations 
between the attorney and his client," Austrian law; BGH. (Nov. 15, 1956) z.a 
BGHZ. 162: American attorney for German party, fees being validly agreed 
upon according to the law of his place of business not violating German 
public policy. 
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 229 n. 7· 
Switzerland: App. Bern (April 7, 1933) 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 826 (Yugo-
slavian law). 
France: App. Paris (July 5, 1954) Revue Crit. 1955, 525, note Y.L.; App. 
Paris (May 6, 1961) Revue Crit. 1962, r88, note GAVALDA; (both decisions 
applying Swiss law to contracts with Swiss attorneys). 
57 Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (C. C. A. 7th 1943) 132 F. (zd) 829 (limita-
tion of action) is not strict evidence since everything happened in Illinois. 
In Lust v. Atchinson etc. R. Co. ( 1932) z67 Ill. App. 6o it was held that the 
law of the place {San Francisco) where the attorney entered into his contract 
with his client determined whether the attorney has a lien for the costs of 
the suit against the defeated adversary. But evidently this decision was-
supported by the facts that the attorney was domiciled in San Francisco and 
the judgment was rendered there. 
As to the problem of whether federal law or state law governs a contract 
with an American attorney in a case pending in a Federal Court, see Green· 
berg v. Panama Transp. Co. (D. C. D. Mass. 1960) 185 F. Supp. 320. 
ss Germany: OLG. Miinchen (June n, 1926) 75 Seuff. Arch. 313 No. 129. 
In addition, see EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 532. 
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legal provisions literally restricted to commercial servants 
so as to comprehend certain groups of merchants.59 There-
fore, conflicts rules should not necessarily require a radical 
distinction of functions. 
In the United States, the clear tendency to apply the 
law of the agent's domicil has been concealed under the 
cover of lex loci contractus. 
Illustration. The Transit Bus Sales Company, a resident 
of Wisconsin, obtained by written contract exclusive dis-
tribution of interurban busses manufactured by Kalamazoo 
Coaches, Inc., in the territory of "a number of states," in-
cluding Wisconsin and Upper Michigan. The court after 
much argument about the doubtful "place of contracting" 
construed it as being in Wisconsin.60 The sales territory, 
59 For example, in the United States where a truck driver uses his own 
vehicle to transport goods of another, courts have allowed common law 
action for injury or death, or applied statutes on workmen's compensation, 
social security, and unemployment compensation. Cf. Note, 144 A. L. R 735, 
740, but see 151 A. L. R. 1331. 
In Germany, the case of independent contractors employed similarly to 
servants (Arbeitnehmeriihnliche Agenten) has been much discussed, see 
HUECK in 39 Riv. Dir. Com. (1941) I 143 at I45i I HUECK & NIPPERDEY 
( ed. 6) 52 f. 
A nice example, for our purposes, is furnished in a German case, RG. 
(Jan. 8, 1929) JW. 1929, 1291. A German firm appointed a firm in New 
York as exclusive general agent for distributing its goods in the United 
States and Canada. The goods, however, were to be bought by the American 
party as buyer and resold by it within its territory. In the words of the 
annotator, TITZE, the New Yorker is not an "agent" (in the German sense) 
since he sells in his own name; he is not a commercial employee, since he 
sells in carrying on his own business; and he is not a commission agent since 
he distributes on his own account. The court finds a relationship similar to 
"agency" as justification for applying by analogy the limitations on dismissal 
by the principal, prescribed for agency in § 92 of the Commercial Code. Of 
course, the court should not have applied German law at all, much less 
without a word of justification, cf. IPRspr. 1929 No. 34· 
60 Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches, Inc. (C. C. A. 6th 1944) 145 F. 
(2d) 8o4; Alexander v. Barker (1902) 64 Kan. 396, 401, 67 Pac. 829 directly 
applied the law of Cherokee, the place of activity and performance, to the 
validity of the contract of agency. 
In Gaston, Williams & Wigmore of Canada, Ltd. v. Warner (C. C. A. zd 
1921) 272 Fed. 56, the broker employed for the sale of a ship was domiciled 
in New York where the brokerage contract was made and the vessel was 
to be delivered. It was held immaterial to the earning of the fee, on the 
ground of the law of New York, that both parties to the sale were British 
subjects and hence the sale, in wartime, was void. 
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of course, afforded no clue since the states of both parties 
are included. The decision in favor of Wisconsin law could 
have been very simple, on the ground of the place of busi-
ness of the sales agent.61 
In another recent case of a contract, combining sales and 
agency, exactly the same result has been based upon the law 
of the place of performance. 62 
In a long chain of decisions, German and Swiss courts 
have developed the constant doctrine that the law of that 
place governs where "the agent deploys his activity," mean-
ing the fixed domicil where the agent is established and from 
which he is active in the interest of the principal.63 
(b) Brokers and occasional agents. We distinguish this 
6 1 This theory should have been followed in Smith v. Compania Litogr. 
de Ia Habana ( 1926) 127 Misc. 508, 217 N. Y. Supp. 39· The plaintiff was 
to represent the defendant company of Cuba in the United States and 
Canada, and made the contract inter praesentes in Cuba. The court referred 
to the law of Cuba as mere lex loci contractus, which is insufficient, and as 
supplanting lex loci solutionis, because the agent had to work in several 
countries (a known, inappropriate approach). Finally, the Cuban law not 
being in evidence, the lex fori was applied. The agent probably had a domicil 
in the United States from which he traveled; the decision does not state the 
contrary. Even so, he lived and worked in North America. This fact surely 
supports the application of some American law-though not the lex fori-in 
preference to the labyrinthian solution of the court. 
62 Cowley v. Anderson (C. C. A. xoth 1947) 159 F. (2d) I. 
63 Germany: RG. (Oct. II, 1893) JW. 1893, 549 (rights of agent after 
notice); 38 RGZ. 194, 51 id. 149; JW. 1899, 146 No. 21; OLG. Kolmar 
(March 27, 1896) 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 45, Clunet 1903, 886 (agent for buying 
flour in Paris, French law); OLG. Hamburg (June 26, 1909) 21 ROLG. 385 
(English agent for exclusive distribution for Great Britain and colonies, 
English law of restraint of trade); OLG. Miinchen (March 8, 1956) IPRspr. 
1956/57 No. 46 (Italian with domicil in Munich acts as agent for an Italian 
firm, German law). 
Otherwise, RG. (Oct. 28, 1932) 138 RGZ. 252 (on the ground of express 
agreement for the German law of the principal). RG. (Jan. 8, 1929) JW. 
1929, 1291 (without justification and much criticized). BGH. (March 19, 
1956) IPRspr. 1956 j 57 No. 23 (agreement for German law implied in state-. 
ments by counsels in court). 
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 322 (French general agent 
for France and the French colonies, French law). BG. (Oct. 25, 1939) 65 
BGE. II 168 (as a rule, Jaw of the place where the exclusive representative 
deploys his activity). For many other cases, see KNAPP, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. 
(N. F.) (1941) 335 (a) No. 40. A Swiss law of Feb. 4, 1949, by express 
provision, governs all contracts of permanent agents, insofar as the agent's 
"field of activity" (Tiitigkeitsgebiet) is Switzerland, regardless where his 
place of business is situated. See LITTMANN, Die kollisionsrechtliche Bedeutung 
EMPLOYMENT AND AGENCY 205 
group for the one reason that certain doubts have arisen 
with regard to stockbrokers. Apart from some old decisions 
which do not even consider the conflict of laws,64 there is 
no controversy with respect to factors and to selling or 
buying agents contracting in their own name on orders. 
Certainly the domicil of the principal65 and the place where 
the order is given66 are without importance, although both 
have been favored by some theoreticians. 67 Thus, where a 
von Art. 418, lit. b., Abs. :z. OR. (1955); STOLL, Book review, 25 RabelsZ. 
(1960) 38o f.; 2 ScHNITZER (ed. 4) 742. 
Austria: OGH. (July 9, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 748 No. 433, where the 
agent is a merchant registered and domiciled in Austria, Austrian law 
applies. 
Hungary: Curia P. VII 3813 (1931), SzA.szY, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 172 No. 
I: a Hungarian firm granted an American firm exclusive distribution of 
certain skins in the United States and Canada; the agent gave notice and 
demands damages because the principal made a direct offer to another 
American firm. The court recognizes American law as governing, but under 
a sort of natural law, it charges the American plaintiff with lack of good 
faith because he failed to warn the defendant of the rigidity of American law. 
64 E.g., Cartwright v. Greene ( 1866) 47 Barb. 9 explains the effect of an 
account of del credere under the New York law of the principal, whereas 
the factors were in San Francisco. 
The French Supreme Court, Cass. req. (July 9, 1928) S. 1930.1.17, examin-
ing the question whether a broker in Leigh, England, was entitled to insert 
a clause of arbitration into the contract with the third party, thoughtlessly 
applied French law; see Note, NIBOYET, ibid. 
65 Thus, Adams v. Thayer (1931) 85 N. H. 177, 155 At!. 687, the principal 
lived in New Hampshire, the contract was centered in Massachusetts. 
66 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625. French courts do not 
really apply in this case the lex loci contractus, see BATIFFOL 287 n. 3· 
67 The place where the order is given appears as late as in the proposals 
of PILLET to the Institute of International Law, 23 Annuaire ( 1910) 283, 291, 
and in AMIEux's article, 2 Repert. 440 f. n. 17, although he concedes that this 
place is difficult to determine. 
Similarly the I. L. A., Copenhagen Draft of 1950, see supra Ch. 40 n. 67b, 
in certain cases favors the law of the place where "the authority has been 
given" (art. 4); and the Lucerne Draft of 1952, see supra Ch. 40 n. 67c, 
declares applicable the law of the place of business (tftablissement) "through 
the intermediary of which the authorization is given" or received, respectively 
(art. 4). 
To the same effect GUTZWILLER, 43 Annuaire (1950) 74, 86 ff. and probably 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 346m par. (1). The new 
Restatement subjects contracts with stock brokers to the law of the exchange, 
if the contract "is entered into by a broker in the state where the exchange is 
situated." This rule apparently refers to the place where the broker makes 
the contract rather than to his place of business and is therefore along the 
lines of the proposa Is mentioned before. 
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grain broker in Chicago is ordered to buy or sell grain on 
the Chicago Board of Trade Exchange or a stockbroker 
in New Y ark is ordered to transfer securities on the New 
York Stock Exchange, the local law of the broker and the 
exchange governs the entire contract, including validity, 
performance, and effects of wrong performance by either 
party.68 However, complications do exist.688 
The American practice has become fairly firm in applying 
this rule to the question whether the contract is invalid as 
gambling or wager.69 The contract is even enforced in the 
states where it would be invalid under domestic law, 70 the 
few exceptions71 probably being obsolete. However, this 
concerns the relation of the states to federal institutions 
for the common benefit. W auld the rule be applied to for-
eign exchanges as well? We have seen a more restrictive 
practice in European courts. 72 
All these propositions, which make the place where the contract or part of 
the contract is made a decisive criterion, meet with the very same criticism 
that has been pointed out regarding art. 3 ( 2) of the Hague Convention 
I955; see supra Ch. 36 n. 2Sb and text. 
68 France: Trib. com. Seine (July 4, IS94) Clunet IS94, 994 (London 
broker) ; and many subsequent decisions, see BATIFFOL 2S7 n. 3; ad de Paris 
(March 7, I93S) Clunet 193S, 739· 
Belgium: Cass. (June 4, I940) 70 Pand. Belges 599, cited by BRANDL, Int. 
Borsenprivatrecht Ss n. I3. 
Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 25, I925) Ruperts' Merck & Co. v. 
Broca & Cie., 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 795; (Feb. 22, I926) Cohen v. Herz, 
6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 22S. 
Germany: RG. (May 10, ISS4) I2 RGZ. 34, 36; (April x, IS96) 37 RGZ. 
266 (although the instant contract was invalidated by public policy); RG. 
(June IS, ISS7) 4 Bolze No. 26, according to NussBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2 
denies the right of the English broker to intervene as a party according to 
English law. 
Italy: Cass. Napoli (Sept. IS, I9I4) Clunet I9I5, 703, and many other 
decisions, the "absolutely prevailing opinion" according to CAVAGLIERI, Dir. 
Int. Com. 425 n. I. 
68a Thoroughly discussed by STOLL, "Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen beim Kom-
missionsgeschiift unter Beriicksichtigung des internationalen Borsenrechts," 24 
RabelsZ. (I959) 6oi. 
69 Winslow v. Kaiser ( I934) 313 Pa. 577, I70 At!. I35· 
70 Jacobs v. Hyman (C. C. A. 5th I923) 2S6 Fed. 346; MEYER, The Law 
of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges ( I93 I) 67S. 
n MEYER, id. 677 n. 4· 
72 Vol. II ( ed. 2) pp. 569 ff. The criticism there expressed is supported by 
STOLL, supra n. 6Sa, at 634 ff. 
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A difficulty arises where the broker's place differs from 
the location of the exchange. Of course, it is commonly 
realized that the parties reasonably contemplate the rules 
of the exchange at which the order is intended to be exe-
cuted.73 American courts, furthermore, have conveniently 
applied the rules of an exchange not determined by the 
parties but at which the contract would be customarily 
executed. 74 In connection with this view, the legality of the 
operation always depends on the law of the state of the 
exchange and not of the place where the order was given 
or received, thus excluding the law of the broker's domicil.75 
Sometimes, a direct correspondence between the client and 
the substitute of his local broker, at the seat of the exchange, 
has facilitated the decision that the entire contract was 
governed by the law of the exchange.76 
Nevertheless, in numerous respects there remains room 
73 E.g., Winslow v. Kaiser (1934) 313 Pa. 577, 170 At!. 135· The defendant 
client "was visited with knowledge of the board's rules which allowed the 
matching of orders to buy and orders to sell." 
France: E.g., Trib. com. Dijon (July r, 1908) Clunet 1910, 536 (selling out). 
Germany: Infra n. 79· 
Switzerland: See Vol. II Ch. 28. 
74 Berry v. Chase (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 146 Fed. 625, 629. The Restatement 
(Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 346m par. (2) (a) only takes into 
account the case in which the customer knows the exchange where the trans-
action is to be made. Even in this case, the application of the law of the 
exchange has been criticized at the 37th Annual Meeting of the American 
Law Institute; see Proceedings 563-566. 
75 Brooks v. People's Bank (1921) 233 N. Y. 87; 134 N. E. 846; In re 
Clement D. Cates & Co. (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1922) 283 Fed. 541, 545; Hoyt v. 
Wickham (C. C. A. 8th 1928) 25 F. (2d) 777, 779; Lyons Milling Co. v. 
Gaffe & Carkener (C. C. A. roth 1931) 46 F. (2d) 241, 245; MEYER, The Law 
of Stock Brokers 677 n. 4, Supp. (1936) 236 § 181. 
Germany: To reach the same result, the Reichsgericht goes so far as to 
apply the law of the exchange as the general law of the contract, see JUPra 
n. 72 and BRANDL, Int. Borsenprivatrecht 94· 
France: The courts emphasizing generally the determination of legality by 
the law of the exchange, e.g., Trib. sup. Colmar (Jan. 17, 1923) Clunet 1924, 
1049 and Note, NAST, might decide likewise where the broker is established 
elsewhere. It is true that the frequent detour of decisiun through construing 
the place where the commission agent receives the order as place of con-
tracting might mislead in this case. 
76 Hoyt v. Wickham, supra n. 75· In Mullinix v. Hubbard (C. C. A. 8th 
1925) 6 F. (2d) 109, II4 the order was given in Memphis to a local branch 
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for the broker's law. Some decisions have ignored the prob-
lem, and some have directly referred to the law of the 
exchange, although the operation is made through a local 
broker with the aid of a subagent. On the other hand, in 
what appears to be the best considered decision, the Massa-
chusetts court states that, as in the absence of specification 
the order was executed in New York, it was only "in certain 
respects subject to the rules and regulations of the New 
York Stock Exchange," but not "to be governed by the 
laws of that state relating to stock bought on margins."77 
This question was determined under the law of Massa-
chusetts, considered as the law of the place of contract; we 
ought to add that payment and delivery were due there, and 
more important yet, the broker was domiciled there. 
As a Quebec decision justly asserts, advances made by 
a broker in buying and selling at an exchange are to be 
recovered under the law governing the contract with the 
client, and not by the law of the place where the buying and 
selling took place. 78 
The German Reichsgericht, to the contrary, prefers the 
law of the exchange as a whole79 to that of the broker. But 
this is just another consequence of overemphasizing the lex 
loci solutionis. Prevailing German literature is in oppo-
sition.80 
of the New York stockholders; hence no further question of localization 
occurred. 
France: A similar case, though with express submission to the rules of 
the London stock exchange, in Trib. com. Seine (June 8, 1931) Clunet 193:1, 
629. 
7 7 Papadopulos v. Bright (1928) 264 Mass. 4:1, 46, 161 N. E. 799 citing 
Barrell v. Paine (1922) 242 Mass. 415, 425, 136 N. E. 414; Marshall v. 
James (1925) 252 Mass. 306, 310, 147 N. E. 740. 
78 Finlayson v. Kell ( 1921} 23 Que. Pr. 328. 
79 RG. (Nov. 30, 1899) JW. 1900, 19 No. 32; (Nov. 21, 1910) JW. 19II, 
148 (German broker ordered to sell securities in the United States, American 
limitation of action) ; contra: LEHMANN in 5 Diiringer-Hachenburg II 676. RG. 
(May 30, 1923) 107 RGZ. 36, see infra n. So. 
France: Similarly, the editor of Clunet in Notes, e.g., Clunet 1938, 742, 745, 
speaking of the law of the exchange as "professional law." 
so This is the main point of controversy between German writers and the 
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The law of the broker's place of business, hence, should 
govern such problems as free consent and capacity of the 
parties, time and place of payment and of delivery to the 
customer, remedies for nonperformance by the broker, and 
his duty to account. Where the broker under his own law, 
e.g., German, is entitled to take up the ordered transaction 
in lieu of a third party, he may do so despite the contrary 
law of the state, e.g., England, where the exchange is situ-
ated in which the order would otherwise be carried out. But 
of course this question is decided under the usages of the 
exchange in the case where the order is performed by a 
subagent. On the other hand, if the customer fails to provide 
cover according to the contract, the broker is entitled to 
sell out by any method recognized at the exchange.BI 
(c) Real-estate broker. When a real estate broker is 
domiciled at the situs of the immovable, this fact deter-
mines the applicable law without regard to the place where 
the brokerage agreement is made or a purchaser is found. 82 
The Georgia court, so reasoning, decided to apply the lex 
loci solutionis, 83 but this, too, is not the adequate rule. The 
broker sues for his fees, which he earns when he presents a 
buyer able and willing; this may occur at any place. If the 
broker resides outside the state of situs, an Illinois decision 
has applied the Louisiana law of the situs on the ground 
that the agreement was made there.84 This, however, hap-
Reichsgericht, IO'J RGZ. 36; cf. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 276 n. 2; STAUB-KOENIGE 
in 4 Staub 638 § 383 n. 37; BRANDL, Int. Borsenprivatrecht 91; LEHMANN in 
5 Diiringer-Hachenburg 676 § 383 n. 25. 
81 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 179, 181 recognizes this 
in principle, although by substituting Swiss law for the "unknown" Czecho-
slovakian procedure, the rights of the banker of Prague against the Swiss 
customer were frustrated. 
82 Pratt v. Sloan ( 1930) 41 Ga. App. 150, 152 S. E. 275; since the broker 
was not licensed in Florida, the Georgia court dismissed his claim. 
83 BATIFFOL 288 n. 3 claims this construction for his theory. 
84 Benedict v. Dakin ( 1909) 243 Ill. 384, 90 N. E. 712: the fees are de-
termined according to the standard of Louisiana which is half of that of 
Illinois. 
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pened only by accident, as the activity of the broker was 
centered in Illinois where he also found a purchaser. Lex 
loci contractus in this case, as lex loci solutionis in the first 
case, is beside the point. The lex situs has simply scored 
another undeserved victory. 
Even more questionable are other decisions invalidating 
the brokerage and depriving the broker of his fees on the 
ground of his lack of license. While understandably the law 
of the situs upholds its public policy with respect to its 
land,85 an Illinois court decided against a broker, licensed 
in Illinois, who found a purchaser for Illinois land in New 
York, where he was not licensed, 86 and in New York a 
broker's suit was dismissed because he was not licensed to 
deal in Pennsylvania land.87 
Consistently, the contract ought to be centered at the 
domicil of the broker. The broker, then, should be required 
to be licensed at his domicil, and the situs may void his 
claim if he is not licensed there, although even this, once 
more, unduly disturbs the private law in the interest of 
administrative interstate diversity. 878 
4· Public Policy 
Under the French law, the promise of an exaggerated fee 
to any agent, including solicitors, barristers, notaries, archi-
tects, and enforcement agencies, may be reduced by the 
court. It has been correctly argued that the law of the con-
tract rather than the French territorial law should apply.88 
85 Moore v. Burdine (La. 1937) 174 So. 279· 
86 Frankel v. Allied Mills, Inc. (1938) 369 III. 578, 17 N. E. (2d) 570. 
87 Angell v. VanSchaick (1892) 132 N.Y. 187, 30 N. E. 395· 
87a For criticism and a completely different interpretation of the cases in 
point, see EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 529-532; EHRENZWEIG, "The Real Estate 
Broker and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Col. L. Rev. (1959) 303. 
88 MAURY, Revue Crit. 1936, 371 ff., 382, commenting on a decision applying 
the French provision for the honorarium of a foreign advocate on a contract 
made in France. 
CHAPTER 42 
Workmen's Compensation 
I. THE SuBSTANTIVE LAw 
I. Municipal Systems1 
I T HAS always been recognized that liability of em-ployers for injury to the health of employees could be 
based on tort, which, however, required either proof, 
or at least a prima facie showing, of fault. The German 
Civil Code, § 6 r 8, added a contractual duty of employers to 
protect the employee against dangers to life and health, 
:md this has been adopted in other codes. In the industrial 
age, however, special institutions have increasingly been 
found necessary to provide accident compensation not based 
on tortious and contractual liability of the employer and 
even despite excusable fault of the injured employee. In 
1 Strangely, despite an immense literature, no satisfactory modern compara-
tive work exists. 
United States: ScHNEIDER's Workmen's Compensation (ed. 3, 1941) Vol. I 
§§ 155-218; 1958 Cumulative Supp. Vol. I pp. I84-233; LARSON, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation (1952) Vol. 2 §§ 84.00-91.77; 1962 Supp. pp. 
33I-356 j EHREN ZWEIG, Conflict I44 ff., 220 ff., 604 ff. j STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 212 
ff.; YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1932) 338, 340; HANCOCK, Torts 2IIj 
CHEATHAM, Cases ( ed. 4) 473-484, 1961 Supp. pp. 52-57, and articles cited 
by the authors of this casebook. 
European countries: The most informative general survey is still afforded 
by NEUMEYER, 2 Int. VerwaltungsR. (I922) 437 ff. § 69. The various publica-
tions of the International Labour Office contain numerous details. In addition, 
see GAMILLSCHEG 257 ff.; BINDER, "Zur Aullockerung des Deliktsstatuts," 20 
RabeJsZ. ( 1955) 401, 488 ff. j VESTER & CARTWRIGHT, Industrial Injuries ( I96I) 
Vol. I Ch. II, I (I); BERENSTEIN, "Les ten dances actuelles dans Ia reparation 
des accidents du travail," 2 Riv. Dir. Int. Comp. Lav. (I955) 75· 
On Latin America, a short report by TrxrER, "The Development of Social 
Insurance in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay," 32 Int. Labour Rev. 
(I935) 6Io is mainly concerned with the social and administrative features. 
As to comparative aspects, see, furthermore, LAROQUE, "International 
Problems of Social Security," 66 Int. Labour Rev. (I952) r, u3. 
2II 
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the common law countries, an additional reform was needed 
to eliminate the defense of common employment. Progres-
sive impulses were most felt in hazardous industries, which 
still constitute a special class in New York, but the area of 
"social protection" has constantly expanded, though it varies 
in the world. 
Finally, the legislative idea of the statutes has changed. 
The great tendency, taken as a whole, has been from im-
provements on, or substitutes for, the ordinary tort remedies 
to a theory of the employer's professional risk, and from 
individual responsibility of the employer to common liability 
of the employers of a district or industry, often with con-
tributions by the employees and public subsidies. 
Four groups of compensation organization are distin-
guishable: 
(a) A group of mere substitutes for tort actions, such 
as the British Employers' Liability Act, I 88o, is repre-
sented in the United States by the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, 1908. The former Swiss Factory Liability Act, 
r881/1887, illustrated an analogous attempt to insert a 
somewhat stricter liability in the employment contract. 
(b) A superior type of individual liability has been 
adopted in the workmen's compensation acts of most states 
of the United States (since 1908), the United States Em-
ployees' Compensation Act (1916), the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( 1927), and the 
enactments of England ( I 9 2 5) and many other countries. 
These statutes apply regardless of real or presumed fault 
on the part of the employer, or the defense of common em-
ployment, and other features of the old master and servant 
doctrine. 
The American compensation acts are of two kinds. "Elec-
tive" or "optional'' acts operate merely if the parties, or 
either party, declare for the act, or do not reject its applica-
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tion. Statutes of the other kind apply irrespective of any 
disposition by the parties. 
(c) To secure the employee's claim, some of the same 
statutes in the United States and abroad favor, others re-
quire, that the employer take out insurance for the com-
pensation risk. The insurer may be a private company, or a 
public or semipublic institution, at the employer's option. 
By another method, the French Law of I 898 created a 
trust fund to which all employers contribute, for guarantee-
ing the claim of the injured in case of insolvency of the 
employer. . 
(d) The most effective protection of workers is pro-
vided by the system of automatic insurance against accident. 
On the mere ground of occupation in work in a domestic 
enterprise the worker enters into a corporative, "social" 
relation with a public or semipublic insurance fund operating 
as an administrative agency. Germany adopted this system 
as early as I 8 8 5 under Bismarck and was followed by the 
states of central and northern Europe, and later by others, 
including certain jurisdictions on the American continent. 
Great Britain has joined this system by its National Insur-
ance Acts of 1946.2 
2 United States: See LENHOFF, "Insurance Features of Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws," 29 Cornell L. Q. ( 1944) 176, 353· 
Great Britain: National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, and 
:'1/ational Insurance Act, 1946, 9, 10, II, Geo. VI., c. 62 and c. 67. The Em-
ployers' Liability Act, x88o, has been repealed by Law Reform (Personal 
Injuries) Act, 1948, s. 1 (2). 
Canada: "Beginning in Ontario in 1914, workmen's compensation laws are 
now in force in every province except Prince Edward Island .... More 
nearly uniform than any other class of Labour Legislation, the provincial 
Workmen's Compensation Acts each provide for a system of State insurance 
... the Ontario statute embodies principles adopted from the German system 
of accident insurance and from a collective liability law enacted in I9II by 
the State of Washington." Labour Legislation in Canada. Legislation Branch, 
Department of Labour of Canada, August 1945, p. 17. 
Brazil: Decree No. 85, of March 14, 1935 and following acts, see CESARINO 
}UN!OR, 2 Dir. Soc. Bras. 321 § 308. 
France: Law No. 46-2426 of Oct. 30, 1946, now incorporated into the Code 
de Ia securite sociale. 
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2. International Treaties3 
International conventions of Geneva established a mint-
mum of unified rules of compensation for the benefit of the 
workers.4 Of great influence is another Convention designed 
to end the frequent discriminations against alien workers 
in general, or nonresident workers, or nonresident alien 
dependents of workers, by guaranteeing reciprocity of treat-
ment. This Equality of Treatment (Accidents Compensa-
tion) Convention of 1925, was in force in sixty-one states5 
in 1962. 
II. NATURE OF CONFLICTS 
The nature of conflicts between divergent laws on pro-
fessional accidents varies according to the systems involved. 
On the one hand, statutes represented by those imposing 
employer's liability for presumed fault move in the sphere 
of quasi-tortious liability. Their application remains tied 
to the principle of the lex loci delicti. 
On the other hand, obligatory social insurance of the 
workers depends exclusively on territorial public law. The 
requirements of participation in the scheme by business 
establishments and insured workers are set out in detail in 
3 The International Labour Code 1951, published by the International 
Labour Office, Geneva 1952, vol. 1 pp. 611-652. 
4 Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture} Convention, 1921; Workmen's 
Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925, Int. Labour Code, supra n. 3, at 
6n-6r8, 621-622. For the status of ratifications, as of 1962, see International 
Labour Conference, 46th Session (Geneva 1962} Report III, Part I pp. 22, 
267 and pp. 33, 273. 
5 It has been termed "one of the most widely ratified Conventions"; see 
International Labour Conference, 45th Session (Geneva 1961), Report VIII, 
Part I p. 25. For the status of ratifications, as of 1962, see International Labour 
Conference, 46th Session (Geneva 1962) Report III, Part I pp. 51, 279· 
Most recently, the International Labour Conference has endeavored to draft 
a more general convention on equality of treatment in matters of social 
security; see proposed text in International Labour Conference, 46th Session 
(Geneva 1962) Report V, Part II pp. 72 If. For a discussion of the situation 
in the United States, see DAFFER, "The Effect of Federal Treaties on State 
Workmen's Compensation Laws," 107 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1959) 363. 
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the statutes, and bind the courts as well as all other agen-
cies. These statutes cannot be applied abroad. 
The situation created by most American and similar 
statutes, despite their different theories, results in the same 
rule of a purely territorial application of workmen's com-
pensation acts. The American states, with few exceptions, 
have established administrative boards which by their organ-
ization and composition of personnel are intended to admin-
ister exclusively the domestic workmen's compensation law. 
In this majority of states, the particular local circumstances 
and policies so completely dominate the spirit of the stat-
utes, and a speedy and inexpensive regulation of claims is so 
important, that application of another state's compensation 
act is commonly thought to be entirely impracticable. 6 
Five jurisdictions, however, expressly permit an employee 
hired outside the state to enforce rights acquired under the 
foreign law. 7 
Continental countries, following the system of individual 
employers' liability, have usually entrusted the administra-
tion of their industrial and agricultural accidents statutes 
to the labor courts or other segments of the regular judiciary 
which are regarded as capable of deciding cases according 
to foreign law. Nevertheless, the arguments and solutions 
are fairly comparable to those advanced in the United 
States. 
Generally, indeed, the normal conflict arising when a 
6 Mosely v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co. (1926) 313 Mo. 225, 245, 281 S. W. 
762, quoted by HANCOCK, Torts 214; GOODRICH 244 § 97 j Note, 57 Harv. L. 
Rev. (1943) at246; DWAN,2oMinn.L.Rev. (1935) 19. 
7 Arizona, Idaho, Utah, Vermont, Hawaii, see Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 
( 1943) at 246; see also HANCOCK, Torts 215, 216. Thus far, even in these 
states, no case has been decided under foreign law of workmen's compensa-
tion; and, in fact, application of foreign law can hardly be achieved if the 
administration of this law is geared to specified tribunals; see 2 LARSON, 
supra n. r, at 357 § 84.20; ROTHMAN, "Conflict of Laws in Labor Matters in 
the United States," 12 Vand. L. Rev. (1959) 997, 1000 n. ro; Note, 6 Vand. 
L. Rev. (1953) 744,749 n. 15. 
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worker employed in one state is injured in another, is a 
conflict of jurisdictions rather than of substantive laws. 7a 
The intricacies and ramifications of this subject, however, 
have given it a certain prominence in the treatment of con-
flicts law. 
III. THE THEORIES 
An able survey of the territorial delimitation of Ameri-
can workmen's compensation statutes, by their express 
provisions or court construction, has stated six types of 
solutions, one of which has five variants. 8 Arminjon enu-
merates six different theories in France.9 Resorting to his-
torical and comparative points of view, we may distinguish 
three main theories.10 
1. Tort Theory 
In the United States, workmen's compensation was first 
construed as substituting a statutory for a common law tort. 
Consequently, an act was applied always and only when the 
injury occurred in the stateY At present, however, only 
very occasionally does a court retain the idea that the do-
mestic statute does not include injuries outside the stateP 
The Restatement ( § 398) forms a presumption to the 
same effect, viz., that a workman may sue for bodily harm 
arising out of and in the course of the employment, but 
restricts this to contracts concluded in the state. Never-
theless, it presumes also ( § 399) the applicability of any 
7R Accord, EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 6o4 with reference to cases in n. I. 
8 Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1943) 242. 
9 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 344 § I2I. 
1o See Restatement, Introductory Note before § 398. 
11 See the cases in rs Am. Dig. 2d Dec. Ed. 86 and 2 LARSON, supra n. r, at 
379 ff. § 8po. 
12 Oklahoma: Utley v. State Industrial Commission (1936) 176 Okla. 255, 
55 Pac. (2d) 762. The famous previous decisions in Massachusetts and 
Illinois were abrogated by statute, see STUMBERG (ed. 2) 213 ns. 2-4. The con-
clusions regarding the American principle in NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs 
R. 493 are obsolete. 
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workmen's compensation act when the harm is sustained 
in the state-a principle conforming to the tort theory and 
not corresponding with the actual situation, which, how-
ever, may suggest a possible equitable supplement to the 
main rule. 
The English Court of Appeal interpreted the now abol-
ished Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, to the same 
effect as the tort theory on the ground that acts of Parlia-
ment do not extend beyond the territorial limits of the 
kingdom, unless they so declare.13 The Belgian Supreme 
Court sometimes followed the tort doctrine,14 which is occa-
sionally also found elsewhere.15 
In France, the tort theory has been developed in a con-
13 Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, Ltd. (1909) 100 L. T. R. 685, Revue 1910, 
480, per Cozens-Hardy, M. R.; Schwartz v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha and 
Telegraph Works Co., Ltd. ( 1912] 2 K. B. 299, Clunet 1913, 215. See also 
dictum in Krzus v. Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co., Ltd. ( 1912] A. C. 590, 597-
P. C. This absolute doctrine was rejected by the High Court of the Irish 
Free State, in Patrick Keegan v. Julia Dawson ( 1934] I. R. 232, without 
indicating the minimum requisites for applying the Act. 
Exceptions were made for seamen and persons employed on certain aircraft, 
and in the case of reciprocal treaties, see 34 HALSBURY ( ed. 2, 1940) Sao 
§ 1134· 
According to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Matthews v. Kuwait 
Bechtel Corporation ( 1959] 2 Q. B. 57, the employer's liability for an occupa-
tional accident of an employee can also be based on contract. But the liability 
is no longer a statutory one, because the English Workmen's Compensation 
Act has been repealed by the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act; 
see supra n. 2 and DICEY (ed. 7) 759 n. 48. 
14 Cass. Belg. (Feb. 21, 1907) and (Nov. 26, 1908) Revue 1909, 952, the 
second also in Clunet 1909, 1178. 
Other Belgian courts and some Belgian authors have characterized the 
employer's liability as contractual; cf. Trib. civ. Antwerp (July 30, 1910) 
Revue 1911, 725 and Trib. civ. Mons (Dec. 19, 1902) Revue 1912, 429; 
GRAULICH 65 § 84; SIMONE DAviD, Responsabilite civile et risque professionel 
(1957) §§ 64 f. For a discussion, see GAMILLSCHEG 259 f. and BIND·ER, supra 
n. r, at 427. 
15 Italy: App. Roma (Aug. 18, 1935) Foro Ita!. 1936.1.159, Rivista 1936, 
295, criticized by BALDONI, ibid. and BALLADORI! PALLIERI, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
( 1938) 86 No. 36. But the latter author, according to BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 
440, also advocated the law of the place of the accident. For a recent survey, 
see VENTURINI, La disciplina degli infortuni sui Iavoro nel diritto interna-
zionale privato, 3 Riv. Dir. Lav. ( 1951) 17. 
In France, 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 346 likewise simply concludes for the law 
of the place of the accident. 
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struction of the domestic compensation statutes as laws 
of securite et police, involving all professional activity on 
French soil. Some courts of appeal, taking this theory seri-
ously, have emphasized the fact that the law has not con-
sidered where the contract is made or of what nationality 
the parties are, but only whether the work is done in 
France.16 However, the administrative courts and, follow-
ing them, the Court of Cassation, have adopted this theory 
with a singular reservation. They use it to assume jurisdic-
tion over all cases of injury occurring in France but, revers-
ing the lower courts, have also assumed jurisdiction under 
other theories in case of outside injuries.17 
2. Contracts Theory 
(a) Lex loci contractus. Undoubtedly, the statutes es-
tablishing employer's liability for accidents commonly pre-
suppose a contract of employment. It has frequently been 
concluded therefrom that the statute covers contracts gov-
erned by domestic law; and through the usual influence 
of the lex loci actus principle, the thesis is reached that a 
workmen's compensation act has for its domain accidents 
occurring anywhere to workers hired by a contract within 
the state. For practical purposes, several jurisdictions of 
the United States have adopted this proposition in its pure 
form or with certain qualifications.18 Similarly, all contracts 
of employment made in France were subject to the now 
16 See especially App. Ami ens (Dec. 10, 1913) Anti foul v. Hers ant freres, 
Revue 1921, sox, later reversed, see infra n. 17. 
17 Circular of the Garde de Sceaux, of April 22, I90I, see SUMIEN, I Repert. 
109 No. 19; Cass. civ. (May 8, 1907) Revue 1907, 539; also two decisions in 
the case, Antifoul v. Hersant freres: Cass. civ. (March 10, 1913) S. 1913.1·307, 
Revue 1914, 425, and Cass. Chambres n!unies (May 26, 1921) Revue 1921, sox, 
reversing the Amiens decision, supra n. x6. 
Since the French legislation on industrial accidents has been repealed in 
1946, see supra n. 2, the earlier cases are merely of historic interest. Under the 
new act the essential test for the application of French law is whether or not 
the injured employee was insured with the French social security; see GAMILL-
SCHEG 259 and Cass. soc. (Dec. 9, I9S4) Revue Crit. 1956, 462. 
18 For details, see 2 LARSON, supra n. I, at 376 f. § 87.n. 
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repealed French statute of I 898 according to the Court of 
Cassation, irrespective of alien nationality of the parties, 
although at the same time accidents occurring in France 
formed another ground for application.19 
An influential Italian doctrine follows the legal prescrip-
tion of lex loci contractus in the cases where the working 
place is outside the country, so that the Italian accident 
statute is applicable, as well when the work is done in Italy 
as when the contract is made in Italy.20 
It is noteworthy, however, that in this matter even the 
Restatement has felt compelled to concede special treatment 
to a worker hired through an employment agency in, e.g., 
Pennsylvania, where the worker is sent to enter his occupa-
tion in, e.g., California. In that case, it is agreed, the com-
pensation act of the state where the workman reports for 
duty governs compensation.21 Why not recognize generally 
that it is not the making of the contract but the starting of 
the work that is essential? 
(b) Proper law. In a few cases, American courts have 
preferred the law of the place of performance.22 On the 
other hand, the Indiana court, in an obviously just denial of 
compensation to a worker hired in Michigan to cut timber 
in Michigan, who was injured doing transitory work in 
Indiana, believed that this case constituted an exception to 
the rule of lex loci solutionis.23 
In particular, the argument "that the rights and duties 
19 See GAMILLSCHEG 258 and BINDER, supra n. I, at 424. 
20 BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 442; Rivista 1936, 298; followed by SCERNI 128; 
App. Milano (Dec. 12, 1930) Rivista 1932, 438 applied Italian law to a 
contract made in Italy between Italian parties for working abroad, but in 
this case both parties were Italian. 
21 § 398 comment a; cf. GOODRICH 249· 
22 Thus, Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Thrane (1923) So Ind. App. 432, 141 
N. E. 229, the court applies its own act to an occupation considered not 
temporary. 
Similarly, Belgium: Trib. civ. Arion (July 13, 1904) Revue 1905, 539; 
(July zo, 1904) id. 543· 
23 Elkhart Sawmill Co. v. Skinner (1942) 111 Ind. App. 695, 42 N. E. (zd) 
412. 
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under the Workmen's Compensation Act are contractual 
and the provisions of the Act binding only as part of the 
employment contract," was invoked in a series of decisions 
restricted to "optional" acts. That is, since the effect of 
these acts depends upon election or a presumed agreement, 
which may be excluded by voluntary act of one or both of 
the parties, as the case may be, it has been thought that the 
liability rests upon consent of the parties, whereas a com-
pulsory act applies by operation of the law.24 
Thus, in Iowa quite recently the domestic act was applied 
because it was elective and the contract made in the state, 
though for work in Oklahoma.25 
The contracts theory has been pushed to the farthest 
point by some French writers and decisions in France and 
Louisiana (whose act is optional). They directly invoke 
party autonomy to the effect that the law chosen or pre-
sumed to be chosen by the parties for governing the employ-
ment contract also includes the respective compensation 
statute.26 It does not need much argument27 to refute this 
24 Sheehan Pipe Line Con st. Co. v. State Industrial Comm. ( I93I) I5I Okla. 
272, 3 Pac. (2d) I99· 
25 Haverly v. Union Construction Co. (I945) 236 Iowa 278, I8 N. W. (2d) 
629; the criticism in 3 I I a. L. Rev. ( I946) 472 is beside the point. 
2 6 PERROUD, Clunet I906, 633; I9IO, 668; I9I2, 389; RAYNAUD, Clunet I9I3, 
63; SuMIEN, I Repert. no; Cour Paris (March I6, I925) Revue I925, 348, 
Clunet I926, 346; cf. J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 592; McKane v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co. (La. App. 1940) I99 So. I75; Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum 
(La. App. 1942) IO So. (2d) Io9, reversed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States on the grounds discussed below; cf. Note, 5 La. L. Rev. ( I943) at 357· 
Particularly strange, Belgian Trib. civ. Mons (May 30, 1925) Pasicrisie 
1925.3.I2I applying lex loci contractus in adding that even though lex loci 
delicti (French law) were applied, a deviation in favor of the lex fori would 
be assumed according to the presumable intentions of the parties. 
27 See GOODRICH 240, 24I, and in France, NIBOYET, Recueil I927 I 2I, n. I. 
However, a recent American decision has recognized without restriction a 
party stipulation for the applicable law. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Air-
lines Corp. (C. C. A. 6th I948) I67 F. (2d) 727, 730; noted, I6 U. of Chi. 
L. Rev. (I949) I57· For further cases passing on party autonomy in the field 
of workmen's compensation, see 2 LARSON, supra n. I, at 395 ff. § 87.70; 
CowAN, "Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's Compensation Laws-A 
Suggested Solution," 33 Tex. L. Rev. ( I955) 9I7; WELLEN, "Workmen's Com-
pensation, Conflict of Laws and the Constitution," 55 W. Va. L. Rev. (1953) 
131, 233. 2SI-256. 
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transformation of a law applicable to a contract into a law 
selected by the parties. Where an "optional" compensation 
act is not dependent on adoption by the parties but only per-
mits either party to exclude its application by declaration 
in contracting, the choice has been said to be usually merely 
on paper.28 At any rate, the law does not base its own force, 
in the absence of a declaration, on the agreement of the 
parties. Even though both parties may contribute to a fund 
covering the liability, the law governs as it is at the time of 
the award, changes of the law not being prevented by con-
stitutional protection of contractual obligations, and the 
parties are without power to modify its effects. 
(c) Contracting and residence required. Certain Ameri-
can statutes restrict the jurisdiction of their boards to the 
case where, in addition to the making of the employment 
contract, the residence of employer or employee29 or both30 
is in the state. A sound instinct has driven these legislators 
away from purely contractual reasoning. But better formu-
lations have been found in the third group. 
3· Law of the Place of Employment 
(a) In general. Some American compensation statutes 
define their territorial sphere with reference to the place 
where the worker is regularly employed. This is sometimes 
the only test.31 In other statutes it is an alternative to the 
law of the place of contracting,32 or the working place and 
the employer's residence must both be in the state.33 
It may be recalled, moreover, that the employer's place 
of business or residence is an additional requisite to the 
28 STUMBERG (ed. z) 217. 
29 California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan; see z LARSON, supra n. r, at 
376 f. § Sp 1. 
30 North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia; id. at '377· 
31 Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, West Virginia; id. at 377· 
32 Nevada; id. at 377· 
3 3 Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania; id. at 377· 
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domestic place of contracting in some states.34 And more 
important, when the place of the making of the contract is 
emphasized, following the beaten path of the doctrine, 
coincidence with the really important place of work is very 
largely the rule.35 
This slow trend to a method away from the inadequate 
terms of tort and contract, though not yet carried to a 
settled conclusion, 36 is unmistakable and effective. The re-
sulting localization patently agrees with the European 
theories converging from the doctrines in older and newer 
types of liability to practically consonant delimitations. The 
Canadian laws,37 German38 and Swiss39 courts, the Italian 
writers,40 and probably many other national systems41 refer 
to the place where the work is regularly to be done within 
the employer's business organization. 
It is still impossible to extract a precise common idea from 
these regulations. But two basic concepts have emerged; 
whether applied alternatively or in combination these con-
34 Supra n. 29. 
35 Cf., e.g., for Georgia, McDonald-Haynes v. Minyard (1943) 69 Ga. App. 
479, 26 S. E. (2d) 138. 
In New York, in the case of nonhazardous employment it is usually said 
that it suffices for application of the act (e.g., to traveling salesmen) that 
"the employment contract" is made in the state. See Wagoner v. Brown Mfg. 
Co. (1937) 274 N.Y. 593, 10 N. E. (2d) 567; Roth v. A. C. Horn Co. (1941) 
262 App. Div. 922, 28 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 8o8, aff'd (1941) 287 N.Y. 545; 
Lepow v. Lepow Knitting Mills (1942) 288 N. Y. 377, 43 N. E. (2d) 450; 
cf. CRONIN, Note, 28 Cornell L. Q. ( 1943) 206 n. 4, 209 n. 19. 
36 GOODRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 295, 
319: "So there developed the description of the acts as a regulation of the 
relation of employer and employee. Enunciation of the theory, however, did 
not settle all the questions." 
37 E.g., Ontario Rev. Stat. 1960, c. 437 s. 6. 
38 Germany: Reichsversicherungsordnung §§ 153 ff.; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. 
Verwaltungs R. 514 and cit.; Trib. Arb. Mixte Germano-Belge (April 25, 
1924) 4 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 319; (April 10, 1925) 5 id. 348. 
39 Switzerland: BG. (March 4, 1892) 18 BGE. 354· See, moreover, Swiss 
Federal Law of June 13, 19u, art. 6r. 
40 GEMMA, Dir. Int. del Lavoro 241 f.; BALDONI, ScERNI, cited supra n. 20. 
41 In France, the statute of the normal place of working was advocated by 
MAHAIM, cited by BALDONI, Rivista 1932, 441, n. 6 at 442. 
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cepts at any rate mark the main tendency and may lead to 
a final agreement. One idea is that the employer's business 
to which the employee is attached must be in the state, the 
other that the worker must do his regular work in the state. 
(b) Place of employment. The localization rule of Min-
nesota has acquired some repute, whereby the place of the 
employer's business prevails rather than his main office even 
though the worker may be hired at the latter place. Where 
the work, as for instance the construction of an airport, is 
carried on, there is the decisive location.42 This, in a fre-
quent expression of New York constitutes a "status of 
employment," more important than the fact of hiring the 
worker at a particular place.43 The localization of the indus-
try justifies application of the police power of the state to 
regulate that industry; originally aimed at preventing ac-
cidents, it has been extended to provide accident com-
pensation.44 
Illustration. "Where air route between Minnesota and 
Illinois was operated by a foreign corporation (a Dela-
ware corporation) from Minnesota where all runs were 
started, business offices maintained, mechanical work done, 
payrolls distributed, and pilots and copilots lived and re-
ceived all instructions, copilot injured in crash was subject 
to Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act so as to pre-
clude a common-law negligence action, notwithstanding crash 
occurred in Wisconsin and regardless of whether contract 
of employment was made in Iowa, on theory employer's 
business was 'localized' in Minnesota."45 
42 De Rosier v. Craig ( 1944) 217 Minn. 296, 14 N. W. (2d) 286, Note, 28 
Minn. L. Rev. (1944) 335· 
43 Note, 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. ( 1933) 518, 522. 
44 Minnesota: Chambers v. District Court {1918) 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 
185; Ginsburg v. Byers (1927) 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55· 
Nebraska: Watts v. Long (1928) u6 Neb. 656, 218 N. W. 410. 
45 Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines (C. C. A. 8th 1939) 105 F. (zd) 
622, headnote summary. See other airline cases, GOLDBERG, "Jurisdiction and 
Venue in Aviation Accident Cases Including Workmen's Compensation 
Claims," 36 Cal. L. Rev. (1948) 41, 50 n. 33· 
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Other statutes approach this conception. But it appears 
useless to look for an absolutely unequivocal localization. 
Provided that both the contract is made and the business 
located in the state, the employment is sure to be considered 
domestic. 
(c) Regular work in the state. The bulk of discussion 
in the American practice concerns the distinction between 
the case where the employee works regularly and where he 
does only transitory, "incidental," "occasional," or "tem-
porary" work in a state. 
There seems to exist agreement that a claim otherwise 
founded is not prejudiced by the fact that the injury occurs 
in transitory work outside the state. This maxim is often 
applied, since usually the transitory nature of out-of-state 
work is liberally affirmed. 
The cases of multiple claims of employees are thereby 
even more increased than in the other systems. It would 
seem logical and equitable to accord optional compensation 
also when an employee is hired by a firm for out-of-state 
work but suffers an accident within the state while tempo-
rarily employed there.46 
Some statutes have, however, limited the time of outside 
employment to ninety days47 or required that the injury 
should not happen six months or more after leaving the 
state48 or set up additional requirements for awarding com-
pensation for outside injuries.49 
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 400 recognizes that a state may 
confer a right of action within the terms of its statute even though it is not the 
place of injury or place of contracting. The interest of the state in the 
employer-employee relationship is considered sufficient to justify such an 
extraterritorial effect of the statute. 
46 To this effect, evidently, GoODRICH, "Five Years of Conflict of Laws," 
32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) at 320, criticizing House v. State Industrial Accident 
Commission (1941) 167 Ore. 257, 117 Pac. (2d) 611, noted, 5 U. of Detroit 
L. J. (1941) 67. 
47 Delaware, Pennsylvania; see 2 LARSON, supra n. r, at 378 § 87.12. 
4 8 Colorado, New Mexico, Utah; id., at 378. See also Ontario Rev. Stat. 
1960, c. 437 s. 6 (r). 
49 Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 244. 
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Similar provisions are to be found in the Treaty between 
France and Great Britain, of July 3, rgog, 50 and many sub-
sequent treaties. 
On the other hand, great variety or doubt exists as to 
work regularly divided between two state territories and 
work prevailingly done out of the state which, viewed from 
the standpoint of the employer, is incidental to his business. 
It has been maintained that the New York courts have 
reached a system covering the entire ground, as summarized 
in the footnote. 51 
(d) Self-sufficiency of the test. However the "place of 
employment" may be understood, it can obviate additional 
requirements. Considering the strong effort to extend work-
men's compensation to employees in domestic business who 
are not primarily employed outside the state, it is not 
strange that § 400 of the Restatement, asserting that "No 
recovery can be had under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act of a state if neither the harm occurred nor the contract 
of employment was made in the state," was amended ( 1948) 
by adding "unless the Act confers in specific words, or is 
50 See Int. Labour Code 1951, supra n. 3, at 634 n. 420. 
51 Mr. WILLIAM SPRAGUE BARNES, in agreement with the Note, 28 Cornell 
L. Q. ( 1943) 206, submits the following statement: 
The New York statute contains no provision as to extraterritorial effect. 
The courts have followed a consistent approach in recent cases. The nature 
of the work in the course of which the employee was injured is the decisive 
factor. 
If the "employment" is of a fixed or permanent nature at a definite location 
outside the state, recovery under the New York Act is denied, regardless of 
such New York contacts as the principal office of the employer, the residence 
of the employee, or the place of hiring; Copeland v. Foundation Co. ( 1931) 
256 N. Y. 568, 177 N. E. 143; Amaxis v. Vassilaros, Inc. ( 1932) 258 N. Y. 544, 
180 N. E. 325; Zeltoski v. Osborne Drilling Corp. (1934) 264 N. Y. 496, 191 
N. E. 532; or compensation insurance in New York, Bagdalik v. Flexlume 
Corp. (1939) 281 N.Y. 858, 24 N. E. (2d) 499; all these claims were dismissed, 
reversing the lower court on the ground of the decision in Cameron v. Ellis 
Construction Co. (1930) 252 N.Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622. 
The place of "employment" is located in New York as a matter of law, 
if the injury-producing work is confined to a definite location in the state 
regardless of foreign residence or hiring, Bauss v. Consolidated Chimney 
Co. (1945) 270 App. Div. 70, 58 N. Y. Supp. (2d.) 717, even though there is 
no office in New York and no New York compensation insurance. Adams v. 
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interpreted to confer, a right of action because of the extent 
of the activities of the employer or employee within the 
state." We may take it, just to the contrary of the original 
rule, that both tests included are undesirable for a main 
rule and as such antiquated by the current development. 
As the Wisconsin court said, "Where the employer under 
the act engages a person to perform services in this state 
under a contract of hire, express or implied, no matter 
where or when such contract may have been engendered, 
such employee is under our act and is entitled to its benefits, 
and this is so even though he is in jured while outside of the 
state, rendering services incidental to his employment within 
the state. Whether the employee be a resident of this state 
is not material. The controlling and decisive factor is 
whether he had a status as an employee within this state."52 
This is an unusually clear formulation of the modern 
tendency. 53 
Max Solomon Co. (1943) 265 App. Div. 427, 39 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 492; Grasso 
v. Donaldson-Reynolds, Inc. (1938) 279 N.Y. 584, 17 N. E. (2d) 449· 
If the work is not fixed at a definite location but is temporary, Berman 
v. Hudson Amer. Corp. (1946) 271 App. Div. 847, 65 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 676, 
or transitory in nature, Alexander v. Movietonews, Inc. (1937) 273 N.Y. 5n, 
6 N. E. (zd) 604 (cameraman), a place of business in New York to which 
employee is attached is sufficient to allow New York recovery even though he 
is injured outside the state. White v. H. J. Heinz Co. (1936) 248 App. Div. 
654, 287 N.Y. Supp. 951. 
The courts will also allow claims under the New York law on the ground 
that the work outside is: under the supervision of the New York headquarters, 
Farrigan v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1945) 269 App. Div. 872, 56 N.Y. Supp. 
(2d) 103; incidental to New York business, Rendt v. Gates (1945) 269 App. 
Div. 1007, 58 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 438; based on New York union wage scale, 
Carp v. Gladstone Raines, Inc. (1942) 264 App. Div. 962, 37 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 
146. 
If the employee of a foreign business is injured while working in the 
state, claims under New York law are precluded where the New York work 
is incidental to foreign "employment," Eurbin v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer. 
(1937) 250 App. Div. 868, 295 N. Y. Supp. 247; or temporary, Proper v. 
Polley ( 1932) 259 N. Y. 516, 182 N. E. 161; or transitory, Whitmire v. 
Blaw-Knox Constr. Co. ( 1934) 263 N.Y. 675, 189 N. E. 753· 
52 McKesson-Fuller-Morrisson Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 
(1933) 212 Wis. 507, 512,250 N. W. 396. 
53 See also HANCOCK, Torts 212. 
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4· Social Insurance System 
The German pattern of insurance54 under public law is 
based on a network of regulations, including duties of the 
employer to report on employments, to contribute premiums 
on his own and the worker's account, and many other obli-
gations facilitating administrative control. The natural 
criterion determining the connection with the state in this 
system is the situation of the employer's establishment in-
volved, viz., the place where he carries on that independent 
part of his undertaking to which the worker is attached 
( Betriebsort). Nationality and domicil of the employer 
and the employee are immaterial except in a few special 
situations. The place of the undertaking, thus, is decisive 
for enrollment of the parties to the insurance as well as 
for claims for benefits. Consequently, when workers are 
sent to work in another country, it depends on the nature 
of the foreign establishment, whether a new undertaking 
is formed subject to the territorial statute or the occupation 
of the individual worker is only incidental, temporary, or 
accessory, a so-called "radiation" of the domestic under-
taking. Examples of the latter category have been the send-
ing of employees to install machines, to construct a bridge, 
to give theatrical performances, to load vehicles, and the 
various activities of interstate transportation. 
The Canadian pattern exemplified by the Ontario statute 
includes temporary work outside Ontario for less than six 
months where the residence and usual place of employment 
of the workman are in Ontario; temporary work, if only 
his residence is out of Ontario; and work for some casual or 
incidental purpose outside the province, if the employer's 
place of business or chief place of business is outside, but 
54 For Germany, see NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 514 If.; STIER-SOMLO, 
2 Kommentar zur Reichsversicherungsordnung ( 1916) 31 If., 988. 
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the worker's place of employment is within Ontario.55 The 
text underlines the rule that no compensation shall be pay-
able where the accident to the workman happens while he 
is employed elsewhere than in Ontario. 
The present Italian view is not known to me. But in 1939 
it was agreed that application of the workmen's compensa-
tion statute, having territorial character, should be based 
either on the place of the accident, or that of the enterprise, 
or that where the work is done, with the accent on the last 
test. 56 It would seem that the German doctrine eliminates 
this doubt. 
5. International Treaties 
Article 2 of the above-mentioned Equality of Treatment 
(Accident Compensation) Convention, r 92 5, expressed the 
following recommendation: 
"Special agreements may be made between the members 
concerned to provide that compensation for industrial acci-
dents happening to workers whilst temporarily or intermit-
tently employed in the territory of one Member on behalf 
of an undertaking situated in the territory of another Mem-
ber shall be governed by the laws and regulations of the 
latter Member."57 
The influential Treaty between Germany and Austria, 
of 1926/193058 decided that the law of the state where the 
head office of an employer is situated is applicable to a 
temporary employment in the other state for a period of 
one year. The provisions of the same law relating to other 
claims on account of the same accident are also applied. 
5 5 Ontario Rev. Stat. 1960, c. 437 s. 6 (I), ( 3), and (4). 
56 See MARMO, Note to Cass. (Jan. I, I939) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1939, 67 in 
8 Giur. Comp. DIP. ( I942) 179 No. 99, summarizing a book by VENTURINI. 
57 Int. Labour Code 1951, supra n. 3, at 63I, art. 8I7. 
58 League of Nations, Leg. Ser. I93o--Int. IO, reproduced in International 
Labour Code, id. at 636 f. 
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Another model Treaty, concluded between Denmark and 
the Netherlands, of October 23, 1926,59 follows the general 
rule that the insurance law of the country in which the work 
is performed shall apply. But the legislation of the state 
where the undertaking carries on its main operation extends 
to work of short duration and performed in a subsidiary 
manner in the other country by workers not permanently 
domiciled there. It is likewise applicable when workers are 
sent out to perform inspection or supervision or any other 
special duties. 
In the absence of such treaty agreements, the Interna-
tional Labour Office is of opinion that according to Article 1 
of the Convention, the laws and regulations of the country 
in which the accident occurred should be applied.60 
IV. CoNcURRENCE OF CLAIMS 
We shall first deal with the conflicts rules irrespective of 
the United States Constitution. 
r. Compensation and Tort Actions 
It seems settled in this country that if the state of injury 
in its compensation act has barred alternative remedies 
based on common law tort no other state will allow the 
employee to avail himself of such remedies.61 Since the 
lex loci delicti refuses a tort action, there is none anywhere, 
59 League of Nations, Leg. Ser. 1926-Int. 6; Int. Labour Code ibid. notes 
that it contains the fullest provisions of date subsequent to 1925 which are 
not based on the Austro-German model. 
60 Answer to the Japanese Government (roth Session, Int. Labour Con-
ference ( 1927) Report of the Directors, vel. 2, 99) Decennial Report ( 1937) 27. 
61 Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper (1932) 
286 U. S. 145, 154 takes this for granted. 
The 1948 Supplement to the Restatement § 401 confines this doctrine to 
the place of injury recognizing that the place of contracting cannot deprive 
a victim of his right of action if the place of injury finds such a provision 
obnoxious to its public policy. 
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whether at the court of the place of contracting62 or at the 
court of the place of employment.63 This thesis thus dis-
regards the possibility that these latter courts interpret 
their own compensation statutes as not exclusive. On the 
other hand, it is regarded as settled that replacement of 
common law suits by the statute of the state where suit is 
brought, does not bar tort actions flowing from injuries 
received in another jurisdiction.64 The latter theory acknowl-
edges that the substitution of statutory workmen's com-
pensation for tort has exclusive effect only for the awards 
made in the state, whereas extraterritorial effect is given 
to the similar foreign provision of another state. Apparent 
logic has once more misled the lawyers. Both propositions 
are mistaken. The reason why in many jurisdictions liability 
without fault, though with a limited measure of damage, 
exclusively replaces unlimited tort liability based on inten-
tional, or at least unintentional fault, 65 is simply that a 
broader scope of liability is balanced by a milder compensa-
tion standard. Additionally, the employer, in the thought 
of some legislators, should not be sued twice. A state 
reasoning thus within its own compensation system does a 
strange thing in allowing suits for foreign tort beyond its 
domestic awards of workmen's compensation, although it 
has no interest in restricting cumulations of claims in the 
case of foreign awards. The result, hence, should be just 
opposite to that commonly accepted. Whether an award 
of accident compensation without fault may be supple-
mented by other remedies ought to be determined by the 
62 Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co. ( 1913) 35 R. I. 321, 87 At!. I; 
vVasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co. (1914) 87 Misc. 156, 149 N. Y. 
Supp. 1035; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner ( 1933) 188 Ark. 177, 65 
S. W. (2d) r. 
63 Restatement § 401 ; GoODRICH 244 and n. 90. 
64 Reynolds v. Day (1914) 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pac. 681. 
65 The German Versicherungs 0. § 636, as amended, leaves standing the 
ordinary action in excess of the compensation award when the employer has 
caused the accident intentionally. 
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legal system of which the workmen's compensation is a 
part. Exactly to the analogous effect, the prementioned 
Austro-German Treaty provides that the law of the state 
whose insurance statute is applied has to decide whether 
additional rights arise out of the same accident.65a It is in-
consistent with the policy of a workmen's compensation act, 
barring common law suits, that a common law suit should 
be brought under a foreign tort law in respect of the same 
injury. Where, on the other hand, workmen's compensation 
is granted pursuant to a statute combining statutory re-
stricted liability without fault and full liability under com-
mon law for fault, there is no reason why the tort law of 
the place of injury should not be applied, although it would 
not be available to increase workmen's compensation of the 
state of injury. Objections to these claims until they are 
satisfied or waived, should only arise insofar as the em-
ployer is subrogated into the claim against the tortfeasor, 
or his liability is reduced by the latter's payment. The North 
Carolina court in a case involving injury in Tennessee, find-
ing the common law action forbidden by the Tennessee 
Workmen's Compensation Act, allowed recovery in tort 
under the common law of North Carolina. 66 The court 
should have applied the Tennessee tort law, abrogated in 
workmen's compensation cases only for the use of Tennes-
see, not North Carolina courts. 
Curiously, in a recent Ontario decision, the court found 
it against public policy that the dependents of a Michigan 
ssa The same result has rightly been reached in Stacy v. Greenberg ( 1952) 
9 N. ]. 390, 88 At!. (:zd) 619. In Ohlhaver v. Narron (C. C. A. 4th 1952) 195 
F. (:zd) 676 the court also seems to approve the principle advocated above, 
but the law of the forum barred the action as well as the law under which 
compensation had been awarded; hence, no real conflict existed. For a dis-
cussion, see FORD, "The Liability of Nonemployer Tortfeasors Under State 
(1958) 54· 
\Vorkmen's Compensation Statutes: A Choice-of-Law Problem," 68 Yale L. ]. 
r.r. Johnson v. C. C. & 0. R. Co. (1926) 191 N. C. 75, 131 S. E. 390; 
HANCOCK, Torts 218 n. 3 cites a similar decision of a Quebec court, Johans-
dotter v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. (1914) 47 Que. S.C .. 76. 
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employee killed as a passenger in an airplane crash near 
St. Thomas, Ontario, could have a remedy against the 
wrongdoer in one state, and workmen's compensation 
against his employer in another.67 
2. Several Compensation Acts 
Before the Supreme Court of the United States com-
mitted itself to a novel application of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause with regard to workmen's compensation, the 
Constitution did not preclude a workman from obtaining 
compensation in two states up to the higher amount granted 
by either statute68 where the statutes made this possible. 
The Restatement, § 403, maintains this proposition, which 
has been adopted by the courts with very few exceptions, 
although rarely confirmed by statutes.69 The plaintiff may 
choose freely which statute seems proper and according to 
some of the authority, he may switch even after an award.70 
But apart from the constitutional issues, some courts denied 
compensation proceedings when an award was given m an-
other stateY 
3· American Constitution 
(a) Legislative power. The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in a decision formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
6 7 Scott v. American Airlines Inc. (Ont. High Ct.} [1944] 3 D. L. R. 27. 
The decision should have been based on the fact that all rights were termi-
nated by release. Compare the recent decision in Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. 
v. Henson (Tex. 1943) 172 S. W. (2d) 113, stating that the claim of an 
injured person in one state and that of his dependents after his death in 
another state are two separate actions. Cf. Note, 22 Tex. L. Rev. ( 1944) 246. 
68 GOODRICH 243 n. 88; Restatement §§ 398, 399· 
69 See Note, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 246. 
Canada: The independence of the provincial statute is emphasized in 
Desharnais v. C.P.R. [ 1942] 4 D. L. R. 605. 
The amendments in the 1948 Supplement to the Restatement except the 
case where the act of the state of award precludes recovery under any other 
act. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt (1943) 320 U.S. 430. 
70 GOODRICH 238. 
71 HANCOCK, Torts 228 n. 5· 
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extended the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Consti-
tution to legislative state acts, and applied this thesis to 
workmen's compensation statutes. The decision is generally 
understood as recognizing the power of only one state to 
regulate compensation for accidents in the case of a specific 
contract of employment. The contract was made between 
residents in Vermont, which has an optional statute; the 
employee was killed while working temporarily in New 
Hampshire. On these facts it was held that the statute of 
New Hampshire was excluded by the statute of Vermont. 72 
Opinions may be divided on the problem whether for 
humanitarian reasons an injured worker should have free 
option among compensation statutes offering him redress, or 
whether the parties should have foreknowledge of the 
applicable statute, so as to be able to ascertain the risks to 
be covered or the fund to which contributions should be 
made. The above-mentioned decision, in its effect rather 
than its reasoning, favors the latter view and joins the 
modern efforts to give the main employment place prefer-
ence over an accidental work assignment. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances of employment and the policies of the differ-
ent states are too heterogeneous for efficient regulation of 
power from the standpoint of a superstate. Although a 
federal compensation law, of course, would be feasible in 
its sphere and with its own policy, it is inconvenient to weigh 
critically the legitimacy of territorial connections which 
state legislatures may find sufficient. In addition, Mr. Justice 
Brandeis borrowed the test of legitimate power from the 
mechanical conflicts rule of lex loci contractus instead of 
emphasizing mainly the work in Vermont. 
This decision was too radical to stand. The theory of an 
exclusively controlling workmen's compensation statute was 
72 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper ( 193Z) z86 U. S. 145. The optional 
character of the Vermont Act emphasized by the defendant was not urged. 
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soon "tactfully explained away," 73 and the criterion was 
radically changed by Supreme Court decisions influenced 
by Mr. Justice Stone.74 The ancient conflicts rule was re-
placed by an appraisal of the legitimate public interest 
which a state has in granting workmen's compensation. In 
a leading case, California was approved for having applied 
its act, although the parties had stipulated for Alaskan law 
and all facts except the place of hiring pointed to Alaska. 
The main ground was equitable; it would have been a great 
hardship for the worker to seek compensation in the far-
away territory, and he might have become a public charge to 
California. 
The California statute was again permitted to operate 
in the inverse case where the injury happened in that state, 
though the work was temporary and Massachusetts law 
governed the employment.75 Furthermore, the legitimate 
interest has been declared not to turn on the fortuitous cir-
cumstance of the place of work or injury.76 "Rather it 
depends upon some substantial connection" between the 
jurisdiction and the particular employment relationship. 
Finally, the state of injury has been allowed to disregard a 
bar to common-law actions against general contractors em-
bodied in the law under which the injured employee has 
received compensation, if the law of the state of injury does 
not immunize general contractors. 76a 
73 CHEATHAM, "Stone on Conflict of Laws," 46 Col. L. Rev. (1946) 719, 723 
n. 16. 
74 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Commission (1935) 294 U.S. 532. 
75 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission 
(1939) 306 u. s. 493· 
The 1948 Supplement amends § 401 of the Restatement by omitting the 
power of the place of making the contract of employment to abolish tort 
actions extraterritorially. 
76 Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1947) 330 U.S. 469 at 476. 
76a Carroll v. Lanza (1955) 349 U. S. 408; see Note, 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 
( 1956) 515. This, of course, does not imply that by disregarding the foreign 
bar the forum follows a sound conflict-of-laws rule; for a discussion of this 
problem, see supra pp. 229-232 and Note, Harv. L. Rev. (1962) 355· 
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Much effort has been spent in the American literature 
to evolve fragments of a legal system out of these incoher-
ent pieces. Perhaps it will be finally conceded that Stone's 
idea is no more conclusive than that of Brandeis. 
In no event, however, should we be influenced by the 
numerous authors who seem to hope for better conflicts 
rules to be gained from these decisions. From the point of 
view of conflicts law, it is a plainly illusory proposition to 
hold that the state where a worker is injured in temporary 
business, as in the case of New Hampshire, has no "interest" 
sufficient to apply its own law, while California has an 
interest sufficient to exclude the Alaskan law. It is also im-
material that in the first case, New Hampshire seemed not 
necessarily to refuse giving effect to the Vermont act under 
conflicts principles, 77 and that in the other case, Massachu-
setts assumed exclusive applicability of its own law.78 
When two states make their administrative or judicial 
machineries available to an injured workman, this may be 
done for different reasons, but never really without some 
reasonable consideration. Apart from the nature of a fed-
eral state, there is neither occasion in such cases to supervise 
their judgment in taking jurisdiction nor, much less, to select 
a contact and impose it on all states. 
Co-ordination and equitable treatment of the employer 
must be secured through interstate, if not federal, arrange-
ment. Models are contained in the numerous international 
treaties. That an employer should have to pay the same 
damages twice, as happened once in European practice,79 
is a rare occurrence also in this country.80 
77 Mr. Justice Stone based his concurrent vote on this fact; see FREUND, 
"Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev. (1946) 
1210, 1220. 
78 This Mr. Justice Stone himself declines to consider for conflicts law, see 
CHEATHAM, supra n. 73, 722, 723 n. 16. 
79 See NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 726. 
80 See SCHNEIDER'S Workmen's Compensation, sujJra n. 1, 470. 
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(b) Force of awards. In the Magnolia decision, rendered 
by a five to four majority, 81 it was held that a final award 
of Texas, equivalent by statute to the judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction, is under the protection of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, irrespective of any "interest" 
of other states. The state in which the contract was con-
cluded was forced to give the award of the state of injury 
exclusive force, and to reject the claim of the employee 
for additional compensation. This theory treated workmen's 
compensation on the footing of a transitory tort action, and 
failed to evaluate precisely the particulars of the Texas 
procedure.82 Although this decision has sometimes been 
praised, the Supreme Court itself has recently reduced its 
bearing to the least possible scope. It has been stated re-
cently that to be exclusive the award must be final and con-
clusive, intended to preclude another judgment not only in 
the state but also under the laws of other states; and such 
an interpretation was held not readily to be reached.83 
V. CoNCLUSIONS 
The development of conflicts law in workmen's compen-
sation cases has amply demonstrated that the tests borrowed 
from the general rules regarding tort and contracts are 
equally impracticable. The choice of the applicable law lies 
among the places with which the work rather than the 
8l Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt ( 1943) 320 U. S. 430. 
82 CHEATHAM, "Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause etc.," 
44 Col. L. Rev. (1944) 330; FREUND, supra n. 77, 1229. 
83 Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin (1947) 330 U. S. 622. 
In this case, the first awards under the Illinois workmen's compensation 
statute stipulated that "this settlement does not affect any rights that applicant 
may have [in] Wisconsin." But the majority of the Supreme Court seems to 
have modified its general proposition, cf. DEAN, in 1947 Annual Survey of 
American Law 61 f. However, in Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1955) 
19 N.J. 594, n8 At!. (2d) 21 the Supreme Court of New Jersey has given full 
faith and credit to a New York award, although this was considered to be 
not exclusive. The rules of the Magnolia case and the McCartin case are 
profoundly discussed by 2 LARSON, supra n. r, at 358-367 § 85. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 237 
conclusion of the contract or the accident is connected. Fur-
thermore, European and international efforts suggest that 
decisive influence should be accorded the place of the em-
ployer's business supervising the employee's work. This 
result entirely agrees with the most desirable principle gov-
erning labor contracts. 
If the contract is made at the headquarters of the firm, 
it has been claimed in the United States that with respect 
to optional compensation statutes the parties are presumed 
to agree on the law of that place. In Europe, a similar 
preference for the law of the headquarters has been based 
on the integration of the worker into the employer's organi-
zation. It would seem that the more closely the state takes 
the indemnization of the workers in hand, especially by 
making it a public or semipublic institution of social insur-
ance, the more distinctly attention is turned to the mere 
territorial connection of the business place to which the 
workman is attached. 
In the United States, this leading idea, more or less con-
sciously living, might well be generalized and achieve uni-
formity. Even so, competition among the state laws would 
remain unchecked in the various cases of temporary employ-
ment in a state other than where the controlling business 
place is situated. Whether a total elimination of such an 
overlapping jurisdiction is desirable, except in the interest of 
the employer, is uncertain. If complete unification is wanted, 
the agreements made on the basis of the Geneva Conven-
tion would be a natural model. So long, however, as no uni-
form statute or agreements among the states with federal 
support are in existence, past experience eventually ought 
to teach that judicial interference in order to define the 
proper spheres of state legislation on this subject has not 
proved helpful. 
CHAPTER 43 
Maritime Transportation of Goods 
I. INTRODUCTION 
r. Conflicts and Unification 
UNTIL the nineteenth century, the ancient modes of carrying persons and goods on the seas and on the 
highways did not cause many problems of conflict of 
laws; carriage by sea because universal conceptions had 
achieved a general maritime law, and carriage on land be-
cause territorial boundaries separated the laws. In modern 
times, this situation has changed. The transformation of 
marine commerce by powerful and costly vessels, by the 
enormous increase of traffic, and the many modern innova-
tions in communication, just when the policies of national 
seclusion segregated the laws of the various countries, has 
multiplied and aggravated the conflicts of law.1 Equally 
cumbersome were the legal complications arising from inter-
state and international operation of railways. Sensitivity to 
these obstacles to commerce has been such that the unifica-
tion of laws concerning carriage has been accomplished 
more readily than in most other fields. Railroad transporta-
tion has been unified in the United States by federal statutes 
and in almost all states of Europe by the Bern Convention 
on international carriage of goods, which upon its revision 
in 1924 was accompanied by a convention concerning car-
riage of persons and luggage. In the maritime and aero-
nautic fields, the technical rules of navigation have been in 
1 See BERLINGIERI, Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare, seconda serie 
(I933) 20. 
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great degree unified; the almost universally enforced Con-
vention of Brussels/a that of Warsaw, and the Rome 
Conventions of 1933 and of 1952 all mark a vigorous im-
pulse towards uniform private law. These and other signifi-
cant efforts await final success. 
Conflicts law remains awkwardly married to a worn-out 
scheme of lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis, which, 
at least apparently, does not differentiate between the mani-
fold means of transportation, its objects, and the types of 
related agreements. Similarly, the writers, as a rule, do not 
attempt to consider such distinctions, despite their indul-
gence in various opinions regarding the most appropriate 
single local connection for this whole congeries of contracts. 
In fact, the most recent enactments have served to destroy 
rather than to foster international uniformity. 
Most discussion, judicial and literary, has been devoted 
to carriage of goods in maritime cases. For this reason we 
commence with this topic. 
2. Types of Contracts Involved 
In the various systems of transportation, contracts are 
classified differently, and even analogous types are often 
given different names. If all such categories were decisive 
for "characterization" in conflicts law, the rules would be 
illusory. 
Fortunately, there are favorable influences: traditions 
inherited from a past more satisfactorily unified, similarity 
of habits in the international trade, and the support afforded 
by the prevalence of British shipping. Only recently have 
the codes begun to recognize the main types of contracts 
created by a long development. The following kinds of 
la For the status of ratifications of, and accessions to, the Convention, as of 
Jan. I, 1962, see Revue Crit. 1962, 368 f. In addition, see for details 
MARKIANos, Die Dbernahme der Haager Regeln in die nationalen Gesetze 
iiber die Verfrachterhaftung ( 1960). 
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contracts must be distinguished, in order to be adequately 
classified in conflicts law. 
(a) Lease of vessel. The Roman jurists distinguished 
the hiring of a ship, viz., of a thing, a locatio conductio rei, 
from the contract of carriage, that is, for doing a job, 
locatio conductio operis.2 In the first case, there is no con-
tract of transportation, and opinion is divided whether it 
is a maritime contract at all. 
Demise. In the Anglo-American countries, the hiring of 
a vessel, termed the demise charter, has been defined for 
certain purposes, such as fixing the liability of the ship-
owner for the acts of the master and crew, or the statutory 
limitation of liability. In a demise, the owner agrees to 
transfer possession and control of the vessel to the char-
terer.3 The former remains only the "general owner" for 
the period of the charter, during which the charterer, who 
is to "man, victual and navigate" the vessel, is deemed to be 
the owner pro hac vice.4 This may be the case, even though 
the general owner appoints and pays the wages of the 
master and crew. This type of agreement is never presumed 
to have been made; it is less frequent in peacetime, though 
not extinct.5 It would seem to transcend the ordinary scope 
2 In ScAEVOLA, Dig. 19,2,62 § 11, when a vessel was hired for a voyage from 
Cyrenaica to Aquileja and was retained after loading at the port of dispatch 
for nine months, the rent for this time had to be paid by the lessee (conductor 
rei). In LABEO-ULPIAN, Dig. 19,2,13 § 1, the skipper assumed transportation 
of a cargo by voyage charter (he is the conductor, i.e., operis). The latter 
type included carriage of goods (eod. 13, § 2) and of persons (eod. 19, § 7). 
a SCRUTION, Charterparties {ed. 16) 4; WILLISTON, 4 Contracts 3001, 3003 
§ 1074; Guzman v. Pichirilo {1962) 369 U.S. 698, 699 f. 
4 United States: Rev. Stat.§ 4286,46 U.S. C. (1958 ed.) § 186. 
To the same effect, Canada: Shipping Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. V., c. 44, 
p. 245, s. 653. In its present form, the Canada Shipping Act, Rev. Stat. of 
Canada 1952 val. I c. 29 s. 661, which replaced the original s. 653 of the act, 
does not confine itself to a charterer to whom the ship is demised, but rather 
applies to "any charterer of the ship." 
5 Banks v. Chas. Kurz Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 61, 66 in 
the case of the usual oral demise of lighters without motive power. It is 
not at all so "very rare" as the often repeated words of Vaughan Williams, 
L. J., in Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton [ 1903] 2 K. B. at 689 would 
indicate. Cf. the Indices to American Maritime Cases. 
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of the usual conflicts rules respecting "transportation" or 
"carriage." The parties are not in the relation of carrier and 
shipper. 
Bareboat lease. The same is true of the transaction, well 
known in civil law, where a ship is leased so as to give the 
lessee full nautical as well as commercial control. In the 
simplest case, the vessel is not equipped for transportation 
of goods, or it is delivered without master and crew, in 
consideration of compensation for a term or a voyage. Such 
bareboat charter, services to be furnished, is certainly a 
contract alien to transportation. In the German doctrine, 
it was formerly sometimes contended that all contracts 
giving the charterer control of navigation should be ex-
cluded from the category of maritime contracts, 6 while most 
French writers and their followers include them under 
affreightment. 7 
In any case, as between the two parties to a demise or 
bareboat charter, the applicable law is more appropriately 
determined by the conflicts rules concerning leases of mov-
able chattels than by those concerning transportation. Of 
course, if the law of the flag is invoked to cover all contracts 
regarding the use of a vessel, as in recent Italian notions, 
it operates also here.8 
(b) Charter party (affreightment by charter). Under 
a traditional type of agreement, the shipowner furnishes the 
6 German Schiffsmiete in contrast with Frachtvertrag, see WusTENDORFER, 
Seehandelsrecht ( ed. 2) n6 ff.; ScHAPS·ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht ( ed. 3) 134 
§ 510 n. 5; pp. 267 ff. before § 556. 
The new Swiss Shipping Act of Sept. 23, 1953, distinguishes clearly between 
bare-boat-lease (arts. 90 ff.), charter (arts. 94 ff.), and contracts of affreight-
ment (arts. ror ff.). 
1 DAN JON, 2 Droit Marit. §§ 744 ff.; RIPERT, Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 245 ff. 
§§ 1341 ff. 
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 533 § 622 distinguished this affretement-louage 
from affretement-transport, but in the treatment starting in § 627 the compre-
hensive concept of affreightment is underlying. 
Belgium: 1 SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN § 272. 
8 C. Navig., Disp. Pre!. art. ro. 
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ship as a whole, with master and crew. He agrees to deliver 
the cargo in good condition, dangers of the sea excepted, 
and assumes the marine risk as to the ship; the charterer 
determines the ports for loading and discharging the cargo 
to be delivered by him to the ship. The essentials of all 
charter parties are full control of navigation by the owner 
and directions for proceeding by the charterer. Although 
oral contracts are not excluded by usage and the codes, there 
is normally a written contract, originally a deed, a carta 
partita (whence the name comes), at present one of the 
printed standard forms of English origin. Constructive 
analysis of these forms has finally led to the assumption 
that they combine elements of hiring of things and hiring 
of services in a "mixed" contract.9 
The use of the ship and equipment may be granted for a 
time (time charter) 10 or for a voyage. A promise of a pro-
portional part or specific quarters in the vessel is sometimes 
included in this category, where the other characteristics of 
charter parties are present. It is so classified in the German 
Commercial Code, § 55 7, because charter party documents 
are usual in such cases. But these cases seem to have become 
rare. In the United States, usually "charter" carriage is 
distinguished from common carriage by the fact that the 
charterer engages the whole of the ship's capacity.U 
Charter parties are in wide use in many branches of trade 
for reasons of organization and geographical considera-
tions. Thus, for instance, American steel concerns shipping 
9 For certain purposes of mercantile law, analysis is required for ascer-
taining which element prevails; see PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 87; ScRAPS-
ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht ( ed. 3) 266 f. 
10 German: (Eigentliclzer) Zeitfrachtvertrag, e.g., "Baltic Time Charter"; 
similar names in Scandinavian and Dutch languages; French: affretement 
a temps; Italian: noleggio a tempo. Explicit distinctions between time charter 
and voyage charter are made in the Swiss Shipping Act of Sept. 23, 1953, 
arts. 94 ff. 
11 ROBINSON, Admiralty 593 § 83; GILMORE & BLACK 170 § 4-1. 
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ore from remote South-American ports commonly enlarge 
their fleets by chartering "tramp" vessels.12 
(c) Carriage by general ship (Stiickgiiter-Frachtvertrag; 
affreightment with bill of lading). Under the ordinary 
contract of marine transportation, the shipmaster is under 
the exclusive control of the carrier, whereas the shipper has 
merely a right similar to that in rail transport of merchan-
dise. The contract may include conditions obligating the 
carrier to load the goods in certain types of compartments, 
but though stowage is not necessarily at the discretion of 
the vessel, it is always under its responsibility. 
The Netherlands Code, in treating this type of contract, 
distinguishes tramp and line steamers, 13 while the recent 
Italian law, apart from charter parties, somewhat obscurely 
differentiates transport of shipload or partial shipload from 
that of identified objects. In the Russian Law of I 929 (art. 
7 3 ) charter parties are contracts in which the whole vessel, 
or a part of it, or identified spaces in it, are put at the dis-
posal of the charterer, in contrast to contracts without such 
conditions.13a 
(d) Purpose of the distinction. Many further types can 
be differentiated.14 However, thus far except for time char-
ters, differentiation of all the variants included in groups 
(b), charter party, and (c), bill of lading, has been slow 
and somewhat difficultY This fact may have caused the 
remarkable phenomenon that in the common law and in the 
12 Other articles are sugar, wheat, rice, potash, bauxite, lumber, coal, oil 
etc. See C. D. MACMURRAY and MALCOLM M. CREE, Charter Parties of the 
World (1934) 4 ff.; }OHNSON-HUEBNER-WILSON, Principles of Transportation 
( 1932) 467 ff., s6o, 569 ff. 
13 C. Com. arts. sx7e-517Y (special rules for carriage in line shipping); 
520g-520t (for carriage not by line boats). 
13a See Law in Eastern Europe (edited by SziRMAY), Vol. 4, The Merchant 
Shipping Code of the Soviet Union (1960) p. 39· 
14 This regards especially the peculiarities in the services of privately 
operated or industrial carriers and the contracts, not of agency but of 
transportation, made by the United States Shipping Board for government-
owned vessels. 
15 PAPPENHElM, 3 Seerecht 103. 
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Latin laws, charter parties and other forms of transporta-
tion have been prevailingly treated together under the gen-
eral term of affreightment or carriage of goods, while 
German commercial law doctrine has consistently distin-
guished the two above groups, the technical name of Stiick-
giitervertrag (contract relating to single packages) 16 being 
employed for group (c). The Brussels Convention on bills 
of lading also distinguishes this latter contract although it 
extends its effects to negotiated bills of lading issued under 
a charter partyP 
In conflicts law, however, the two groups are quite com-
monly merged without any discrimination. This is true of 
the United States18 as well as of France19 and Germany.20 
By way of exception, the Dutch Law of 1924, in the absence 
of a contrary intention of the parties, applies to time char-
ters the law of the flag, instead of the usual law of the place 
of contracting.21 
Under these circumstances, it would not be suitable fur-
ther to divide the materials relating to carriage of goods 
by sea. Ultimately, it will nevertheless be easy to see that 
such failure to discriminate is improper. Not only must the 
lease of vessels be excluded but neither time nor voyage 
charters can be brought simply under the criteria appro-
priate to ordinary carriage by liners. 
3· Carrier 
"Carrier" includes the owner of the vessel and the 
charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with the 
shipper.22 
16 Germany: HGB. § 556 No. 2. 
11 Art. I {b), see infra n. 27. 
18 Cf. MINOR§ I69; BEALE§ 346.7; see also DICEY (ed. 7) Rules ISS, I59· 
19 BATIFFOL 257 § 284 implies this; cf. BATIFFOL, Traite ( ed. 3) 660 § 607. 
20 2 FRANKENSTEIN 573; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 28I; SCHAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 
Seerecht ( ed. 3) 277 ff.; KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 564. 
21 The Nether lands: C. Com. art. 51 8g. 
22 Convention of Brussels on bills of lading, art. I (a). 
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Private carrier. The important common law distinction 
between common and private carriers has some bearing on 
the application of the Harter Act and more recent federal 
legislation in American courts.23 But no consequence is 
known to have been drawn in conflicts law from the dis-
tinction. 
Forwarding agent (French ({commissionaire," German 
uSpediteur"). The services of independent merchants oper-
ating as intermediaries in effectuating transportation are 
brought under very different categories in the various sys-
tems. Moreover, doubts exist almost everywhere concern-
ing their treatment insofar as the rules of agency and the 
rules on carriage conflict. It would be disastrous if the 
conflicts rule should follow the variety of these domestic 
characterizations. 
A model of international characterization may be found 
in the simple words of Scrutton, L. J., interpreting the con-
cept of "carrier" for the specific narrow purpose of the 
Convention as one which "might include a freight agent or 
forwarding agent or carriage contractor in cases where by 
issuing a bill of lading he enters into a contract of carriage 
with the shipper."24 
Whenever, we might say, any person, not a servant of 
either party, contracts with the shipper for carriage, whether 
by his own or another's services, the conflicts rules involving 
contracts of transportation ought to apply exclusive of 
those regarding agency inasmuch as they lead to different 
results. 
4· Transportation Contract and Bill of Lading 
It is elementary to distinguish between the contract of 
23 On this difficult subject, see as to the Harter Act, AusTIN T. WRIGHT, 
"Private Carriers and the Harter Act," 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 1926) 602; 
and with respect to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, ROBINSON, 
Admiralty 506 f.; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) at 667 and n. 33; KNAUTH, 
Ocean Bills of Lading ( ed. 4) 176-179. 
24 SCRUTTON, Charterparties (ed. 16) 466. 
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affreightment and the obligations flowing from a bill of 
lading. In theory, the relationships in the two sets of obli-
gations are so differently shaped that two entirely different 
conflicts rules seem to be required. In practice, however, 
the picture appears modified. In the great rna jority of cases, 
there is either a written contract or a bill of lading, but 
not both. The former in almost every case involves a charter 
party, while in the modern conveyance of goods bills of 
lading are almost unfailingly used and usually incorporate 
the contract of carriage.25 The Hague Rules adopted in the 
Brussels Convention of r92426 illustrate the situation. They 
envisage in the first place the rights based on bills of lading 
issued in connection with ordinary carriage but also include, 
in the case of a charter party, bills issued to a charterer and 
endorsed to a holder. They exclude the relationship created 
by the charter party itself.27 
Although the systems vary in the details of the protec-
tion granted to an innocent holder, as for instance, whether 
the bill of lading constitutes prima facie or conclusive evi-
dence, the bill everywhere dominates the relation between 
the carrier and a consignee who is a holder in due course. 
It follows that the bill of lading must prevail also for the 
purpose of conflicts law. Instinctively, the American and 
many other courts, as we shall see, are anxious to subordi-
nate the law of the affreightment contract to that of the 
25 Cf. PAPPENHEIM, 3 Seerecht 221: failure to issue a bill of lading may 
occur when goods are shipped on the account of the shipowner, in case of 
urgent dispatch and in coastwise shipping; I VAN HASSELT 363 f. 
26 Hague Rules, art. I (b); in the United States, Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act, 1936, 46 U. S. C. A. § 1301 (b). The same exclusion of charter 
parties in the relation between shipowner and charterer was assumed for 
the Harter Act, see ROBINSON, Admiralty 506; GILMORE & BLACK 175 f. § 4-2. 
This subject does not include of course the common phenomenon that 
charterers issue bills of lading to their customers. 
27 On this situation, cf. the cases cited by PooR, Charter Parties (ed. 4) 
§ 25, and in England, The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90, 155 L. T. R. 109. See also 
GILMORE & BLACK 193 f. § 4-10. 
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port where the bill of lading is issued. They endeavor also 
to eliminate such conflicts as may arise. 
Transfer of title in goods by transfer of the bill of lading 
is not in question here. In regulating this function, the law 
governing the creation and effect of bills of lading is sub-
ordinate to the law of the situs of the goods but never to 
the law governing the contract. 
II. MAIN SYSTEMS oF CoNFLicTs LAw 
I. Choice of Law by the Parties 
Remarkably, apart from restrictions on stipulations ex-
onerating the carrier from liability, 28 the usual attempts 
to restrict the efficacity of party autonomy in the determina-
tion of the general law of the contract, are all but absent. 
Probably due to the age-old conceptions of maritime inter-
course, an appropriate stipulation or, in the absence of 
express agreement, the so-called presumable intention of 
the parties, universally justifies application of foreign law.29 
Even the Soviet Maritime Law expressly states the right of 
the parties to modify the normal conflicts solutions; al-
though the imperative Soviet rules are excepted, this ex-
28 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 423. 
29 See e.g.: 
United States: The Ferncliff, infra n. 35; Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown 
(1913) 214 Mass. 196, 100 N. E. 1025 (express clause, in contrast with the 
law governing the endorsement). Compare Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft 
No. 6 ( 1960) § 346n and note on p. 156. 
Belgium; I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 391 § 277. 
England: Lloyd v. Guibert (1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, 13 L. T. R. 602. 
Denmark: Trib. marit. Copenhagen (May 17, 1889) 16 Rev. Autran 
( 190CH>I) 249· 
France: LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 § 844; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 
347 f. § 1432· 
Germany: 68 RGZ. 209; 122 RGZ. 316; ScHAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht (ed. 
3) 277 ff. 
Greece: 2 STREIT-YALLINDAS 254 and n. 42. 
Italy: C. Navig. Disp. Pre!. art. w; C. C. (1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 25; SCERNI 
193· 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 185 cf. 285; cf. BUSTAMANTE, Der. Int. Priv. (ed. 
3) 332 § 1449· 
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press permissiOn was in contrast to the general Soviet 
legislation at the time when the Merchant Shipping Code 
of 1929 was adopted.30 
This result is exactly the opposite of what the adversaries 
of party autonomy expect of a contract bound to such 
stringent provisions as those contained in the Harter Act 
and the Hague Rules. 
2. United States 
Not the law of the flag. The vast majority of American 
cases involving carriage are concerned with interstate trans-
portation by rail or water. The simultaneous treatment of 
land and maritime shipments, therefore, serves to explain 
why the law of the flag has never been stressed.31 The fact 
that American ports were prevailingly served by foreign 
vessels may have contributed to this same result that in no 
case has the law of the flag been decisive. The most influ-
ential decision of the Supreme Court investigated the law 
of the flag in the light of a thorough review of the English 
cases and flatly rejected it.32 
General maritime law? In two significant cases of old 
standing, the federal courts resorted to the general mari-
time law as administered in the United States, in each case 
on the ground of the presumed intention of the parties. In 
30 See art. 5 Merchant Shipping Code, supra n. 13a; FREUND, Das 
Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 39, 58. As to the efficacy of party 
autonomy under Soviet conflict of laws in general, see Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 375 
n. 61 and 1 LUNZ 166 If. 
31 The decision in The Titania (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883) 19 Fed. 101, 103, 
is nominally based on the English law of the flag, but at the same time 
shipment in England is emphasized. 
The ground on which British law would have been applied in Franklin 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1931) 
54 F. (2d} 807, if it had been proved, is unknown. The cases cited in 
2 WHARTON 1067 n. 14 for occasional application of the law of the flag are 
exclusively English. 
32 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U.S. 397, 449"453· 
See also The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886} 29 Fed. 373, 381, 384 
(defending general maritime law against the law of the flag). 
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the first case, the domicil of the shipowner in Baltimore was 
expressly discarded; it was deemed of no importance since 
local connections of the carriage were at a considerable 
distance. 33 In the second case, the fact that the contract was 
concluded in New Orleans was declared immaterial be-
cause the contract was between an American and an English-
man for an ocean voyage of an English ship (to Europe) .34 
In other decisions extending to a recent date, "our general 
maritime law" or "mercantile law" has been applied in lieu 
of foreign law recognized as governing, but not proved in 
the suit.35 This is but another name for the lex fori. 36 No 
other use seems to have been made of this device, although 
admiralty jurisdiction covers a very large field37 and com-
monly is said to imply federallaw. 38 
Evidently, the above-mentioned old decisions are no 
longer authoritative. As the editor of Wharton has noted, 
whereas once the courts resorted to general maritime law 
in order to eliminate foreign law, it is now possible for the 
law of the place of contracting (or what they so term) 
to govern, since all matters of public policy are being taken 
care of by the growing body of Congressional statutes on 
maritime law.39 
Lex loci contractus. Although the Harter Act and the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ( 1936) apply to inward as 
well as outward maritime carriage, this extension of scope 
33 Naylor v. Baltzell (C. C. Md. 1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 10,061. 
34 Watts v. Camors (1885) II5 U.S. 353· 
35 The Ferncliff (D. C. Md. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 728, 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 
206; Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Brocklebank (C. C. A. 3d 1945) 148 F. 
(2d) 727,1945 Am. Marit. Cas. 635; The President Monroe (1935) 156 Misc. 
432, 286 N.Y. Supp. 990. 
36 The President Monroe ( 1935) 286 N. Y. Supp. 990. 
37 James Richardson & Sons v. Conners Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944) 
141 F. (2d) 226. On the discretionary jurisdiction on a charter party between 
foreigners made abroad, see The Wilja, Dreyfus v. Wipu (C. C. A. 2d 1940) 
II3 F. (2d) 646, and for nonadmiralty cases, Kaufman v. John Block & Co. 
(D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1945) 6o F. Supp. 992. 
38 ROBINSON, Admiralty 27 § 5; GiLMORE & BLACK 43 ff. § 1-17. 
39 2 WHARroN 1069 f. 
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does not affect the problem of what law governs a contract 
of transportation in general. Characteristically, the Pom-
erene Act of I 9 I 6 has never been applied to bills of lading 
issued abroad for transportation to the United States. In 
fact, apart from the questions of liability imperatively 
regulated by the Acts of I893 and I936, it is commonly 
recognized that the law of the place of contracting has 
fundamental force in all contracts of transportation accord-
ing to the great majority of American decisions.39a How-
ever, more accurate inquiry is necessary. Just how strong 
is the rule? And if the ancient approach through a general 
contracts rule is no longer attractive, is the rule in this par-
ticular field supported by special considerations? No direct 
answer can be expected from the decisions; they are seldom 
articulate on policy.4() 
The original authority for the application of lex loci con-
tractus, it is submitted, is a decision dating from I 843, 
which justifies itself merely by the allegedly well-settled 
general rule, citing three cases not involving transporta-
tion.41 Since then, this test constantly appears as the normal 
connection, sometimes as a "strong presumption," not easily 
rebuttable.42 But close investigation reveals additional fac-
tors. Attempts at such an analysis have already been made 
by Wharton, whose result, however, that the true criterion 
adopted by the courts was the domicil of the shipowner, 
has been refuted by the editor of his own work, Parmele.43 
The latter suggested the importance of the commencement 
39a See Note, "Ocean Bills of Lading and Some Problems of Conflict of 
Laws," 58 Col. L. Rev. ( I958) 212, 2I6 f.; SINCLAIR, "Conflict of Law Problems 
in Admiralty," I5 Sw. L. ]. (I96I} I, 207, 2I4 ff. 
4 0 As BATIFFOL 240 n. I notes, the cases, excepting two named by him, even 
express their solutions as though they were simply applicable to any kind 
of contract. 
4 1 Hale v. New Jersey Steam Navig. Co. (I843) I5 Conn. 538, 546, 39 Am. 
Dec. 398. 
42 Grand v. Livingston ( I896) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490 (the 
case belongs to group (i) infra). 
43 2 WHARTON I055· 
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of the voyage.44 Reviewed at present, the decisions of the 
last hundred years demonstrate that in the opinion of the 
courts the presumable intention of the parties governs and 
that this normally points to the place where, in the usual 
phraseology, "the contract was made." More accurately, 
the applicable law depends upon one of the following four 
situations: 
( i) In most leading cases, the place of contracting is 
identical with the port of dispatch.45 Statements of Ameri-
can courts may be found purporting to apply a supposedly 
well-settled rule: "The contract of carriage was entered 
into in Roumania and performance began there, but was to 
be completed in this country, and therefore the contract is 
governed by the law of Roumania."46 
( ii) In some cases, the law of the flag coincides with the 
above law. 47 
(iii) In others, the law applied was that of the port of 
dispatch alone, expressly without reference to the lex loci 
contractus. 48 
( iv) In a few decisions, other points of the journey are 
4 4 2 WHARTON 1063, 1072. 
45 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (r889) 129 U. S. 397; The 
Majestic (C. C. A. 2d 1894) 6o Fed. 624; O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship 
Co. (1894) r6o Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force 
(1894) 142 N.Y. 90, 36 N. E. 874; M. & T. Trust Co. v. ExportS. S. Corp. 
( 1932) 143 Misc. r, 256 N. Y. Supp. 590 (still stressing only the place of 
contracting); The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29, 1941 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 1744, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1943) 137 F. (2d) 6r9, 1943 Am. Marit. 
Cas. 1044, cert. denied, 320 U. S. 802. 
Interstate: The Henry B. Hyde (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1897) 82 Fed. 68 r. 
46 The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 97, 98, con-
cerned with a passenger's contract but citing the Liverpool Case, supra n. 45· 
47 The Carib Prince (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1894) 63 Fed. 266; The Titania 
(D. C. S. D. N.Y. r883) 19 Fed. ror; The Frey (D. C. S. D. N. Y. r899) 
92 Fed. 667. The first two decisions apply English law, the third, French 
(though restricted by the Harter Act). The Dartford, Warren v. Britain 
S. S. Co. (C. C. A. rst 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 1548, applied English 
law to a bill of lading issued to the charterer; in addition the English form 
of a charter party was used. 
48 The Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340; The Cypria 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 816, 1942 Am. Marit. Cas. 985, aff'd, 
252 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
relied upon, these being regarded as places where per-
formance occurs. 
(a) In such connection, the place where the goods are 
damaged or lost appears decisive in several cases.49 In one 
case, expressly, in others presumably, the court was anxious 
to reach the law of the forum. This view ought to be entirely 
abandoned; it is due to a confusion between contract and 
tort. 
(b) In one case, 50 a vessel went from India to New York; 
part of the cargo was shipped in Colombo, Ceylon, and part 
in British India. Under the circumstances, the court dis-
carded the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and without 
further motivation applied American law, i.e., the law of 
the forum, which was also the law of the port of destination. 
(c) Apart from federal or New York public policy at 
the American port of destination with respect to clauses 
limiting carriers' liability,51 certain special problems have 
been considered, here as in other countries, as most closely 
attached to the port of arrivaJ.52 
137 F. (2d) 326, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 947,-both expressly rejecting the 
foreign lex loci contractus. In the Cypria Case, the court could, however, rely 
on the express incorporation of the American Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 
49 Most remarkable was the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in Hughes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1902) 202 Pa. 222, 51 Atl. 990 invali-
dating a New York exemption clause under the law of the forum, a decision 
strongly criticized by PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1056 n. 1, ro6o n. 2, 1063 n. 6, 
but followed in a railway case, Zahloot v. Adams Exp. Co. (1912) 50 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 238, where an exemption clause of Pennsylvania was declared 
valid under the law of New York, the place of loss of the goods by negligence 
in delivery. 
Analogous, Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific (191o) 58 Wash. 239, 
expressly applying lex fori; The Steel Inventor (D. C. Md. 1940) 35 F. 
Supp. g86 under the peculiar circumstance that the bill of lading referred 
to the Indian Act (as of dispatch) as well as to the United States Act (as 
of destination) ; the court chose the latter, for a loss by unloading in Balti-
more. Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. 
( 2d) 824 reaches a similar result by adopting the splitting theory of the 
Restatement. This view is in the minority; cf., e.g., The Miguel di Larrinaga 
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) .217 Fed. 678. It is expressly rejected in Carpenter 
v. U.S. Exp. Co. (1912) 120Minn. 59,139 N. W. I54· 
50 Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 184. Against 
this argumentation, see infra p. 271. 
51 Treated at length, Vol. II Ch. 33· In addition, see YIANNOPOULOS, 
Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962). 
52 See infra Ch. 44 n. 94· 
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3· Great Britain 
For a long time, numerous Continental writers have been 
accustomed to point to an English rule that carriage is 
governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 53 They still 
regard this as an important confirmation of their analogous 
postulate. But the English authors who have contributed 
to this mistake have been more cautious.54 
In fact, the English decisions have applied the law of 
the flag to the extent of the authority given by the ship-
owner to the master so as to subject the shipowner as well 
as the cargo owner to liability.55 Apart from this, there is 
only one case of somewhat doubtful bearing. In its famous 
decision of r865, the Court of Exchequer Chamber ex-
tended the law of the flag to the question whether the char-
terer and cargo owner who had paid the deficiency amount 
on a bottomry bond burdening ship, freight, and cargo, 
could recover from the shipowner.56 This not only involved 
the master's authority to issue a bottomry bond on the 
cargo but concerned also the liability to bear the burden 
so caused in the internal relationship between the owner and 
the cargo. It seems, therefore, a little optimistic for English 
judges subsequently to reduce the precedent of Lloyd v. 
Guibert to "such contracts as the master may be driven to 
53 This same mistake also happened to Duff, J., in the Canadian Supreme 
Court, in Richardson v. "Burlington" [1930] 4 D. L. R. 527, [1931] S. C. R. 
76, while the majority emphasized the lex loci contractus and the domicil of 
the parties, the result being the same. 3 JOHNSON 475 hence should not have 
made an exception from the lex loci contractus prescribed in art. 8 of the 
Quebec C. C. 
54 Especially, FooTE 429 and DICEY ( ed. 7) 823 Rule 159. 
55 The Karnak ( x869) L. R. 2 P. C. 505, and The Gaetano and Maria 
(t88z) 7 P. D. x, 137. Formerly, Duranty v. Hart (1863) 2 Moo. P. C. Cas. 
(N. S.) 289, (x864) B. & L. 253, 260, 272, invoked "the ordinary maritime 
law," in the Privy Council "the General Maritime Law." 
56 Lloyd v. Guibert (x865) L. R. 1 Q. B. II5, 128. Under the French law 
of the flag, the shipowner was freed by abandon of the vessel; under the 
other laws involved, he was not. 
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make by necessity in the course of the voyage."57 In addi-
tion, the decision of the Exchequer Chamber proclaimed 
a far-reaching rule subjecting all liability for sea damage 
and its incidents to the law of the flag, and an advocate of 
this solution has contended that it could not be overruled 
by a decision of the Court of Appeal.58 
Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the English courts 
do not feel bound by the rash pretensions of this old de-
cision. This has been formally stated by Lord Merriman: 
"As regards the contract of affreightment as a whole, there 
is no necessary presumption that the law of the flag ap-
plies."59 Thus, not even the often alleged presumption, 
easily displaced by counterinferences,60 exists. This result 
is also amply supported by the cases, as pointed out by the 
Supreme Court of the United States as early as r889.61 
From the time when general maritime law was replaced 
by conflicts law, the English courts in reality have never 
considered any basic test other than the intention of the 
parties. It was most emphatically invoked in Lloyd v. 
Guibert itself and despite this precedent in all later cases. 62 
And in the other celebrated carriage case, In re Missouri, 
where the English law of the flag was applied, this was 
regarded as expressly intended, being supported by the 
57 Lord (then Sir Boyd) Merriman, in The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90 at 107, 
on the ground of the distinction made by the Court of Appeal in The 
Industrie [ 1894] P. 58. The opinion on the proper law is given, although 
the parties did not expressly request it (p. 107) "in case it may be of 
assistance" to them. In The Assunzione [ 1953] 1 W. L. R. 929, 937 f. Will mer 
J. also was inclined to take the position that the principle of the law of the 
flag only applies to said contracts of the master; contra: Hodson L. J. in the 
same case, see The Assunzione [ 1954] 2 W. L. R. 234, 261 ff. For comments, 
see KAHN-FREUND, 17 Mod. L. Rev. (1954) 255; CHESHIRE, 32 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1955-6) 123. 
58 I forget the name. 
59 Supra n. 57· 
60 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 435 § 416. 
61 Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U. S. 397 at 
449-453· 
62 See esp. Lindley, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. 
Netherlands India Steam Nav. Co. (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 at 540. 
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terms of the contract and of the bill of lading as well as 
by the English port of destination; the Court of Appeals 
confirmed the decision on these grounds only.63 The lack 
of preference for any fixed criterion has occasioned the 
complaint of an English admiralty judge that "there is 
abundance of authority for practically every proposition 
that has been put forward." 64 Nevertheless, there is a cer-
tain pattern in the prevailing decisions. 
Courts have relied: 
( i) On the English forms used in the charter party or 
the bill of lading. 65 Some decisions have expressly rejected 
inferences from the flag66 and disregarded the place of con-
tracting.67 Others have mentioned only the English language 
or English documents in connection with the English port 
of destination.68 It is recognized in England as well as 
everywhere else that language itself is no useful criterion. 
Such references presumably meant and at least today would 
have to be understood to mean the English style of mari-
time affreightment. 
At least in one case the English form alone seems to have 
been decisive.69 
A judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada has applied 
63 In re Missouri Steamship Co. ( 1889) 42 Ch. D. 321. 
6 4 Langton, J., in The Adriatic [ 1931] P. 241 at 244. 
65 The lndustrie [ 1894] P. 58, 73; Aktieselskab August Freuchen v. Steen 
Hansen (1919) ILl. L. Rep. 393; The Adriatic [I93xl P. 241; The Njegos 
[ 1936] P. 90, xo6 f. 
66 The lndustrie and Adriatic cases, supra n. 65. 
67 The Adriatic and Aktieselskab etc. cases, supra n. 65. In The Assunzione 
[ 1953] I W. L. R. 929, 938 f. the judge emphasized rightly that the place 
of contract in many cases is quite fortuitous. 
68 The Wilhelm Schmidt ( x87x) I Asp. Marit. Cas. (N. S.) 82; The San 
Roman (1872) L. R. 3 A. & E. 583, 592; semble, Woodley v. Mitchell (1883) 
I I Q. B. D. 47, 51. The first two decisions have been criticized insofar as 
they involve agency of the master by necessity, which should have been 
determined by the flag, see editors of SCRUTION, Charterparties ( ed. x6) 25. 
69 Aktieselskab etc., supra n. 65. But in The Metamorphosis [ 1953] I 
W. L. R. 543, 549 Karminski J. rejected the argument that the use of the 
English language in a charterparty or in a bill of lading is of specific 
significance; he regarded it as one of the matters which a judge has to 
consider. 
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American law, that is, the Harter Act, to a carriage of 
grain shipped from Buffalo, N. Y., to Montreal on a Nor-
wegian ship on the ground that the contract was made in 
the United States and contained the "Jason Clause" neces-
sary in this country but not necessary under Canadian or 
English law. 70 
(ii) On the law of the place of contracting, either be-
cause the contract was made in England between domiciled 
parties or agents,71 or simply because the bill of lading was 
issued in an English port.72 
The preceding review of leading and other cases may 
show a certain preference for the application of English 
law, but they favor the lex fori even less than most other 
countries. They do not justify in the least the astounding 
pronouncement of Dicey that a contract for the carriage 
of persons or goods from or to England or by a British ship 
is prima facie governed by English law,73 a statement that 
may have stimulated much particularism in other countries. 
In the light of a comparison with other courts, the English 
follow policies remarkably analogous to the general habits 
of courts elsewhere. 
70 Bunge North American Grain Corp. and Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. 
SS. Skarp [ 1932] Ex. C. R. 212. In regard to the (plaintiff) fire insurance 
association, it is added that its insurance certificates contain an express 
reference to the Harter Act. The law of the flag is eliminated. 
71 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navi-
gation Co. (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521 (English port of dispatch and English 
parties); The Industrie [1894] P. 58, 72 (charterparty made in London be-
tween an English broker of the German shipowner and a London charterer, 
in the usual form of English charterparties); The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90 
( charterparty made in London in the "Centrocon" form between the English 
agent of a Yugoslav steamship company and the English branch of a French 
firm, agent of an Argentinian skipper) ; the bill of lading follows the 
presumable law intended in the charterparty. 
72The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 180, 28 Revue Dor (1933) 180: 
the shipowner contracts by accepting the goods against the bill of lading. 
Hence where this operation occurs, there the contract is made. 
Canada: Melady v. Jenkins S. S. Co. (1909) 18 0. L. R. 251 (standard 
of pounds contained in a bushel). 
73 DICEY ( ed. 5) 686 ff.; no statement of this kind can be found in DICEY 
(ed. 7) 822 ff. 
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4· France and Belgium 
Many decisions of the Court of Cassation and the lower 
courts have with unusual consistency applied the law of the 
place of contracting.74 This covers not only the form of 
charter parties and bills of lading but also the performance 
of the contract. 75 Originally this rule was declared impera-
tive,76 but it persists as a regular conflicts rule, susceptible 
of being replaced even by a presumable intention of the 
parties. 77 
In a series of older cases, it is true, in France and still 
more so in Belgium, the law of the port where the goods 
arrive or should arrive, has enjoyed a more or less wide 
application. 78 It seems certain, however, that this tendency 
has been overcome, and the place of performance has signifi-
cance merely as a device for special problems.79 
The reasons for emphasizing the place of contracting 
are inarticulate in the decisions, since the rules directly derive 
from the inherited general contracts principle. But the 
writers are conscious that this place is usually identical with 
the place where the goods are dispatched. If in rare cases 
74 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) D. x864.1.166 S. x864.1.385; Cass. civ. (June 
12, 1894) D. 1895.I.I6I, Clunet 1894, 8o6, 10 Revue Dor 147; Cass. req. 
repeatedly; Cass. civ. (Dec. 5, 1910) S. 1911.1.129, Revue 1911, 395, Clunet 
1912, 1156 (on principle); for the many decisions of lower courts, see 
RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. ( ed. 4) §§ 1428 ff.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 785 ff. 
§ § 843 ff.; 1 Repert. 27 5-278 ; VAN SLOoTEN 17-22. Recently, Trib. com. Seine 
(Jan. 22, 1942) Nouv. Revue 1943, 77 applied the French law of the place of 
contracting as a matter of course. In addition, see BATIFFOL, Traite ( ed. 3) 
66o § 607 and recent cases cited there. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, 1900) 16 Rev. Autran (19<>o-o1) 694; 
Trib. com. Antwerp (July 2, 1906) Jur. Port Anvers 1906.1.307; (Jan. 30, 
1907) id. 1907, 180 etc. 
75 See BATIFFOL § 284. 
76 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, 1864) supra n. 74; cf. BATIFFOL 258. 
77 Cass. civ. (Dec. 5, 1910) supra n. 74· 
78 The law of the port of actual discharge was proclaimed as a rule gov-
erning performance in Antwerp (Jan. 14, 1891) Jur. Port Anvers 1893·1.19; 
App. Gent (May 2, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390, 16 Rev. Autran (19oo-o1) 
842 (as dated April 27, 1901); a very faulty decisi!m, 2 FRANKENSTEIN 515 
n. 66; Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, 1903) 18 Revue Autran (1902-o3) 901. 
79 See infra Ch. 44 pp. 289-290. 
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the two places differ, the courts have been divided, but in 
the opinion of the lawyers expert in commercial law, the 
port of lading has been preferred.80 The contrary choice of 
law is not supported by a decision of I 8 8 5, 81 although it 
declared that the contract was completed in Norway by 
acceptance of an offer; in fact, Norwegian law was also 
indicated by the Norwegian flag and, above all, because 
the vessel was chartered for a transport from Norway to 
England. 
The only significant doubt concerns the case where the 
parties are of common nationality. This the older writers 
were inclined to emphasize.82 But the practical inconven-
iences of discriminating among customers according to their 
nationality are particularly pronounced when goods are 
shipped by the same vessel or on the same voyage.83 There 
is no case supporting such exceptional treatment.84 
5· Germany 
In this field, the German courts have rarely employed 
their theory of splitting the contract.85 But they have de-
duced from their principle of lex loci solutionis the rule that 
maritime affreightment contracts of all kinds are governed 
by the law of the port of destination. This rule has been 
claimed to possess the widest possible scope. 86 Nevertheless, 
80 FROMAGEOT, 18 Revue Autran ( 1902-o3) 754 f.; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
792 § 85o; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 345 § 1429.2; VAN SLOOTEN 30. 
Contra: CRouv.Es, 1 Repert. 268 n. 18 for the sake of the "general principle." 
81 App. Douai (Nov. 10, 1885) 1 Revue Autran ( 1885-86) 360. 
82 I FoEL!X §§ 83, 96; 1 FIORE § 114; WEISS, 4 Traite 355, and others. 
83 Thus the experts on the subject, FROMAGEOT, IS Revue Autran ( I902-o3) 
749; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 848. 
84 Of no concern in this connection is Trib. com. Rouen (April 23, I888) 
4 Revue Autran (1888-89) 3I, cited by CRouvils, I Repert 267 § I3, where 
the parties also signed a bill of lading in their country. 
85 Such a case is RG. (May 22, I897) 39 RGZ. 65. 
86ROHG. (May 30, I879) 25 ROHGE. I92; RG. (March 21, I883) 9 RGZ. 
5I; (May25, I889) 25 RGZ. 104, Io7; (Oct. 24, 1891) 49 Seuff. Arch. No. 36; 
(May 2, 1894) 34 RGZ. 72, 78; and other old decisions; RG. (July 8, 1933) 
IPRspr. 1933, 51 (principle). 
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after the practice of the Reichsgericht had been subjected 
to stringent criticism,87 experience also considerably modi-
fied this questionable theory. At present, the force of the 
principle may be regarded as seriously challenged, despite 
repeated contrary assertions in the German and interna-
This does not include, of course, the application of special 
laws to certain problems, e.g., of the law of the port of 
tional literature. 
dispatch to questions connected with lading, but is the 
result of actual replacement of the official criterion. Often 
enough, the contract has been subjected to a law other than 
that of the port of destination: 
(i) Contracting by ship brokers or other agents in Lon-
don who use an English charter party form has consistently 
been recognized as indicating submission to English law,88 
quite as in the English case of The /ndustrie. This is not 
controverted by the fact that a contract of carriage made 
in London by the London branch of a Hamburg firm with 
the London broker of another Hamburg firm was deter-
mined under the German law. The form employed was 
printed in Hamburg, though in English, without references 
to English law, as was the usual document of the steamship 
agent in Hamburg whose name was carried at the head.89 
In one case, where a German form of a Nitrate charter 
party was used in a contract made in Germany, German 
law was applied, with the excuse that the port of destina-
tion, to be determined by the charterer, was uncertain.90 
87 2 BAR 219 n. 82; id., Int. Handelsrecht 439; RrPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 
4) 348 § 1432; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 517 f. 
88 RG. (Jan. 5, 1887) 19 RGZ. 33 (English law); OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 30, 
1893) 14 Hans. GZ. 1893 HBI. 301, 4 Z. int. R. (1894) 353 (English law); 
RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209 (form of the Rio Tinto Company, Ltd. 
in London for its usual ore shipping from Huelva, Spain) ; RG. (Nov. 24, 
1928) 122 RGZ. 316 (English law, intended by public policy based on HGB. 
§ 614). 
89 RG. (Oct. 27, 1904) Hans. GZ. 1905 HBI. No. 28, 15 Z. int. R. (1905) 
293-297· 
90 RG. {May 6, 1912) Leipz. Z. 1912, 548. 
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In another case, a charter party made in Germany concern-
ing a voyage starting in Germany was regarded without 
hesitation as subject to German law.91 
(ii) When persons of common nationality contract in 
their own country, the Reichsgericht is satisfied with their 
intention to have such country's law applied.92 
(iii) When an English ship was chartered in a German 
port for a voyage to Vladivostok, German law was ap-
plied.93 The place of contracting and dispatch thus prevailed 
over the port of destination. In another case, the place of 
contracting and the nationality of the shipowner were theo-
retically mentioned as criteria.94 
(iv) Other exceptions have been unavoidable when the 
port of destination is uncertain. In the very frequent case 
where the port of destination is indicated optionally so as 
to include several places situated in different countries, such 
as a port in the United Kingdom or on the Continent be-
tween Le Havre and Hamburg, or on the North American 
and Canadian coast, not less than six solutions have ap-
peared.95 No port of destination is given in time charter 
contracts; the port of dispatch or the flag must substitute. 
Forwarding agents. German law accentuates the particu-
91 RG. (Jan. 2, 19II) 75 RGZ. 95· The ship was English and the destination 
Vladivostok. 
D2RG. (Sept. 27, 1884) 13 RGZ. 122 (German law); (April29, 1903) Hans. 
GZ. 1903 HBI. Nos. 102, 229, 231, 20 Revue Autran (1904-o5) So (English 
law; also the flag was English; English law implicit, although the right of the 
German holder of the bill of lading is distinguished); (Dec. 14, 1910) JW. 
1911, 225, 22 Z. int. R. ( 1912) 182; 24 id. ( 1914) 319 (German law; also the 
port of destination was German); (Oct. 5, 1932) 137 RGZ. 301 (German law; 
German parties, through bill from a German place to another German place 
via Holland). 
93 RG. (Jan. 2, 19II) 75 RGZ. 95, 96, affirming OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 10, 
1910) Hans. GZ. 1910 HBI. No. 76, correctly commented on by BATIFFOL 253 
n. 2 against 2 FRANKENSTEIN 514. 
94 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 13, 1934) Hans. GZ. 1934 Part B, 303 No. 94. 
IPRspr. 1934, 82 No. 38. 
95 SCRAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht ( ed. 3) 281 n. 39 before § 556 rejects 
connection with five advocated places, viz., the presumable port of destination, 
the port of distress, the order port, the place of contracting, and the domicil 
of the debtor, and accepts the law of the flag. 
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lar nature of freight agents contracting with carriers in 
their own name, in contrast with selling and buying agents 
or carriers. It is noteworthy that again the application of 
lex loci solutionis raises doubt. For the place where a Spedi-
teur is to perform his duties to the shipper is in one view 
where he accepts and dispatches the goods,96 and in another 
his commercial domiciJ.97 
6. The N etherlands97a 
The Law of 1924 amending the Commercial Code on 
the occasion of introducing the Hague Rules sought to 
enlarge and assure its own force. 
The law declares a great number of its provisiOns as 
compulsory for all ships leaving a Dutch port and with a 
certain exception regarding clauses of exemption, even for 
ships destined for Dutch ports. 98 In addition, charters are 
subjected to certain provisions if the ship flies the Dutch 
flag even though they carry freight entirely outside of the 
Kingdom.99 Only time charters are allowed to change this 
effect by selecting a foreign law.100 This attitude exceeds 
even the maritime reservations of the United States laws, 
and in its extraterritorial scope covers duties newly imposed 
by the law. 
Nevertheless, even this exercise of public policy is an 
exception and not the main rule involving carriage.101 So 
far as can be seen, the courts have quietly continued to apply 
96 RG. (Dec. 5, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; Warn. Rspr. 1925, No. 33; RAn in 5 
RGR. Kom. HGB. (ed. 2) n8 § 407 n. 24 (where also two opinions are 
reported on the question concerning the place where the goods are redeliver-
able on request of th.e shipper). 
97 OLG. Kalmar (Feb. 12, 1914) 39 Els. Loth. J. Z. 603 as cited in LEWALD 
220. LEHMANN in Diiringer-Hachenburg § 383 n. VII. 
97a See 0FFERHAUS, "Netherlands Maritime Law and the Conflict of Laws," 
2 Arkiv for Sjprett (1954-57) 599· 
98 C. Com. (Wetbook van Koophandel) arts. 517d, SI7Y, 52ot. One of these 
provisions, art. 5I7Y, has been repealed by the Law of Aug. zs, 1955· 
99 Arts. sz8g, 52of. 
100 Art. 518g. 
1 0 1 Informative: Rb. Amsterdam (June 19, 1931) W. 12410, N.J. 1932, 177; 
I VAN HASSELT 414. . 
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the customary principles of conflicts law.102 If the parties 
have not expressly agreed on an applicable law, their so-
called intention is sought. The foremost theoretical criterion 
has remained the place of contracting, which, however, is 
used in at least two combinations, viz., (i) when the parties 
are of the same nationality and contract in their country/03 
or (ii) when a charter party is signed in London by the 
parties or their authorized agents, with English forms, the 
forms being more important than other criteria.104 
7· C6digo Bustamante 
The C6digo Bustamante distinguishes between two types. 
Contracts concluded by a carrier under his own conditions 
which the customer may only "accept totally" fall under 
the rule that "contracts of adhesion" are subject to the law 
of the carrier (art. r 8 5). 
102 See the long lists in I VAN HASSELT 36I ff. 
103 Rb. Rotterdam (March I5, I922) N. J. I923, 245, 248: bill of lading, 
the cargo was received in the United States on a United States-owned vessel, 
American law. Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. 23, I932) The Aslang, W. I2537, 28 
Revue Dor ( I933) 370: charterparty concluded in Paris between the Paris 
agent of the Danish shipowner and a French company, French law; Rb. 
Amsterdam (Dec. 23, I932) N.J. I933, 953: English insurance company suing 
a Dutch carrier for damages is barred by Dutch limitation of action because 
the insured shipper was a Netherlander, evidently contracting in Holland. 
In Rb. Amsterdam (June I9, I93I) supra n. IOI, Dutch law applied, as the 
Dutch parties contracted in the Netherlands for a Dutch vessel destined for 
a Dutch port. 
104 Hof s'Gravenhage (Nov. I4, I9I3) W. 96I5, N.J. I9I4, 429; id. (June 
I9, I9I4) N. J. I9I4, 1256; Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 14, I928) N. J. 1930, 622: 
only the carrier was English, the charterer being the Soviet Corn Export 
Co., Ltd. in Moscow, but the ship was English and both charter and bills 
of lading were in English style. Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 14, I929) N. J. 1929, 
I36I, reversed on other grounds, App. Hague (April 25, I93D) N. J. 1930, 
II 11: the captain of a United States-owned vessel letting it while in Antwerp 
harbor to an Antwerp firm for a voyage from Antwerp to a British port; 
the parties must have had the English law in view, as the charter party 
was in the typical English maritime contract form; Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, 
I930) W. I2729, N. J. I934, 63I, I VAN HASSELT 423: voyage charter, a 
German coal concern hiring from an Italian shipowner, through London 
brokers, the vessel shall take the coal in Rotterdam and carry it to Ancona. 
Contrarily, Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. I6, I935) N. J. I936, No. 59 correctly dis-
cards American law but fails to justify why Dutch rather than English law 
should gover~ the charter party. 
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An affreightment not being of this category is governed 
by the law of the place from which the goods are dispatched 
(art. 2 8 5). But "acts of performance" are placed under 
the law of the intended place of performance (art. 28s 
par. 2). 
Local laws and regulations are reserved (art. 199). 
8. Latin-American Public Policy 
Law of the place of performance compulsory. In im-
portant codes, the idea that a contract performable in the 
territory must be treated under the domestic law/05 has 
been repeated106 for special application to contracts of trans-
portation.107 The place of making the contractl08 and the 
nationality of the ship are immaterial for this purpose, 
although the texts strangely speak only of "foreign" ships, 
which could mean that contracts involving domestic ships 
are all under an imperative lex fori. In the prevailing view, 
the parties can not validly agree on a foreign court.109 
Law of the place of contracting compulsory. In Chile, 
the domestic law is forcibly applied to affreightment "on 
foreign ships" made in a port of the Republic although the 
master be a foreigner.110 
105 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 423. 
106 Thus, art. 1091 of the Argentine Commercial Code is only a special 
application of art. 1209 C. C. {new 1243); MALAGARRIGA, 7 Cod. Com. 
Coment. 137. 
107 Argentina: c. Com. art. 1091; s.-Ct. (Nov. s. 1870) 9 Fallos 492, 495· 
Brazil: C. Com. art. 628. 
Paraguay: C. Com. art. 1091. 
Uruguay: C. Com. art. 1270. 
108 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) 16 Arch. J ud. 5, 99 Rev. Dir. 
287 (foreign bill of lading). 
109 Argentina: The majority of the Cam. Fed. Cap. (June 6, 1906) Saens v. 
Mala Real, affirmed the right of prorogation, although a dissenting vote 
allowed it only where delivery and payment are agreed to be made abroad. 
But. S. Ct. (Nov. 16, 1936) 36 Revue Dor (1937) 100 has decided for the 
prohibition. 
Brazil: Not allowed, Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 1_925) 83 Rev. Dir. 327 No. 269. 
11° Chile: C. Com. art. 975 par. I. 
CHAPTER 44 
Maritime Carriage of Goods : Comparative 
Conflicts Law 
I. THE CONTACTS 
1. Obsolete Connections 
(a) General maritime law. The modern English cases 
no longer mention general maritime law with respect to 
transportation of goods. In the United States its only re-
maining role seems to be to substitute for foreign law that 
is not proved; so the term is just another word for lex 
fori_! 
(b) Place of accident. Another connecting factor no 
longer seriously to be considered is the place where the 
goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged. This local connec-
tion enjoyed some favor in American2 and other3 courts, 
but has nothing to recommend it with respect to a voyage 
contractually assumed by one carrier on one vessel. Only 
by confusion of tort and contract could such a view originate 
in actions sounding in contract. 
The following local connections are used in the absence 
of a law agreed upon by the parties which is respected 
everywhere, at least in principle (supra p. 24 7). 
1 Supra Ch. 43 pp. 248, 253· 
2 Supra Ch. 43 p. 252 at n. 49· 
3 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (April 26, 1939) Rechtskund. WB. 1939, c. 409 
No. 82: a stipulation limiting to 10 centimes per kilogram the liability of 
the carrier, cannot be applied in case of negligent maintenance of the ship 
according to the Dutch C. Com. art. 470 (applied through reference in 
art. 748), the Belgian law being replaced by the law of the country where 
the damage occurred. 
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2. The Flag 
The often-assumed preference of English courts for the 
law of the flag to govern affreightment contracts, if it ever 
existed, disappeared long since.4 Much less has it been a 
feature of American5 and other laws until very recently. 
Even the reference to the nationality of the ship as an 
additional clue to the presumable intention of the parties, 
once popular, 6 has practically vanished. 
It is difficult for me to ascertain to what degree the stipu-
lations in bills of lading for the law of the flag flown by the 
ship have remained in usage. Such clauses may be reason-
able and useful to a certain extent, although courts have to 
view the problem under quite different considerations in the 
absence of a party agreement. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the principle aban-
doned by the courts has encountered increasing favor with 
writers of various countries. 7 They had restricted success 
in the Dutch law reform of 1924, but quite recently two 
Italian writers advocating the law of the flag8 scored a full 
victory in the present Code of Navigation ( 1942) providing 
that "contracts of hire, charter, or transport are governed 
by the national law of the vessel or the aircraft, in the 
absence of a different intention of the parties."9 
4 Supra pp. 2S3-2S6. 
5 Supra p. 248 n. 32. But see for Denmark, BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 
22S No. 9I. 
6 England and the United States: See supra pp. 2SI n. 47, 2S4, infra p. 266. 
Canada: Moore v. Harris (I876) I App. Cas. 3I8: bill of lading made in 
England and English ship. 
Germany: RG. (April I4, I92o) 98 RGZ. 33S· 
7 France: FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran ( I902--o3) 742, 766 f.; RIPERT, 2 
Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 347 § I468; J. EYNARD, La loi du pavilion (I926) I64; 
BATIFFOL 247 f. 
Germany: BAR, Int. Handelsrecht 439; 2 FRANKENSTEIN s18, 523. 
Italy: See next note. 
s ScERNI 2o8; MoNAco I35· 
9 Art. IO, Disp. Pre!. to the Codice della Navigazione of 1942. See MAKAROV, 
"Das internationale Recht der See- und Luftschiffahrt im italienischen 
Schiffahrtsgesetzbuch von 1942," IS RabelsZ. (I949/ so) so, 59 f. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
The arguments advanced for this view have always 
culminated in two incontestabl,e advantages. In the first 
place, this principle avoids differentiating goods delivered to 
the same ship on one voyage according to the nationality or 
domicil of each shipper, or to the individual places of ship-
ping or arrival. In the second place, the law indicated by 
the flag, besides being uniform, is easy to recognize for all 
persons interested and usually regarded as the only one 
familiar to the master. This assuredly means superiority 
over the many uncertainties connected with the place of 
destination. For the Italian solution, it has been added that 
this principle secures each of the national maritime laws its 
application in exact proportion to the respective country's 
participation in the world traffic-an argument truly remi-
niscent of the ideals once proclaimed by Mancini's theory 
of the national law. Would Italy, without this antecedent, 
have been converted to the law of the flag? 
However, if the virtues of this device are so obvious, how 
could they have escaped the attention of the courts in prac-
tically all countries? Why did the Anglo-American judges 
desert this temporarily much-considered rule? One answer 
was given as early as r886 by an American admiralty judge. 
"Practically," he said, "the extreme rule (of the law of the 
flag) would require all merchants to acquaint themselves, 
at their peril, with all the details of the municipal law of 
every nation with whose ships they might deal, even in 
ordinary commercial transactions; certainly a most onerous, 
if not impracticable, requirement."10 This, it is true, has 
only the merit of making us aware that every test, including 
that of the flag, burdens some of the parties involved with 
the dangers of ignoring the applicable law. Why the courts 
prefer the law of the port of dispatch to that of the flag, 
1o Brown, J., in The Brantford City (D. C. S. D. N. Y. x886) 29 Fed. 373, 
385. 
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is a matter of guessing but the fact itself shows that the 
nationality of the vessel is not regarded as eminently im-
portant. With the modern expansion of shipping, the major 
ports have a constant stream of incoming and outgoing 
vessels; great uniformity of conditions and tariffs prevails 
in the shipping pools; and nautical skill appears in com-
parable equivalence. The date and place of sailing, adequate 
space facilities, and personal acquaintances are of greater 
weight than the registration of the ship. Freight may be 
handled by a broker without naming a ship or even a line. 
A maritime agent may announce to his clientele the next 
outgoing vessels and their destination but issue the bills 
of lading on his own form for an unnamed shipownerY 
Or, acting for a shipping pool, he may accept the goods 
without determining which line will take care of the car-
riageP All this confirms an insight taught by the history 
of commercial law. In our time, by a complete change from 
ancient economic organization, an enterprise of transporta-
tion on the sea is an entity almost independent from the 
individual ships and the persons performing navigation and 
carriage. If a particular vessel is agreed upon at all, pro-
viding the vessel has become a collateral rather than a 
principal duty.13 
These may be speculative reasons for an irrefutable phe-
nomenon. But there is one certain disadvantage of applying 
the law of the flag in foreign countries, which the courts 
must have felt in some way. If the law of the ship governs 
the contract and the bill of lading as a whole, its provisions 
are added to the imperative prescriptions of the lex fori. 
Moreover, prohibitions such as those directed against 
11 The Iristo (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29 at 35, supra Ch. 43 
n. 45, calls this a "haphazard manner of conducting such a large business." 
12 See for the same situation in air carriage, LEMOINE, Traite de droit 
aerien (1947) 396. 
13 See the forceful summary of development by GARRIGUES, Curso de derecho 
mercantil, II, 2, esp. 740. 
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clauses of exemption from liability have to be applied inter-
nationally if they are the law in the country of the port of 
dispatch. In the United States and a few other countries, 
a court would also have to observe, in addition to the law 
of a foreign place of dispatch and the law of the flag, large 
portions of its own law if the goods are deliverable in the 
country. Business and courts do not even consider compli-
cating the situation in such a manner. The simplicity imag-
ined by the advocates of the flag does not materialize. 
Except for its lighthearted adoption in the hasty Italian 
compilation of 1942, the law of the flag is positively perti-
nent only by express agreement and in such problems as the 
authority of the master14 and the limitations on the ship-
owner's liability.15 It has been deliberately disregarded in 
the Brussels Convention on bills of lading, with the result 
that shipping in foreign trade even in vessels registered m 
the United States is not subject to the law of the flag. 
3· Domicil of the Shipowner 
Some writers have expressed sympathy with the personal 
law of the carrier, that is, his domicil, rather than that of 
the ship.16 The shipping companies, it is argued, are vitally 
interested in a uniform legal treatment of their affreight-
ments, and uniformity cannot be guaranteed except by the 
law of their headquarters. This view has been adopted by 
some German decisions and writers,17 and the Swiss Federal 
14 England: The Industrie; The Njegos; and for other countries, see supra 
p. 150. 
Denmark: Trib. marit. and com. Copenhagen (Dec. 23, 1931) 28 Revue Dor 
(1933) 215 applies the Greek law of the flag simply to the authority of the 
master in deciding how to protect the cargo. 
15 France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 268. 
16 2 MElLI 369; BAR, 2 Int. Handelsr. 438 (as to the carrier's duties). RoLIN, 
3 Principes 259 § 1243; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 479 f.; cf. on land transportation, 
the unanimity of the European doctrine, BATIFFOL 104 § n8. Inst. of Int. Law, 
22 Annuaire ( 1908) 291, art. 2 (j). 
17 See NussBAUM, D. IPR. 231 and n. 2. 
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Tribunal.18 The same opinion, in the terms of the theory of 
contrats d' adhesion, appears in the C6digo Bustamante19 
and in the Yugoslav Maritime Law of I959.19a 
The logic of this theory is challenged as usual by the 
American antimonopolistic tendency. Above all, it is true 
for affreightment what in I 84I Judge Taney said with less 
foundation about the law governing the authority of a 
master to make a charter.20 He refused to take into con-
sideration that the shipowner resided in Maryland, for one 
thing because Baltimore had no part in the conclusion of a 
charter in Chile for carriage to England, and again, because 
the domicil of one party is not competent to determine his 
own rights and duties in a contract. As in this case, the 
main office of the owner or carrier may be far distant from 
the scene envisaged by the acting persons. With what justi-
fication can a contract made in Argentina with the Argentine 
agent of a French shipping company be subjected to French 
law ?21 The courts in Argentina are certain not to follow 
this law. 
These objections are avoided by the international com-
mercial Treaty of Montevideo, of I 889, article 9, making 
affreightment dependent on the domicil of the maritime 
agency that concludes the contract. If, however, the mari-
time agency is situated at the port of dispatch, or in the same 
country as this port, the result is adequate not because of the 
location of the agency but because the port is situated there. 
For if, on the other hand, the provision should mean that 
18 BG. (July IZ, 1922) 48 BGE. II 281 f.; c/. OsER-SCHOENENBERGER 1608 
n. II; 2 SCHNI'rLER (ed. 4) 725; BG. {Jan. 20, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 85. 
19 C6digo Bustamante, art. 185. 
19a According to this statute (art. 132 par. 2) the law of the carrier's domicil 
applies to a contract of affreightment provided that it is an adhesion contract; 
other contracts of affreightment are governed by the lex loci contractus. See 
CrGOJ, "Jugoslawische Kollisionsregeln des Seefrachtvertrages," 6 Osteuropa-
Recht (1960) 97, 103 f. 
20 Naylor v. Baltzell (1841) 17 Fed. Cas. 1254 No. 1o,o61. 
21 This remark is borrowed from LEMOINE 395· 
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Argentine law governs when an agent in Buenos Aires con-
tracts for transportation from Montevideo to Brazil, this 
does not make sense.22 
The section is remarkable only in the fact that in this 
instance the Treaty of Montevideo abandons its tenaciously 
predicated lex loci solutionis. 
4· Place of Contracting 
The law of the place of contracting is the prevailing 
principle in the American courts,23 the declared French 
rule,24 and probably the favorite approach in many coun-
tries,25 including Italy until its recent legislation.26 It is also 
sometimes resorted to in individual embarrassing cases.27 
Yet, the familiar objections to the mechanical lex loci 
contractus are increased in this special application by the 
absurdity of a maritime contract naturally governed by the 
tradition of the seafaring nations, depending on the law 
of an inland shipper who happens to be in the role of accept-
ing the offer sent by a shipping agent.28 On the other hand, 
in the inverse case where a carrier through his local agent 
22 BUSTAMANTE, Manual 372. 
23 Supra pp. 249-252. 
24 Supra pp. 257-258. 
25 E.g., Belgium: Supra p. 257 n. 74· 
Brazil: Implication of C. Com. art. 628, cf. Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 1925) 
83 Rev. Dir. 326. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old), changed from former systems, 
see VANSLOOTEN 15; at present prevailing rule of the courts, see supra p. 261 f. 
26 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529; Cass. (June 8, 
1933) Rivista 1933, 492; App. Genova (June 17, 1932) Monitore Trib. 1932, 
86o, 9 Z. ausl. PR. (1935) 217; App. Trieste (May 30, 1933) Rivista 1933, 250; 
Trib. Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (expressly against the 
law of the flag). 
27 England: Supra p. 256. 
Germany: Supra p. 259 f. 
28 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 793 § 850 and, following them, authors who 
advocate the law of the flag, have availed themselves of this convincing 
argument by illustrating it with Swiss shippers not having any maritime 
law. During the last war, however, Switzerland used a fleet of its own and 
provided it with an emergency legislation drawn from the international 
conventions and usages. This legislation has been replaced by the Swiss 
Shipping Act of Sept. 23, 1953; see supra Ch. 43 ns. 6, 10. 
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in the usual course of business accepts applications for trans-
port written on his own standard form, the law of his 
country is favored not because his agent there completes the 
contract by signing, but because he will dispatch the goods 
therefrom. 
5. Port of Destination 
Under the guidance of Savigny's lex loci solutionis, the 
German courts proclaimed the law of the port of destination 
for charter parties as well as ordinary affreightments.29 This 
doctrine, as seen above, could not be maintained,30 and with 
the exception of Greece, has only sporadically been followed 
in other countries.31 The Treaty of Montevideo has re-
pudiated it. 32 
Under a one-sided public policy, it is true, certain Latin-
American codes impose themselves on foreign-governed 
carriages to domestic ports.33 The motives are very similar 
to the true background of the German practice. This, either 
in the result34 or by intention, 35 protects the German con-
signees in overseas trade against foreign rules less favor-
able to innocent holders of bills of lading. 
Technically, the alleged rule has often been criticized 
as impracticable whenever the ship sails with optional or 
uncertain orders or when it does not reach its destination. 
From a commercial point of view, the situation should not 
differ for a particular ship's journey, possibly for the same 
29 Supra Ch. 43 p. zsS. 
30 Supra Ch. 43 pp. zsS-261. 
31 E.g., Belgium: App. Gent (May z, 1901) Clunet 1902, 390 (lex fori) and 
other cases; supra p. 257 n. 78. 
Greece: See 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 252 n. 38. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 498 (old); Rb. Rotterdam (Jan. 23, 1907) 
Clunet 1912, 291. 
32 Aetas de las Sesiones 560, allegedly because there is no one place of 
performance, cf. SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso sud-
americano de Montevideo (1889) 78. 
33 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 422 n. 123; supra Ch. 43 n. 107. 
34 NussBAUM, D. IPR, 283. 
35 RAAPB, IPR. ( ed. 5) 480. 
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shipper, according to the various foreign places to which 
the goods are sent. Although the intended place of delivery 
may have importance in certain respects for the rights of 
the consignee or holder of the bill of lading, it certainly 
does not deserve to qualify the entire contract. 
6. Port of Dispatch 
Much of our preceding survey has shown the sound 
tendency of practice to localize carriage in the port where 
the goods are brought into the custody of the carrier and 
the bill of lading is issued.36 The introduction of the Hague 
Rules has furnished an important, though scarcely noticed, 
support to this theory. To illustrate the attitude taken by 
most member states of the Brussels Convention, the British 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, section r, applies 
the Hague Rules to "the carriage of goods by sea in ships 
carrying goods from any port in Great Britain or Northern 
Ireland to any other port whether in or outside Great 
Britain or Northern Ireland." Since the Rules themselves 
are restricted to "contracts of carrying covered by a bill 
of lading or any similar document" (article I b), the Eng-
lish Act is applicable under two conditions, viz., that car-
riage starts in England and that it is covered by a bill of 
lading. It is immaterial at what place the contract of 
affreightment may legally be regarded as concluded. This 
method of viewing affreightment is just what the courts must 
have in mind when they emphasize the place of contracting 
in the same breath with the port of dispatch. 
Furthermore, the Dutch law demands application of 
numerous provisions to carriage from Dutch ports rather 
than to affreightments made in Holland.37 And a strange 
provision of the Soviet law is only explainable by the same 
36 Supra Ch. 43 ns. 45 ff., 71 f., So, 93, 98; C6digo Bustamante, art. 285; 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) § 346 n. 
37 The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 470, 517d, 520t. 
MARITIME CARRIAGE OF GOODS 273 
idea. The Maritime Code applies (in the absence of party 
agreement for a foreign law) to all transports from Russian 
ports, but to those from foreign to Russian ports only in 
suits before Soviet courts.38 This means evidently that 
foreign judgments applying the law of the port of dispatch, 
if no party is a Soviet national, will be recognized. 
Sometimes this same port has been fitted into the con-
ventional pattern by terming it the place where, in addition 
to the contracting, the commencement of the performance 
by the carrier occurs.39 In other cases, doctrinal appear-
ances were saved by emphasizing the beginning of trans-
portation as the most important part of the performance. 
On the other hand, legal construction seems to have helped 
some writers to prefer the port of dispatch to the place of 
contracting if situated in different countries; they have fol-
lowed the theory reminiscent of the Roman receptum nau-
tarum, which conceived the contract of affreightment as a 
kind of real contract, requiring for its formation the de-
livery of the goods to the carrier.40 All these overly tech-
nical considerations are beside the point. The administrative 
provisions of all kinds imposed on outgoing vessels also 
affect the business of shipping and the activities of maritime 
agents. The stricter policy of the maritime states has been 
implemented by imperative rules of private law such as 
those restraining exemption clauses in carriage from their 
ports. This is the background on which the entire operation 
is deemed to be centered at the place where the goods are 
delivered for carriage by sea and the all-important bill of 
lading, or possibly a bill of receipt for lading, is issued. 
The most serious objection to this solution might be 
borrowed from the old argument against the law of the 
58 See Merchant Shipping Code, supra Ch. 43 n. 13a, art. 4 (b); FREUND, 
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) comments that probably the 
port of dispatch is thought to be usually identical with the place of contracting. 
39 E.g., The Pehr Ugland (D. C. E. D. Va. 1921) 271 Fed. 340. 
40 Thus, probably 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 792 § 850. 
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place of contracting: goods loaded on the same ship in 
several ports should not be subjected to different laws. But 
this disharmony is easily remedied by a clause in the bills 
of lading stipulating for the same law. Furthermore, dis-
patch is at least an indisputable fact, whereas the place of 
contracting is not, and it is in the nature of a sea voyage 
touching several countries that the law under which goods 
are accepted may vary. 
7· Subsidiary Le.v Fori 
The Soviet Maritime Law resorts to the law of the forum 
in the absence of an express party agreement on the ap-
plicable law in any of the following cases: whenever the 
transport is between Russian ports or from Russian to 
foreign ports; if both or even only one of the parties is a 
Soviet citizen or juristic person, even though the transport 
may run between foreign ports; and if the suit is decided in 
a Soviet court, with respect to transport from a foreign to 
a Russian port.H The last provision gives the foreign law 
of the port of dispatch a slight concession.42 
8. Public Policy 
The law of the forum is prescribed for certain problems 
with respect to outgoing vessels everywhere; with respect 
to outgoing and incoming vessels in the United States/3 
Holland,44 and Belgium ;45 for the entire contract with re-
spect to outgoing vessels in Chile ;46 and to incoming vessels 
in Argentina and Brazil.47 This list is not exhaustive, of 
41 Merchant Shipping Code, supra Ch. 43 n. 13a, art. 4 (b); cf. FREUND, 
Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 59, 70. 
42 Supra n. 38. 
43 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, § 13, cf. Vol. II ( ed. 2) p. 422. 
44 C. Com. art. 517d, cf. Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 422 n. 122. 
45 C. Com. art. 91, cf. Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 422 n. 119. 
46 C. Com. art. 975 par. 2. 
47 Argentina: C. Com. art. 1091. 
Brazil: In trod. Law, art. 9; C. Com. art. 628. and see supra p. 263 n. 107. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Navigation (1940) art. 26. 
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course.48 The climax is reached by the Maritime Code of 
French Morocco; all its provisions concerning the rights 
and duties of the parties to a carriage "apply to every trans-
port destined to or originating in the ports of the French 
zone of Morocco," even though the bill of lading or docu-
ment of carriage is issued abroad, between foreigners, or 
the parties stipulate that the contract of transport should 
be governed by a foreign law. Any stipulation of this kind 
is null and void. 49 
9· Conclusion 
Comparative observation results in some positive con-
clusions on the subject. 
(a) Ordinary carriage. In the first place, the legislative 
situation of the maritime countries and the circumstances 
of the modern line steamers have promoted a universal 
tendency of the courts towards a conflicts rule that gives 
prevalence to the law of the port of dispatch. The law of 
the flag is no longer important, even in England. In Ger-
many the law of the port of destination has been practically 
abandoned as the general law of the contract. The few 
remains of the mechanical conception of lex loci contractus 
can easily be assimilated to the really significant rule. 
(b) Charter parties. In the second place, it follows that 
all conflicts rules of the world used on this subject are wrong 
when they are applied as in the current theories to all con-
48 For the normal application of the Hague Rules, in case of outgoing 
vessels, see Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 422 n. 119. The scope of application of these 
Rules is comprehensively discussed in YrANNOPOULOS, supra Ch. 43 n. 51; 
Gon, "Der zwingende Geltungsbereich der Haager Regeln nach anglo-
amerikanischem Recht," r2r Z. Handelsr. (1958) 47; NECKER, Der raumliche 
Geltungsbereich der Haager Regeln (1962); S!ESBY, "What Law Governs 
Carrier's Liability According to a Bill of Lading?" 5 Arkiv for Sjprett ( 1961) 
417. 
49 French Morocco: Dahir of March 31, 1919, art. 267; Lours RIVIERE, 3 
Traites, codes et lois du Maroc (1925) 88o. After obtaining their independence, 
the former French territories in Africa with the sole exception of Morocco 
adopted new Maritime Codes; see BoBOLZA, "Apen;us sur le Code de com-
merce maritime tunisien," 14 D. M. F. (1962) 760. 
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tracts of transportation, if not even to demises. The above 
assumed rule has justification only when a bill of lading or 
"a similar document" is issued. It does not have any bearing 
on charter parties. 
The question of the law adequate to charter parties has 
in fact given rise to most of the litigation reviewed above. 
Actually, the method regularly followed by the courts, 
American, English, German, and others, is always the same, 
the so-called method of cumulating connecting factors. Fre-
quently, the courts indulge in another common tendency, 
the inclination toward the lex fori. But we also encounter 
a common preference for the English law when the parties 
are represented in the great center of vessel chartering in 
London, and the contract is made there on a standard form 
of the trade. 
It would seem that in otherwise doubtful cases it is again 
the formulary from which the charter has been printed 
that decides to which country's legal environment a charter 
party belongs. But when the same blank form is uniformly 
used in several countries, or throughout the world, as has 
been achieved by successful efforts for unification in our 
time, this argument loses its value. 5° 
Negatively, it is also certain that in a charter party the 
ports are totally immaterial,01 except when a vessel lying 
in a foreign port is let by the master to a local charterer. 
Indeed, if an English firm in Calcutta charters a Norwegian 
ship lying in the port of Calcutta for a voyage from the 
Straits Settlements to San Francisco, the latter locations 
50 This point of view would justify, for instance, the Appeal Court of 
Memel (Oct. n, 1934) 10 Z. ausl. PR. (1936) 142, applying the law of the 
forum to a charter party concluded in Memel on the "Baltwood" form of 
1926 between a Danish and a French firm, both represented by a local broker 
with loading and dispatching to be in Memel. 
51 "While bills of lading are ordinarily given at the port of loading, 
charterparties are often made elsewhere," Willes, J., in Lloyd v. Guibert 
( 186s) L. R. 1 Q. B. ns, 127. 
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do not support conflicts consideration; the place of con-
tracting ought to prevail. 
A new problem arises when a charter party is governed 
by a law other than that of the country in which a bill of 
lading is issued. In this case we shall see that if possible 
the former law is deemed to extend to the bill. 
II. ScoPE oF THE LAw OF THE CoNTRACT 
I. In General 
On principle, the law governing any maritime transporta-
tion of goods covers conclusion, effects, and termination of 
the contract. These include such problems as the common 
law presumption that a charter party is not a demise, the 
nature of warranties and conditions, the liability of the 
shipowner and of the charterer for delay in delivery, dam-
age and loss of the goods, the exemption clauses, the obli-
gation to pay freight, the remedies for breach or recovery 
accorded by law or agreement, and the question whether 
an action is in rem or in personam.52 "Particular average" 
is nothing else than damages, subject to the law of the 
contract.53 
The most important of all clauses, the stipulation elimi-
nating or lessening the carrier's legal liability, as earlier 
52 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Law ( 1889) art. 22. 
That limitation of liability, so differently organized at present, should be 
classified as substance, but is unfortunately treated as a procedural incident, 
has been indicated in the discussion of torts, Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 352 ff. For a 
case demonstrating the monstrous effects of the procedural theory, see 
KNAUTH, "Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law," 
49 Col. L. Rev. ( 1949) 3· A most recent example of this theory in a 
non-maritime tort case is provided by Kilberg v. N.E. Airlines ( 1961) 9 N. Y. 
(2d) 34, 172 N. E. (2d) s26; the true basis of the case is a strong public policy 
of the forum, see Davenport v. Webb (1962) II N.Y. (2d) 392, 230 N. Y. 
Supp. (2d) 17 and Gore v. N. E. Airlines (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1963) 222 F. Supp. 
so. 
53 Cf. The Constantinople (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) IS F. (2d) 97, 98 
regarding a passenger's suit for breach of contract). 
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discussion of this subject has shown, is also subordinated to 
the law governing the contract in general.54 
Illustration. Cotton was shipped on an English vessel 
from New Orleans to Le Havre. The bill of lading con-
tained a clause that delivery of the goods should be taken by 
the consignee along side board. When fire destroyed a part 
of the goods piled on the quay, the effect of the clause was 
tested under American and French law.55 In the prevailing 
and correct view, the American law alone should have been 
decisive. 
This liability of the shipowner based on the contract and 
covered by the law of the contract, as may be recalled, IS 
concurrent with his liability for tort. 56 
The following applications deserve discussion. 
2. Formalities of Contracting 
Although the charter party derives its name from the 
deed on which it was written, neither this contract nor an 
agreement of carriage need be in writing to have legal 
existence. But writing is often required for evidence57 and 
as such is subject to the conflicts rules on form, mainly the 
rule locus regit actum in its various shades. 
In the absence of recognized usages, however, the gov-
erning law alone decides whether the shipper is entitled to 
54 Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 420 ff. 
Cf. United States: Liverpool etc. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. 
N.Y. 1889) 129 U.S. 397; HERZOG, "Validity of Contracts Exempting Carriers 
in Interstate and Foreign Commerce From Liability," II Syracuse L. Rev. 
(1959-60) 171, 185 f. 
France: Cass. civ. (June 12, 1894) S. 1895·1.161; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
791 n. 1. 
55 Trib. Le Havre (April18, 1899) 15 Revue Autran (1899-1900) 101. 
56 Vol. II ( ed. 2) pp. 290 ff. 
See especially RG. (May 28, 1936) 151 RGZ. 296. 
57 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 273, cf. 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 553· 
Italy: Cass. (July 14, 1938) 40 Revue Dor 354; C. Navig. (1942) arts. 377, 
385, 420. 
Peru: C. Com. art. 66 5: form of the "p6liza de fletamento." 
Soviet Russia: Merchant Shipping Code, suPra Ch. 43, n. 13a, arts. 75, 121, 
cf. FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 37· 
MARITIME CARRIAGE OF GOODS 279 
demand a bill of lading (as in the United States and Ger-
many) ;58 how many parts a set of bills should have; whether 
the costs of the bill are common or whom they burden. 
Significantly, the German courts, contrary to their main 
rule calling for the law of the port of destination, are forced 
to determine by the law of the port of dispatch whether 
the master has to issue a bill of lading.59 
In the Soviet Union it is prescribed that affreightment 
contracts must be registered; if they are made abroad, they 
have to be registered with the Soviet consul. This provision 
is sanctioned not by nullity of the contract but by the pro-
hibition for the vessel to enter or leave a Russian port.60 
Hence, this is no formality; failure may be a cause of non-
performance. 
3· Interpretation of the Contract 
"Construction" of the contract as a whole, of course, is 
subject to the law governing the latter. 61 For example, the 
frequent clause in an English charter party saying that the 
master will sign the bill of lading as presented by the shipper 
without prejudice to the charter party, has been construed 
in a German court according to English law.62 
But also in respect to certain terms, courts have developed 
detailed presumptions which apply in connection with and 
apart from usages. Thus, the French doctrine expounds 
that the law of the place of contracting which governs the 
contract also determines what is meant by "tons," although 
if freight is measured by "tons delivered," the law of the 
58 United States: Harter Act, § 4; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, 
§ 3 (3). 
Germany: HGB. § 642. 
59 RG. (Dec. 5, 1887) 20 RGZ. 52, 61; cf. ScHAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht 
( ed. 3) pp. 562 ff. 
6° FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der Sowjetunion ( 1930) 13, 67 f. 
61 ScRUTroN, Charterparties (ed. 16) 20 ff., art. 7, treats the conflicts Jaw 
under this denomination. 
62 OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 9, 1910) 26 Revue Autran (191o-u) 215. 
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port of destination is competent to complete the meaning.63 
As to usages, apart from the local customary rules for load-
ing, unloading, and delivery, customs of trade are continu-
ously admitted to "explain ambiguous mercantile expres-
sions"64 under the general conditions for reading them into 
the contract. We may repeat that the universal use of Eng-
lish clauses is not a reference to English law.65 
Illustration. A charter between German parties held to 
be governed by German law contained the familiar English 
cesser and lien clauses. What the combination of these two 
clauses means, was investigated by the German Reichs-
gericht66 under the rule of the BGB., § 133, prescribing 
search for the true meaning of terms, although the result 
conformed to the interpretation of the clause found in 
Carver's Carriage of Goods by Sea. 
4· Rights Flowing from a Bill of Lading 
The relationship between an affreightment and the bill 
of lading is rarely examined in conflicts law, perhaps be-
cause the subject is not all too clear in most municipal sys-
tems. Attention is focused if not exclusively on the general 
doctrine of negotiable instruments, preferentially on the 
function of commercial instruments in the transfer of title 
in the goods rather than their obligatory aspect. Our solu-
tion can merely be tentative. 
(a) Formalities of issue and endorsement are un-
doubtedly governed by the rule, locus regit actum. Whether 
the bill is special, to order, or to bearer should simply be 
determined on the same principle; but this is a controversial 
matter of more general nature. 
(b) The authority of the master. It is universally settled 
63 App. Rouen (Dec. 30, 1874) Clunet 1875, 430; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 
790 n. 2; for the term "management," see Trib. com. Marseille (May 6, 
1892) Clunet 1892, 1149; cited by all writers. 
64 ScRUTTON, Charterparties ( ed. 16) 26. 
65 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 536. 
66 RG. (Dec. 14, 1910) JW. I9II, 225. 
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that the master's power to determine the conditions for a 
bottomry on the cargo, or even to pledge the credit of the 
cargo owner, etc. are subject to the law of the flag. But 
does this law also decide who is bound by the master's sign-
ing the bill of lading? 
Illustration. A New York corporation, time charterer of 
a Norwegian vessel, let it under subcharter to the Canadian 
Ocean Dominion Corporation. The vessel took cargo in 
Halifax, N. S., and later in St. Joseph, N. B., and the master 
signed bills of lading by a formula causing litigation on the 
question who was obligated by them, the shipowner, the 
charterer, or the subcharterer. The American court held, 
correctly, that Canadian, not Norwegian nor American, 
law decided and therefore under the circumstances only the 
shipowner was liable to the holder.67 
(c) The effects of endorsement are determined by the 
law of the place of endorsement, according to the principles 
of negotiable instruments. 58 When a bill of lading was issued 
and endorsed in blank in Czarist Russia, and so sent by the 
shipper to the buyer in France, theFrench court recognized 
that under the then Russian law a blank endorsement did 
not protect any holder against defenses which the carrier 
could oppose to the shipper.69 
(d) Remaining problems. What law, however, decides 
the main body of questions, such as the conditions of hold-
ing in due course? Or the extent to which the right of an 
innocent holder, or the right of the carrier for the payment 
of the freight, stipulated in the bill, is independent of a pre-
ceding contract between consignor and carrier not referred 
to in the bill? What law determines the effect of the much-
employed abbreviated references in the bill to a charter 
party? Is it the law of the contract? The problem is not the 
same as in the case of a bill of exchange or promissory note. 
67 The Iristo (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29. 
68 E.g., Greece: App. Athens (1925) No. 418,37 Themis 378. 
69 App. Bordeaux: (Jan. 24, 188o) Clunet 1881, 358. 
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The rights embodied in a bill, of lading are nowhere re-
garded as independent of the consideration given therefor; 
at most, as in German law, they are isolated from the 
affreightment by the formal writing, and in many jurisdic-
tions even this theory is not accepted. 70 
Law of the port of destination. For a court presuming 
that the law of the port of destination is intended by the 
parties, a part of the problem is removed. The most justi-
fiable feature of the German port of destination doctrine71 
is the argument that the rights of the holder ought to be 
safeguarded by the law of the country where he is entitled 
to request delivery of the goods. In a French appreciation 
of this doctrine,72 it has been observed that the successive 
parties not involved in the original transaction are interested 
only in the place of prospective delivery. The effects of 
the instrument on transfer of title and the right of obtaining 
physical possession of the goods, are thus united under the 
same law. 
Likewise, if the right of the carrier against the receiver 
for payment of the freight, is assigned to the law of the 
port of destination, it may simultaneously be based on the 
bill of lading and on the contract or the acceptance of the 
goods. The Reichsgericht needlessly construed the rights of 
the carrier towards the consignee as flowing from the accept-
ance of the goods rather than from the contract and there-
fore as subject to a separate conflicts rule.73 However, the 
7° For recent treatment in Italy, see MESSINEO, 2 I titoli di credito 173; 
SCORZA, 2 La polizza di carico (1936) 218 § 265. 
11 Last decision (according to the "General Register," vols. 161-170) 169 
RGZ. 257, 259, with the understanding that the bill of lading may refer to 
another law such as that agreed upon in the affreightment contract. 
Also the Greek practice before the Code of 1940 shared this doctrine, see 
2 STREIT·YALLINDAS 253 f. n. 41, on the basis of lex loci solutionis. 
Since World War II the former Reichsgericht's doctrine has been corrobo· 
rated by the highest West German court; see BGH. (Sept. 26, 1957) 25 BGHZ. 
250, IPRspr. 1956-57 No. 57a) at 208 and cases cited there. 
72 BATIFFOL 255 § 281. 
73 RG. (April 29, 1903) Hans. GZ. 1903 Hbl. No. 102, 20 Revue Autran 
( 1904-<>5) So. 
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criticism that the right of the carrier, flowing from accept-
ance according to § 6 I 4 of the German Commercial Code, 
is not independent of but substantially identical with the 
right created between the original parties, is a domestic-
minded theory. 74 The conflicts rule should cover any rights 
accruing to and against third beneficiaries, however the 
municipal theory construes them. 
It may be appreciated that by such method the same law 
will control the effects of both contract and bill of lading, 
in defining the position of a person who is consignee and 
holder. But the unity of law so gained is lost in another 
respect. 
For it has admittedly been impossible to extend the law 
of the port of destination to the creation of bills of lading. 
Even the German courts determine the substantive condi-
tions for the formation of such bills under the law of the 
place where the instrument is issued. 75 The Reichsgericht 
has also admitted that the laws of the contract and of the 
bill may differ on the ground of the intention of the parties.76 
But this is true under any theory. 
L'aw of the port of dispatch. When the governing law of 
the affreightment is taken from a place where the con-
tractual relationship begins, the solution is less easy. Ameri-
can decisions do not answer the question squarely, but it is 
safe to assume that they apply the same law, termed lex 
loci contractus in affreightment, also to the creation and 
effects of bills of lading. The Italian practice before the new 
Code of Navigation was outspoken to this effect.77 
It was again the odious privilege of the German Reichs-
74 2 FRANKENSTEIN 523, arguing on the German HGB. § 614. 
75 SCHAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht (ed. 3) 563; WuRDINGER in 4 RGR. Kom. 
HGB. (ed. 2) 194 Vorbem. vor § 373 n. 18oa. 
76 RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316. 
77 Cass. (May 25, 1926) Rivista 1927, II2 (limitation of action); App. 
Trieste (May 30, 1933) Rivista 1933, 250 (validity of clause of jurisdiction). 
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gericht to deviate from this na,tural idea. In an old case,78 
a bill of lading was signed by the master of an English ship 
at Bombay, himself and the shippers being Englishmen. 
There was no question but that English law governed the 
contract. The bill stated the loading of a certain cargo and 
promised to deliver it in Hamburg. But through a fraud 
for which one of the shippers subsequently was jailed, the 
goods were not brought on board. The court refused to 
apply the English rule that the master cannot bind the ship-
owner by signing bills of lading for goods that were never 
shipped at all, 79 and other English defenses of the owner. 
It asserted the German protection of an innocent purchaser 
of the bill, whenever the destination is a German port. This 
result was precariously based on the old fiction of the 
debtor's spontaneous submission to the law of the foreign 
place of performance, simply by his agreeing to perform at 
that place. But the court went farther and placed the Ger-
man rule under a compulsory public policy, namely the rule 
that the bill of lading constitutes, as between the owner and 
the holder in good faith, obligations independent of the 
carriage contract and unconditionally performable, when-
ever delivery is due in Germany.80 This one-sided policy, 
though approved by certain authors,81 and not overruled, 
78 RG. (May 2, 1894) 34 RGZ. 72. No such preoccupation is visible in the 
earlier decisions of ROHG. (March 28, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 93 (English law 
for the charter party because of the form used; fire exemption clause in both 
the charter party and the biii of lading, but English construction prevails 
over (old) German HGB. art. 659). But ROHG. (May 30, 1879) 25 ROHGE. 
192 in a case of goods in fact not shipped, rejected an alleged usage in 
Wilmington, N. C., allowing the signing of bills of lading before embarkation 
of the goods on the ground of German Jaw; RG. (Dec. 5, 1887) 20 RGZ. 
52, in view of an analogous usage of New Orleans, held it pertinent whether 
the holders acquiring the bill knew that in fact it was only a bill received 
for shipment. 
79 SCRUTION, Charterparties (ed. 16) 70 and n. (c). The contrary German 
rule prevails also in the United States, Uniform Bills of Lading Act, 1909, 
§ 23; Pomerene Act, 1916, § 22, cf. KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 4) 
174 f.; and e.g., in Italy, see Cass. (March 22, 1934) Foro I tal. 1934 I 929. 
80 34 RGZ. at 79; RG. (Sept. 24, 1910) 74 RGZ. 193, 194. 
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is an erratic element in the recent practice of the German 
courts.82 
Rationale. For the holder of the bill of lading, the goods 
are of primary concern. Where the goods will be, or ought 
to be, when discharged from the vessel and delivered at 
the end of the maritime voyage, is eminently important for 
him. But consignees and holders of the bill are not the only 
interested persons. In the eyes of the insurance company in 
the country of dispatch and of the banker financing the 
seller, the port of arrival may be a very far distant place, 
often an uncertain one, and ordinarily not a familiar contact. 
At any rate, the law governing the contract of carriage 
should extend to the bill of lading in the following cases: 
( i) An express reference in the bill of lading to a specific 
law takes care of the question for everyone concerned. 
( ii) Where the bill of lading refers to the conditions in 
use by the carrier, or to a charter party, concluded either 
between the parties to the bill or between the shipowner and 
the carrier, it is natural that one law ought to govern the 
entire relationship. Such a reference effectively lessens the 
independence of the instrument, allowing the holder to 
oppose defenses outside the bill of lading. The problem has 
arisen in the English cases. 
An English decision of 1933, though strangely compli-
cated, shows the tendency to subject a charter party and 
the ensuing bill of lading to one law, "in deviation from 
the law where the goods were exchanged against the bill of 
lading," which would normally have governed the relation-
ship between the shipowner and the holder.83 
81 Lastly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 284 n. I. 
82 In RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316,319 embarrassment is recognizable. 
83 The St. Joseph (1933) 45 Ll. L. Rep. 180, 28 Revue Dor (1933) I8o. 
As far as I understand, Belgian law, in principle, as the law of the port of 
dispatch and issuance of the bill of lading, would govern the relationship 
between the Norwegian shipowner and the holder, the Guatemalan govern-
ment. But the charter party between the owner and the French charterers 
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A thorough study, however, was given to the question 
by the admiralty counsel and judges in The Njegos. 84 The 
charter party was clearly subject to English law-made in 
London by agents of the parties (Yugoslav shipowners and 
a French company) in English on the Chamber of Shipping 
River Plate ( "Centrocon") form, and in addition contain-
ing the usual English arbitration clause. The bills of lading, 
in English form and English language, were issued in 
Buenos Aires for destinations in Norway and Denmark. The 
bills incorporated "all the terms, conditions, and exceptions" 
of the charter party, "including the negligence clause," but 
were not deemed to include the arbitration clause. The 
receivers of the goods, Norwegian or Danish nationals, ac-
quired the bills. The President, Sir F. B. Merriman, speak-
ing for the court,· held that "the sensible business man must 
be assumed to intend that the contract shall be read with 
the English interpretation which admittedly attaches to the 
charter party as such, though that interpretation is nowhere 
expressly stated, but it is to be inferred from several in-
dications .... " 85 
A recent Italian writer, Scerni, has given attention to the 
subject. He also thinks that where the parties enjoy full 
freedom in selecting the law, their intention is that the 
reference in a bill of lading to a charter party includes the 
applicable law.86 
did not refer to Belgian law and the bill was declared nonnegotiable; the 
Hague Rules were not even implicitly referred to in the bill, therefore the 
Belgian limitation of the shipowner's liability (Hague Rules) was not applied. 
84 The Njegos [ 1936] P. 90. 
85 I d. at 105. 
86 ScERNI 219. Assuredly, ScERNI denies party autonomy to the then Italian 
commercial law (art. 58 C. Com.), a wrong thesis in my opinion, and inade-
quately requires an express stipulation for the applicable law in the charter 
party or the model bill of lading printed in the charter. 
A relevant argument is to be found in a Dutch decision, Rb. Rotterdam 
(Oct. 16, 1935) N. ]. 1936, No. 59, upholding an obligation of the holder of 
the bill to pay the freight at the value of gold dollars before the American 
depreciation. The charter party made in London with a clause for arbitration 
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Where the bill of lading fails to refer to a previously 
written document, so as equitably to justify extension of 
the law concerned to the bill, it is logical to keep the choice 
of law for both sources of obligation separate. The parties 
may easily remove this by any clause admitting uniformity. 
5. Distance Freight 
Under English and American basic conceptions, the car-
rier has to perform an entire undertaking for a specific 
sum.87 Freight is owed only on proper delivery. Conse-
quently, in case of disaster at sea, if no goods are salvaged, 
no freight is due. Of course, more recently, usual clauses, 
such as "freight to be deemed earned, ship or goods lost 
or not lost," reverse the situation.88 In most civil law 
countries, on the contrary, at least the part of the freight 
proportional to the voyage accomplished at the place of 
loss, is regarded as earned. 89 This distinction is very well 
in London evidently was governed by English law. But the bill of lading 
issued in a Dutch port by a Dutch line to an American corporation referred 
merely "to all the conditions and exceptions and liberties contained in the 
charter-party"; this was not to be extended either to arbitration or to English 
law, and Dutch law applied. The court, however, argued on the basis of the 
presumable intention of the parties. 
87 Blackburn, J., in Appleby v. Myers (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 6so at 661, as 
used by SCRUITON, Charterparties (ed. 16) art. 146. 
88 On the broader meaning of this clause in a case including all freight 
due at destination, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Guernsey-Westbrook Co. 
(C. C. A. 9th 1947) 159 F. (2d) 139, 141. 
89 E.g., France: C. Com. art. 296 par. 3· 
Italy: C. Com. {1882) art. 570; C. Navig. (1942) art. 436 is interpreted 
to the same effect by BRUNEITI, C. N avig. Marit. { 1943) 2057 n. IX. Cf. Trib. 
Livorno (March 29, 1941) Dir. Int. 1941, 275 (applying the Italian lex loci 
contractus on the ground of the former art. 58 C. Com. against the different 
German law stipulated. 
Spain: C. Com. art. 623. 
Argentina: C. Com. art. 1088. 
Mexico: C. Com. art. 737, etc. 
Germany: C. Com.§§ 630, 631, 641. 
Japan: C. Com. art. 613; new C. Com. (1938) art. 760. 
Sweden: Marit. Law, art. 129, the measure of the freight conditioned by 
the circumstances. 
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recognized and has been a subject of drafts of unification 
from 1907.90 It has been unanimously understood in the 
courts of the world that the solution depends on the law 
governing the contract of affreightment which is prevail-
ingly the law of the "place of contracting. " 91 
This is a perfect example of universal agreement. 
6. Right of Payment for Freight after Delivery 
Whether a lien on the cargo should be regarded as a 
property interest remains subject to the lex situs or depends 
on the law of the flag, according to theories not to be dis-
cussed here. But commercial liens in favor of the freight 
are always based on obligatory rights. A case in the Italian 
courts furnishes an excellent illustration. 
An Italian firm, subsequently in bankruptcy, chartered by 
contract made in London a ship of the Italian shipping com-
pany "Garibaldi." The cargo was unloaded on the dock in 
Genoa. According to Italian law (C. Com., 1882, art. 5 So), 
the captain was not entitled to retain the goods but could 
enforce a claim for the freight. Under English law, how-
ever, a master waives the lien by delivering the goods with-
out requiring payment. The Appeal Court92 and the Su-
preme Court93 did not hesitate to apply English law as the 
lex loci contractus. The Italian ship should hence have re-
tained the goods contrary to the Italian legal provision, 
considered imperative in municipal law. It was also imma-
90 BERLINGIERI, Verso l'unificazione del diritto del mare ( 1932) 142. 
9l United States: China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force ( 1894) 142 N. Y. 90, 
36 N. E. 874. 
England: The Industrie [1894] P. 58; The Adriatic. [1931] P. 241. 
France: App. Douai (Nov. to, 1885) 1 Revue Autran (t88s-6) 36o; 5 LYON-
CAEN et RENAULT § 849. 
Germany: RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 209. 
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Oct. 14, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
432, 434· 
9 2 App. Genova (June 17, 1932) Monitore 1932, 86o, 9 Z. ausl. PR. (1935) 
217. 
9 3 Cass. (June 8, 1933) Foro Ita!. 1933 I 938, Rivista 1933, 492, 28 Revue 
Dor (1933) 349· 
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terial that the act in question was closely connected with 
delivery. 
III. SPECIAL LAWS 
I. Port Regulations 
There seems to be universal agreement that local pro-
visions and usages in both the port of dispatch and that of 
arrival are determinative of the rights of the parties with 
respect to the technical operations of loading and un-
loading.94 
This rule extends to the formalities to be fulfilled with the 
authorities ;95 the beginning, interruption, and speed of load-
ing and unloading,96 in particular the lay days, when the 
contract is not specific ;97 the method of stowage ;98 the com-
putation of weighing expenses and allowance of expenses, 
when loading is difficult ;99 the procedure for formal ascer-
94 United States: The Dartford (C. C. A. rst 1938) 1938 Am. Marit. Cas. 
1548, 1555 (whether Saturday is a half holiday in Boston), citing Holland 
Gulf S. S. Co. v. Hagar (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1903) 124 Fed. 460, 463; Pool 
Shipping Co. v. Samuel (C. C. A. 3rd 1912) 200 Fed. 36. 
England: The Thortondale, Hick v. Tweedy (1890) 63 L. T. R. 765-C. A., 
6 Revue Autran ( 189o-91) 474, 7 id. ( 1891-92) 327: lex loci contractus 
governs, but the usages of the port where the charter party ought to be 
performed determine such questions as at what moment a vessel is ready 
for loading, provided that the usages are recognized also by the foreigners 
using the port. 
France: 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 851. 
Germany: ScRAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht (ed. 3) 280 n. 33 before§ ss6. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 358 § 167; SCERNI209. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517d par. 2 cf. art. 458 (old) of the C. Com. 
95 CRouvF:s. r Repert. 269 No. 24; Cass. civ. (April 12, 1938) D. H. 1938, 369. 
9 6 Quebec: C. C. art. 2460. 
97 Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Nov. 15, 1905) 22 Revue Autran (r9o6-
07) 537: whether the excuse of torrents of rain is allowed for delayed action; 
25 id. (1909-10) 404. 
France: FROMAGEOT, 18 Revue Autran (I902-<l3) 742; 5 LYON-CAEN et 
RENAULT § 851; 2 DE VALROGER § 69o; but see as to certain citations of 
cases, VAN SLO<YrEN 23 f. 
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Nov. u, 1889) 45 Seuff. Arch. 258; (March 27, 
1913) Hans. GZ. 1913, HBI. 181 No. 86. 
98 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 851. 
99 Italy: Cass. (Oct. 15, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529, cf. RHEINSTEIN, 5 
Z. ausl. PR. (1931) 845. 
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tainment of damage, etc.100 The local standards also govern 
the rights of the carrier against a shipper who fails to 
deliver the goods to the vessel on time.101 Such rights to de-
murrage102 do not depend on the question whether the duty 
to pay for delay in loading or unloading beyond the per-
mitted period is construed as a supplement to the freight 
(as in the French courts) or as damages (according to the 
prevailing conception) .103 
Since, however, the contract may dispose of all these 
questions, it may also, under certain circumstances, be 
deemed to refer these to the law governing the contract m 
general.104 
2. Lex Loci Solutionis 
(a) Modalities of performance. According to its usual 
role, the law of the. place of performance governs modali-
ties of delivery of the goods105 and of payment of the 
freight.106 The currency of payment is also included.107 
Whether the master has to give notice before unloading108 
and in what manner the bill of lading has to be tendered109 
belong to the same category. 
The law in force at the port of arrival thus serves as 
lex loci solutionis to the same effect as in its function just 
1°0 Trib. com. Bordeaux (April 19, r888) 4 Revue Autran (r888-89) 299; 
see VAN SLOOTEN 30. 
101 Germany: Handelsg. Hamburg (July 24, 1872) HGZ. 1872 HBI. No. 226. 
102 In U. S. v. Ashcraft-Wilkinson Co. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 
977, reversed on other grounds (1929) 29 F. (2d) 961, the suit involving 
demurrage is decided without hesitation under American law, the vessel, 
probably Italian, having arrived in Savannah. 
103 See on the controversy, 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 728 § 797· 
104 Swedish S. Ct. (May u, 1939) Nytt Jur. Ark. 1939, 247 No. 69: 
charterparty made in Sweden between Swedish parties, lay days in a German 
port, Swedish law; cf. SCHMIDT, Revue Crit. 1948, 430. 
1°5 Trib. Marseille (March 8, 1838) Jur. Mars. r838.1.246. 
106 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 851. 
107 3. DESJARDIN 658 § 840; Trib. com. Marseille (June 25, 1895) Jur. 
Mars. r895.r.262, cited I Repert. 277 No. 89. 
10s r VAN HASSELT 364. The question is answered in the negative in England 
in the absences of stipulation, ScRUTTON, Charterparties (ed. r6) 138, 337· 
109 Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. r6, 1935) W. 1936 No. 59· 
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mentioned sub ( 1). Other formulations are more doubtful. 
(b) Broader statements. In one formulation, the law of 
the port of arrival embraces everything involving discharge 
of the vessel, receipt of the goods, and measures regarding 
damage and deficiencies.l1° The German Reichsgericht, re-
stricting its old rule of the law of the port of destination, 
still favors it as a special law for various problems.111 
The C6digo Bustamante provides that "The acts of per-
formance of the contract (of affreightment) shall be effec-
tuated in conformity with the law of the place where they 
should be performed." (art. 28 5 par. 2) 
It is uncertain, however, whether this formula really 
intends to include more than the rules expressed supra (I) 
and ( 2) (a). But it does not go so far as a new section of 
the Montevideo Treaties submitting the "contract" to the 
law of the place of performance if the latter is in a member 
stateY2 
Finally, some writers, followed temporarily by a few 
decisions, have applied the theory by which the contract is 
divided into conclusion and performance.113 Under the 
former Italian Commercial Code, this was the doctrine of 
the courts, 114 until the Court of Cassation liberally recog-
nized the foreign lex loci contractus.115 
110 I SMEESTERS and WINKELMOLEN 393· 
111 Germany: RG. (Nov. 24, I928) I22 RGZ. 3I6 defines the scope of the 
law of the port of destination, when the contract is generally governed by 
another law, as including: the provisions conforming to the mercantile con-
venience of holders of bills of lading (thus bowing to 34 RGZ. 72, So, see 
supra p. 284 n. 78) ; the modalities of discharge; and the provisions involving 
the conditions under which rights and obligations accrue between carrier and 
consignee in the meaning of the German C. Com. §§ 6I4 ff. It would seem 
that all these problems are still treated as subject to public policy. Whether 
this would be the attitude at present, I venture to question. 
112 Montevideo Treaty on Navigation ( I940) art. 26, supra n. 47· 
113 AsSER-RIVIER, Elements § 33; FROMAGEOT, I8 Revue Autran ( I902--Q3) 
744; 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 851; I Repert. 269 No. 2I. 
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. I41 I89I) Jur. Port Anvers I893.I.I9; 
and App. Gent (May 2, I90I) Clunet I902, 390. In both cases, loss on the 
open seas, law of the Belgian port of destination or discharge, respectively; 
Trib. com. Antwerp (Jan. 7, I903) infra. 
114 Italy: C. Com. (I882) art. 58; App. Trieste (May 31, I932) Rivista 
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Although the Restatement utilizes the same divisive 
method, Judge Learned Hand in his well-known judgment 
in a carriage case116 has been less outspoken in defining the 
scope of the law of the place of performance. Repeating the 
alleged rule that the initial validity and interpretation of a 
contract are governed by the law of the place of making the 
contract, but that any breach or nonperformance is governed 
by the law of the place of performance, he nevertheless 
started his own investigation by the observation that "the 
boundaries of this doctrine are not easy to find." The issue, 
moreover, was whether a grain shipment from Duluth to 
Montreal with transshipment in Pt. Colbourne was subject 
to American law with respect to the entire distance or was 
governed by the Canadian Water-Carriage of Goods Act 
with respect to a loss occurring in the Canadian port. The 
decision derives the latter answer from the fact that the 
carrier117 was in th~ course of performing his duty in Can-
ada when the negligence of his servant occurred. But this 
formalistic language reveals the idea that the carrier, by 
promising transportation to be made first in the United 
States and then in Canada and stipulating for exoneration 
from negligence was subject to the American public policy 
invalidating the clause only so long as the goods were mov-
ing to the border. This idea is certainly not far from the 
intentions of the carriers in through routes, as we shall 
observe. Personally, I think the decision, as to the result, 
is right. 
Of course, from such a point of view, the contrary con-
struction is not excluded, viz., to the effect that the entire 
1934, 583,28 Revue Dor (1933) 349: maritime carriage from France to Italy; 
notice of damage in Italy has to observe Italian C. Com. art. 415. 
115 Cass. (June 8, 1933) supra. 
116 Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. 
(2d) 824, 826, cf. Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 467, 541 n. So. 
117 The second ship, carrying the goods from Pt. Colbourne was chartered 
by the defendant's agent, and therefore the defendant carrier was liable for 
the ship "as for his own." 
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contract is subject to the American law because it was cen-
tered here. This conclusion would be nearer to the tendency 
of the great majority of American decisions applying the 
lex loci contractus to every problem. 
However, which construction to prefer is evidently a 
matter of interpretation of the contract, and this interpreta-
tion is a legal matter belonging without doubt to the law 
governing the contract or, in the language of the American 
judges, including Judge L. Hand, to the law of the place of 
contracting. 
Unfortunately, no such justification can be furnished for 
a subsequent decision of the Second Federal Circuit Court,118 
which comprises within the scope of "performance" the 
question whether the carrier's misdelivery of the goods is a 
breach, and whether this excuses the cargo owner from 
giving notice of nondelivery within five days after discharge, 
as stipulated. The court assigns these questions in the instant 
case to German law, a decision that is in all too perfect 
harmony with the ill-reputed German doctrine. The effect 
of a contractual clause in the case of events not foreseen by 
the parties is a problem of contractual construction and has 
nothing to do with the place of performance. In this case 
the rules and regulations of Hamburg properly determined 
only the conduct of the carrier's agent for the purpose of 
delivery; no question of this sort was involved. 
A firmer grip on these exceptions to the general law of 
the contract is urgently needed. 
The overwhelmingly prevailing conception extends the 
unitary law of the contract to the existence, excusability, 
and effects of nonperformance. It would seem also that a 
stipulation exempting the carrier from damages under cer-
tain circumstances on the ground of misdelivery belongs to 
this scope.119 
118 Bank of California, N. A. v. International Mercantile Marine Co. 
(C. C. A. zd 1933) 64 F. (zd) 97· 
119 To this effect, M. & T. Trust Co. v. Export S. S. Corp. (193:2} :256 
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(c) Custody in case of refused acceptance. A case de-
cided by the German Supreme Court is a good illustration. 
A German, having sold 2000 pairs of bicycle pedals to a 
buyer in Birmingham, England', contracted with an agent in 
Hamburg for their carriage which was performed through 
the Hamburg agent of the General Steam Navigation Com-
pany by steamer to Norwich, from there by the Great 
Eastern Railway to the station at Curzon Street. The buyer 
refused to accept the goods, and the railroad notified ship-
per and consignee that the goods were stored at the sender's 
risk at the railway depot. Delivery was finally delayed by 
servants of the railway. The Court, applying English law, 
stated that the duty of custody owed by the carrier on the 
ground of the affreightment contract was terminated when 
the buyer refused to accept the goods in a reasonable time, 
and hence the Hamburg agent was not liabile for subsequent 
events.120 
(d) As imperative law. We have encountered the law of 
the place of performance as necessarily governing the lia-
bility of carriers in transports to the ports of the United 
States, Belgium, and, conditionally, the Nether lands ;121 the 
entire contract in Argentina and Brazil ;122 and various prob-
lems in Germany.123 
Chile, where affreightments made in a Chilean port are 
subject to the lex fori, moreover, imposes its domestic law 
"as to everything regarding the unloading or any other act 
that should be done on Chilean territory." (C. Com. art. 
975 par. 2) 
None of these last three extravagances is compatible with 
international reciprocity. 
N. Y. Supp. 590, reversed, 259 N. Y. Supp. 393, re-aff'd (1933) 262 N. Y. 
92, applies American federal law as lex loci contractus, as against the law 
of French Morocco as lex loci destinationis. See also infra n. 124. 
12o R.G. (April 10, 1901) 48 RGZ. 108. 
121 Supra p. 274· 
122 Supra pp. 263, 274 n. 47· 
123 Supra n. In. 
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IV. Loss oF RIGHTS OF THE CoNsiGNEE 
1. Failure to Give Notice of Loss or Damage 
Legal provisions. Before the introduction of the Brussels 
Convention concerning bills of lading, an informative con-
troversy arose in France on the application of article 435 
(par. I) of the French Commercial Code which barred all 
actions against the master and the insurers for damage done 
to the goods if the goods have been accepted without pro-
test. In one view, this provision was classified under the 
incidents of discharging, governed by the law of the port of 
arrival, and therefore applied to all ships arriving in French 
ports.124 But the Court of Cassation always adopted the 
opposite theory that the law intended by the parties, or 
other general law of the contract, includes time and for-
malities to be observed by the consignee.125 This certainly 
is the sounder view. To the contrary, an Italian decision 
regarded the analogous provisions of the former Italian 
Commercial Code, article 4 I 5, as pertaining to the incidents 
of delivery; yet this rested on the construction of the then 
conflicts rule of the same Code, article 58.126 
The Brussels Convention has been less rigorous. If the 
notice of loss is not given at the time when the goods are 
removed into the custody of the person entitled to delivery, 
only prima facie evidence of acceptance is constituted.127 
Rebuttal by proof to the contrary being possible, the notice 
is no longer a necessary prerequisite to suit.128 In accordance 
with our view expounded earlier the new rule ought to be 
applied in all courts when the Convention is adopted in the 
124 Trib. com. Marseilles (Dec. 29, 1920) 33 Revue Autran (1922) 93, 
Clunet 1922, 1011; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) § 1430 n. 5 and in 11 Revue 
Dor (1925) 289j 5LYON-CAEN etRENAULT793 § 852· 
125 Cass. civ. (June 19, 1929) S. 1929.1.309. This opinion has been advocated 
by DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 408. 
126 App. Trieste (May 31, 1932) 28 Revue Dor (1933) 349· 
127 Art. 3 (6); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S. C. § 1303. 
128 The Southern Cross (1940) 1940 Am. Marit. Cas. 59· 
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state of the port of departure.129 In the United States, of 
course, it is applicable also to homeward bills of lading. 
The conflicts problem is thereby eliminated in American 
courts but remains unsettled for shipments to all other 
countries from those which have not adopted the Rules. 
Stipulation limiting the time for claims. Clauses in bills 
of lading requiring that notice should be given to the car-
rier and claims brought within a certain period of time, in 
principle depends on the law of the contract. This has been 
recognized by American courts.130 
Under the Brussels Convention, a clause limiting time to 
less than one year is ineffective.131 On this ground such 
clauses have been rejected in American decisions as to both 
outward132 and homeward133 bills of lading. Longer periods 
are permitted.134 
Apart from such modification by public policy, the law 
of the port of departure ought to govern. 
It is a different consideration when public law is declared 
129 See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 427 f. and suPra p. 272. 
l30 Before the introducti~n of the Brussels Convention, in The President 
Monroe (1935) 286 N.Y. Supp. 990, the clause would have been determined 
under the expressly stipulated law of the Strait Settlements, if this had been 
proved. 
In The Carso (1937) 1937 Am. Marit. Cas. 1078, it seems that the govern-
ing law was English, but the court did not find a reason for distinguishing 
English and American authorities holding the clause to be valid. 
The decision in M. & T. Trust Co. v. ExportS. S. Corp. (1932) 256 N. Y. 
Supp. 590, supra p. 251 n. 45, implies the same view. 
Recently the clause was upheld in an interstate shipment not considered 
subject to the Carriage Act of 1936, Newport Rolling Mills v. Miss. Valley 
Lines (1943) 50 F. Supp. 623, 1943 Am. Marit. Cas. 793· 
Opposite solutions appeared in Bank of California N. A. v. Int. Mercantile 
Marine Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1933) 64 F. (2d) 97 criticized supra n. uS, where, 
however, American law was substituted, no proof of German law being 
offered; and in Duche v. Brocklebank (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 
184, applying American law as that of the port of arrival. 
131 Convention, art. 3 ( 6); 49 Stat. 1207, § 3, 46 U. S. C. § 1303. 
1 32 The Argentino, Buxton Limitida S. A. v. Rederi (1939) 28 F. Supp. 440, 
1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 815. 
133 The Zarembo (C. C. A. zd 1943) 136 F. (zd) 320, 1943 Am. Marit. 
Cas. 954· 
134 U. S. v. Gydnia American Shipping Lines, Ltd. (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1944) 
57 F. Supp. 369. 
MARITIME CARRIAGE OF GOODS 297 
to intervene. In a Canadian through bill, the time for claims 
after delivery was restricted to four months, and such stipu-
lation was held inoperative after the shipment passed the 
Canadian border into the United States, because a provision 
of the Interstate Commerce Act required a minimum period 
of nine months.135 
2. Limitation of Actions 
The legal provisions restricting the time during which a 
carrier may be sued for nondelivery or defective delivery, 
are regarded as substantive in Continental laws. For they 
affect the right, although only the action is barred.136 
Although the French writers share this view,137 the 
French Supreme Court disagrees. This court once, precisely 
in a case of affreightment, announced the theory that the 
domicil of the debtor governs limitation138 and in another 
such case has reiterated this questionable idea.139 N everthe-
less, the period of limitation is characterized as substantive. 
An American court, however, disregarded the French 
limitation to one year of the action against a carrier and 
applied the lex fori, when the holder sued upon a bill of 
lading issued at the French port of departure and stipulating 
for French law; this follows the usual approach of common 
law lawyers.14° 
135 Goldberg v. Delaware etc. Ry. Co. (1943) 40 N.Y. Supp. (zd) 44· 
136 See Vol. I (ed. 2) pp. 69-72 and infra Chs. 52 and 53; for an action 
against a carrier see, e.g., App. Bologna (June 2, 1913) Riv. Dir. Com. 1914 
II 43· 
137 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 854; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 7) 587 f. 
§ 476i; I Repert. 269 § 25; BATIFFOL § 584. 
138 Cass. civ. (Jan. 13, x869) D. x869.1.135, S. 1869.1.49; followed in Trib. 
com. Anvers (Jan. 7, 1903) x8 Revue Autran (1902-o3) 901, under the theory 
of lex loci executionis. 
139 Cass. civ. (Jan. 9, 1934) S. I934·I.20I, D. 1934·1.22, Revue Crit. 1934, 
915, Clunet 1934, 672; Cass. civ. (July x, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 175, Clunet 
1937. 302. 
140 A. Salomon, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1929) 32 F. 
(zd) 283. 
CHAPTER 45 
Other Transportation Contracts 
l. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS 
CARRIAGE of persons by sea, because of certain features, has become a separate topic in the more 
recent municipal enactments.* Conflicts law has not 
given it much special attention. Some writers, it is true, have 
urged the significance of the flag, with more insistence than 
for carriage of goods, because a passenger boards the ship 
in person, stays under the captain's discipline, and is sub-
ject to the national penal jurisdiction of the ship's country.1 
However, not until the Dutch rule for time charters2 and 
the Italian law of 19423 did any decision or law declare for 
the law of the flag. 
Passenger tickets often refer to the law of the vessel, but 
this still leaves the subsidiary rule open. 
1. Lex Loci Contractus 
In addition to the usual advocates,4 a few American deci-
sions have characteristically employed the law of the place 
* A convention on the carriage of passengers by sea was signed at the 
Brussels Conference of April 29, 1961; see 63 Dir. Marit. ( 1961) 381 (French 
and English) and IOAm. J. Comp. Law (1961) 445 (English). For a comment 
on the draft, see PRODROMIDES, "La responsabilite du transporteur dans le 
transport international des passagers et de leurs bagages," 9 D. M. F. (1957) 
195, 259· 
1 SCERNI 243; BATIFFOL 260 § 287. NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 286, risks the assertion 
that the law of the flag governs "without doubt." Most plausibly, this view 
is advocated by ToRQUATO GIANNINI, II passaggiero marittimo istruito 
(Milano 1939). Some authors have suggested that the law of the flag should 
govern only if there is a real contact between the ship and the country of 
the flag; see ScRAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht (ed. 3) 815 before § 664 n. 19. 
2 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 533 p. 
s Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. Navig. art. 10. 
4 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 376 and cit. n. 5· 
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of contracting. A Massachusetts decision before the Harter 
Act, under the lex loci contractus, enforced an English 
exemption clause to which the Cunard Line referred in the 
ticket for a voyage from England to the United States.5 
The same court, however, again sanctioned the application 
of English law to a voyage from Ireland to Massachusetts, 
although the passage was booked in Boston. For justifica-
tion the court construed the contract made in Boston by 
the passenger's daughter as a mere preliminary to the "con-
tract ticket" received in England.6 A better reason would 
have been that the embarking rather than the booking was 
decisive. In a more recent case, a ticket was bought in the 
United States for a voyage from Alaska to Seattle. The 
passenger, an Indian girl, was attacked, probably in the 
waters of British Columbia, by two Negroes of the crew. 
Tort action against the company according to the law of 
this Canadian province was excluded for procedural rea-
sons. But action for damages according to general maritime 
law was granted because the carrier had the contractual 
duty to protect passengers against violence of its own crew.7 
In this case it would have been immaterial if the ticket had 
been bought in British Columbia, or if the vessel had flown 
the Norwegian or the Japanese flag. The only consistent 
theory was expressed by one court when it applied the law 
of the place where the journey begins.8 
In several recent cases the courts had to deal with con-
tractual clauses requiring that suit for personal injuries sus-
tained by a passenger must be brought within a certain 
limited time. It has been held that the validity of such 
~Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co. (r89r) 153 Mass. 553,27 N. E. 665. 
6 O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Co. (1894) r6o Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070. 
7 Pacific S. S. Co. v. Sutton (C. C. A. 9th 1925) 7 F. (zd) 579; The Admiral 
Evans (1925) 1925 Am. Marit. Cas. 1335. 
8 Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1915) 227 
Fed. 127, 130. 
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clauses is governed by the law of the place of contracting. sa 
But when a ticket contained an express choice of law clause, 
the law designated has also been applied to the contract 
limitation period as well as to the problem of whether the 
defendant waived the defense flowing from that contractual 
provision. Sb 
2. Other Contacts 
Repetitiously, we may briefly note that a few European 
writers think that the passenger, subject to the carrier's 
fixed conditions, must also be under its law,0 to which the 
C6digo Bustamante agrees.10 The Treaty of Montevideo 
points to the place of the maritime agency, 11 and some Ger-
man authors to the port of destinationP 
Soviet law declares itself applicable whenever one party 
is a citizen.13 
3· Special Laws 
The passenger's coming on board and leaving the ship 
are subject to local laws, if these are different from the 
governing law. Thus, the Dutch law provides that the 
(Dutch) provisions including those applicable before or 
at embarkation and those applicable at or after disembark-
sa Jansson v. Swedish American Line (C. C. A. 1st 1950) 185 F. (2d) 212, 
219 f.; McCaffrey v. Cunard Steamship Co. (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1955) 139 F. 
Supp. 472, 474; Sundberg v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien ( 1955) 
163 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 253, 254. It is noteworthy that in each of these cases the 
pertinent American law, which provides for a minimum limitation period of 
one year, had been complied with; see 46 U.S. C.§ 183 (b) (1958). 
Sb Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1955) 221 F. (2d) 
189, 194 ff. On the "renvoi" problem involved in the case, see the excellent 
Note, 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 120. 
9 FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 481; SCERNI 244 f. 
10 C6digo Bustamante, art. 185. 
11 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 14. 
12 SCRAPS, before § 664 n. 8; contra: BAR, Int. Handelsr. 442; 2 FRANKEN-
STEIN 536. 
13 Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (2), see FREUND, Das Seeschiffahrtsrecht der 
Sowjetunion ( 1930) 70. 
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ing, always apply if the embarkation takes place in a Dutch 
harbor.H 
That many local administrative rules are to be observed 
by a vessel in leaving and landing and that they have 
compulsory force are facts which the contracting parties 
are deemed to contemplate. Emigration laws are not the 
only ones so to be observed. 
4· Conclusion 
As American courts correctly see it, 1t ts no convincing 
argument that the monopoly of a carrier points to the tacit 
acceptance of his domiciliary law. Nor has the law of the 
flag any natural claim to regulate the contractual rights 
and duties of a person alien to the ship's nationality. How-
ever, it has been persuasively said that it is more awkward 
to discriminate among passengers than to differentiate goods 
on board a vessel. Is there an objective criterion outside the 
ship for establishing a sound local connection? 
The port of destination must be excluded. An American 
acquiring a ticket for China cannot be considered by any 
argument to have contracted under Chinese law. But it is 
no less a mistake to freeze the applicable law at the technical 
point of completing a legally binding contract. Booking in 
Rio de Janeiro for a voyage from New York to South-
ampton, or accepting in Rio a stateroom for such a cross-
ing, offered by cable by a New York travel bureau, does 
not establish Brazilian law as dominant. 
Where the desirable stipulation for an applicable law is 
missing, the agreed port of departure may be accepted as 
the important center of the contractual relationship. The ob-
jection that the choice of this port is accidental is not true. 
No passenger regards his point of embarkation as imma-
terial. He may think that he is allowed to board the ship 
14 Dutch C. Com. art. 533C p;tr. 2. 
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at a subsequent landing place, in Montevideo instead of 
Buenos Aires, in Cherbourg instead of Southampton, but 
he will presume that this makes no difference in his contract, 
as he also will not expect to recover the price difference if his 
berth has remained unfilled. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
earlier with regret/5 New York 'applies American law on 
grounds of public policy where a ticket for passage between 
two foreign ports is purchased in the United States. 
The choice, therefore, is between the port of departure 
indicated on the ticket and the flag. The latter may be 
preferable. 
II. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF BAGGAGE 
The Continental literature has expounded that the ob-
ligation of carriers to transport baggage, at least when 
checked for this purpose/6 is a collateral pact annexed to 
the contract of passage; but it has been asserted at the 
same time that the rights and duties flowing from this agree-
ment are analogous to those relating to the carriage of 
goods.17 It follows in the municipal field that it does not 
matter whether the ·baggage is "free," that is, paid with 
the ticket, or must be paid separately. In the conflicts field, 
the consequence is that the rules involving carriage of goods 
would be correctly applied. 
The well-known decision of the British Privy Council of 
I 8 6 518 concerning lost luggage has been considered a leading 
15 Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 423 f. 
16 Baggage taken by a passenger to his stateroom, in a traditional wide-
spread opinion, is not subject to contractual obligation. But analogy to the 
liability of innkeepers has sometimes been advocated, and more recently the 
literature definitely prefers contractual liability for any baggage by sea or 
land. See for France, }EAN lzE, Responsabilite en matiere de transport des 
bagages (Paris 1936) 34, 38, 42· 
17 5 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 831; Dutch C. Com. art. 533 par. r. Contra: 
T. GIANNINI, supra n. I. 
18 P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r865) 3 Moo. P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 
272. 
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case for maritime and even for all contracts. The English 
law of the place of contracting was applied, but it happened 
to agree with both parties' domicil, the flag of both vessels 
engaged in the carriage, and the port of departure.19 Under 
analogous circumstances, an American court, before the 
Harter Act, declared valid under English common law a 
clause limiting liability of the vessel to a value of ten 
pounds. The vessel was English, went from England to the 
United States, and the ticket was bought in England.20 
The law of the flag, 21 in this case again, has much at-
traction. 
III. FLUVIAL TRANSPORT 
The much-needed unification of the law involving inter-
national transportation on rivers and canals has failed to 
materialize despite strenuous efforts before they were tem-
porarily ended by World War II.22 Territorial law has, 
of course, paramount importance with respect to territorial 
waters, rivers, lakes, and canals. Nevertheless, many con-
flicts of laws are possible and should not all be left simply 
to the state where the waterway is situated. 
In the carriage on the great lakes, canals, and rivers 
between the United States and Canada, the conflicts 
principles are taken without hesitation from the maritime 
model; this is an effect of the through bills recognized in 
19 I d. at 29r. 
20 The Majestic (C. C. A. 2d 1894) 6o Fed. 624, reversed (1897) 166 U. S. 
375, 381 on the same basis of English law, because the clause on the back 
of the ticket was not a part of the contract. 
21 Advocated by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 536, SCERNI 244, MONACO 141, adopted by 
Italian C. Navig. Disp. Pre!. art. 10. 
22 On developments since the Vienna Congress and the more recent 
Barcelona Convention and Statute of 1921, which included nationality and 
registration of vessels, ownership, and collision, see OsBORNE MANCE, 
International River and Canal Transport ( 1944) 4, 2r. Of the older literature: 
NIBOYET, "Etude de droit international prive fluvial,'' 5 Revue Dr. Int. 
(Bruxelles) (1924) 333-
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both countries. The port of departure furnishes the appli-
cable law.23 
The matters not yet covered by international drafts such 
as limitation of liability, assistance and salvage, attach-
ment, and documents of transport, deserve unification, 
and at least an international clarification of the conflicts 
principle.24 
IV. LAND TRANSPORTATION 
Carriage of goods is prominent in conflicts discussion, but 
no material difference attaches to the carriage of persons 
and baggage. 
Interstate commerce legislation in the United States and 
the Bern convention on the carriage of goods by rail, now 
accompanied by a convention on the carriage of persons and 
baggage, in their large scope have practically eliminated 
the conflicts of laws.248 Universally, some progress has been 
achieved by the very. wide acceptance of through trans porta-
23 Grammer Steamship Co. v. James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. (D. C. W. D. 
N.Y. 1929) 37 F. {2d) 366, 368, aff'd (C. C. A. 2d 1931) 47 F. (2d) 186: 
lake freighters from Ontario to Buffalo, under two charters and bills of lading, 
Canadian law. {The court speaks only of the Canadian place of making the 
contract.) See also Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. {C. C. A. 2d 
1930) 43 F. {2d) 824 as to the main governing law, but see supra Ch. 44 p. 290 
with respect to the law governing performance. As an example of an internal 
American carriage under the New York Produce Exchange Canal Grain 
Charter Party No. x, see James Richardson & Sons, Ltd. v. Conners Marine Co. 
(C. C. A. 2d 1944) 141 F. (2d) 226. 
24 See MANCE, supra n. 22, at 104; SEBBA, "Das Internationale Privatrecht 
der Binnenschiffahrt," 10 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. VolkerR. (1930) 107 ff., and 
proposals, 173 f. 
A Convention on the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland Water-
ways {C. M. N.) and a Convention on the Carriage of Passengers and 
Luggage by Inland Waterways (C. V. N.) are now in the drafting process 
with the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome; 
see Year-Book 1960, 399 and 89 n. I. 
248 In addition to these treaties, a Convention on the Contract for the Inter-
national Carriage of Goods by Road (C. M. R.), signed at Geneva on May 
19, 1956, is now in force; see Comunita Internazionale 1956, 563. An analogic 
Draft Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers 
and Luggage by Road (C. V. R.) has been adopted by the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome; see 1960 Year-Book 
255, and the commentary by HosTIE, id. at 87. 
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tion to the effect that a contract of carriage is considered 
"one contract" in certain situations involving successive 
carriers. 
The outstanding model for such unity of contract is the 
case where a carrier undertakes transportation over a dis-
tance which he does not intend to reach within his own 
business. He concludes and signs the only contract to which 
the consignor is a party. The subsequent carriers are his 
agents in performing the contract. In the absence of an 
express provision, he is liable for loss or damage occurring 
on any part of the journey.25 A situation which is equivalent 
in many respects arises when the agent dealing with the 
consignor acts in his own name and as authorized agent for 
preceding or subsequent carriers or the latter are made 
liable by law. Where thus all carriers, or the first and the 
last, are considered liable, usually each carrier is only re-
sponsible for losses on his own line, 26 but there are excep-
tions of joint and several liability for the whole carriage.27 
In view of the present scarcity of conflicts in the United 
25 England: Great Western Ry. v. Blake (r862) 7 H. & N. 987; Thomas v. 
RhymneyRy. (1871) L. R. 6. Q. B. 266; ScRUTTON, Charterparties 84 n. (p). 
United States: See infra n. 79· E.g., Uniform Straight Bill of Lading, issued 
by a railroad for rail and water carriage from a point in one state to a point 
in another state, see Palmer et a!., Trustees v. Agwilines, Inc. (D. C. E. D. 
N. Y. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 239, 1941 Am. Marit. Cas. 1566; Lyons-Magnus v. 
American Hawaiian S. S. Co. (1941) 1941 Am. Marit. Cas. 1291 (through 
bill from Italy to New York and by coast to San Francisco). 
Belgium: x SMEESTERS and WrNKELMOLEN § 464-
Germany: HGB. §§ 432 par. r, 449 ("Hauptfrachtfiihrer" and "Unter-
frachtfiihrer"); 137 RGZ. 301. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517v. 
26 United States: E.g., Contracts, Terms, and Conditions on the back of the 
Uniform Through Export Bill of Lading, § 2 (a) (b); and cf. New York 
Produce Exchange v. B. & 0. Ry. Co. (1917) 46 ICC. 666, 670. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517w par. 2. 
Italy: For transport of persons, C. C. (1942) art. 1682; and as to usual 
clauses, BRUNETTI, Manuale del diritto della navigazione marittima e interna 
(1947) 259· 
27 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 517w par. I. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1700 cf. VrVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com.§§ 2102 ff.; 
AsQUIN I, infra n. 43, 470 § 180 (as to the former C. Com. arts. 399, 4n). 
Argentina: C. Com. art. 171; cf. Cam. Apel. La Plata (May 23, 1947) 
47 La Ley (1947) 32, 34· 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
States and Europe, Batiffol has referred to the numerous 
former American and French decisions.28 
1. Carriage of Goods 
Law of the place of shipping. The vast majority of the 
American cases of the time previous to interstate regulation 
proclaimed the law of the state where the goods were 
shipped and the contract of carriage was made,29 a duality 
of premises often stressed in the formulations of the courts. 
The same has been the constant position of the French 
courts throughout. 30 
The revised text of the Montevideo Treaty on com-
mercial law, abandoning the law of the place of destination, 
which generally governs, applies the law of the place of 
contracting31 to the form, effects, and nature of a unitary 
contract of through carriage, affecting the territory of 
several countries. A contract that promises cumulated serv-
ices of several carriers by a single and direct instrument of 
transport,32 is recognized as unitary. 
Law of the place of loss. In a former minority view, 
the law of the place where the goods are injured or lost 
governed. This theory has been favored by some English 
and Continental writers and some French and American 
28 BATIFFOL 233 ff. 
29 See the cases in Beale's many notes recorded by BATIFFOL 238 n. 4 and 
in BATIFFOL 239 f. § 267. For example, see the much cited decisions, Grand v. 
Livingston (1896) 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N. Y. Supp. 490; Powers Mercantile 
Co. v. Wells-Fargo & Co. ( 1904) 93 Minn. 143, 100 N. W. 735; Carpenter 
v. U.S. Export Co. (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. 154. 
3° France: A long series of identical decisions, Cass. (March 31, 1874) 
S. 1874·1.385; (Aug. 25, 1875) S. 1875-1-426; (Aug. 14, 1876) S. 1876.1.478 
etc.; cf. BATIFFOL 243 f. An old decision App. Colmar (June 30, 1865) 
S. 1866.2.25 considered the (French) place of contracting rather than the 
Alsatian place of dispatch; but Trib. Ceret (April 22, 1921) D. 1921.2.145 
is cited to the opposite effect. 
Argentine decisions to this effect and 4 Vrco 151 § 165, have been super-
seded, see infra n. 37, but the Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law, 
art. 14, adopts the law of the place of contracting. 
31 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law ( 1940) art. 14. 
a2 !d. art. 15. A similar provision in art. 259 of C6digo Bustamante probably 
refers to the I aw of contracts of adhesion, art. 18 5· 
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decisions.33 It was approved by Minor because the result 
achieves identity of solutions for tort and contract actions.34 
Such a split may be intended by the parties,35 and in fact 
is very frequently stipulated. But as a confusion of the 
spheres of contract and tort, the rule deserved its re-
jection.36 
There are, however, modern parallels. To some extent, 
the Argentine Supreme Court shares the view that each 
distance is governed by its own territoriallaw.37 
A comparable result is reached by the Dutch reform 
legislation of 1924. It has been taken for granted that the 
carrier contracting for through carriage on his own account 
is only responsible according to the laws obtaining in each 
territory passed. The same division, a fortiori, characterizes 
the liability of several carriers.38 
Law of the place of destination. While the place of the 
loss has sometimes been considered a place of performance, 
a few decisions, some of them involving lost baggage, ap-
plied the law of the place where delivery is due.39 
33 See FOOTE 456 j BATIFFOL 237 n. I j for American cases, see 2 BEALE 1163 
n. 2 and BATIFFOL 235 n. 4· 
34 MINOR 38I § I6o. 
35 France: Cass. civ. (June I2, I883) S. I884.I.I64; (Dec. 4, I894) D. 
I895.I.526; opposed by BATIFFOL 236, not rightly in my opinion. 
36 See, e.g., Faulkner v. Hart ( I88o) 82 N. Y. 4I3, 422; ECHAVARRI, 3 Cod. 
Com. 525; BATIFFOL 234 ff. §§ 262,263. 
37 Argentina: S. Ct. (Sept. 28, I93I) 36 Jur. Arg. 839 (Molins & Cia. v. 
Ferrocarril Central de Buenos Aires) assumes a unitary enterprise of car-
riage from Paraguay to Argentina but emphasizes that this does not prejudice 
the application of the territorial laws of the states along the line of travel. 
This may have been an obiter dictum in a case where the assumption of 
delay of the transport depended on the speed territorially prescribed, but 
has been understood in a broader meaning. Cf. Cam. Com. Cap. (June 3, I938) 
62 Jur. Arg. 792; Cam. Ape!. Mendoza (May IO, I94I) 74}ur. Arg. 793· 
38 The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 5I7V: The carrier makes himself liable 
for the whole distance "in conformity with the law applicable to each part 
of the transport"; art. 5I7W par. I: "Two or more carriers who accept 
goods ..• are liable for the entire carriage in conformity with the law in 
force for each part of the transport." 
39 E.g., Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. Co. (I877) 83 Pa. St. 3I6 and 
other cases cited by BATIFFOL 237 n. I and § 265. On baggage, Curtis v. Dela-
ware, Lackawanna R. Co. (I878) 74 N.Y. u6; Williams v. Central R. Co. 
of N.J. (I904) 93 App. Div. 582, 88 N. Y. Supp. 434· 
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The prevailing criterion, disguised as lex loci contractus, 
has been defended against the emphasis on performance 
by arguing that the contract is one and the performance a 
continuous act not restricted to the final delivery ;40 that the 
shipper is presumed to send the goods under the law he 
knows ;41 and that dispatching includes the commercement 
of performance,42 or, under certain theories is essential for 
the conclusion of the contract.43 More often, the plurality 
of the places of performance has been said to leave the law 
of the place of contracting the only available one. The truth 
is that a carriage contract has its only material center in 
the place of dispatch, which has little to do with contracting 
and more with the delivery to the carrier and his acceptance, 
the Roman receptum, than with performance. 
Special law. It would seem that the incidents of loading 
and unloading should have a special rule analogous to mari-
time carriage. The Montevideo text of 1940, in fact, es-
tablishes as a special rule that the law of the state where 
the delivery is made or should have been made to the con-
signee, governs the question concerning its performance 
and the form of the delivery.44 A decision of the French 
Supreme Court may really rest on such a consideration; 
it determines the formalities and the time for protest as 
well as for the request for examination of the goods ac-
40 Thomas, D. ]., in Wiley v. Grand Trunk R. of Canada (D. C. W. D. 
N.Y. 1915) 227 Fed. 127. 
41 Valk v. Erie R. Co. (1909) 130App. Div. 446, 114 N.Y. Supp. 964. 
42 Cole, J., in McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (r868) 24 Iowa 412 
stressed that it was necessary to transport the goods consigned to Chicago 
on the territory of Iowa. See more cases in BATIFFOL 239 n. 2. 
4 3 See AsQUIN!, Del contratto di trasporto, in Bolaffio e Vivante, 6 II codice 
di commercia commentato ( ed. 6, 1935) II 147 § 49· The Bern and Rome 
Conventions are considered to require the acceptance of the goods, see 
ARMINJON, r Droit Int. Pr. Com. 431 § 245. 
44 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Law, art. 14 in fine. On the interpreta-
tion, in part too broad as usual, see LAZCANO, "EI trasporte terrestre y mixto 
en el Derecho lnternacional Privado," 6 Rev. Arg. Der. Int. (1944) ser. 2, 
VII, 252, 264, 343, 355, 357, 363. 
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cording to the (foreign) law of French Morocco rather 
than according to the Algerian (French) law of the ship-
ping place.45 
2. Carriage of Persons 
The transportation of passengers on railroads does not 
cause much conflict of laws at present. We may take it from 
the former practice of the American courts that here, too, 
the place of departure as indicated in the ticket supplies 
the law.46 The reason, again, is not that the contract is a 
"real" contract needing performance for its completion, 
which is a minority opinion. In the rna jority view, the ticket 
is only evidence. 47 
A case that has retained some actuality in the United 
States concerns "free passes," providing gratuitous trans-
portation but expressly excluding liability for accidents. The 
latter stipulation has been recognized under federal law,48 
and in cases of multiple contacts under the law more favor-
able to the validity of the clause.49 It would be simpler and 
more satisfactory to realize that such a clause is perfectly 
justifiable under any law if, and only if, the grant of free 
transportation is a courtesy and not a part of wages. 
45 Cass. civ. {April 12, 1938) 5 Nouv. Revue (1938) 6z7, reversing a decision 
of the App. Cour of Paris which applied the lex loci contractus. The 1940 
text of Montevideo on Com. Terr. Law, art. 15 par. z, adopts the special rule 
of the place of arrival for questions concerning delivery, see infra n. 84. 
46 Example: Ticket taken in Maine for transport of a person between two 
places in Manitoba; Manitoba law applies, Brown v. Can. Pac. Ry. {1887) 
4 Man. R. 396. 
47 DALLOZ, 1 Nouveau repert. de droit ( 1947) 770 No. 89. 
48 Francis etc. v. Southern Pacific Co. (C. C. A. roth 1947) 162 F. (2d) 
813, alf'd, 333 U. S. 445, cf. Ins. L. J. 1947, 761 {pass issued under the Hepburn 
Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 and based on federal law). A different situation existed 
in Sasinowski v. Boston etc. Ry. (C. C. A. rst 1935) 74 F. {zd) 628 {a circus 
train) ; transportation was held to be agreed upon by the railway and the 
employer, a circus, and governed, with its exemption clause, by the Massa-
chusetts law of the place of contracting because the railroad acted as a private 
carrier. 
49 Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 
132 Pac. 494· 
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We may note here a Belgian decision50 elucidating the 
relation between contract and tort from a point of view 
not yet mentioned in this work. By judgment of a court in 
Rome, Italy, a streetcar company was declared liable simul-
taneously upon tort and breach of contract, for the damage 
done to the family of a man killed in Tivoli, near Rome. 
The action for enforcement in Belgium was denied for the 
reason that the damages were wrongly assessed in Italy. 
The family could sue only for tort since such claim is per-
sonal. In contract they could sue only for the damage 
suffered by the deceased himself, on survival of his action. 
To explain this curious case, it may be noted that Italian 
legislation did not hold railways responsible for damage 
without proof of negligence. 51 
v. AIR TRANSPORTATION 
1. The Warsaw Convention 
In commercial law, air transport has essentially the same 
position as maritime transport.52 Charters of planes and 
consignments are comparable to charters of ships and bills 
of lading.53 Charters are distinguished as flight or voyage 
charter, time charter or lease, and charter hire.54 
It has been said that the document of carriage, either of 
goods or of persons, regularly contains a clause referring 
to a specific law, which is ordinarily that of the carrier.55 
In the absence of such clause, conflicts problems would 
50 App. Bruxelles (July 14, 1941) Bonacci v. S. A. Belprise, Jur. Com. 
Brux. 1942, 34· 
51 See VrVANTE, 4 Trattato Dir. Com. §§ 2167 f. 
52 MoNACO 146 with citations. 
53 Cf., e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. v. Glose (1933) 66 F. (2d) 
710; 1933 U. S. Av. R. 26, 30; cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 
20. 
54 Thus, the U. S. Av. R. Indices. 
55 VAN HOUFFE, La responsabilite civile dans les transports aeriens in-
terieurs et internationaux ( 1940) 61. 
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be particularly hard to solve if the Warsaw Convention and 
its almost worldwide adoptionG6 had not eliminated the 
most conspicuous sources of trouble. Like the Hague Rules 
which inspired them, the provisions of the Convention, 
cutting through the opposing interests involved and smooth-
ing out the legal distinction of tort and contract, have found 
a middle road, more favorable to their air carriers than some 
preceding speciallaws.57 By such enactments as the British58 
and the Brazilian,59 the rules of the Convention have been 
incorporated into the national body of law, to be applied 
also with respect to nonmember states. 
The Convention provides that any clause shall be null 
and void which purports to infringe the rules of the Con-
56 See Vol. II ( ed. 2) p. 342. A few words are due here to this international 
achievement, including tort and contract claims. On the reassumption of the 
prewar drafts and amendment proposals to the Convention, see KNAUTH, 
1946 Annual Survey 771. 
In 1955 the Convention has been amended by the Hague Protocol; see 
MANKIEWicz, "Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention," 5 Am. ]. 
Comp. Law ( 1956) 78; RIESE, "Die internationale Luftprivatrechtskonferenz 
im Haag zur Revision des Warschauer Abkommens, September 1955," 5 
Zeitschrift fiir Luftrecht (1956) 4; FORREST, "Carriage by Air: The Hague 
Protocol," ro Int. Comp. Law Q. ( 1961) 726. 
In 1961 a Convention supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, and re-
lating to carriage by air performed by a person other than the contracting 
carrier, has been adopted by an international conference at Guadalajara and 
has been enacted in Great Britain (ro and 11 Eliz. 2, c. 43) and West Ger-
many (1963 BGBI. II. n6o); see RIESE, "Die internationale Luftprivatrechts-
konferenz und das Charterabkommen von Guadalajara (J a!., Mexico) vom 
r 8. September 1961," II Zeitschrift fiir Luftrecht ( 1962) r. 
For a discussion on whether the United States should withdraw from the 
Warsaw Convention, see Am. Soc. Int. Law, Proceedings, 56th Annual 
Meeting (1962) 115 ff. and KARLIN, "Warsaw, Hague, the 88th Congress and 
Limited Damages in International Air Crashes," 12 De PaulL. Rev. (1962) 
59· See also SAND, "Limitation of Liability and Passenger's Accident Com-
pensation Under the Warsaw Convention," II Am. J. Comp. Law (1962) 21. 
57 This has been observed with some astonishment in Italy, App. Milano 
(April 29, 1938) Giur. Ita!. 1939 I 2, 53· 
58 British Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 and 23 Geo. 5, c. 36. This act will 
cease to have effect as soon as the Carriage by Air Act, 1961, 9 and ro Eliz. 2, 
c. 27, comes into full effect; see JoHNSON, "Carriage by Air Act, 1961," 25 Mod. 
L. Rev. (1962) 569. 
59 Brazil: C6digo do Air, D. Lei No. 483, of June 8, 1938, art. 68 par. tin; 
see HuGO SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) 164. 
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vention by determining the law to be applied (article 32). 
Thus party autonomy is limited to matters not covered by 
the Convention. 60 In view of this restriction, it is doubtful 
whether the parties to a contract of carriage by air may 
choose the law according to which their contract is to be 
construed, as an English author has submitted.61 The Gen-
eral Conditions of the former International Air Traffic As-
sociation, now International Air Transport Association 
(both known as lATA), implementing it, assure that the 
paramount clause referring to the Convention, if at all ma-
terial, is practically never omitted. 
It has also been doubted whether the Convention covers 
contractual relations or only liability for tort. The Conven-
tion, however, not only applies to air transportation without 
such distinction but determines its applicability according to 
certain terms of the contract of carriage between the carrier 
and the individual passenger. 
2. Relation to National Laws 
The national rules have been reduced by the Convention 
to a somewhat obscure scope. The literature distinguishes 
between a carriage international in the meaning of the Con-
vention, which is a particular concept,62 and international 
carriage in the "ordinary sense."63 But the latter is entirely 
unnecessary as a technical concept. 
The Convention's definition of its own applicability has 
recently raised doubts informative for studies of choice of 
law. The Convention includes carriage between the terri-
so But it is not correct to suggest that all choice of law clauses in air 
passenger tickets or air waybills are invalid, as one author does; see HERZOG, 
"Validity of Contracts Exempting Carriers in Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce from Liability," II Syracuse L. Rev. (1959) 171, 199· 
6l N. H. MOLLER, Law of Civil Aviation ( 1936) 297; CONRADIE, "Inter-
national Private Law and The South African Carriage by Air Act, 1946," 64 
S. A. L. J. ( 1947) 51, 6o n. 28 repeats the question without answering it. 
62 Art. I ( 2) of the Convention. 
sa Crossing of a border and a single document of transportation are re-
quired, cf. LEMOINE 3 87 § 55 5· 
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tories of two parties to the Convention and the case where, 
departure and destination being within the territory of one 
contracting power, a stopping place in the territory of any 
other power is agreed upon. In postwar discussion it has 
been recognized that this delimitation imposes an unwar-
ranted and possibly unenforceable burden upon aircraft of 
nonmember states (e.g., upon a Portuguese air line taking 
passengers from New York to Bermuda) and subjects air 
lines to different systems of liabilities according to the dis-
tances indicated in the tickets. 64 In the United States, more-
over, it has been complained that the maximum amount of 
liability, often inadequate for American standards, strangely 
differs from the superior compensation due in the same case 
of an accident within the United States, to other passengers 
with a do:nestic ticket.65 
Yet it bs been replied: 
"On the other hand, to base the applicability of the 
Convention solely upon the nationality of the aircraft 
irrespective of the place of departure or destination, or the 
'lex loci contractus' (or, which may be the same thing, upon 
the proper law of the contract), would raise difficulties of 
jurisdiction, and also practical difficulties since aircraft of 
different nationality flying the same route might be operat-
ing upon a different liability basis ... possibly a combina-
tion of the two criteria may prove to be the solution."66 
The municipal laws raise questions respecting the relation 
of the Convention to federal and state statutes.66a The few 
64 See WILBERFORCE, "The International Technical Committee of Experts in 
Air Law," I The International Law Quarterly (1947) 498, 502. 
65 RHYNE, "International Law and Air Transportation," address of July 16, 
1948, 47 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1949) 41, 56. See the discussion mentioned supra n. 56 
last paragraph. 
66 WILBERFORCE, supra n. 64. But when the Convention was amended by the 
Hague Protocol in 1955, supra n. 56, its provision on applicability remained 
practically unchanged. 
66a See RIESE, "lnternationalprivatrechtliche Probleme auf dem Gebiet des 
Luftrechts," 7 Zeitschrift fiir Luftrecht ( 1958) 271, 277 If.; MAKAROV, "Conflits 
de lois en matiere de droit aerien," Annuaire 1959 I 359, 385 If.; SCHLEICHER-
REYMANN-ABRAHAM, I Das Recht der Luftfahrt (ed. g, 1960) 254 f. 
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American cases in point deal with the following questions. 66b 
Death of passengers. The Warsaw Convention has been 
implemented in Great Britain by certain provisions set out 
in the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act, 1932. 
Thereby, the liability is enforceable "for the benefit of 
such of the members of the passenger's family as sustained 
damage by reason of his death." With this complement, 
the courts have since applied article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, stating that "the carrier shall be liable for 
damage sustained in the event of death or wounding of a 
passenger .... " 67 Accordingly, the British courts recognize 
a cause of action governed by the new law rather than by 
Lord Campbell's (Fatal Accidents) Act. 68 Deprived of 
such statutory assistance, the American decisions thus far 
rendered have not determined "who may be thought to 
be injured by a death."69 It seems that these courts have 
made up their mind to the effect that the cause of action for 
the death of a passenger is determined by the law of the 
place where the death occurred,70 including the Death on the 
66b For cases dealing with the Convention in other than conflict-of-laws 
respects, see GUERRERI, American Jurisprudence on the Warsaw Convention 
(Montreal 1960). 
67 Schedule z. Cf. for details, SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, Air Law (ed. Z, 
1951) 383 ff. § 408. 
68 Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. [ 1937] I K. B. 50, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 
184, and ibid. p. 2II reversing the judgment of the K. B. 
69 Frank Choy, as Adm. of the Estate of Watson Choy, deceased v. Pan-
American Airways Co. (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 1941 U. S. Av. R. 10, 1941 Am. 
Marit. Cas. 483, 1942 U. S. Av. R. 93· Apart from the question "whether the 
Convention confers rights or creates causes of action," the Convention is, 
of course, self-executing, Rifkind, D. J., in Indemnity Ins. Co. of North 
America v. Pan-American Airways (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1944) 58 F. Supp. 
338, 1945 U. S. Av. R. 52, 54 f. 
Garcia and Alvarez v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. and others ( 1946) 
183 Misc. 258, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 317, aff'd, 295 N. Y. 
852, 67 N. E. (2d) 257· See for complete action, 1946 U. S. Av. R. 496. 
70 The decisions in the cases Choy, Wyman, Garcia, and Indemnity In-
surance Co. (ns. 69, 71, 72) are understood in this sense by ORR, "The Warsaw 
Convention," in 31 Va. L. Rev. (1945) 434 n. 18; RHYNE, Aviation Accident 
Law (1947) 270; see also GOLDBERG, "Jurisdiction and Venue in Aviation 
Accident Cases etc.," 36 Cal. L. Rev. ( 1948) 41, 55 f. n. 59· 
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High Seas Act.71 Perhaps, a case could be made for the 
death statute of the lex fori; international draftsmen are 
likely to think of this first, and the British implementation 
rests on such an autarchic ground. But the lex loci delicti 
has doubtless a better claim in tort actions. 
In one of the American cases,72 the Warsaw Convention 
was applied to a death on the high seas, but as the Conven-
tion says nothing about interest on the debt of compensa-
tion, the court looked to the Death on the High Seas Act 
which, however, is likewise silent on interest. 73 
3· The Remaining Problems 
Most questions not covered by the Convention have been 
uniformly answered in the General Conditions mentioned 
above.74 One of these conditions prescribes that the consign-
ment should be printed in one of the official languages of 
the country of departure. This is a new hint in favor of 
the law of that country for the remaining questions. How-
In Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1952) 111 
F. Supp. 393 the court applied Portuguese law as lex loci delicti; reversed on 
other grounds, (C. C. A. zd 1953) 209 F. (zd) 436. On the other hand, the New 
York Supreme Court in Salamon v. Koninlijke Luchtvaart Maatschippij, N. V., 
(N. Y. 1951) 107 N.Y. Supp. (zd) 768 took the position that the Convention 
itself created a cause of action and rendered inapplicable the pertinent lex 
loci delicti. But this view has been explicitly rejected in Noel v. Linea Aero-
postal Venezolana (C. C. A. zd 1957) 247 F. (zd) 677; cf. also Spencer v. 
Northwest Orient Airlines (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1962) 201 F. Supp. 504. For 
a discussion, see CALKINS, "The Cause of Action under the Warsaw Con-
vention," 26 J. Air L. & Comm. ( 1959) 217, 323; PROMINSKI, "Wrongful Death 
in Aviation: State, Federal, and Warsaw," 15 U. of Miami L. Rev. (1960) 59· 
71 Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan-American Airways {S. Ct. N. Y. 1943) 181 
Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 420, 1943 U. S. Av. R. x, aff'd, 267 App. Div. 
947, 48 N. Y. Supp. {2d) 459, aff'd, 293 N. Y. 878, 59 N. E. (2d) 785, cert. 
denied, 324 U. S. 882; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, supra n. 70; 
D'Aieman v. Pan-American World Airways (C. C. A. 2d 1958) 259 F. (2d) 
493· 
72 Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan-American Airways, supra n. 71. 
73 46 U. S. C. §§ 761, 762. 
74 Supra p. 312. Cf. Grein v. Imperial Airways, supra n. 68: if the carriage 
were not international in the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, it would 
be governed by the IA T A agreement. 
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ever, a Dutch court took it for granted that Dutch law 
governed an air passage concluded with the Royal Dutch 
Airways in Bangkok, Siam.75 And the Convention itself 
seems to point to the law of the forum. 76 
VI. MIXED THROUGH CARRIAGE 
Mixed through routes in international trade, with alter-
nating transportation by railway, vessel, and aircraft have 
lacked adequate legal and organizational machinery,77 with 
the main exception of the through bills in the traffic between 
the United States and Canada, 78 and the American Ocean 
Bill of Lading;79 the latter as used for export, issued by 
a railroad, includes the maritime carriage. Although sepa-
rate "local" bills of lading may be issued on the subsequent 
stages to the signer of the through bill, as shipper, the 
original bill is the document intended to represent the goods, 
in order to finance the transaction and to assure the right to 
delivery.80 Usually a clause provides that no carrier is liable 
for loss, damage, or injury not occurring while the goods 
are in its custody.81 Difficulties in foreign countries in recog-
nizing the American bill to its full extent have probably 
diminished. 82 
7 5 Rb. s'Gravenhage (Feb. 28, 1935) W. 12884. Application of the carrier's 
domiciliary law is also urged by the Inst. Dr. Int. in a recent resolution; see 
Revue Crit. 1964, 166 f., art. 5 par. 2. 
7 6 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 342 n. 32. 
HuGo SIMAS, C6digo brasileiro do air (1939) seems to understand art. 68 
par. 2 of the Brazilian Code to the same effect. 
77 See the excellent summary by BAGGE, "Der Durchfrachtverkehr," 10 Z. 
ausl. PR. ( 1936) 463; also in his article, "International Through Biils of 
Lading," Commercial and Financial Chronicle (New York 1945) 1340, 1362. 
78 See CoYNE, The Railway Law of Canada (1947) 467 f. 
79 Uniform Through Export Bills of Lading, prescribed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, first under the provisions of § 441 of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920 ( § 25 Interstate Commerce Act) see HoTCHKISS, A Manual on 
the Law of Bills of Lading etc. (New York 1928) 131 f. 
80 ScRUITON, Charterparties (ed. 16) 193 f. 
8 1 See, e.g., The Iristo (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 29. 
82 RG. (June 23, 1939) 161 RGZ. 210 refused to consider an American bill, 
termed through bill (under which the goods were shipped from New York 
to Hamburg to be delivered in Leipzig but not delivered there), because the 
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There have been other efforts to create appropriate facili-
ties for through carriage, however. Thus, the International 
Union of Railroads has concluded an agreement with the 
International Air Transport Association (lATA) on com-
bined international air-rail transportation, with implement-
ing accords. 83 The recent Montevideo text extends the unity 
of a contract in case of a through bill to mixed transporta-
tion on land, sea, and air, but is neither ratified nor im-
plemented. 84 
Through bills of lading in any sense of the word very com-
monly contain a reference to the conditions usual in the bills 
of lading of the on-carrying steamer or other carrier. Such a 
clause in a maritime through bill of lading has been declared 
to be recognizable only insofar as it is consistent with the 
original bill.85 But with this restriction, particularly in mixed 
carriage, the measure of liability is separately determined 
for each kind of transportation. In the case of an ocean 
through bill, issued by a railway on the basis of the Pom-
erene Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936 took 
care to provide that insofar as the bill relates to the carriage 
of goods by sea, the bill is subject to the new Act. This sec-
tion has been repealed because it was obviated by the federal 
legislation of 1940. 
bill was not issued in the name of the shipowner. This objection has been 
eliminated by the Hague Rules, HGB. §§ 642, 656, as amended by Law of 
August 10, 1937. For a discussion and further references, see SCRAPS-ABRAHAM, 
2 Seerecht ( ed. 3) 621 ff. 
83 LEMOINE 435 § 629. 
84 Montevideo Treaty on Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 15 par. 2. A draft 
convention on international combined traffic is discussed by PRODROMIDES in 
14 D. M. F. (1962) 67. 
85 The Idefjord, Blumenthal Import Corp. v. Den Norske Amerikalinje 
(C. C. A. 2d 1940) 114 F. (zd) 262, 266. Imperative rules of the original 
maritime carriage continue for continued sea carriage. Thus the British Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act is considered applicable even though only the first 
part of a through bill of lading refers to a departure from a port in the United 
Kingdom and transshipment is to be effected in a foreign port. ScRUITON, 
Charterparties (ed. 16) 461 f. On the other hand, art. I excludes the distance 
not by sea, SCRUITON, id. 467. 
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Clearly, the provisions of the Bern Convention on the 
liability of railways do not extend to a continuation of the 
transport by sea.86 Conformably to this, where a cask of 
brandy (cognac) was shipped from Cognac to Le Havre 
by rail and from Le Havre to New York by sea, and 
breakage occurred during the land transit, the exception 
from liability for negligence of the servants or agents under 
French law was recognized.87 
So far as the scattered attempts to solve the conflicts 
problem go, they reflect the present defective organization 
of combined international carriage. The consignee may be 
relieved by some provision from the necessity of receiving 
the goods at an intermediate place, but neither he nor the 
consignor is entitled to the benefits of the original bill as an 
exclusive embodiment of all rights. It seems to have been 
justifiably concluded therefrom in conflicts law that in this 
unorganized succession of carriers it is inevitable to let each 
part of the distance stand by itself. Hence, rights and 
liabilities are determined under the law of the territory 
where the individual facts completing the cause of action 
occur, be it loss or damage during carriage or any incident 
of delivery. 
Contrarily, the perfection of interstate and export through 
bills in the United States and Canada eliminated the former 
division of opinions on the same question and has promoted 
the application of the law where the original through bill 
is issued. Under this approach and with all the usual pre-
cautionary stipulations, the exceptions needed in favor of 
local laws do not seem to require other consideration than 
in the case of ordinary bills of lading issued by one carrier. 
86 Italy: Cass. (March 21, 1941) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1941, 173, cf. MARMO, 
10 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1944) 128 No. 28: art. 28 of the Convention does not 
provide for combined transportation. 
87 Baetjer v. La Compagnie General Transatlantique (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 
1894) 59 Fed. 789. 
CHAPTER 46 
Insurance 
I. AMERICAN LAw* 
T HE question of the law governing insurance con-tracts in the United States recurs in three different 
spheres. The state courts determine the private law 
applicable to insurance contracts, allegedly under the ordi-
nary general rules for contracts. The state statutes regulate 
the conditions for licensing foreign insurance companies 
with more or less effect upon the content of the contracts. 
To what extent the power of the states to regulate insur-
ance contracts is restricted by the federal Constitution, has 
been the object of a long line of decisions of the Supreme 
Court. The interrelation among these three levels offers 
rarely noted problems of its own that reach beyond the task 
of this work. 
I. Judicial Doctrine 
In treatises respecting conflicts law, the Restatement, and 
the overwhelming rna jority of judicial authorities-number-
ing many hundreds of decisions-, the law applicable to 
insurance contracts is determined by the ordinary general 
tests of contracts. Among them, the place of contracting 
is commonly regarded as the paramount factor. But this is 
not an absolutely exclusive rule, and the place where an 
insurance contract is located has given rise to a complicated 
• See also LENHOFF, "Probleme des zwischenstaatlichen Versicherungsrechts 
in amerikanischer Sicht," Versicherungswissenschaftliches Archiv 1955, 267; 
LENHOFF, "Conflict Avoidance in Insurance," 21 Law and Cont. Probl. (1956) 
549 and 1957 Ins. L. J. 101; EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 511-520. 
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system of rules of thumb. Complete surveys have been made 
by three outstanding writers. 
(a) Beale. Only Beale and the Restatement postulate 
an exclusive rule of lex loci contractus.1 The confusion in 
determining the place of contracting is resolved in the Re-
statement by a tripartite distinction: 
"§ 3 I 7. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon 
delivery by mail, the place of contracting is where the policy 
is posted. 
"§ 3 I 8. When an insurance policy becomes effective upon 
delivery and is sent by the company to its agent and by him 
delivered to the assured, the place of contracting is where 
it is thus delivered to the assured. 
"§ 3 I 9· When an offer for an insurance contract is re-
ceived by the compa'ny through a broker who acts for a 
client, and the policy is effective on delivery, the place of 
contracting is where the policy is posted or otherwise de-
livered to the broker." 
This scheme has been suggested by a great number of 
cases and has influenced more. Apparently, it furnishes 
objectively conceived contacts, favoring the insurer insofar 
as he may choose the way of sending the policy, determining 
the applicable law. Beale has been receptive to the argument 
that the company sends the policy to its agent in order to 
keep control of it until the condition is fulfilled which makes 
it valid. The courts have certainly assumed that the last 
act of contracting is deferred when the agent has still to 
ascertain the good health of the insured or to receive pay-
ment of the first premium. But the rule expressed in § 3 I 8 
has often been used where no continued control by the agent 
has been intended. 
Whether the obvious oversimplification of the decisions 
in this set of rules presents an advance or not is doubtful. 
But a cardinal defect is that the Restatement reproduces 
1 z BEALE 1054 ff. 
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merely the ritualistic gestures of the courts. Other authors 
have looked to the practical results. 
(b) Batiffo/.2 In his delicate research, the French scholar 
notes the application of the law of the place of contracting 
in the vast majority of the American decisions, although 
in many cases this place coincided with the place of payment 
of premiums or with the location of the insured objects. 
Batiffol's statistics deserve attention: The place of con-
tracting was found in approximately 7 5 per cent of the 
cases at the domicil of the insured.3 The common law prin-
ciple that a contract is completed by the dispatch of the 
acceptance would stand in the way, whenever the company 
simply accepts the initial application (an observation con-
firmed by the theoretical admission in§ 317 of the Restate-
ment quoted above). But the courts have used various 
devices to overcome this obstacle such as playing up small 
divergences in the policy as compared to the application and 
by insisting that the delivery into the hands of the insured 
is essential, when the policy is under seal and not mailed, 
or the agent has to exercise some control before he delivers 
the policy; at times the courts have given no explanation. 
Batiffol states expressly that the frequent justification that 
the agent had to check on the health of the insured at the 
time of the delivery, is rather farfetched. Many decisions 
bolster their arguments by defining the domicil of the in-
sured as the place where the first premium has been paid. 
In the remaining 2 5 per cent of the published decisions, 
the contract has been held to be made at the home office 
of the insurer. This has sometimes been justified by the 
2 BATIFFOL §§ 330, 338 bis, 341 ff. 
8 /d. § 336. The recent decisions follow the same pattern. Bradford v. Utica 
Mut. Ins. Co. (1943) 179 Misc. 919, 39 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 810 is particularly 
noteworthy; here the court sets a striking example how this practice, combined 
with the adventures of husband-wife tort liability, manages to establish an 
insurance liability not existing, for one or the other reason, in either of the 
two involved states, New York and Massachusetts. 
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fact that the client sent the first premium with his applica-
tion, but often no reason has been advanced. 
The judges believe the insured best protected under his 
domiciliary law. In some cases, however, the mechanical 
rule has been followed so faithfully as to disregard an ex-
press stipulation for the insurer's law more advantageous 
to the insured4 or to localize the contract at a place where 
neither party was domiciled.5 
(c) Carnahan.6 In the only monograph on the subject, 
a specialized voluminous treatise on the conflict of laws 
regarding life insurance, the expert author prudently dis-
tinguishes life insurance from other insurance and divides 
the problems involving life insurance into small compart-
ments. These are concerned with the form of writing in-
surance, the various modes and conditions of delivering the 
policy, the warranties and representations made in applica-
tions, the rights of beneficiaries, the assignment of policies, 
the various nonforfeiture provisions, the death of the cestui 
que vie, limitation of action, incontestability clauses, and 
statutory penalties and fees. Within these parts smaller 
segments are formed. The basic contention is that within 
such a section or segment the courts handle the cases "in 
one of a few limited ways." 7 Uniformity limited to these 
individual problems is claimed in the sense that there are 
rna jority rules.8 But the author reveals in the course of his 
investigation many more distinctions. Thus, the effectiveness 
of delivery for determining the place of contracting is 
allegedly decided by the query: Where is the last necessary 
act? Yet: 
4 I d. 311 n. 2, citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hathaway 
(C. C. A. 9th 1901) 106 Fed. 815. 
s I d. 311 n. 3, citing Hicks v. National Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. zd 1894) 6o 
Fed. 690. 
6 CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (ed. z, 1958). 
7 I d. 53, 495· 
8 I d. 53· 
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"Actually one often suspects from the cases that selection 
was made with the consequence in view. The delivery con-
cept is only a tool and how that tool will be employed in 
relation to problems of life insurance cannot accur.ately be 
determined merely by an inspection of the four corners of 
the insurance policy."9 
The last act may be defined in such way that it occurs at 
the home office of the carrier [insurer], or at the place of 
physical receipt of the policy. But: 
"The courts adopt one or another connotation of delivery 
which will connect the policy with the law of the state where 
the applicant resided and manually received the policy. Con-
sequently there is not the extent of uncertainty in the func-
tioning of the delivery concept in conflict of laws as would 
at first appear."10 
For the law governing warranties and representations, 
"the courts have not consistently enunciated any single 
rule." The courts have decided conflict of laws cases as the 
result of a weighing and balancing of various factors in their 
relation to the laws of several states. 
"In six jurisdictions the opinions ... have stated incon-
sistent rules. But most courts have explained their decisions 
in terms of the rule of the place of making of the contract.11 
... The cases reveal that a liberal statutory or decisional 
rule of the forum will be applied if the court, by adopting 
that connotation of delivery which relates to physical receipt 
of the policy by the applicant, finds that the forum was the 
place of making of the insurance contract .... Thus the 
net effect is to apply the law of the insured's residence at the 
time he applied for the policy, at least when it is more 
favorable to him ... P To the extent that rules of the 
applicant's home-state are most liberal, it may be taken 
that courts will tend to determine that the contract was 
9 /d. 204. 
10 !d. 250· 
11 /d. 325 f. 
12Jd. 327· 
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made there and to adhere, with at least verbal consistency, 
to the rule of the place of making the contract."13 
Carnahan has summarized his findings in a forceful re-
port in which he also asserts that 
"Examples of the tendency to disregard conflict of laws 
rules in interstate transactions occur in every phase of insur-
ance law, even in instances where the policy was taken out in 
another state. All too frequently, the court of the forum 
adopts and enforces its internal rule .... " 14 
(d) Conclusion. Carnahan's well-founded criticism is 
rather restrained. Viewing the matter under the general 
aspect of conflicts law reform, we must state that atomiza-
tion of the contract by dissolving it into various incidents 
is totally unsound and that if conflicts rules are not binding 
on the court they are not legal rules. In sum, there is a 
certain stability in the method of handling the various situa-
tions, but practically no law on conflicts concerning insur-
ance. This is all that the mechanical rules have achieved. 
In the search for the real objective of the courts operating 
these rules, one more point seems characteristic. The ques-
tion of where the contract is made, is largely replaced by 
the question of where the policy has been delivered, that 
is, the document is manually transferred to the insured; 
when this, too, cannot be ascertained, according to a rule 
adopted for instance in Pennsylvania, delivery is presumed 
to have occurred at the residence of the insured.15 
The courts have had before them an overflowing mass 
of litigation in life insurance and relatively infrequent 
cases of other types of insurance. To these they have ex-
tended their questionable rules. But differences are notable, 
13Jd. 328. 
14 CARNAHAN, "The Conflict of Laws in Relation to Insurance Contracts," 
American Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 58 to 59· 
15 White v. Empire State Degree of Honor (1911) 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 52, 
57; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Levine (C. C. A. 3d 1943) 138 F. (zd) 286, 
z88; Pierkowskie v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1944) 147 F. (zd) 
928, 932. 
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and certain types of contracts, such as especially marine 
insurance, fall out of the picture. Lex loci contractus and 
the casuistry of delivery are applied also to marin-e insur-
ance, but its old history has preserved for it universal prin-
ciples of maritime law serving for the construction of the 
contract in agreement with other seafaring nations. The 
courts preferably interpret the contracts "in harmony with 
the marine insurance laws of England, the great field of this 
business. m 6 
2. Statutes 
In rare cases, decisions have pointed directly to the im-
portance of the statutes, even to those of the forumY If 
they do, it is usually in order to declare that the statutes of 
the place of contracting are a part of the contract, which 
idea leads to a denial of party autonomy.18 
In reality, most branches of the insurance business are 
very intensively regulated in the states and territories and 
the statutes have made various attempts to prescribe the 
application of domestic law to insurance contracts. 
These provisions, however, despite a trend to unification, 
16 Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. (1923) 263 
U. S. 487, 493; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co. (C. C. A. sth 
1931) 49 F. (2d) 121, 124 states too pointedly that "it was a maritime contract, 
and therefore governed by the general admiralty law and not by the law of 
Texas," deserving correction as by The Anthony D. Nichols (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 
1931) 49 F. (2d) 927. The international community of maritime insurance law 
must be kept in view in the problem of reform, as rightly suggested by KELLY, 
"Effect of Proposed Conflict of Laws etc.," American Bar Assoc., Section of 
Insurance Law, 194o-1941, 176, 177. In addition, see GRIJ!SI!, "Marine Insur-
ance Contracts in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study of the Case 
Law," 6 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. (1959) 55; GRIESE, "lnternationales Seeversiche-
rungsrecht," Versicherungswissenschaftliches Archiv 1959, 129. 
17 As an exception, see, e.g., Yeats v. Dodson (1939) 345 Mo. 196, 206, 127 
S. W. (2d) 652, 656 where the authorization to make insurance contracts at 
offices in Kansas City, Missouri and nowhere else is the principal of four 
reasons to apply Missouri law, thus avoiding a clause. 
18 Cf. BATIFFOL 310 § 347; see Vol. II ( ed. 2) p. 397· A restrictive theory 
as to party autonomy in insurance contracts is explicitly advocated by RYSER, 
Der Versicherungsvertrag im internationalen Privatrecht (Thesis) (Berne, 
1957) 78-87 and KELLER in Roelli's Komm. (ed. 2) 61 ff. 
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still differ on the point here in question and, notwithstanding 
many improvements, still need reform.19 It is a rather ob-
scure matter, somewhat neglected in the literature. 
Tentatively, we may distinguish the following types of 
statutory provisions for governing insurance contracts. 
(a) In some states, all policies of insurance issued for 
delivery or issued and delivered within the state are declared 
subject to the provisions of the domestic law, either as a 
condition of licensing foreign insurers,20 or by subjecting 
foreign and domestic .insurers in one clause to the insurance 
statutes.21 
(b) In some statutes all insurance contracts on the life 
of residents and property or other interests within the state, 
are deemed to be made within the state and subject to its 
law.22 Contrary stipulations are sometimes declared void.23 
It may be noted marginally that in the flood of statutes 
in 1947-1948 mainly regulating insurance rates it has ap-
peared natural to extend their scope to insurance on prop-
erty or risks located in the state.24 
(c) Many provisions prohibit specific contract stipula-
tions or prescribe certain clauses.25 
Other statutes contain variations or are difficult to place. 
In particular, the meaning of many provisions indiscrim-
inately addressed to domestic and foreign insurers is 
ambiguous. 
19 Cf. 0RFIELD, "Improving State Regulations of Insurance," 32 Minn. L. 
Rev. ( 1948) 219. 
20 E.g., New Mexico: Stat. (1953) § 58-5-7; Wisconsin: Stat. Ann. (1957) 
§ 201.32. 
21 E.g., Indiana: Ann. Stat. (1952 Replacement) § 39-4206; Nebraska: Rev. 
Stat. ( 1943) § 44·302· 
22 E.g., Minnesota: Ann. Stat. (1945) § 60.28; Mississippi: Code (1942) 
§ 5633; cj. CARNAHAN (ed. 2) 122 ff. § 26. 
23 Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1959) c. 175 § 22. 
24 See the list by ELY, "State Rating and Related Laws," Ins. L. J. 1947, 
at 877 n. 12. 
25 PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," American Bar Assoc., Section 
of Insurance Law, 1937-38, 69 at 71 calls these statutes the "internal law 
group" and describes their criteria at 72 ff. 
INSURANCE 327 
The over-all result, however, is a broad claim not only 
to regulate insurance business by administrative prescrip-
tions but also to control insurance contracts of domestic 
and foreign licensed insurers by the domestic private law. 
In this regard, the statutes are efficiently supplemented by 
supervision over the policy forms to be used.26 Consultations 
between the commissioners or superintendents and the com-
panies about intended changes of legislation result, as I am 
told, in a satisfactory understanding as well as a vigorous 
influence by the state. 
Insurance carriers and state legislatures have considerably 
simplified the matter by establishing standard policies. 
These are nation-wide in the case of insurance against auto-
mobile liability and workmen's compensation, or are similar 
in all but a few states, as in fire insurance, or they are uni-
form for a group of states, as in theft and burglary insur-
ance. But although it is possible for the companies to comply 
with the various requirements of financial security and 
investments in the different states by obeying the highest 
standards,27 the heterogeneous private law provisions may 
not be easily satisfied. At the same time, a typical policy 
clause says in fact that "terms of this policy which are in 
conflict with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is 
issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes." 
If this is the living law, working as a whole, it would 
appear without much question that the law of the books and 
of the decisions is very improperly correlated. How do both 
spheres co-operate? 
The answer should lie with the definitions of the contracts 
26 Michigan: 17 Stat. Ann. ( 1943) §§ 24.266, 24.267. 
Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1935) § 40-216. 
South Dakota: Code (1939) § p.16or. 
27 PATTERSON, "The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," :1.3 Tex. L. 
Rev. (1944) r8, 31, 
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which the domestic law claims to govern, or at least of the 
contracts under its administrative supervision. 
We do not know, however, whether it is a singular pre-
tension or presents the rule generally in mind of the legisla-
tures, when the statute of Alabama prescribes: 
"All contracts of insurance the application for which is 
taken within the state, shall be deemed to have been made 
within this state and subject to the laws thereof, " 28 
or what is the exact meaning of the Utah provision: 
"Every insurance contract made through an authorized 
agent ... shall be deemed to have been made in the state 
of Utah irrespective of where the insurance contract was 
written. " 29 
Usually foreign corporations are not considered doing 
business in a state when they maintain only soliciting agents 
there, but insurance is a special matter. We encounter, in 
fact, divided opinions.30 
The universal trend, of course, towards extension of 
government control, in the states of this country as well as 
in Europe, produces results such as in Canada. Insurance 
28 Alabama: Code (I940) tit. 28 § IO. The Annotation declares that this is a 
constitutional provision, citing State Life Ins. Co. v. Westcott ( I9IO) I66 Ala. 
I 92, 52 So. 344· 
North Carolina: Stat ( I943) § 58.28. 
29 Utah: Code (I943) tit. 43 c. 3 § 23. 
ao 44 C. J. S. Insurance § 82: "A foreign company may be doing business 
in the state, if it actively solicits insurance and collects assessments ... "; 
to the same effect, 29 Am. Jur., Insurance § 4I, Supp. I948 p. 78 new par. 
But compare FLETCHER, IS Cyc. Corp. § 8725: " ... the mere solicitation of 
insurance through agents in such state, and the mere receipt or collection 
of premiums ... does not constitute business there unless other activities 
are engaged in by the foreign corporation in the foreign state." 
In a case involving contribution to an unemployment fund, the Supreme 
Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (I945) 326 U. S. 3IO, 320, 
found activities carried on through soliciting sales agents so systematic and 
continuous throughout years as to justify liability for contribution. This, 
certainly, is an exception to the rule. 
In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (I957) 355 U. S. 220, the Supreme 
Court upheld a California statute providing for jurisdiction over foreign com-
panies in cases where suit is brought on insurance contracts with residents of 
that state. This, again, shows that insurance is a special matter. 
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contracts "deemed to be made in the Province" will be 
assumed subject to its law when a local residence has been 
indicated in the policy or application, even though there 
is no actual residence in the state.31 However, the same 
result is reached by construction also if the contracts are 
really made in the Province.32 Thus, two jurisdictions are 
immediately in a positive conflict. 
For all connected questions, an exact definition of doing 
insurance business in a state is highly desirable but seldom 
afforded. An exception is Illinois where the following acts 
if performed within the state are declared to constitute 
transacting insurance business: 
" (a) Maintaining an agency or office where contracts 
are executed which are or purport to be contracts of insur-
ance with citizens of this or any other state; (b) maintaining 
files or records of contracts of insurance; or (c) receiving 
payment of premiums for contracts of insurance."33 
For describing the insurance contracts subject to super-
vision, the statutes usually emphasize issuance and/ or de-
livery of the policy in the state. As Patterson has discovered, 
delivery, "the crucial word," is ordinarily supposed to occur 
at the residence of the applicant who is usually the insured, 
whereas the domestic insurers are normally said to have "is-
sued" the policy.34 
In the entire picture, the most clearly emerging ideas are 
that states desire to regulate, partially or wholly, insurance 
contracts when ( 1) the insured is a resident or ( 2) the 
insured property is situated in the state. The first case 
conforms to the majority of the decisions. The second point 
of view is in direct contrast to the court decisions that in 
31 Re Duperreault (Sask.) [ I94I] I D. L. R. 38, discussing Rev. Stat. Sask., 
I 93o, C, IOI S. I 56. 
32 Re Mutual Benefit Accident Ass'n and Anderson (Ontario) [ I94d 4 
D. L. R. 347, commenting on Ins. Act, Rev. Stat. Ont., I937, c. 256 s. I30. 
33 Illinois: Rev. Stat. (I949) c. 73 § 733· 
34 PATTERSON, supra n. 25, at 74· 
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apparent consistency, for one or the other reason, recognize 
the law of the place of contracting even for fire insurance, 
although the objects are in another state.35 
3· Federal Constitution 
The impact of federal restrictions on state power to 
regulate insurance has been a controversial subject for a 
long time. The fluctuating views of the Supreme Court of 
the United States on this subject, often discussed,36 have 
led ultimately to a minimum of interference with the state 
activity. Insurance may be regulated by any state as it sees 
fit, provided that the regulation is neither outrageous nor 
discriminating and can be justified m any reasonable 
manner.37 
The orbit of unchecked state regulation thus permitted, 
35 To the same effect, Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (D. C. N. D. 
Ga. 1928) 27 F. (zd) 616, because "fire insurance is a purely personal con-
tract," but the court clearly construed the lex loci contractus as truly intended 
by the parties, in order to maintain the validity of the contract. The Seamans 
v. The Knapp Stout & Co. (1895) 89 Wis. 171, 61 N. W. 757, because 
insurance does not affect title; Western Massachusetts Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Hilton ( 1899) 42 App. Div. 52, 58 N. Y. Supp. 996, because the insurance 
was payable in Massachusetts; Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha (D. C. S. D. 
N. Y. 1926) 13 F. (zd) 500, 508, with constitutional argument; Vermont 
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Dyke (1933) 105 Vt. 257, 165 At!. 906, because of 
the "ordinary rule" of lex loci contractus. For comment see infra p. 347 f. 
The location of property is mentioned in addition to countersignature as 
supporting choice of law in George L. Squire Mfg. Co. v. Nat'! Fire Ins. Co. 
(D. C. W. D. N.Y. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 137. 
36 On the background of insurance regulation in the relationship of federa-
tion and state, see in particular Mr. Justice Rutledge in Prudential Ins. Co. 
v. Benjamin ( 1946) 328 U. S. 408, 413 ff. 
On the prehistory of this decision, see United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Association (1944) 322 U. S. 533· Note, "Congressional Consent to 
Discriminatory State Legislation," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) 927; and subse-
quently the McCarran Act of March 9, 1945, c. zo, 59 Stat. 33, as amended 
July 25, 1947, c. 326, 61 Stat. 448, 15 U.S. C. A.§§ 1012-1015; and bibliography 
in "Insurance as Interstate Commerce," by the Insurance Section of the 
American Bar Association, 1946-1947. The ensuing legislative activity of the 
states has been described by ELY, supra n. 24, at 867. 
37 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting vote, in Order of United Commercial 
Travelers of Amer. v. Wolfe (1947) 331 U. S. 586 at 630: "I had considered 
it well settled that if an insurance company does business at all in a state, 
its contracts are 'subject to such valid regulations as the state may choose 
to adopt.'" 
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in turn must be defined. Since Paul v. J7irginia,38 the Supreme 
Court has simply used the customary criterion of the place 
of contracting. A contract made in Tennessee "was a Ten-
nessee contract. The law of Tennessee entered into and 
became a part of it."39 Mississippi overreached its scope 
when it claimed control over a contract "made and to be 
performed in Tennessee."40 
However, the Due Process Clause, as in the last-men-
tioned case, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not 
operate so smoothly in other situations. In 1943, an event 
occurred of extreme importance for a basic contention of 
this work. The criterion for distributing state power over 
insurance was readily changed. Mr. Justice Black spoke for 
the court :41 
"In determining the power of a state to apply its own 
regulatory laws to insurance business activities, the question 
in earlier cases became involved by conceptualistic discussion 
of theories of the place of contracting or of performance. 
More recently it has been recognized that a state may have 
substantial interests in the business of insurance of its people 
or property regardless of these isolated factors. This in-
terest may be measured by highly realistic considerations 
such as the protection of the citizens insured or the protec-
tion of the state from the incidents of loss." (Reference to 
the opinions in the workmen's compensation case of Alaska 
Packers.) 42 
as Paul v. Virginia ( 1863) 8 Wall. 168. 
39 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken (1924) 266 U.S. 389, 399; New York Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357· 
40 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 
292 U. S. 143; cf. Vol. II ( ed. 2) p. 556 n. 15. The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi has accordingly revised its view, Protective Life Ins. Co. v. 
Lamarque (1938) 180 Miss. 243, 177 So. 15. 
41 Hoopestone Canning Co. v. Cullen (1943) 318 U.S. 313, 316. See LENHOFF, 
"Die spezifischen grenzrechtlichen Probleme im neueren amerikanischen 
V ersicherungsrecht," in Internationales V ersicherungsrecht-Festschrift fiir 
Albert Ehrenzweig (1955) 153, 161 ff. 
42 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. of California ( 1935) 294 
u. s. 532, 542. 
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Accordingly in the instant case, the elements connecting 
the insurance contract with the state of New York were 
enumerated and held to prevail, including activities, visits, 
and consultations, prior to and subsequent to the making of 
the contract, and the location of the insured object. 
This abandoning of the formalized old contracts presents 
a progress of immeasurable value.42a Their replacement by 
a method of balancing state interests in every individual 
situation, it is submitted, may not be the last word. It is 
too much like the method of ascertaining the most closely 
connected law by grouping all local connections, an opera-
tion vastly superior to lex loci contractus, but a source of 
great uncertainty. Conflicts law, advancing further, may 
once more suggest improvements in the constitutional 
doctrine. 
4· Fraternal Benefit Associations in Particular 
The different approaches in the three different spheres 
mentioned above are apparent in the treatment of corpora-
tions, including insurance of the members among other 
social purposes. The ancient Roman collegia funeraticia 
have their analogy in the fraternities taking care of the 
funerals of their members. From modest beginnings, certain 
American fraternal benefit associations have developed into 
very powerful companies using the same methods of business 
as ordinary insurers. Therefore the problem arose whether 
42R In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. ( 1960) 363 U. S. 207 the plaintiff, 
while being a resident of Illinois, purchased there from defendant an insur-
ance policy requiring that suit for a loss be brought within one year of the 
discovery; after having moved to Florida, plaintiff sustained losses there and 
instituted an action more than 12 months after discovery. A minority of the 
court was willing to affirm the application by the District Court of a Florida 
statute invalidating the time limitation of one year, which presumably was 
valid under Illinois law; but the majority held that the constitutional question 
was prematurely put and refused to answer it. 
See also Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. (1954) 348 
U.S. 66 and Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 264 f. 
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the insurance relationship of the corporation to the mem-
bers is governed by the law of the charter state conform-
ably to the principle of personal law or follows the same 
law as an ordinary insurance contract. 
(a) The courts were divided. A minority applied the 
law of the home state of the corporationY For the most 
part, the lex loci contractus prevailed.44 
(b) The state statutes commonly have excluded fraternal 
associations from their main provisions on foreign insurance 
carriers and subjected them merely to a restricted super-
vision. Nevertheless, under the title of public policy the 
home law has been disregarded in several cases which have 
raised the question of federal restraint.45 
(c) Recently the Supreme Court has declared by a nar-
row rna j ori ty the prevalence of the charter state over the 
state where a member resides.46 An essential part of the 
reasoning, however, seems to rest on the argument that the 
state of South Dakota had licensed the association and 
thereby acquired full knowledge of the terms of its insur-
ance conditions ;47 "if a state gives some faith and credit" 
to the organization of a fraternal benefit society by another 
state, permitting its own citizens to become members of, 
and benefit from, it, "then it must give full faith and credit" 
to the burdens and restrictions inherent in the membership.48 
The practical significance of the decision is doubtful, 
43 More recently, Van de Water v. Order of United Commercial Travelers 
of America (C. C. A. zd 1935) 77 F. (zd) 331; Meyer v. Meyer (C. C. A. 
8th 1935) 79 F. (zd) 55; Modern Woodmen of America v. Crudup (1935) 
175 Okla. 183, 51 Pac. (zd) 718; Kohler v. Kohler (C. C. A. 9th 1939) 104 F. 
(zd) 38. 
44 Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Meyer (1905) 198 U. S. 508; for 
the other cases, cf. z BEALE 1056 n. 6. 
45 See Note, "Full Faith and Credit: Preferential Treatment of Fraternal 
Insurers," 57 Yale L. J. (1947) 139· 
46 Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947) 331 
u.s. 586. 
47 !d. p. 624. 
4Bfd. p. 6z5. 
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since the plaintiff corporation itself subsequently changed 
the clause in issue (for a short limitation on members' 
suits) 49 and states are now expected to admit foreign fra-
ternal associations less easily.50 
5. A Reform Attempt 
In excellent reports to the American Bar Association in 
1937, it was explained that the conflicts practice concerning 
insurance contracts is defective,51 and subsequently a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Professor Patterson sub-
mitted a tentative draft of a Uniform Statute.52 Its first 
section was based on the principle that an insurance contract 
should be governed by the law of the state where the insured 
risk is situated. Life insurance should, for this purpose, be 
localized at the residence of the insured; insurance against 
loss or damage to property at the situation of the property; 
automobile liability insurance at the place where the vehicle 
is principally garaged, et cetera.52a Section 2 limits the ap-
plication of the domestic law to the contracts delivered or 
issued in the state. Section 3 exempts coverage of risks 
located in different states. 
The draft has been abandoned because of opposition 
from a number of representatives of insurance companies.53 
49 See Note, supra n. 45, at 143· 
50 I d. at 144. 
51 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, 1937-1938, Kansas 
City Meeting, 58 ff. 
5 2 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Program and Com-
mittee Reports (for the Meeting at) San Francisco, July xo-12, 1939· See also 
PATIERSON, Essentials of Insurance Law (ed. 2, 1957) 52 ff. § xo. 
52RThe Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (x96o) § 346h and§ 346i, 
contains virtually the same proposition. See also EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 516 ff. 
53 American Bar Association, Section of Insurance Law, Philadelphia Meet-
ing 194o-194I, 176 ff., reports by AMBROSE B. KELLY, ROBERT E. HALL, and 
HERVEY J. DRAKE. HENRY, id. 173 sub (I) recognizes that the companies 
"escape liability" only by exception. The apprehensive arguments of KELLY, 
id. 178 f. against Patterson on the ground of unconstitutionality of rules other 
than the law of the place of contracting have since quickly lost their value. 
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Apart from certain amendments, they advanced the thesis, 
doubly astonishing in the mouth of insurers, that the present 
conflicts rules are all to the good and exclude any doubt. At 
the same time it was contended that the proposed local 
connections would provoke litigation. Force of habit is a 
strong force with lawyers I Professor Patterson's authority 
reinforces the conviction that in all three sets of American 
rules a change is maturing from legalistic tests to criteria 
indicating a connection with the scope of state supervision 
and with the risk insured. An analogous development of 
the European doctrines confirms the adequacy of the new 
method and contributes further suggestions for its use. 
There the conflicts literature has largely adopted the view 
of the specialists of insurance law that insurance contracts 
are of a peculiar nature due to the extensive influence of the 
supervising state which "directs" or "dictates" the contents 
of the contracts.54 
II. FoREIGN LAws 
I. Traditional Tests 
Lex loci contractus. As in other contracts, the law of the 
place of contracting has exercised a strong hold on insurance 
contracts. This is true, not only of the United States, as 
well as France and Italy, countries professing this principle, 
but also of several other countries. 55 Particularly for mari-
time insurance, lex loci contractus is favored. 56 
54 See, e.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 7) 40'] § 353· 
55 Canada: Re Mutual Benefit & Accident Ass'n ( 1941) 4 D. L. R. 347· 
France: Cass. req. (Dec. 18, 1872) S. 1873.1.35, Clunet 1874, 235; Cass. civ. 
(Dec. 28, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 682: an English styled policy. 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 13, 1891) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3 (domicil of insurer); 
(Nov. II, 1928) 122 RGZ. 233· For other cases, see BATIFFOL § 350. 
Italy: Former C. Com. art. 58; C. C. Disp. Prel. ( 1942) art. 25; CAVAGLIERI, 
Dir. Int. Com. 466 ff. 
56 See RrPERT, 3 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 369 § 2377; 2 }ACOBS § 681; (most cases 
cited supra n. 55 concern maritime insurance) ; 2 Repert. 180 n. 5· 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 17, 1925) Jur. Port Anvers 1925, 97· 
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The C6digo Bustamante repeats this rule if it is not a 
contract "by adhesion," for all insurance contracts, except 
fire insurance between parties of different personallaw.57 
But a group of writers have adjusted the law of the place 
of contracting to the phenomenon of contracts of adhesion. 
Because the application is on the standard form of the 
insurer, the contract is completed by the insurer at his home 
office.58 
L'aw common to the parties. Nationality or domicil com-
mon to the parties has been stressed particularly if they are 
subjects of the forum, 59 but this is an awkward rule. 
Lex loci solutionis. A few decisions have localized in-
surance at the insurer's place, apparently as a place of 
performance,60 but they rest on the assumption that the 
prevailing circumstances point to this place. 
France: Cass. req. (April 24, 1854) S. r8s6.1.339; Trib. consulaire Alex-
andrie (June 29, 1874), aff'd, App. Aix (April 15, 1875), 2 Repert. 183 No. 29. 
Germany: RG. (April 13, 1898} JW. 1898, 371, Clunet 1899, 295. 
The Netherlands: See infra n. 63. 
57 C6digo Bustamante, art. 262, omits a reference to art. 185, but is con-
sidered to imply it by BusTAMANTE, La Commission de Jurisconsultes de Rio 
147; id., 2 Der. Int. Priv. 294 § 1377· 
58 RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 401 f. § 2409; DESMET§ 36; DIENA, 2 Dir. 
Com. Int. 462; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 476 (thus evading art. 58 of the 
former Italian C. Com.). Cf. also Note, 22 Revue Dor ( 1930) 287. 
59 England: DICEY ( ed. 6) Rule 149: where an English merchant ships goods 
from England and insures them with English underwriter, English law, 
despite a foreign flag. DICEY ( ed. 7) Rule 161 superseded the old rule by 
enunciating the principle that marine insurance policies are governed by 
English law if issued by an underwriter carrying on business in England. 
France: App. Aix (March 22, 1923) S. 1924.2.124 (maritime insurance; 
common nationality and flag}. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 27, 1928} 120 RGZ. 70, 73 (German law for life 
insurance taken out in Vienna, Austria, by a German domiciled in Vienna 
from the local general representative of a German company; expressly 
overruling RG. (Feb. 13, 1891) 47 Seuff. Arch. 3· Contra: NussBAUM, JW. 
1928, 1198; BRUCK 30 n. 84; KELLER in 4 Roelli's Komm. ( ed. 2) 23. 
Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. C. (1942) art. 25 par. 1. 
60 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, 1902) 53 RGZ. 138; (Jan. r6, 1925) 34 Z. int. R. 
(1925) 427; Bay. ObLG. (June 24, 1931) IPRspr. 1931 No. s; OLG. Koln 
(Sept. 9, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, No. 94· 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 BGE. Il287, 291. 
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2. Proper Law 
The English doctrine has consistently maintained the 
force of express and presumptive party intention. "It is no 
doubt competent to an underwriter on an English policy to 
stipulate ... according to the law of any foreign state."61 
Subsidiarily, the circumstances of the case may supersede 
even the English law of the place of contracting.62 The 
prevailing Continental theory has been to the same effect. 
Express agreement, presumptive intention, or the law most 
closely connected with the contract have been looked for 
as a rule. 63 Particularly maritime insurance, naturally free 
from intensive state supervision, has enjoyed a long tradi-
tion of free choice. Among the criteria of choice of law, use 
61 Greer v. Poole (I88o) 5 Q. B. D. 272, per Lush, J., cited by DICEY (ed. 7) 
836 as a general rule. In Pick v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. (I958) 2 LI. L. 
Rep. 93 per Diplock, J., the force of party intention has been confirmed, and 
from the circumstances given in the case at bar the learned judge inferred 
that the law of the insurer's head office (Ontario) governed a policy delivered 
to plaintiff in Palestine. For a comment, see KAHN-FREUND, "Contractual 
Obligation and the Conflict of Laws: Contracts of Insurance," 22 Mod. L. Rev. 
(I959) I95· 
62 Maritime Ins. Co. v. Assecuranz Union von I865 (I935) 79 Sol. J. 403, 
52 LI. L. Rep. I6 per Goddard, J.: reassurance with a German reassurer, 
signed in Liverpool and Hamburg respectively; the English arbitration clause, 
though merely "an honorable agreement," points to English law under which 
the contract is void (an illustration to Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 390 n. 118). 
63 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 6, I900) and other cases, see DE SMET 49· 
France: PICARD et BESSON, I Traite § 303 (for contracts that are not forcibly 
French, see infra p. 344). 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, I93I) IPRspr. I932, 6I No. 30 with respect to the 
consent of the parties in form (separated from the contract against the better 
methods of the same court); (April 11, I933) IPRspr. I933, 40 No. 2I. OLG. 
Stettin (Feb. 22, I932) IPRspr. I932, 79 No. 35 (party intention for the law 
of the German insurer according to all circumstances). 
Greece: FRAGISTAS, I Symmikta Streit at 347, proves full liberty of the 
parties to exist. 
The Netherlands: H. R. (June I3, I924) N.]. I924, 859, 8 Revue Dor 3I9 
(reversing the decision by App. den Haag cited in Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 390 n. 
118; see also id. at n. 120). App. den Haag (Oct. I9, I934) W. 12889, N. ]. 
I934, I66o (two Belgians contract in the Netherlands on a Dutch policy for 
insurance of Dutch agricultural products). 
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of a national standard form has much importance as m 
maritime carriage. 64 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, however, seems only to 
recognize an express agreement, formulated by at least one 
party.65 
3· The Law of the Insurer 
More recently a theory has found great favor which 
again starts by recognizing the group of "contracts of ad-
hesion," concluded on the terms of one party through mere 
acceptance by the other. The contract of insurance is cer-
tainly an outstanding example. The need for protecting the 
interests of the insured is evident and well known.66 But 
this is a consideration of municipal policy everywhere. 
In conflicts law it has been inferred that the place of the 
insurer is the center of the contract. In addition to the 
authors mentioned above who to this effect construe the 
place of the insurer as the place of contracting, increasing 
authority has directly adopted this law.67 A sound formula-
64 Congress of Antwerp on Commercial Law (1885) Actes IZ9 quest. 52. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (May 13, 1936) 35 Revue Dor 96. 
England: The Penthames, Boag v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. ( 1937) 
57 Ll. L. Rep. 83 (implicitly). 
France: App. Aix (March 22, 1923) S. 1924.2.124: goods shipped from the 
Philippines, where contract made, to Marseilles, English insurance form; 
contra: Cass. req. (Dec. 28, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 682. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 23, I93I) IPRspr. I932, 6I No. 30: English law for 
a contract of participation in an insurance risk, because of policy clauses. 
OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 23, I934) Hans. RGZ. 1935 B 31: insurance taken 
in Istanbul with reference to Lloyd's usages, no application of the General 
German Marine Insurance Conditions. 
65 BG. (Nov. 2, I945) 7I BGE. II 287, 290 in this case acknowledges inten-
tion to apply German law. On the subsidiary rule, see infra p. 343 n. So. On 
the requirement of an express agreement, see RYSER, supra n. I8, at 84 f. 
66 A book by A. MISSOL, L'assurance contrat d'adhesion, et Ie probleme de 
Ia protection de )'assure (Paris I934) is announced in 34 Revue Trim. D. 
Civ. (I935) 344 No. I6. 
67 2 BAR I48, 226; 2 MElLI 375; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 458, 3 id. 468; 
}ITTA, I Substance 393; JOSEPH, I Z. int. R. (I9I3) 492; 2 SCHNITZER (ed, 4) 
734 f.; KEGEL, Kom. (ed. 9) 562 f. note I93 before art. 7 EG. BGB. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8 No.5; Draft 1961, art. 15 § 2 No.7· 
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tion has been achieved by the leading German scholar m 
insurance law, Ernst Bruck.68 He argues as follows: 
In exceptional cases, individual agreements may be con-
cluded in insurance of transport, vessels, credit, or against 
loss by money exchange. Other insurance contracts, however, 
usually follow a definite pattern, although some individual 
clauses may be modified or inserted. The totality of the 
contracts of one class form an economic unit conditioned 
by their essentially identical legal structure. To assume a 
risk requires technical as well as legal uniform planning. 
\V e must focus not on the isolated contract but on the group 
of similar contracts, when we look for adequate localiza-
tion. Consequently, the contract centers in the country where 
the in~u.rer uses his particular technique under national 
supervisiOn. 
Or to quote a French author: 
It seems more normal to localize the contract at the seat 
of the insurer, because of the technical organization of in-
surance and the insurer's duty of basing statistics on similar 
conditions, in order to calculate with some certainty. Often 
the idea of protecting the assured is invoked for justifying 
the application of the law of the place of contracting, but 
if the assured knows the law of his domicil, it is not shown 
that this law protects him better than the law of the insurer's 
domicil.69 
Nevertheless, the concentration on the domicil of the 
insurer, by this reasoning, turns to its exact opposite in case 
of a branch or agency established in a foreign country since 
it forms a partial nucleus of contracts. Even on this basis 
several systems are possible. But in the rna jority70 of Euro-
68 BRUCK IO f.; BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 40 ff.; BRUCK-MOLLER, Kom. ( ed. 
8) 8 I ff. ns. 86-98 before sect. 1. 
69 PICARD et BESSON, I Traite 624 § 304. 
70 See, as an example, Brazil, Decreto-Lei of March 7, I940, No. 2063 art. 7· 
We do not hear much of the minority to which England belongs and in 
which FRAGISTAS, "The Contract of Insurance in Private International Law 
(Greek)" in I Symmikta Streit 34I, 345 counts Greece. He maintains that a 
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pean and Latin-American countries, insurance contracts 
made through the general representative of a foreign insurer 
are in a compulsory manner subjected to a domestic law. 
This seems to have been suggested by the particular nature 
of the license needed by any insurer, which includes a grant 
depending on numerous prerequisites. The subjection of 
the contracts to the domestic law has been inferred from 
their presumptive intention, or voluntary submission, or by 
implication from the grant of the license.71 
The impact of the territorial law on establishments of 
a foreign insurer is commonly very large in Europe and 
Latin America. The authority of the general representative 
whom foreign insurers must appoint, is broad, if not un-
limited and unlimitable as in Germany. Often a company 
is not allowed to make contracts otherwise than by the 
local agent with residents of the state or with respect to 
domestic immovables.72 The local requirements of financial 
security and investment contribute to complete the division 
of an international insurer's business into separate terri-
torial compartments. 
An illustration existed in the Peace Treaty of Versailles. 
An Allied or Associated Power could cancel the insurance 
contracts of its nationals with a German company, in which 
case the company had to hand over "the proportion of its 
assets attributable to the policies so cancelled." In the case 
of a branch in a victor country, subject to the latter's right 
to liquidation, conflicts rules were expressed: 
Greek license to do business subjects the foreign insurance carrier to the 
Greek laws but does not force application of Greek (private) law upon 
contracts made in Greece. 
71 BRUCK 30 n. 84; KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 563 n. 55· 
For a thorough discussion, see PROLss, "Das Statut der Zweigniederlassung 
im internationalen Versicherungsrecht," r6 RabelsZ. ( 195o-5r) 203; RAISER, 
Bestandszugehorigkeit im internationalen Versicherungsrecht, Festschrift fiir 
Hans Lewald (1953) 349· 
72 BRUCK, Privatversich. R. II2, II4. The method is familiar; see, for 
instance, Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1925) 9 F. (2d) 
202, based on a provision of the Ohio Code respecting property in Ohio. 
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"Where contracts of life insurance have been entered into 
by a local branch . . . in a country which subsequently 
became an enemy country, the contract shall, in the absence 
of any stipulation to the contrary in the contract itself, be 
governed by the local law .... 
"In any case where by the law applicable to the contract 
the insurer remains bound by the contract ... until notice is 
given to the insured, etc."73 
The local state control over business establishments issu-
ing policies pia yed a role also in other problems after the 
First World War. A well-known New York decision went so 
far as to attribute to theN ew York branch of a nationalized 
Russian insurance company a distinct personality sufficient 
to keep it alive. 74 The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in analogous 
reasoning, mentioned the importance of the obligatory 
Swiss general representative of any foreign insurer and the 
security furnished by the latter, and held that where a 
German obtained a policy through the Swiss branch of a 
German company, his rights were inaccessible to a French 
war liquidation.75 The German Supreme Court similarly 
assumed that an insurance policy issued by an Indian branch 
of the New York Life Insurance Company, but later wholly 
transferred to the Berlin branch of the company, could not 
be validly seized by the British custodian in India: 
It may be left undecided whether the Berlin branch is 
an independent legal person. In any case it is represented by 
the general agent, entitled in its external relation to acquire 
73 Treaty of Versailles, Part X, V, Annex III, MARTENS, Recueil Ser. 3, XI, 
580 ff., §§ 13, 14. In the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, Annex XVI, No.4, 
insurance contracts are reserved for separate conventions between the Allied 
or Associated Power interested and the Italian Government. An implementing 
agreement between Italy and the U. K. of June r, 1954, was ratified on 
May 9, 1958 (British Treaty Series No. 27, 1958). A similar agreement was 
concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the U. K. ( 1961 
BGBI. II. no). 
14 Lehman, J., in Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. 
(1939) 28o N.Y. 286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, aff'd (1940) 309 U.S. 624. 
75 Swiss BG. (Nov. 4• 1920) 46 BGE. II 421. 
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rights independently and must therefore be treated like an 
independent legal person in domestic transactions. 76 
Correspondingly, an American court, refusing jurisdiction 
in a test case for recovery of the cash surrender value from 
the New York Life Insurance Company, states that the 
policy was issued by the branch in Germany to a German 
resident and: 
"The agency in Germany was established as a distinct 
entity, a German creation under German law. A reserve 
fund was made and all premiums received were placed in 
that fund and invested in Germany under German official 
approval. " 77 
Numerous consequences of this situation are perceptible.78 
The entire theory calling for the law of the insurer's head-
quarters or its branch office, respectively, has been endorsed 
by contemporary writers,79 German and Swiss courts,80 and 
the Montevideo Draft of 1940.81 
If, however, the applicable law is to be dependent on 
16RG. (Nov. 26, 1920) JW. 1921,245. 
77 Heine v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 9th 1931) so F. (2d} 382, 
385. The court says that 28,000 policies executed in Germany were sought to 
be enforced in this country. 
78 E.g., Italy: Cass. (April 8, 1938} Foro Ita!. 1938 I 823, Giur. Ita!. 1938 I 
7 55, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 1938, 323: the Italian "general agency" of a foreign 
insurer is an independent enterprise, hence its assets in the country may be 
separately liquidated; Cass. (Jan. 10, 1941) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1941, 12, 10 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. ( 1944) 125 No. 25: hence, also, the Italian stock of insurances with 
reserves is a possible object of separate transfer. 
79 Argentina: HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro (seguros terrestres) (Buenos 
Aires 1946) 64 § 57· 
Austria: ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, sr., Deutsches (osterreichisches} Versich-
erungsvertragsrecht ( 1952) 29 f. 
France: PICARD et BESSON, 1 Traite 624 § 304, supra n. 69; ARMIN JON, Droit 
Int. Pr. Com. 471 § 281. 
Germany: BAR in Ehrenberg's Handb. 413; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 231. An 
opponent has been criticized by MOLLER, 9 Z. a us!. PR. ( 1935) 336; HAGEN, 
Z. f. d. Ges. Versicherungs-Wissenschaft (1935) 76. 
Italy: LORDI, 1 Istituzioni di diritto commerciale ( 1943} 34, referring to his 
work, 2 Obbligazioni commerciali 1032 § 831; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 501. 
Switzerland: KELLER in 4 Roelli's Komm. (ed. 2) 7 ff.; BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 
71 BGE. II 287, 292. 
BOGermany: OLG. Konigsberg (Dec. 9, 1930) BI. IPR. 1931, 2n; Bay. 
ObLG. (June 24, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, 13; RG. (April u, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 
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the influence of state supervision, the delimitation of the 
administrative state supervision is of primary importance. 
In the same connection the situation of the insured risk 
requires consideration. 
4· State Supervision and the Situation of the Risk 
The European doctrine concedes great influence to the 
scope claimed by the state for administrative control of 
insurance contracts. 
In contrast to the traditional American emphasis on the 
legal completion of contract-making, the most thorough 
Continental authors have stated that doing insurance busi-
ness requires carrying on of insurance operations, whereas 
the making of contracts is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
In the German opinion, any activities preparatory to or 
subsequent to contracting such as soliciting, advising, cash-
ing of premiums, or watching the development of the risk, 
may be grounds for state supervision even though the con-
tract may be concluded in a foreign country.82 
Even taking this broad definition of the agent's co-opera-
tion in the individual contract as a criterion, delimitation 
of the scope of the domestic law requires additional facts. 
Definition of the scope of control in general is given by 
each state as it sees fit, and is often left to the controlling 
board of commissioners.83 But the laws leave gaps, and 
40; see the comment by BATIFFOL 313 n. 6; BGH. (Feb. 11, 1953) 9 BGHZ. 34 
and IPRspr. 1952-53, No. 37; BGH. (March 24, 1955) 17 BGHZ. 74 and 
IPRspr. 1954-55, No. 32. 
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 2, 1945) 71 BGE. II 287, 291, referring to its inde-
pendently developed previous thesis, 51 BGE. II 409, that insurance of Swiss 
79 BGE. II 193. 
inhabitants by foreign insurers is subject to Swiss law. BG. (March 26, 1953) 
81 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 12 sent. 2 for life 
insurance: where the company is domiciled or has its branch or agency. 
8 2 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 329. 
83 NEUMEYER, id. 343 ff. 
As to constitutional limitations on state supervision in insurance matters in 
this country, see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia (1950) 339 U.S. 643. On 
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choice of law is sufficiently distinguishable from discretion-
ary delimitation of the scope of supervision, to be subjected, 
for instance in Germany, to court jurisdiction.84 
The literature has sought a desirable method of defining 
the limits of state control for the purpose of choice of law. 
Among the numerous solutions,85 one has been prevailingly 
favored: In the insurance of persons their residence, in the 
insurance of property rights the situation of the property, 
and generally the place of the risk insured, are decisive.86 
The similarity of these results with the order of ideas lead-
ing in the United States to the recent theory of the Supreme 
Court and to the proposals of the Patterson Committee and 
of the Restatement (Second) is obvious. 
A recent French development is of particular interest. 
First conceived for fiscal purposes, a theory emphasizing 
the locality of the risk has been extended to the application 
of private law. Foreign insurers submit reports on all con-
tracts "signed or performed in France or Algiers ... or 
any contract of assurance accepted by them and concerning 
a person, an asset, or a liability in these territories." It is 
further provided that any contract of insurance not regis-
tered within a month from its date is void.87 According to 
authoritative writers, this recent law implies that all activi-
the scope of application of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the field of 
interstate insurance, as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Federal 
Trade Commission v. Travelers Health Ass'n ( 1960) 362 U. S. 293 and 
(C. C. A. 8th 1962) 298 F. (2d) 82o. 
8 4 This seems to be the true thesis of RG. (Feb. 21, 1930) 127 RGZ. 360. 
85 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 348 f. 
86 Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law (1889) art. 8 for insurance 
"on land" and transportation: where the object is at the time of contracting. 
NEUMEYER, id. 350 advocates localization of the risk as to movables at their 
ordinary place; and of liability and reinsurance at the center of the assets 
and liabilities of the insured. 
87 Decree-Law of October 30, 1935, amending art. 2 of the Law of Feb. 15, 
1917, complemented by Decree of Jan. 12, 1937 concerning the foreign enter-
prises or insurers doing business in France and Algiers. These provisions 
have been maintained in the Insurance Law, Decree-Law of June 14, 1938, 
art. 42. 
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ties of foreign insurers in France are compulsorily subjected 
to all "imperative French laws."88 Hence French law is 
applicable, not only the fiscal but also the private law, 
whenever the risk covered is situated in France. This means 
that life insurance or an individually agreed accident or 
health insurance is localized at the domicil or the habitual 
residence of the insured, if in France. A liability insurance 
is French, when the act involving responsibility covered 
should normally or principally occur in France. The object 
insured against fire, hail, and the like must be in France. 
In this view, French law does not necessarily govern 
marine, credit, or fluvial insurance and reinsurance if they 
have foreign elements, nor are contracts signed in a foreign 
country and covering a risk situated outside France, subject 
to its law. These contracts are said to be the only subject 
matters of conflict of laws which follow the lines designed 
by Bruck.89 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The basic problems of conflicts of insurance laws could 
not by any means be exhausted in the foregoing report.90 
But the fundamental trend in the efforts to reach conflicts 
rules more adequate to the real situation is rather obvious. 
The old rules clinging to the formation of the contract or its 
fulfillment are in this field particularly obnoxious, and in-
88 PICARD et BESSON, I Traite 6I8 § 30I arguing particularly (I) as to life 
insurance, cf. Laws of March I7, I905 and July 13, I93o, (2) as to workmen's 
accident insurance, cf. Decree of Feb. 28, I899, ( 3) as to automobile accident 
insurance, cf. Decree-Law of August 8, I935, and Decree of June 3, I936, 
art. 6, and generally cf. Decree-Law of August 25, I937· For other literature 
to the same effect, see DALLOZ, I Nouveau repertoire de droit (1947) 313. 
89 I d. 623 § 302. 
90 Still less are special problems discussed. See for Continental literature 
on double insurance, 2 BAR §§ 267, 335; BRUCK 48; 3 SMEESTERS and WINKEL-
MOLEN II § 940; DESMET 369 § 402; and on reinsurance, BRUCK IS; 2 Repert. 
183 § 3I; BATIFFOL 317 n. 4; ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 487 § 297· 
On the scope of the conflicts rule concerning insurance contracts, see BRUCK 
I6 f.; FRAGISTAS, supra n. 701 356 ff. 
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tensive state control over the insurance business is recog-
nized as the most powerful force localizing insurance 
activities of all sorts. When the Canadian provinces adopted 
the Uniform Life Insurance Act, the fact was stated with 
regard to alien insurers "that the very natural intention of 
the parties, who live and who do business here, legalized 
and protected by our laws, is that the insurance law of this 
country will govern the contract and rights which arise 
thereunder. " 91 
1. Special Choice of Law 
It must be remembered even in this field that despite 
extremely large inroads of imperative norms into the con-
tractual law,92 disposition by the parties is the primary 
principle and that the rules demanded are merely intended 
for use in the typical standard contracts. 
(a) Party autonomy. As a principle, the right of parties 
also to stipulate for the applicable law in insurance con-
tracts has been strictly affirmed in Europe.93 In the United 
91 FRANK HoDGINS, 22 Can. L. T. (I902) I, quoted with approval by PIERSON, 
Am. Bar Assoc., Section of Insurance Law, I937-I938, 81, a lawyer connected 
with a New York life insurance company. 
92 On the compulsory rules applied to the contract, as a whole, and public 
policy opposing foreign law recognized as applicable in general, see in particu-
lar 44 C. J. S. 5I6 §54; BATIFFOL 3IO § 347; BRUCK 26 ff., 37 ff.; KELLER in 4 
Roelli's Komm. ( ed. 2) 7I ff. 
An example of an illicit object of insurance, much discussed in Continental 
literature, involves the old prohibition against insuring the wages of master 
and crew of a vessel, still existing in German HGB. § 780 but restricted in 
Belgian C. Com. art. I9I; see 2 BAR 227 n. I09; 3 SMEESTERS and WINKEL-
MOLEN 62 § 972 and cit. 
Another nice question: Is insurance with insurers in Johannesburg for 
transport (from Portuguese Africa to Belgium) of diamonds smuggled out of 
Transvaal, lawful? App. Bruxelles (May 13, I936) Belg. Jud. I937, 4· 
93 lost. Int. Law, Florence, Resol. art. 2 n. f, 22 Annuaire (1908) 290. 
Germany: BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 39 § 5 n. 3; HAGEN, Seeversicherungs-
recht (Berlin I938) I9 ("German conception"). 
Greece: FRAGISTAS, supra p. 339 n. 70, at 347 and n. 2. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 462. 
France: SuMIEN, 2 Repert. I5I Nos. IS, I6. Contra: ARMINJON, Droit Int. 
Pr. Com. 478 § 288. 
Switzerland: RYSER and KELLER, supra p. 325 n. I8, tend to deny any party 
autonomy in insurance matters. 
INSURANCE 347 
States it has sometimes been denied.94 But apart from the 
philosophy of private law, admitting for the sake of the 
argument the very system of a compulsory law of the place 
of contracting, it must always be remembered that in this 
country a state cannot impose its insurance law on parties 
contracting in another state.95 The forum, thus, is powerless 
to prevent the parties from eluding all of the applicable 
provisions of the forum, including its most vital "interests." 
It would be strange if they were not allowed to contract 
in the forum and stipulate for a foreign law, which never-
theless would not remove the imperative part of the do-
mestic statute. This more considerate approach, under the 
present-day practice, even preserves extraterritorial effect 
to the public policy of the forum. 
Now, as we are to abandon the system of mechanical 
rules, we have to discover the most suitable rules to replace 
them. But adequate conflicts rules for various types of 
insurance contracts cannot be stated except in a subsidiary 
function. The task would be forbidding, if these rules were 
to be imposed upon the parties with ironclad necessity. 
(b) Special situations. Analogous considerations are due 
to the atypical cases. If we, for instance, postulate as a 
sound rule that fire or windstorm insurance should be 
governed by the law of the state where the insured object 
lies, we must yet recognize that two parties residing and 
contracting in one state to insure a risk located in Japan 
may be subjected to the law of the place of residence, in 
contrast to the case where they contract through their local 
agents in J apan.96 This consideration is entirely different 
94 See Vol. II (ed. z) p. 414, cf. the Mississippi case referred to id. p. 528 
n. 38. 
95 See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 F. 
(zd) soo. 
96 See the analogous German reinsurance case, Vol. II (ed. z) p. sz6; and 
BG. (Jan. zo, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 88: Italian parties to an insurance of a 
transport from Rotterdam to Basle, Italian law, including Italian subrogation 
in contractual claims. 
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from those on account of which fire and windstorm insurance 
has been held not to fall under the law of the situs.97 
Dealing next with the subsidiary rule referring to the 
law of the residence of the insured, we shall concentrate 
on life insurance where this test points in an appropriate 
direction. 
2. Life Insurance: Law of the Residence of the Insured 
A majority of the American court decisions, by applying 
the law of the place of contracting in all insurance contracts, 
have reached the law of the domicil or residence of the 
insured. Many American statutes obtain a similar result 
through various formulas. European doctrines use the same 
criterion in restriction to insurance of persons, such as life, 
health, and accident insurance. 
Yet if the results seem similar, the ideas underlying the 
localization vary, and the exact choice of the decisive con-
tact must be shaped accordingly. 
(a) Delivery of policy. American courts contemplate the 
place where the insured manually receives the insurance 
policy. As such, this place is so casual as to defy the purpose 
of conflicts law. The application of this test has been made 
tolerable only through added fictions. 
(b) Inhabitants. The statutes may certainly be presumed 
to extend their protection to the inhabitants of the state, 
in prescribing standards of fair dealing and fair competition 
between insurers.98 This formula seems to include citizens 
of the state, residents and also probably even people tem-
porarily present in the state. 
Logically, the formula implies that the domestic law 
should govern all contracts of residents and exclude all 
97 Supra p. 330 n. 35 and see the analogous situations in sales of immovables, 
supra p. no. 
98 PATTERSON, "The Conflict Problems etc.," supra n. 25, at 74· 
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contracts of nonresidents (at least, with foreign insurers). 
A proposal understood to this effect was opposed, advancing 
the example that life insurance has been obtainable only 
with exclusion of risk by flying, although some states pro-
hibited "aviation riders"; a resident of such a state would 
be prevented from going to another state where he may 
obtain the usual policy.99 This objection is of doubtful 
value, but such meaning should not be ascribed to the rule. 
In the United States, the constitutional restrictions on state 
power and, elsewhere, principles of reasonable interpreta-
tion require more than domiciliary or residential conditions, 
as shown in the following essentially different constructions. 
(c) Law of licensing state. If the applicable law is con-
ceived as that of the licensing state rather than that of 
the insured's domicil, two basic conditions are required, to 
which the personal location of the insured in the state may 
or may not be a precondition. One of these conditions is 
that the insurer must do business in the state so as to need 
licensing. The other is that the local agent whom every 
foreign insurer is bound to appoint must be in some way 
connected with the individual contract. 
The latter connection can be imagined in various manners. 
The minimum requirement has been indicated, for instance, 
in Germany and Alabama: any activity of a foreign corpo-
ration through its agent with respect to a contract suffices 
to justify the application of the domestic law, soliciting, 
receiving the application, delivering the policy, collecting 
the first premium, etc. Often making the contract is a con-
dition. The Patterson Draft (Section 2) requires in all 
cases of insurance that the contract should be: 
"Either delivered in this state by or through an agent or 
other representative of the insurer, or issued by the insurer 
99 Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law 194o>-1941, 173 No. 2 and 185 No.4· 
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in this state for delivery by or through a person other than 
an agent or other representative of the insurer, ... " 
which in case of life, accident, or health insurance is addi-
tional to the condition that the insured is a resident of the 
state when the contract becomes effective. (Section 1 a) 
In all these variants, a policy is not affected if the local 
agent has no part whatever in its negotiation. Many statutes, 
seeking to avoid evasion, therefore declare that any insur-
ance concluded abroad with an insurer licensed in the state 
should be deemed as made in the state or declared void. 
Whether challengeable or not,100 such provisions transgress 
the reasonable limits of state power. 
Insurance procured merely by correspondence with a 
foreign insurer, at least one not having a local agent, is 
left free. This agrees with the American practice101 and 
the German doctrine.102 
Thus far, however, we have presupposed that the con-
flicts rule selects its own criterion with respect to all life 
insurance contracts. 
(d) Law of the state supervising the contract. Since 
many states refrain from imposing the imperative part of 
their private law upon insurance contracts not "made" in 
the state, it is a possible solution to make the application 
of the local law dependent on the individual regulation 
of doing business in the state. This would avoid applying 
1oo As illustration, see for the United States supra pp. 328, 330; for Brazil, 
McDOWELL, "Contratos de seguro celebrados no estrangeiro," 26 Rev. Jur. 252 
(against the then existing decrees); and inversely in France, SUMIEN, "Des 
conflits de lois relatifs aux assurances sur Ia vie contractees irregulierement 
avec des societes etrangeres," Revue Crit. 1934, so, against a liberal decision 
of Cass. req. (March 21, 1933) published ibid. On the corresponding German 
controversy, see BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 46 f. 
Swiss courts recognize that a Swiss insurer doing business abroad and con-
tracting there is under foreign law; see KELLER in Roelli's Komm. ( ed. 2) 32· 
1o1 E.g., Huntington v. Sheehan ( 1912) 206 N. Y. 486, 489, 100 N. E. 41. 
Since the mail-order insurance business has grown enormously, modern 
American practice is evidently taking a new approach; see the Travelers 
Health Ass'n cases, supra n. 83. 
102 BRUCK 33· 
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the law of a state which does not tmpose it and thus 
obviate some complications. But the uncertainty now pre-
vailing in many states with respect to what contracts are 
subject to supervision, would extend to private law. 
The least uncertain term for a permanent living center 
is "habitual residence." Whether temporary residence 
should suffice ought to be expressly stated in the statutes. 
3· The Law of Situs 
Insurance of immovables against risks such as fire, storm, 
or hail, damage to glass, machines, or waterpipes, mani-
festly belongs to the sphere of the state of the situation. 
State care for agriculture, industry, and housing has become 
of such importance as to require intensive control over pre-
ventive policy as well as over the recovery of damage to 
domestic resources and investments.103 It is reasonable 
to apply the same test to movables "insured in a fixed 
location."104 
4· Various Kinds of Insurance 
It is interesting that the American proposals of 1939 
and likewise the French doctrine locate the center of lia-
bility for automobile accidents at the place where the car 
is principally garaged (or principally used, adds the Amer-
ican draft). Normally, this results in the law of the car 
owner's or user's residence and to that extent it does not 
justify the fear of uncertainty. But the residence by itself 
may well suffice for localizing all types of insurance not 
103 NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 352; BRUCK, Privatversich. R. 47· This 
kind of consideration seems to have escaped the opponents to Professor Patter-
son's proposal, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law, 194o-1941, 178. Cf. 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) § 346i. 
On difficulties in multiple-location cases, see PATTERSON, Essentials, 1upra 
n. 52, at 57; EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 517 f. 
104 Draft of the Patterson Committee, Amer. Bar Assoc., Section of Ins. Law, 
Program 1939, 51 s. I (b), Jupra n. 52. 
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connected with another unquestionable central point. If 
it is the state control over territorial acts of the residents 
rather than the residence itself (as localizing the risk) 
that justifies the imposition of the state's law, a fidelity or 
surety contract, or a group insurance covering health or 
accident, is correctly centered at the headquarters of the 
insured enterprise, as courts have generally held. 
When workmen's compensation insurance is brought 
under the law of the state where "the principal place of 
employment" of the employee is when the contract becomes 
effective/05 this approach comes close to the localization of 
the employer's liability to which modern development tends, 
as discussed earlier .106 
5. Proposals 
Continued studies by insurance experts will be needed to 
reconcile the possible differences of opinion on the precise 
local connections for various types of risks. But the desir-
able approach to the conflicts problem can scarcely be doubt-
ful. As an attempt to show roughly the resulting principle, 
the following formulation is advanced with respect to life 
insurance and fire insurance, in the absence of a stipulation 
for the applicable law and of special circumstances. 
A contract of life insurance is governed by the law of the 
state where the insured has his habitual residence, provided 
that this state claims administrative supervision over the 
contract, and that an agent of the insurer in the state has 
participated in the negotiation of the contract. 
A fire insurance contract respecting immovables, mov-
ables, or other interests in a fixed location, is governed by 
the law of the state of the situation. 
10s Draft, id. § 1 (d). 




I. The Object of the Rule 
PAST and existing legal systems provide for various types of contracts in which a person promises either 
to perform another person's duty in case of noncom-
pliance, or to indemnify the creditor therefor. The basic 
types of suretyship and guaranty at common law are im-
pregnated by this contrast. But a rich variety of forms has 
overgrown the historic dualism. In civil law, the present 
representative types of transactions have developed from 
the late Roman categories from which, however, they differ. 
They include suretyship (fideiussio) -with certain aspects 
of common law guaranty-; mandate of credit (mandatum 
qualificatum) ; guaranty (different from the common law 
institution of the same name) ; and assumption of subsidiary 
liability as codebtor. The differences in the various kinds 
of promises reach from formalities to defenses and en-
forcement. 
The terminology varies greatly in covering this wide and 
1 LETZGUS, "Die Biirgschaft" (in private international law), 3 Z.ausi.PR. 
( 1929) 837; K. RILLING, Die Biirgschaft nach Deutsch em IPR. (Thesis, 
Tiibingen 193 5). 
Comparative municipal law: Articles, HANS ScHULZE, "Garantievertrag," 
and ANDREAs B. ScHWARZ, "Biirgschaft," in 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 
593-622; SLOVENKO, "Effects of Suretyship," 9 Am. J. Comp. L. (1960) 48; for 
the main South-American codes: RAMIRO NAVA, La fianza y Ia unidad en las 
legislaciones (Caracas 1927). 
On the modern "compensated surety" (Restatement of Security § 82 com-
ment i), see for the United States: G. W. CRIST, Corporate Suretyship (1939); 
for Switzerland and Germany: RAAFLAUB, "Die Solidarbiirgschaft im Bank-
verkehr," Gmiir's Abh. (N. F.) No. 73 (1932). 
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practically important ground. Also, its external boundaries 
are not delimited on the same lines. The Restatement of 
the Law of Security, after thoughtful exploration of the 
diverse terms used in American legal language, decided to 
embrace the entire doctrine under the name of suretyship 
and to use guaranty as a synonym. This all-comprehensive 
concept is defined as: 
"The relation which exists where one person has under-
taken an obligation and another person is also under an 
obligation or other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but 
one performance, and as between the two who are bound, 
one rather than the other should perform." ( § 82) 
Such broad terms are particularly suitable to conflicts 
law. For it seems to be agreed that conflicts rules do not 
discriminate among all the possible kinds of such promises.2 
Far from any characterization according to the law of the 
forum, the terms suretyship, cautionnement, Burgschaft, 
fian~a, are used to cover every contract creating a personal 
obligation to the creditor, securing his claim against another 
person. 
The Restatement of Security ( § 83) includes, in addition 
to contracts with the creditor whereby the obligor directly 
intends to become a surety, other transactions having similar 
results. These situations and the various cases in which 
persons are treated by law as if they were sureties, may 
be passed over here. 
2. Independence of the Rule 
It was once assumed3 that because a surety's obligation 
is "accessory" to the principal debt, that is, depends on its 
validity and extent, it is necessarily subject to the same law. 
2 LETZGus, supra n. r, 842; EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 52o; Restatement (Second), 
Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) 130. 
a BoUHIER, r Observations sur Ia coutume du Duche de Bourgogne ( 1742) ch. 
21, 413 § 197, citing a decision of the Parliament of Toulouse of 1655. 
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The only English leading case, seemingly still in authority, 
is definitely to this effect,4 and so are possibly a few Ameri-
can decisions.5 Some modern writers believe in this view.6 
The contrary opinion is undoubtedly correct. Quite as a 
surety or a guarantor is bound by his own agreement with 
the creditor, as distinguished from the undertaking giving 
rise to the obligation of the principal debtor, suretyship is 
governed by its own law independently, in principle, from 
that controlling the main debt. This theory is firmly main-
tained by consistent doctrine in Germany7 and other coun-
tries,8 and is dominant in the civil law literature.9 Story 
and Wharton thought along the same lines.10 The American 
decisions, in great rna jority though usually without express 
mention, are consonant when they apply the law of the 
place where the contract of suretyship is made, or that of 
the place where this contract, distinguished from the prin-
cipal debt, is performableY 
4 England: Rouquette v. Overmann and Schou ( 1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. 5:25, per 
Cockburn, C. J.; BURGE, 2 Commentaries 39· 
5 United States: Cases cited by BATIFFOL 424 n. 1. 
Also in Germany: RG. (Feb. II, 1896) 7 Z.int.R. (1897) 262. 
s Italy: 3 FIORE § 1240; DE AMICIS, I contratti accessorii ( 1909) 46, cited by 
FEDOZZI-CERETI 760. 
Recently to a similar effect, GUTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1932) 98. 
7 RG. (May 23, r883) 9 RGZ. 185, 187; (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 
Clunet 1905, 105o; and many other decisions in constant practice. The litera-
ture is unanimous to the same effect, see e.g., NEUMEYER, IPR. 30; LETZGUS, 
supra n. r, 839; LEWALD 257; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 267; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. s) 
52 5 ; KEGEL, Kom. ( ed. 9) 574 n. 242 before art. 7 EG. BGB. 
s Austria: OGH. (June II, 1929) Clunet 1930,740. 
France: The literature in the absence of cases, cf. 3 Repert. 165 No. ro; 
BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 677 § 625; Note (FRANCESCAKIS) Revue Crit. 1958, 
133. 139· 
Switzerland: BG. (July 18, 1927) 53 BGE. II 347, Clunet 1928, 508 and 
passim; z MElLI 42; 2 ScHNITZER (ed. 4) 744· 
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Campbells v. Blank, 8 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 17, 19. 
9 See, in addition to the citations in n. 8, e.g., JITTA 495; 3 FIORI! § U37; 
FEDOZZI-CERETI 760; BATIFFOL 423 § 521. 
10 STORY 360 § 267; 2 WHARTON 934 § 4:27. 
11 See in particular, Cowles v. Townsend and Milliken (r86o) 37 Ala. 77; 
Tolman v. Reed (1897) 115 Mich. 71, 72 N. W. 1104; Compagnie Generale 
de Fourrures v. Simon Herzig & Sons Co. (1915) 89 Misc. 573, 153 N. Y. 
Supp. 717. The new Restatement mentions expressly that the suretyship and 
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The principle was adequately formulated by Zitelmann: 
The law governing suretyship determines the extent to 
which the liability of the surety depends on the validity and 
content of the liability of the principal debtor.12 Aiming at 
the same idea, the Reichsgericht has often used the succinct 
but inaccurate formula, that the law of the principal debt 
decides what the surety owes, whereas the law of the surety-
ship indicates whether he owesY In fact, the contrast is not 
between existence and extent of the obligation, but is pre-
sented by the difference in the scope of the two obligations. 
Illustrations. (i) Campbell Renfroe, in delegating his 
paternal powers to a trustee, delivered a note to him for 
the support of his children, and Gates signed the note as 
surety. All this happened in Georgia, the law of which was 
applied by the Louisiana court. Gates, who had paid the 
note to the trustee without being sued, was unable to re-
cover from the debtor or his cosurety, either as surety or 
as holder of the note. The surety obligation did not exist 
because the debt was void.14 
( ii) A creditor in France agreed with the debtor that 
the sum due should be paid in pounds sterling instead of 
francs. The French Court of Cassation held that the modifi-
cation of currency was not a novation discharging the surety 
(C. C. article I 2 7 I No. I ) , but neither did it bind the surety 
to pay otherwise than in francs. 15 Both points pertain to the 
law of suretyship. 
(iii) Where someone wrongly believed himself to be a 
surety and paid the true creditor, the question was from 
the main contract may be governed by different laws; Restatement {Second), 
Tent. Draft No.6 {1960) 130. 
12 z ZrTELMANN 388. 
13 RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 311, 315i (Jan. 21, 1926) IPRspr. 1929 
No. 30. Various criticism has been addressed to this formulation by z FRANK-
ENSTEIN 348 n. 79 j NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 268 {but see BATIFFOL 425 § 524) j and 
especially RILLING, supra n. 1, 13 ff. 
14 Gates v. Renfroe ( 1852) 7 La. Ann. 569. In Louisiana C. C. § 3025 {now 
§ 3056) cited by the court, the surety is said to have no recourse against the 
principal debtor, if he pays without being sued and without informing the 
principal; but this is expressly subordinated to the condition that the debt did 
not exist at the time of the payment. 
15 French Cass. civ. {Dec. 17, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1286. 
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whom he might recover. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held 
that in the first place the creditor was unduly enriched and 
owed restitution. But if an action against the creditor were 
barred by limitation or waived by the surety, he was entitled 
to compensation from the debtor, who had been eventually 
discharged of his obligation.16 This interesting theory of 
unjust enrichment presupposes a relation based on an in-
valid suretyship and another resulting from discharge of 
the principal debt. Thus two laws may have to be ascer-
tained, both distinguishable from that governing the prin-
cipal debt. 
Yet, while the law need not necessarily be the same for 
the debt and its guaranty, it is a reasonable wish that it 
should be identical as often as possible. The problem of 
establishing the adequate local connection for suretyship is 
similar to that arising with respect to a contract to sell an 
immovable, for which situs is not a compulsory but a desir-
able contact. 
II. CoNTACTS 
I. United States 
Apart from old cases applying the law of the forum, 17 
the courts in this country have generally adhered either to 
the law of the place of contracting18 or to the law of the 
place of performance.19 But, as usual, these are merely the 
labels. 
The largest group of decisions is characterized by the 
essential role of the creditor's domicil. The surety may 
have had his residence in the same jurisdiction20 or the 
written guaranty may have been mailed to the creditor and 
16 Swiss BG. (Oct. 17, 1944) 70 BGE. II 271, 34 Praxis No. 33· 
1 7 Toomer v. Dickerson (1867) 37 Ga. 428. Expressly contra: Tenant v. 
Tenant ( 1885) uo Pa. 478, r At!. 532. 
18 2 WHARTON § 4275; BATIFFOL 423 § 522. 
19 BAT!FFOL 423 n. 6. 
20 Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9; Colston v. Pemberton ( 1897) 20 Misc. 
410, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1034; Hays v. King ( 1914) 44 Okla. 18o, 143 Pac. II42. 
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accepted by him,21 thereby localizing the making of the 
contract; or performance by the surety allegedly was due 
at the creditor's place so as to call for the law of the place 
of performance.22 A characteristic category was presented 
by the customary official surety bonds delivered to the fed-
eral government as security for the service of employees; 
they were localized at the seat of the government in Wash-
. D C2a mgton, . . 
Ordinarily, the law applied also governed the principal 
debt.24 The courts sometimes stress this fact,25 although at 
other times they do not mention it. 
Another notable situation may be mentioned, although 
some writers minimize its importance.26 Where a guaranty 
is written on the instrument embodying the principal debt, 
courts are probably inclined to let both be controlled by 
one law.27 In one case, it was expressly declared immaterial 
that the surety signed the note of the debtor at a different 
place.28 When a financial operation was negotiated in New 
York, the main contract executed in Nebraska, and the 
guaranty appended in Illinois, the gambling statute of Illi-
21 E.g., Watkins Co. v. Daniel (I934) 228 Ala. 399, I 53 So. 77I. 
22 John A. Tolman Co. v. Reed (I897) II5 Mich. 7I, 72 N. W. n04; 
Alexandria etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson (I900) 6I Kan. 4I7, 59 Pac. 1063; 
Johnson v. Charles D. Norton Co. (C. C. A. 6th I908) I59 Fed. 36I; Fox v. 
Corry (1921) I49 La. 445, 89 So. 410. 
Canada: Scandinavian Amer. Nat'! Bank v. Kneeland (Manitoba I9I4) 
24 Man. R. I68, I6 D. L. R. 565. 
23 Cox and Dick v. United States ( I832) 6 Pet. I72; Duncan v. United States 
( 1833) 7 Pet. 435· Cf. STORY § 290, commented on by 2 BAR no n. II: here 
the surety must know that his obligation is not accepted unless it conforms to 
the law at the seat of the government. 
24 Compagnie Generales de Fourrures etc. v. Simon Herzig & Sons (I9I5) 
89 Misc. 573, I 53 N. Y. Supp. 717; Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co. ( I9I7) 
I37 Minn. I4I, I62 N. W. I082; Furst and Thomas v. Sandlin ( I922) 208 Ala. 
490, 94 So. 740; Watkins Co. v. Hill (1926) 214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244-
25 See the collection of cases by BATIFFOL 424 n. I. 
26 E.g., RILLING, supra n. I, 95 before n. 2. 
27 Continental & Commercial Nat' I Bank of Chicago v. Cobb (C. C. A. ISt 
1912) 200 Fed. 5II, 516, 517; Fisk Rubber Co. v. Muller (19I4) 42 App. 
D. C.49. 
2s Pugh v. Cameron's Adm'r (1877) II W.Va. 523. 
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nois was eliminated.29 In twin cases, the wives of two broth-
ers and debtors, domiciled in Michigan, signed mortgage 
guaranties for property in Ohio. One note was signed by 
one defendant when she was temporarily there with her 
husband in the bank office; the other note was signed at 
home. But in both cases the contracting was held to have 
occurred in Ohio.30 
The bulk of the decisions may be summarized, notwith-
standing their varying formal terms, to the effect that con-
tracts of guaranty or suretyship are preferably subjected to 
the law of the principal debt, especially when the latter 1s 
governed by the law of the domicil of the creditor.30a 
2. Other Countries 
Apart from the abandoned test of nationality of the 
surety,31 most Continental opinions have been divided be-
tween the domiciliary law of the surety32 and the law of the 
place of his performance.33 The law of the place of con-
tracting which is provided in so many laws as a general 
rule,34 does not appear often in practice. 
29 Richter v. Frank (C. C. N.D. III. 1890) 41 Fed. 859· 
30 Butzel, ]., in State of Ohio v. James N. Purse and State of Ohio v. Artie 
Purse ( 1935) 273 Mich. 502, 507, 263 N. W. 872 and 874 although speaking 
in terms of lex loci contractus and of the Restatement. 
soaTo the same effect, the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) 
§ 346j., and with certain qualifications EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 522. 
As to party autonomy in the field of suretyship, see cases cited in the 
Restatement (Second), supra, p. 136 and LoUis C. ]AMES, "The Effects of the 
Autonomy of the Parties in the Validity of Conflict of Laws of Surety and 
Guarantee Contracts," 9 Am. U. L. Rev. ( 1960) 24. 
3l 2 ZITELMANN 366; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 123 ff., 349· 
32 3 FIORE § 1243 (but see § 1238 for lex fori); }ITTA 495; 2 BAR 24; 
NEUMEYER, IPR. 27; WALKER 496; 3 RoLIN§ 1412. 
Denmark: Copenhagen (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet r887, 223. 
Germany: Decisions of the temporary sixth senate of the RG., see (Oct. 12, 
1905) 6r RGZ. 343· 
Switzerland: Seen. 35· 
33 Germany: RG. (Oct. 4, 1894) 34 RGZ. 16 and constant practice; see list of 
decisions, LETZGUS, sup1·a n. I, 837, 84o; LEWALD §§ 314-317; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 
5) 525. 
34 Italian writers mention Disp. Pre!. C. C. (r865) art. 9 par. 2; (1942) 
art. 25. For an interesting case illustrating the application of art. 25, see Cass. 
(Oct. 4, 1954) Clunet 1956, rooo. 
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The law of the domicil of the surety has been justified 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal as suitable to the nature of 
his unilateral and onerous obligation,35 because such an 
obligor ought to be considered bound to a minimum, i. e., 
to not more than his own law indicates. Where a guaranty 
is given for consideration, such as by a bank in the course 
of its business, the circumstances and particularly the con-
nection with the entire financial arrangement are decisive.36 
The comprehensive treatment in the German cases as-
sumes that suretyship is governed by the law of the place 
of its performance, but since according to the general Ger-
man principle the surety like any debtor owes performance 
at his domicil, the result is regularly the same as in the 
view mentioned above.37 
Through this emphasis on the domicil of the person 
giving the guaranty, it happens more often and more strik-
ingly than in other systems that principal debt and guaranty 
are controlled by different laws. 
Illustration. In a case where creditor, debtor and a surety 
lived in Luxembourg, the Reichsgericht did not doubt that 
all their relationships were governed by the law of Luxem-
bourg (substantially French law). This included the question 
whether the surety was to be subrogated by payment to 
the creditor's rights. But at the time of the original trans-
action, the wife of the debtor assumed ( 1) cosuretyship 
with the surety to the creditor and ( 2) countersecurity to 
the surety. She expressed both these obligations simply by 
signing the loan instrument "as cosurety and countersurety" 
( als Mitbiirge und Riickbiirge). When the surety later 
sued the woman, the Reichsgericht determined the recovery 
under German law because the woman had always Jived in 
Germany and therefore had to pay there.88 
This surprising conflicts decision could have been avoided 
85 53 BGE. II 344. 347; 61 id. II 181; 63 id. II 308; 67 id. II 215, 220. 
as BG. (Sept. 23, 1941) 67 BGE. II 215, 220, reported Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 437· 
87 Cf. NussBAUM, D. IPR. 268 n. 2. 
B8 RG. (Oct. u, 1905) 61 RGZ. 343, 16 Z.int.R. (1906) 324. 
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by presuming a unitary law.388 The practical result may be 
strange. Supposing the first surety paid and was subrogated, 
according to his own law, to the creditor, the cosurety, 
reimbursing him partially, may not be subrogated under 
his law. The debtor would be discharged to such extent, 
contrary to the law governing debt and suretyship. 
3· Conclusion 
Although the legal situation of an accessory codebtor 
may be independently defined in conflicts law, in most cases 
it would be desirable to subordinate it to the law of the prin-
cipal debt.39 More recently, study of the American decisions 
has suggested to Batiffol a general presumption in favor of 
this law. 
At least, in the spirit of the American decisions, we may 
propose such extension when no counterindicia appear in 
the individual cases, in the following situations: 
(a) Where surety and principal enter into obligation, by 
signing the same instrument, or otherwise in common; 
(b) Where the principal debt is governed by the law of 
the creditor's domicil; and we may add as a suggestion-
( c) Where an accessory debtor intervened upon agree-
ment with the principal debtor, to the knowledge of the 
creditor. 
Finally, it may be assumed that, likewise as in the United 
States,40 bonds required by a state to secure the fidelity or 
388 In recent cases the courts have availed themselves of such presumption; 
see AG. Bremen (Nov. 22, 1952) IPRspr. 195o-51 No. 17; OLG. Hamm (June 
6, 1957) IPRspr. 1956-57 No. 27. 
39 FEDOZZI-CERETI 761; LEWALD 258 advocates the law of the principal 
debtor's domicil. See Cass. (Sept. 12, 1957) Rivista 1958, 251 for a case 
where, in the opinion of the Italian Supreme Court, the provision of Disp. 
Pre!. C. C. (1942) art. 25 thwarted the desirable result: an obligation created 
in Switzerland between an Italian creditor and a Swiss debtor was secured 
by the guaranty of a second Italian; Swiss law as the lex loci contractus 
governed the principal debt, whereas Italian law was applicable to the 
guaranty as the national law of both parties to this contract. 
40 BATIFFOL 424 § 523. 
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aptitude of its servants or compliance with the laws of the 
state by a foreign corporation are exclusively subject to 
the law of that state as are the principal obligationsY 
III. ScoPE oF THE RuLE 
Apart from formalities42 and capacity, 43 presenting the 
usual problems, the validity, effects, and extinction of guar-
anty or suretyship are controlled by the governing law.44 
Some particulars have been elaborated and may be men-
tioned. We should also notice some intricate questions con-
nected with the fact that statutory regulations of collateral 
obligations usually include the use of defenses belonging to 
the principal debtor and the recourse against the latter. 
Apparently a part of the law of suretyship, these provisions 
go substantially beyond its primary scope. 
I. Extent of Liability 
The law of the guaranty or suretyship, as said before, 
determines the extent to which the legal effect of the prin-
cipal debt influences the liability of the obligor. It decides 
whether an obligor accedes to the debt merely to the extent 
of the debtor's liability, or more independently, either as a 
subsidiary or as an original promisor. Sued by the obligee, 
the promisor may (like a typical guarantor) or may not 
(like an ordinary surety) be entitled to object that the 
41 See for the United States, supra n. 23, and the observations by 2 MEILI44. 
42 United States: Allshouse v. Ramsay ( 1841) 6 Whart. (Pa.) 331; Halloran 
v. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N.Y. 1082. 
Germany: 9 RGZ. 176; 61 id. 343· 
On intricate special problems cf. MANNL, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 802. 
43 United States: See the well-known decisions on guaranty by married 
women, such as Milliken v. Pratt (1878) 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 24I; 
Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall ( 1899) ro8 Ia. 518, 79 N. W. 282; Free-
man's Appeal (1897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 At!. 420. Cf. Vol. I (ed. 2) pp. III, 197· 
Germany: RG. (July 7, 1903) 13 Z.int.R. (1903) 442, Clunet 1905, I049· 
•• United States: See lists of cases in 50 C. J. 14. Cf. 72 C. J. S. 517 and 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 ( I96o) § 346j.; but see EHRENZWEIG, 
Conflict 521 f. 
Germany: LETZGUS, supra n. I, 844. 
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creditor should have first attempted enforcement against 
the principal debtor (beneficium excussionis personalis), 
that he indulged in neglect, or that he failed to give notice 
or written notice of the debtor's default to the defendant, 
according to the contract made between the parties and the 
law governing it.45 For it has been universally recognized 
since Stort6 that it is a substantive, not a procedural, ques-
tion whether the creditor may sue the principal and surety 
jointly or severally and whether he has to comply with a 
prescribed order of suits. Obviously, it is the contract be-
tween creditor and surety, rather than the contract between 
creditor and debtor, that decides whether the surety bears 
an absolute or conditional liability. 
If the burden of proof regarding the diligence of the 
obligee is regulated in the law of guaranty, this provision 
is also binding. On the same theory, the law of suretyship 
determines whether the surety may assert against the credi-
tor the defenses of the principal.47 
This is obvious but for one point, viz., the faculty of 
the surety to set off a counterclaim belonging to the principal 
debtor. Under the prevailing opinion in the United States, 
a surety sued alone by the creditor is not entitled to such 
setoff except in certain cases, 48 although contrary statutes 
exist. Analogous differences are found in Europe. Like the 
American reasoning that the setoff claim of the debtor can-
45 United States: Walker v. Forbes (1857) 31 Ala. 9: guaranty in Louisiana, 
defense of failure of due diligence dismissed; Toomer v. Dickerson ( x867) 
37 Ga. 428: presumably South Carolina contract, promisee lost a pledge of 
slaves by negligent failure to register them in Georgia, the court regards the 
enforcement against the surety as remedy; Johnson v. Charles D. Norton Co. 
(C. C. A. 6th 1908) I 59 Fed. 361, 363: guaranty executed in Ohio but centered 
in Pennsylvania whose law decides whether it is conditional on pursuing the 
principle to insolvency. 
Denmark: Landesoverret Copenhagen (Feb. 2, 1885) Clunet x887, 223. 
Germany: 9 RGZ. 185, 188; 10 id. 282; 34 id. 15; 54 id. 3II, 314· 
46 Howard v. Fletcher (1879) 59 N. H. 151; STORY § 322 b; ROLIN, 3 
Principes §§ 1410, 1417; 2 BAR 109. 
47 Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46. 
48 Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 833, 842. 
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS 
not be brought to final decision without his consent,49 the 
German Code50 is motivated by the consideration that a 
surety may not use another's right without his consent. If 
the contract of suretyship is under ordinary American law, 
"setoff" is undoubtedly excluded. But can it be considered 
to be permitted to a surety bound under French law accord-
ing to the French Code51 when the principal debt follows 
American law? The difficulty is twofold. One involves the 
disposition over the debtor's ownership of a claim. It is 
scarcely possible to leave this question to the law governing 
the suretyship; it rather belongs to the law controlling the 
relationship surety-principal. The other difficulty arises on 
the fundamental theoretical problem which law or laws 
have to be consulted for permitting setoff between persons 
not identical with the original parties to a claim. This prob-
lem of setoff is discussed further in Chapter 51 on setoff. 
2. Paying Surety as Assignee 
According to Roman law and a series of codes, a surety 
is entitled to require, as a condition of his payment to the 
creditor, that the latter assign him the principal debt, com-
monly with the securities attached to it (beneficium ceden-
darum actionum). In common law as well as in the French 
law which is followed by practically all modern ~odes, the 
debt is transferred to the paying surety by operation of 
law (subrogation). 52 
Either effect of the payment, tending towards a succession 
to the creditor's claim rather than its discharge, pertains 
49 Restatement of Security § I33 comment b. 
50 BGB. § 768; Swiss C. Obi. art. 502 {as amended 194I). The surety may, 
however, suspend payment, at least if the creditor can compensate against the 
debtor. See RG. (June 16, I932) I37 RGZ. 34· 
51 C. C. art. I294 par. I. 
Italy: C. C. {I865) art. 1290 par. I, (I942) art. I247 par. I. 
Spain: C. C. art. II97, etc. 
52 For civil law, see BIASIO, Der Obergang der Gliiubigerrechte auf den 
Biirgen und dessen Regressrechte, Gmiirs Abh. (N. F.) No. :nr ( 1944). 
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to the law governing the suretyship. German decisions are 
precise on this point.53 But doubt arises when such a sub-
rogation is not simultaneously supported by the law of the 
principal debt. This problem must be referred to the doc-
trine of legal assignment. 54 
3· Termination 
Extinction of the principal debt, for instance, by setoff 
or release,55 or a bar of limitation on the principal debt, as 
a defense for the surety,56 affects the latter's obligation in 
correspondence with the law governing the debt. 
Moreover, of course, suretyship has its own limitation 
of action.57 
4· Retribution and Exoneration 
When a surety, after payment to the creditor but without 
obtaining from him subrogation or assignment, seeks to 
recover from the principal debtor, it seems logical that this 
is not part of the law governing suretyship.57a His claim to 
be discharged after the principal obligation has matured is 
on the same footing. Ordinarily there is a contract between 
53 Germany: RG. {April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 3n, 316, Clunet 1905, 1050; and 
constant practice. On related German and Swiss decisions, see infra p. 447 
and n. 3· 
54 Infra pp. 447-450· 
55 Cf. Howard v. Fletcher {1879) 59 N.H. 151: deferment of maturity of 
the principal debt (in the instant case all three parties resided in Vermont); 
RG. (Dec. 17, 1907) 33 Els. L. Z. 314 cited by LEWALD § 317. 
That discharge of the principal by federal bankruptcy proceedings does not 
extend to the surety either under federal or Louisiana surety law, was stated 
in Serra e Hijo v. Hoffman & Co. {1878) 30 La. Ann. 67, and with respect to a 
Norwegian bankruptcy and a German surety in OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 12, 
1903) 6 ROLG. 365. 
56 RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46: the surety liable under German law may 
invoke the limitation having run for the principal under French law. 
5 7 OLG. Karlsruhe {Nov. 10, 1927) IPRspr. 1928 No. 32. 
57a See RAAPE, IPR. {ed. 5) 525, giving an example of a case where the 
relationship between the surety and the principal debtor is· governed by a law 
different from the law governing the contracts between either one of them 
and the creditor. On the other hand, see AG. Bremen {Nov. 22, 1951) IPRspr. 
195D-51 No. 17 and KEGEL, Kom. {ed. 9) 574 note 244 before art. 7 EG. BGB. 
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the debtor and surety such as agency or partnership. How-
ever, it would often be desirable to have the same law gov-
ern the recovery as that under which the surety must pay. 
An example of how such a result may be reached was set a 
century ago. 
Illustration. Thomas, a resident of Kentucky, brought an 
alleged slave to Louisiana and there authorized Beckman 
to sell the slave with guaranty of title. This the latter did 
under his own guaranty, but the purchaser was evicted by 
a suit for freedom and had to pay 450 dollars for services 
of the illegally detained person; Beckman was bound to 
make restitution under Louisiana law, including the dam-
ages. Thomas was held liable to Beckman to the same ex-
tent, notwithstanding a limitation of liability under the law 
of Kentucky, which was the law of the forum, Thomas "hav-
ing sanctioned the contract, as made."58 
If the surety intervenes as a voluntary agent, he may sue 
in quasi contract (negotiorum gestio or unjust enrichment), 
Security Restatement § 104 ( 2). Under which law he may 
do so will be mentioned in the next chapter. 
IV. PLURALITY oF SuRETIES 
r. Law Common to Cosureties 
Where several obligors contract by common contract, 
they are ordinarily liable under the law of the principal 
debt. Furthermore the law defining their liability to the 
obligee is generally extended to their internal relationship. 
Both propositions are not necessary but convenient, and 
evidently favored by the courts in the case of cosureties. 
Illustrations. ( i) The Alexandria Railroad advanced 
money for construction of a road in Louisiana, whereas its 
partner, the Kansas City Railroad also of Louisiana, pro-
cured an agreement from their members to indemnify the 
Alexandria if the Kansas failed to pay. Although all the 
ss Thomas v. Beckman (1840) I B. Mon. (40 Ky.) 29. 
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signers of the guaranty were residents of Kansas, the 
forum, their liability was determined under the law of 
Louisiana, "where the delinquency indemnified against was 
to occur and did occur."59 
( ii) Where three guarantors signed a bond jointly and 
severally for a bank in Laurel, Mississippi, in agreement 
with the cashier, to secure loans made by that bank to a 
Mississippi company, the Louisiana court applied Missis-
sippi law to determine rights and duties among the co-
guarantors, without further investigation.00 
(iii) A resident of Winnipeg, Manitoba, signed jointly 
with others a written guaranty, dated and apparently ex-
ecuted in Minnesota, to secure a credit given by a Min-
neapolis bank to a corporation doing business there. The 
bank released one guarantor after partial payment. The 
l\1anitoba court decided according to Minnesota law and 
contrary to its own law that even in the case of joint ob-
ligors release of one of them did not discharge the others.61 
The German Supreme Court has taken an identical at-
titude to the effect that when the cosureties are bound 
under one law to the creditor, they are presumed to be 
bound under the same law as to contribution among them-
selves.62 
2. Different Laws 
Codebtors in the absence of a common source of obliga-
tion, are considered to be subject each to his own law.63 
According to this principle, the situation of cosureties may 
become complicated. 
59 Alexandria, Arcadia & Fort Smith R. R. Co. v. Johnson ( 1900) 61 Kan. 
417, 59 Pac. 1063, 1064. Cynically, one might note that in this manner the 
residents of the forum were spared the common law liability in solidum. 
6° Fox v. Corry (1921) 149 La. 445, 89 So. 410. 
61 Scandinavian Amer. Nat'! Bank v. Kneeland (1914) 24 Man. R. 168, 16 
D. L. R. s6s. 
62 RG. (May 13, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 3; KEGEL, Kom. (ed. 9) 574 n. 
244 before art. 7 EG. BGB. , 
63 PARMELE in 2 Wharton 930 A; 2 ZITELMANN 389; SCHOENENBERGER-}AEGGI 
No. 372. 
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In the relation to the creditor, this principle leads to a 
different treatment of the cosureties. 
Illustration. The Swedish Supreme Court had to decide 
the extent of liability of two cosureties, one domiciled in 
Sweden and one in Germany. Determining the applicable 
law according to the places of performance and identifying 
them with the domicils of the debtors, the court held the 
Swedish cosurety liable for a part and the German liable 
jointly and severally for the entire debt.64 
This method of measuring each codebt under its separate 
law has been declared to be consistent and natural. 65 
If this may be taken as the correct view, what is the 
law controlling contribution by cosureties if they are not 
connected by agreement among themselves? A German 
court resorted to the law of the place where the duty of 
contribution should be fulfilled. 66 The solution may depend 
on the conflicts rule suitable to extracontractual legal 
obligations. 
V. CURRENCY RESTRICTIONS 
Can a surety avail himself of the defense that legal or 
factual impossibility of payment has been caused by currency 
restrictions applying either to him or to the principal? The 
question has come up repeatedly and the answer lies, apart 
from stringent public policy, in the dominant role of the 
law governing the debt,67 which in the case of a surety means 
the law governing suretyship as an independent contract. 
6 4 See SoDERQUIST, Revue 1923, 465. 
65 3 FIORE § 1243; 2 MElLI 43; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 349 n. 86. Likewise, as it 
seems, RG. (Dec. 6, 1884) I Bolze No. 88, cited in the literature, not available 
here. 
66 OLG. Hamburg (May 5, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 17. 
In Frew v. Scoular (1917) 101 Neb. 131, 162 N. W. 496, one cosurety seems 
to have been subject to Scottish law, while the court had no opportunity to 
say whether the other, the defendant, was under Nebraska law. The Scottish 
limitation of action had not run its 40 years when the Scottish cosurety paid 
the local creditor; the Nebraska court ;~.pplied the domestic statute of limitation 
but assumed that its s-year period began only with the payment. 
67 Supra p. 48. 
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Correctly, therefore, the Austrian Supreme Court has de-
cided for an Austrian surety against the Belgian creditor 
on the ground of the restrictions in the German law of 
Devisen because the suretyship was contracted along with 
the principal debt under German law.68 The same court 
likewise followed the principle when it did not allow a 
suretyship obligation governed by Austrian law to be 
affected by the German restrictions excusing the German 
debtor. 69 
The Swiss Federal Court forcefully sustained this solu-
tion, explaining that the faculty of a surety to use the de-
fenses of the principal debtor is limited to normal excuses 
and does not extend to the abnormal interference of a 
foreign state in political and economic emergency.70 Even 
though a German debtor were discharged under the Ger-
man currency laws, a Swiss surety would be liable according 
to the law of his Swiss place of performance.71 This court, 
moreover, in pursuance of its absolute public policy reject-
ing any resort to foreign measures of economic warfare, 
enforced claims against a surety even when his obligation 
was governed by German law.72 In view of repeated criti-
cism, more recently the court seems to reserve an ultimate 
formulation. 73 It distinguished the case of a discharge ob-
tained by the Italian principal debtor in the clearing pro-
cedure operated between Italy and Belgium in accordance 
with a treaty. Since credit in these proceedings is considered 
full payment, the Swiss surety was entitled to avail himself 
of the defense.74 
68 Austria: OGH. (April 24, 1936) 18 SZ. 2II No. 72. 
69 Austria: OGH. (Sept. 5, 1934) 16 SZ. 447 No. 162. 
70 Switzerland: See the discussion in BG. (Sept. 21, 1937) 63 BGE. II 303, 
311. 
11 BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 304 ff. 
12 BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 311 ff.; (June 19, 1935) 61 BGE. II 
181, Revue 1936, 692, S. 1936, 415. 




SOME codifications have stated as a general rule that all obligations arising without contract are governed 
by the law of the place where the act creating the obli-
gation is done.1 This rule is either trite or wrong. Our con-
flicts rule determines whether we recognize a foreign law 
as the origin of an obligation and the law so recognized 
decides what elements create the obligation. 
Nothing better is achieved by general rules placing "quasi 
contracts" under the law of the place where the obligating 
act is done.2 Quasi contract is not a useful term. From its 
range, three topics require a report on the actual state of 
the doctrine. 
I. VoLUNTARY AGENCY (NEGOTIORUM GESTIO ) 3 
In the old doctrine of civil law derived from Roman and 
Byzantine sources, altruistic intervention in the interest of 
another person is considered as a praiseworthy activity, 
suitable to Christian readiness to help. English courts have 
1 Italy: Disp. Pre!. C. C. (I942) art. 25 par. 2. 
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II part. I; Draft I96I, rat. I8 § I. 
Rumania: C. C. (I940) art. 42. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law ( I889) art. 38. Contra, e.g., 
BEVILAQUA, Dir. Int. Priv. 372. 
2 Former Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. 3· 
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of I914, art. 21. 
Tangier: Dahir of I925, art. r6 par. 2. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 222. 
3 Comparative municipal law, American and Roman laws: HEILMAN, 
"Rights of the Voluntary Agent Against His Principal in Roman Law and 
in Anglo-American Law," 4 Tenn. L. Rev. ( I926) 34-54, 76-95; DAWSON, 
"Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?" XXth Century Comparative and 
Conflicts Law (1961) 142; DAWSON, "Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic 
Intermeddler," 74 Harv. L. Rev. (I961) 8I7, I073· 
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taken the contrary attitude in damning "officious meddling." 
In the United States, this hostility to voluntary taking care 
of the business of another has been maintained in principle, 
but it is riddled with a great many exceptions. Occasion-
ally, American law has been more generous than certain 
civilian doctrines. Where there is a duty implied by law to 
preserve human life or property, the work and labor spent 
to this end may be compensable in American courts, a result 
not always reached by German courts.4 
Due to the contrasts in history and development, it is 
understandable that the conflicts problems of this subject 
have been discussed almost exclusively in the Continental 
literature. 
1. Usual Conflicts Theories 
The traditional doctrine, basically territorial in its origin, 
has split on a systematic question. Roman law establishes 
two actions. The actio directa belongs to the person in 
whose business or sphere the intervention occurred, the 
dominus negotii, and is directed to recovery of the gain the 
gestor may have made and of the damage he may have 
caused by negligence. By the actio contraria, the acting 
person, if conditions are present, sues for restitution of ex-
penses. Writers regarding the existence of these two actions 
as the only effect of voluntary intervention concluded that 
each action had its own law. The direct action would be 
localized at the place where the act of interference is done, 
4 HEILMAN, supra n. 3, at 83 ff.; American Law Institute, SEAVEY and 
Scorr, Notes on Certain Important Sections of Restatement of Restitution 
171 ff. § 117. 
Germany: The problem whether more than expenses is recoverable, has 
been controversial. OLG. Celie (Nov. xo, 1905) 12 ROLG. 272 and OLG. Kiel 
(Oct. 9, 1906) 18 id. 22 granted physicians' fees, characterizing labor spent by 
a professional man as expenses. In ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN, 2 Derecho de 
obligaciones (Recht der Schuldverhiiltnisse, translation by PEREZ GONZALES y 
ALGUER, 1933) 353, note to § 164, it is noted that in Spain probably all useful 
expenditures may be recovered. 
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and the counterclaim would be governed by the law of the 
principal. When, to the contrary, the medieval construction 
of the actions as flowing from a phenomenon similar to a 
contract, a quasi contract, was followed, the entire effects 
were subjected to a single law.5 With various motivations, 
the modern theory has preferred the latter result. The ap-
plicable law has been found in the place where the agent 
accomplishes his intervention. 6 
In one opinion, however, exceptions are made in case 
the agent takes care of an entire unity of assets; in the 
absence of a single place of acting the law of the principal 
should be stressed. 7 
On the other hand, the domicil of the principal has been 
indicated as the dominating contact because his interest 
prevails in the institution.8 
2. Distinctions 
Some authors have noticed that the circumstances of the 
cases must be considered.9 In this view, where a contractual 
relation connects the principal and agent, the law governing 
the contract must extend to the effects of acts by the agent 
that exceed his authority.10 This is the correct point of view 
5 For the first opinion, REGELSBERGER, Pandekten I75 and n. (g); 2 MElLI 86; 
WEISS, 4 Traite 4I3 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 395· Contra: PILLET, 2 Traite 3IO f. 
(nationality of the principal) j POULLET, 352 f. j PACCHIONI 332 f. j SAUSER-
HALL, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I925) 296a. The same result is based on the 
presumptive intention of the agent by ROLIN, I Principes §§ 358, 362; 3 id. 
§ I059 f.; contra: 2 ARMIN JON § uS, e.g., BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 3I2. 
6 China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 24. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II :par. I. 
Codigo Bustamante, art. 220. 
See e.g., FIORE, Clunet 1900, 458; Note, Ricci-BuzATTI, 1 Rivista (I906) 2I3; 
PILLET, 2 Traite 3Io § 547 his. 
7 PILLET, 2 Traite 3II j 2 ARMINJON § II8. 
8 NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 295 and n. 3 in fine; Swiss BG. (Nov. 25, I905) 31 
BGE. II 662, 665. 
9 NEUMEYER, IPR. 32 j 2 FRANKENSTEIN 394 n. 44· 
10 See in particular, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 499 § 481. 
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and should be enlarged to include any preceding contractual 
or legal relationship.10a 
After the First World War, it was a situation familiar to 
the mixed arbitral tribunals that a contract involving some 
kind of custody-sale, agency, bailment, etc.-was deemed 
retroactively dissolved by the Treaty of Versailles as of 
the time when the parties became enemies, but the custodian 
had continued to act during the war. This was done either 
in his own interest on the basis of the contract or to safe-
guard the interest of the other party. In the latter case, his 
acting, deprived of its contractual foundation, could be con-
strued as voluntary agency. Acting in self-interest could 
possibly constitute a so-called quasi negotiorum gestio, that 
is, intervention of a person in the business of another person 
in the belief that it is his own.U The mixed arbitral tribunals 
were first inclined to deny a German party any excuse for 
continuing to act, but finally considered the war period of 
suspension as a sequel to the contract. Hence, the law gov-
erning the contract extended to the additional relationship. 
The same result obtained ex fortiori when the contract 
remained in force by exception. 
Illustration. A Rumanian firm before the war deposited 
ten oil tank cars with a German firm. This contract was not 
dissolved by the Treaty. At a time when it seemed reason-
able, the cars were sold in the interest of the owner but 
with loss. The court justified the application of German 
law to the contract of deposit and concluded without any 
question that the German provisions on negotiorum gestio 
should be applied.12 
toa Contra: BoUREL, Les conflits de lois en matiere d'obligations extracon-
tractuelles (Thesis, 1961) 195 f.; his objections are of a purely conceptualistic 
nature. 
11 Germany: BGB. § 687, applied by Germano-Belgian Mixed Arb. Trib. 
(May 27, 1924) Pres. Moriaud, Sturbelle v. Netter, 4 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
342. 345· 
12 Rumano-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. n, 1929) Pres. Fazy, 8 Recueil 
trib. arb. mixtes 917, 9:11. 
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If the German firm would have had to sell the cars in 
Belgium, it would be absurd to apply Belgian law. Suppose 
the contract had been dissolved by the war. The extension 
of the law governing the former contract would be equally 
satisfactory. 
3· Maritime Assistance and Salvage 
When in a famous dictum, Lord Bowen formulated the 
aversion of common law to voluntary agency, he contrasted 
the principle, "liabilities are not to be forced upon people 
behind their backs," with the recognized exceptions of mari-
time law as to salvage, general average, and contributionY 
Despite the universal background of general maritime law, 
however, national differences in the treatment of assist-
ance and salvage were numerous, and conflicts theories 
abounded/4 while very few laws attempted a solution.15 The 
multilateral Brussels Convention of September 23, I 9 I o, 
adopted by the United States and many other countries/6 
has eliminated most, though not all, conflicts among the 
participant powers and is applied in member states even 
though the other state involved is not a memberY Some 
conflicts rules are included in the Convention.18 
Remaining problems seem to be considered subject to the 
lex fori as general maritime law when jurisdiction is taken 
in an English or American admiralty court. In civil law 
13 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. (I886} 34 Ch. D. 234, 248. 
14 For surveys, see 2 Repert. ( I929) 69 ff.; 2 ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 338 ns. 2-7; 
2 STREIT-VALLINOAS 268; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 553 ff. 
15 Portugal: C. Com. art. 690 is known as an exception. 
1 6 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
the Salvage of Vessels at Sea, 37 Stat. I658, I667; The Salvage Act, I9I2, 37 
Stat. 242, 46 U. S. C. §§ 727-73I, BENEDICT, 6A Admiralty (ed. 7) 6I5; 
GiLMORE & BLACK 445· 
17 Art. I5. 
On the distinction between contractual and extracontractual duties, see 
LE BRUN, "Assistance, sauvetage et obligation de service," I Revue Trim. D. 
Com. (I948) 388. 
18 Arts. 6 par. I, 9 par. I, IO par. 2, I5 par. 2. 
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they are at present prevailingly treated by the law of the 
flag if it is common to both parties/9 and otherwise by the 
national law in force in territorial waters.20 But where 
the act occurs on the high seas, or begins there and termi-
nates in a port, the opinions are extremely divided.21 
A convention on assistance and salvage of aircraft, of 
Brussels, 1938, has not been ratified by any country.22 The 
efforts to fill the gaps of unification are being continued. 
II. UNJUST ENRicHMENr8 
A. IN GENERAL 
Restitution of enrichment obtained without just cause, 
a favorite of Justinian's compilators and of the Continental 
common practice at the time of the natural law, has found 
19 Germany: RG. (June 15, 1927) l17 RGZ. 249· 
2o Portugal: C. Com. art. 690. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navigation (1940) art. 12; DIENA, 3 
Dir. Com. Int. 396; WEISS, 3 Traite 413 n. 2. 
21 Particularly: Law of the salvaging vessel, or of the salvaged vessel, or 
lex fori. See for France, DESPAGNET 931; 2 ARMIN JON (ed. 2) 338; RIPERT, 3 
Droit Marit. § 2207; 2 Repert. 72 f.; NIBOYET, 54 Traite so6. 
For Germany: NEUMEYER, IPR. 33, incorrectly opposed by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
558 n. 226. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. Navig. (1940) art. 12 applies the law 
of the flag of the salvaging vessel. 
22 See I Int. L. Q. (1947) sos; and the text in BENEDICT, 6A Admiralty (ed. 
7) 621 and in SCHLEICHER-REYMANN-ABRAHAM, I Das Recht der Luftfahrt 
(ed.3,196o) 615. 
Some governments (Guatemala, Italy, Mexico) have been authorized ac-
cording to their national laws to deposit their ratifications; see BENEDICT, op. 
cit. supra, at 620; MATOS 566. 
23 Comparative writing on municipal laws: FRIEDMANN, Die Bereicherung-
shaftung im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtskreis ( 1930) ; id., "The Principle 
of Unjust Enrichment," 16 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1938) .243, 365; GUTTERIDGE and 
DAVID, "The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment," 5 Cambr. L. J. (1934) 204; 
O'CONNELL, "Unjust Enrichment," 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 2; NICHOLAS, 
"Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law," 36 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1962) 6os; 37 id. (1963) 49· Instructive with respect to the divergence of 
American and English laws, ScoTT and SEAVEY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. 
(1938) 29. A comprehensive, comparative article in 7 Rechtsvergl. Hand-
worterbuch is not available. For a penetrating comparative study, see DAWSON, 
Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (1951). 
Comparative conflicts law: surveys of literary opinions have been afforded 
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its most complete development in the German Civil Code 
and comments, and recently in the American Restatement 
of Restitution. An enormous mass of apparently hetero-
geneous situations is covered thereby. In France and other 
civil law countries, the codes have prevailingly restricted 
their attention to condictio indebiti, the recovery of a pay-
ment not due, which is therefore alone considered in the 
bulk of the conflicts literature, while the more recent French 
doctrine using the name of actio de in rem verso24 has been 
scarcely noted. The English action of indebitatus assump$it 
produced in an early period the actions for money had and 
received and quantum meruit, with an important though by 
no means exhaustive scope. 
Heavy problems burden not only the less advanced theo-
ries of unjust enrichment; new problems arise with elabora-
tion of the system. At the same time the slowly growing 
popularity of the subject multiplies the cases revealing 
divergent solutions. 
The differences are caused much more by legal intricacies 
of technique than by contrasting ideas of justice. But there 
exist also divergencies of the latter kind. Although the en-
tire institution rests everywhere upon equity, the concept of 
equity varies. If, for instance, someone in the mistaken 
belief that he owns a motor car, causes it to be painted, in 
by GUITER!DGE and LIPSTEIN, "Conflicts of Law in Matters of Unjustifiable 
Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. ( 1941) So; Anon., 10 Repert. 776; FICKER, 4 
Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch ( 1929) 387; and most Continental and Latin-
American treatises. There is not even accord among these reports about the 
views attributable to the sketchy treatment by writers. 
Recently, a Swiss thesis has endeavored to deal with the conflicts problems 
of unjust enrichment on a limited comparative basis; see BALASTER, Die 
ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung im internationalen Privatrecht ( 1955). In addi-
tion, see BoUREL, supra n. 10a, at 31 ff., 89 f., 191 ff., 229 f. and KNOCH, Die 
Aufgliederung der Kondiktionen in der modernen Zivilrechtsdogmatik in 
ihren Auswirkungen auf das Internationale Privatrecht (Thesis, Muenster 
1963). 
24 With more justification, the Austrian doctrine has taken § 1041, Allg. 
BGB. as the starting point for developing a modern actio de in rem verso 
different from the action based on enrichment. (A good illustration of the 
distinction: 97 RGZ. 61 at 65.) 
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this country it is thought unfair to let him have compensa-
tion for the plus value of the car ;25 in this special case 
Romanistic doctrine does not even need the action for 
unjust enrichment since compensation is provided by the 
principles of vindication.26 
In conflicts literature, including the Restatement, the 
subject has often been discussed, but in an offhand manner 
until very recently when the real problem was discovered. 
But only tentative propositions in illustrative cases have 
been advanced. A promising study on the same basis of 
comparative research as underlies the present work is an-
nounced,27 and should provide the needed monograph for 
which the following remarks are no substitute. 
Judicial decisions have been declared missing m the 
United States and England.28 Few are available on the 
Continent. 
At least it is certain that however narrow the domestic 
scope of unjust enrichment may be, foreign application of 
this institution is definitely recognized. With regard to the 
peculiar English treatment of foreign tort actions, it has 
been noted that recovery of values based on an applicable 
foreign law of unjust enrichment is enforceable without 
requiring an English parallel. This thesis finds support in 
a decision of the Court of Appeal.29 
25 Scorr and SEAVEY, "Restitution," 54 Law Q. Rev. (1938) 29 at 36. 
26 German BGB. § 996; cf. § 8r8 par. 2. 
27 By Professor KoNRAV ZWEIGERT in Tiibingen who defines his method in 
an article "Bereicherungsanspriiche im internationalen Privatrecht," z Siid-
deutsche Juristen-Zeitung ( 1947) 247. 
28 z BEALE 1429; GU'ITERIIlGE, 7 Cambr. L. J., supra n. 23, at 82. Universal 
Credit Co. v. Marks (1933) 164 Md. 130, 163 Atl. 810, 816 does not speak of an 
obligation but only of a burden to pay unless a lien be lost under Maryland 
law. For further cases, see Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) 
234 f.; EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 601 n. 30 (criticizing the Second Restatement's 
case references); CoHEN, "Quasi Contract and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Los 
Angeles Bar Bulletin ( 1956) 71. 
29 Batthyany v. Walford (1887) 36 Ch. D. 269; GUTTERIDGE, supra n. 23, 
83 f. (the case mentioned awakens my early personal memory since my father 
was one of the plaintiff prince's experts heard by the court on the law of 
family fideicommisses). 
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B. THE CONFLICTS THEORIES 
I. Connection with a Fact 
(a) Place of enriching act. In Belgian and French litera-
ture it has often been proclaimed that the decisive place is 
where the defendant completes the acquisition said to be 
his enrichment. Thus the law of the place where a sum not 
due is paid governs its recovery. This widely held,30 though 
by no means overwhelmingly supported,31 rule has been 
readily adopted by Beale and the Restatement. In two 
obscurely related sections the Restatement32 asserts, regard-
ing "benefits or other enrichment,"33 that the law of the 
place where a benefit is conferred or unjust enrichment is 
rendered, determines compensation or repayment. The illus-
trations show that this means the place of a physical act. 
In England, Gutteridge, as the first to take a stand in 
that country,34 has adhered to this view. 
Various codifications include this rule in their broader 
provisions. 35 
It should be noted that in the few known cases decided 
by courts, all possible theories usually coincide in the result. 
But the basis of this idea is obvious. Trying to localize the 
30 Belgium: ROLIN, 1 Principes 568 § 362; POULLET § 315. 
Brazil: BEVILACQUA 371. 
France: 1 FOELIX 238; BARTIN, 1 Principes 187 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
(ed. 7) § 356; BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 613 § 564. 
Italy: CERETI, Obblig. § 76. 
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 11 par. 1. 
Switzerland: BG. {June 5, 1886) 12 BGE. 339, 342, Clunet 1889, 350; (April 
28, 1900) 26 BGE. Il268, 272; (Nov. 25, 1905) 31 id. II 66o, 665; 2 MElLI 86; 
2 BROCHER 138; FRITZSCHE,44Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1925) 243a; SAUSER-
HALL, id. 295a; 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 682. 
C6digo Bustamante, art. 221. 
31 This is also the conclusion of ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 534 § 236: "Nao 
existe acordo"; 3 Vrco 128 § 146: "Son diversas las soluciones propuestas . 
. • . "Otherwise, LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L. J., supra n. 23, at 86 and n. II. 
32 Restatement §§ 452, 453· 
33 Thus 2 BEALE 1429 § 452.1 formulates the common topic of §§ 452, 453· 
34 Supra n. 23. 
35 See supra ns. I and 2. 
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action of enrichment and missing another purely material 
attachment to a territory, the authors believed that they 
were compelled to select the place of the act of enrichment. 
Territorialism so practiced was naturally attractive to 
Beale. 
A Belgian-French group of writers has argued that resti-
tution of payment of money not due, as based on a "quasi 
contract,"36 or "rather a quasi delict,"37 allows a presump-
tion of party intention for an applicable law. This, again, 
has led to the place where the sum is paid. 
(b) Other connections. Many contacts have been con-
sidered such as the nationality common to both parties,38 
or the nationalitt9 or the domicil40 of the defendant, or the 
place where he has to make restitution of the enrichment, 41 
which is usually both his domicil and the place of enrich-
ment. The lex fori has also found an advcoate.42 
All these haphazard theories have no following. Their 
feeble justification, however, consists in the grave doubt 
inherent in the theory under (a), concerning exactly what 
event should make the alleged territorial contact. It is 
generally assumed that it is the enrichment of the defend-
ant rather than the impoverishment of the plaintiff which 
must be localized.42a But when in a case before the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal a draft was paid in Paris by mistake of 
36 8 LAURENT 8; WEISS, 4 Traite 415 n. r. 
37 DESPACNET 934 § 321. 
38 LAURENT and WEISS, supra n. 36. ROLIN, I Principes 566 § 36o; POULLET 
467; C6digo Bustamante, art. 221 (common personal law); 2 PONTES DE 
MIRANDA 184. 
39 2 Z!TELMANN 528. 
40 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte 156; WALKER 546. 
41 Germany: RG. (Nov. 8, 1906) 18 Z. int. R. (1908) 159; (July 5, 1910) 
74 RGZ. 171; (March 16, 1928) 82 Seuff. Arch. 205 No. 121, IPRspr. 1928, 58 
:\Io. 37; (July 7, 1932) lPRspr. 1932 No. 39; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 384, 392; 
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 294· 
42 VALERY 970 § 671; Cour Paris (May 18, 1893) Clunet 1893, 827; App. 
Alger (May 5, 1896} D. 1899.2.412. 
42a Only CoHEN, supra n. z8, suggests that in view of an alleged analogy 
between torts and cases of unjust enrichment the law of the place where the 
loss occurs should control. 
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the local cashier43 of a certain bank, the enrichment of the 
defendant, a Swiss bank, must have occurred at his domicil, 
the center of his assets, and not in Paris as the court as-
sumed. In fact, a subsequent decision of the same Swiss 
court applies "the law of the place where the enrichment is 
said to have occurred, hence, as a rule, at the place of the 
domicil of the acquirer."44 
2. Law of the Relationship Causing Enrichment 
Should it not be feasible to localize internationally the 
duty of restitution by contemplating the legal origin of the 
enrichment, rather than its territorial origin or the vicissi-
tudes of its future development? Despite all the variety 
in the laws respecting the conditions of a duty of restitu-
tion, there is a common pattern. Whatever else motivates a 
law to recognize a claim for unjust enrichment, the aim is 
always to disallow on account of some initial or subsequent 
vice an acquisition duly made in accordance with the formal 
laws. Following this common idea and neglecting the tech-
nical differences by which the systems of law operate, our 
attention moves back to the various situations that need 
correction. No mechanically ascertainable contact is ade-
quate for all cases. Choice of law must depend on the nature 
of the source from which the enrichment stems. 
This experience has slowly emerged from frequent though 
casual observations that all legal obligations cannot be 
bound to one territorial connection,45 and gradual aware-
ness that in particular the law governing a frustrated con-
tract should extend to the actions enforcing the return of a 
performance made on the contract. Niemeyer and N euner46 
43 BG. (April 28, 1900) 26 BGE. II 268. 
44 BG. {Nov. 25, 1905) 31 BGE. II 662, 665. 
45 E.g., 2 ARMIN JON ( ed. 2) 33 5; zo Repert. 776 No. 2. 
46 NIEMEYER, Vorschliige und Materialien zur Kodifikation des IPR. {1895) 
244; NEUNER, 2 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1928) 122 n. I. 
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in Germany, and with respect to undue payment Pillet and 
Arminjon47 in France, have prepared an appropriate theory, 
now tentatively but with increasing assurance expressed by 
the most recent German authors, particularly Martin 
Wolff, Raa pe, and Z weigert. 48 Various German decisions 
have followed the same view.49 At the same time, the 
British Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, has 
instinctively chosen an identical method. The new law pre-
scribes restitution of all sums paid in pursuance of a con-
tract discharged by impossibility of performance or other 
frustration, and applies to contracts "governed by English 
law." The place where the sum is paid, thus, is without 
importance. Although this deviation from the orthodox 
criterion has been criticized by some writers, it has been 
welcomed and extensively interpreted by Falcon bridge. 50 
Also, the draftsmen of the revised draft of the Monte-
video Treaty (art. 43) in 1940, must have felt in a similar 
way. To the rule that obligations arising without contract 
are governed by the law of the place where the "licit or 
illicit fact" occurs, they add the words: "and in an appro-
priate case, by the law governing the legal relations to 
which they correspond." 
This approach will doubtless be improved by thorough 
exploration. Here we may briefly contemplate the theo-
retical ground and a few typical applications. 
47 PILLET, 2 Traite 311 § 547a; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 338. 
48 GUTZWILLER I623; NussBAUM, D. 'IPR. 295 n. 2; M. WoLFF, IPR. ( ed. 3) 
I 69 ; id., Priv. Int. LaW ( ed. 2) 499 If. § 48 I; 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 267; RAAPE, 
IPR. (ed. 5) 527 If.; ZWEIGERT, supra n. 27; KNAUER, Note 25 RabelsZ. (1960) 
3 IS, 327 If. 
49 Bay. ObLG. (Nov. I6, I8S2) 3S Seuff. Arch. 26o; RG. (June IS, I887) 
4 Bolze No. 26 (unavailable) ; and citations of recent decisions below. 
50 See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 54I If.; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (ed. 2) 
428 If.; MORRIS, "The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes," 62 Law Q. Rev. 
( 1946) 170, I So in case of frustration of a contract. See also EHREN ZWEIG, 
Conflict 599 f. with further references in n. I9. 
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C. RATIONALE 
1. Theoretical Approach 
It is generally agreed that the question whether an en-
richment is justified must be determined by the law under 
which its acquisition takes effect.51 It is submitted that the 
same law governs the action for restitution as a whole. 
Suppose a seller has delivered the goods but rescinded 
the contract because of the buyer's default. This means in 
American and German laws the destruction of the contract. 
If he, then, sues for the return of the goods on the theory 
of unjust enrichment (rather than of ownership), the pro-
visions on enrichment of the legal system governing the 
contract must apply. It is quite true that the enrichment is 
unjust only because the contract has ceased to exist. But if 
it has been therefore objected that it is "illogical" to extend 
the law of the former contract to its sequelae,52 this is the 
typical wrong logic by which it has been declared impossible 
that the formation of a contract should be governed by the 
law applicable if the contract is valid.53 
Any comparison of the municipal systems shows that 
restitution on the ground of failure of consideration is 
afforded by different technical means, such as a claim of 
ownership reverting to the seller; a u condictio" or claim 
for unjust enrichment properly termed; an action inter-
mediate between those for enrichment and breach; or a 
remedy sounding purely in contract. Even the elaborate 
German Civil Code has failed to make it clear to what cate-
gory exactly the action based on recission belongs.54 It is 
51 GEBHARD in Niemeyer, Vorgeschichte I 56 n. I; PILLET, 2 Traite 311; 
ROLIN, 3 Principes 62; 2 ZITELMANN I94, 525; NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) 32; 
2 FRANKENSTEIN 392 n. 32. 
52 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 682 verbally followed by LIPSTEIN, 7 Cambr. L. J., 
supra n. 23, 86. 
53 Vol. I (ed. 2) p. 74; Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 523 n. I7. 
54 See the commentaries to BGB. §§ 327, 348. 
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imperative to subject all of these-merely with certain 
reservations concerning property-to one conflicts rule. 
Where ownership is transferred irrespective of the validity 
of the sales or other contract, as may occur under German 
law, the absence of the presupposed cause leads to unjust 
enrichment. Since the transfer was caused by the contract-
one might say, was done to satisfy the law of the contract-
this law ought to determine what should happen to restore 
balance. The law of the place of transfer has no importance 
whatever. 
Even when a contract is termed void ab initio or by annul-
ment, this is proper juridical language, but it should not 
be stressed too literally. There may be an aftereffect, such 
as when damages for fault in contracting or innocent rep-
resent:ui on are recoverable; without any doubt they are 
subject to contract rules. 55 There is no obstacle in theory to 
applying the law of such a contract to actions for return 
of performance. The common law doctrine of constructive 
trust is commonly applied where there is a violation of a 
fiduciary relationship. The unjust enrichment of the agent 
should therefore be subjected to the law governing the 
relationship and not necessarily to that of the place of the 
enriching act.55a 
That a contractual debtor pays more than he finally is 
found to owe, is an analogous occurrence. Where a seller 
delivers more goods than he should and the surplus quantity 
is finally rejected, ownership may or may not have passed, 
according to the system and the circumstances. No distinc-
tion in this respect can be made in a conflicts rule concerning 
the obligatory claim. We may, however, even go farther. 
A claim for violation of a legal or beneficial property 
55 RABEL, 27 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 291. 
55aAccord, Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 (rg6o) § 354k and 
comment on pp. 229 ff.; for criticism, see EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 6oo f. 
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right is commonly regarded in isolation; and therefore, no 
local contact seems possible other than the lex situs. But 
the relationship between the parties may not be so simple. 
A distinct example is the resulting trust at common law; a 
legal transfer of property in the absence of consideration is 
understood to create, by a tacit agreement, an obligation to 
return the beneficial interest therein. Is the lex situs com-
petent to govern this construction or rather the law con-
trolling the transaction of the parties? 
Inversely, ownership or any property interest may vanish, 
leaving an obligation for restitution. Of such nature is in-
nocent conversion at civil law where it is conceived as unjust 
enrichment rather than as tort. For instance, Justinian-
to show himself as the protector of art-ending an old 
school controversy, adopted the opinion that a table used 
for painting but belonging to another person, should become 
the property of the artist who, however, ought to pay the 
value of the table to the former owner.56 These are two 
parts of one solution and cannot be divided between two 
laws. The lex situs, indispensable for the disposition of 
property, hence, must also furnish the rule on enrichment. 
If goods have been shipped to Rio de Janeiro and there 
delivered to a wrong address, viz., to the local agent of a 
New York firm, enrichment is probably deemed to occur in 
New York, but Brazilian law must govern. It decides 
whether, at what time, and to whom, property passes and 
ought also to determine what duty of restitution burdens 
the new owner. 
2. Historical Reminder 
It is a curious observation that juridical elaboration of 
our system may tempt us to overestimate the value of the 
56 Inst. Just. 2, r, 34, incorporating Gai. Inst. II 78, cf. GAIUS, Dig. 41, r, 9, 
§ 2; PAULUS, Dig. 6, r, 23, § 3· 
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differentiation of categories brought about by our pro-
fessional development. We should not forget that all direct 
and indirect effects of agreement have originated upon one 
basis, first of tort, later of contract. The Roman classic 
process formula of actio certae creditae pecuniae served 
for the recovery of a valid loan but, if the contract was 
void, for instance, because the borrower was a lunatic, or 
because he was in error about the person of the lender, 
the same formula was good for the repayment of the enrich-
ment. 57 The same formal writ used for ages in England to 
enforce repayment of a loan was employed when the money 
given appeared to belong to the plaintiff without a recog-
nized type of contract or tort.58 The primitive notion that 
the lender may claim "my money," recurs to this day. 
"Debt" is really detinue, as the Roman condictio is based on 
non-justified habere. Our ineluctable division between prop-
erty and obligations is not meant to establish barriers sep-
arating naturally connected problems. Conflicts law must 
rigorously strive to avoid this danger. 
D. ILLUSTRATIONS58a 
1. Family Law 
A German recognized in Switzerland his paternity of 
certain children. He sued for revocation of the recognition 
as unjustly obtained by deceit ( BGB. § 812 par. 2). A Ger-
man court correctly applied Swiss law to this claim.59 
57 }ULIANUS, Dig. I2, I, I9, § I (despite interpolation); CELsus, Dig. 12, 
I, 32. 
58 8 HOLDSWORTH 88, 92. 
58a For more recent German cases, see OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. 22, I9S7) 
IPRspr. I956-57 No. 33; BGH. (Apr. IS, I9S9) 25 RabelsZ. ( I96o) 3I3; BGH. 
(Feb. 4, I96o) NJW. I96o, 774; BGH. (July 6, I96I) 35 BGHZ. 267. 
Switzerland: BG. (April 23, I95I) 77 BGE. II 86, 94 f.; BG. (Nov. I, I9S2) 
78 BGE. II 385, Revue Crit. I953, 40I with a note by HOLLEAUX. 
Austria: OGH. (June 24, I9S9) 2 Z. f. RV. (I96I) I8 and note by BYDLINSKI, 
id. at 22, 29 ff. 
From these cases the tendency is clearly discernible to apply the law of a 
pre-existing legal relationship also to questions of unjust enrichment. 
59 LG. Frankfurt (Aug. I71 I932) IPRspr. I933, 105 No. 48. 
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2. Rescission and Avoidance of Contract 
( i) A buyer not paying the price has to restore the goods 
on the request of the seller, because the return is implied 
in the synallagma, that is, the exchange of price and de-
livery, essential to sale. Hence, the law governing the sales 
contract extends to the action for restitution, however it 
may be legally construed. 
(ii) Dissolution of contracts by war. The Treaty of 
Versailles dissolved contracts between persons having be-
come enemies, with certain exceptions. What became of a 
partial performance by one party? Judge Algot Bagge as 
president of a division of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal ascertained that under German and Scotch laws 
an action would lie for recovery as unjust enrichment, but 
that in England under the rule of Chandler v. Webster60 
the acts of performance done before the dissolution were 
not recoverable. To escape such different results, under the 
Treaty, Bagge decided that the Treaty must have intended 
to recognize and maintain a money obligation for restitu-
tion every time the parties had not distributed the risks 
otherwise.61 Thus he rightly took it for granted that resti-
tution of a performance is essentially connected with the 
law destroying the basis of the obligation. In several de-
cisions by another Swedish president, a division of the same 
court turned to the application of the national law of unjust 
enrichment, but this, again, was in all cases taken from the 
system governing the contract.62 The same question of 
whether a claim for the repayment of advances made in 
performance of contracts is implied in the peace treaty 
60 [ I904] I K. B. 493-but overruled by the Fibrosa Case and the Act of 
I943, see Vol. II ( ed. 2) pp. 542 f. 
61 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. (Jan. I9, I926) Burroughs Wellcome & 
Co. v. Chemische Fabrik auf Aktien, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 13, 16. Fol-
lowed by British-Turkish Mixed Arb. Trib. (Dec. 19, 1928) Gouv. Turc v. 
Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd. et Vickers Ltd., 8 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
996, IOOI. 
6 2 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib. President Klaestad (July 2I, I926) 
Alexander Davidson v. Gebriider Dammann, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 588; 
(Oct. 20, I926) Arnold and Foster, Ltd. v. J. W. Erkens, 6 id. 6o6; (Dec. I, 
I926) The Dunderland Iron Ore Co., Ltd. v. Friedr. Krupp A. G. 6 id. 639; 
and in 7 id. 372,375, 379,4I8, 493i 8 id. 7, 283. 
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dissolving contracts or to be based on the applicable na-
tional law, has recurred under the obscure texts of the five 
peace treaties of 1947.63 
3· Performance Without Just Cause-Upon an Assumed 
Pre-existing Obligation 
( i) Suppose a legacy left by a testa tor domiciled in 
Argentina to a citizen of New Orleans is paid to him in 
New York. The Argentine law of inheritance competent 
to state whether a valid legacy obligation exists, is the right 
law also to determine the effects of payment in case of 
avoidance of the legacy. What import has the place of pay-
ment or the domicil of the receiving person ?64 
(ii) Before 1900, A, in a place under Prussian law, hav-
ing bought a house in Brunswick from a vendor domiciled 
there, paid more than he owed, by a payment in Magde-
burg, a place under common law. The sale was naturally 
governed by the lex situs (Brunswick) and rightly the 
Reichsgericht applied the same law to the limitation of 
action for the repayment of that which was not due. It 
should not have invoked the place of performance, but it 
was right in pointing to the connection between the seller's 
duty to repay and his contractual obligations.65 The place of 
payment was immaterial. 
(iii) A Germany company, owner of a German-registered 
steamer, created a first mortgage in Dutch currency to a 
Dutch firm. The vessel was sold at auction in England, and 
the Dutch mortgagee-under an English rule deemed to 
be substantive-received the amount of the mortgage by 
conversion of the guilders into pounds according to the 
exchange rate of the day of the creation of the mortgage. 
The Hamburg Appeal Court stated that the loan and mort-
gage contract expressly stipulated for German law and as 
this law included a rule for conversion according to the date 
63 For the first construction, MARTIN, "Private Property etc. in the Paris 
Peace Treaties," 24 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 273, 297 n. 6; for the second, 
ERNST WoLFF repeatedly, and most recently in his book, Vorkriegsvertriige in 
Friedensvertriigen ( 1949) 101. 
64 RAAPE, IPR. ( ed. 5) 529. 
65 RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171. 
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of payment, it extended to the claim for unjust enrichment 
to recover whatever excess had been paid in England.66 
4· Without an Assumed Pre-existing Obligation 
( i) A German firm assigned all its claims, arising from 
sales to Dutch customers, to a German bank for security 
of credit, but subsequently assigned one of the Dutch drafts 
involved to another German firm. The first assignee ob-
tained restitution from the second under a German rule 
applicable, as the court said, under all conflicts theories con-
cerning enrichment.67 But the decision could not have been 
different, if the second assignee had received the draft by 
indorsement in Holland or had cashed it there. Nor is 
the circumstance that both assignees were nationals and 
domiciliaries of Germany of any significance. The real rea-
son for acknowledging the right of the plaintiff was the 
priority of his claim against the debtor (according to the 
law of the assignor's domicil) 68 effective in the field of en-
richment even after he lost the claim. 
( ii) If a surety has entered into his obligation without 
agreement with the principal debtor and by payment is not 
subrogated in the principal debt, he may have a claim on 
the ground of unjust enrichment against the debtor-accord-
ing to what law? The traditional opinions point to the places 
either where the surety paid or wherever he could pay, or 
where the debtor is enriched by liberation, probably at his 
domicil.69 But as generally in suretyship matters, it is desir-
able to apply the law under which the surety is liable, which 
wherever feasible70 is to be identified with the law of the 
principal debt. 
III. GENERAL AVERAGE 
From ancient times the sacrifice of goods carried on the 
seas in order to save other goods and particularly the 
66 OLG. Hamburg (May 15, 1929) Hans. RGZ. 1929 B No. 227, IPRspr. 
1929, 74 No. 51. 
67 RG. (July 7, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 39, cf. BGB. § 816 par. 2. Cf. an 
analogous case of wrong delivery of a cargo, OLG. Hamburg (July r, 1932) 
id. No. 40. 
68 Infra Ch. 49· 
69 Thus FEDOZZI-CERETI 764. 
70 Supra Ch. 47, p. 361. 
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vessel has produced rules for equitable distribution of the 
loss. The underlying idea is at present regarded as the 
community of risk involved in a sea carriage rather than 
unjust enrichment.71 A common legal history has not pre-
vented, however, a great many differences of regulations, 
accompanied by a chaos of conflicts rules. Unification was 
therefore early sought by the International Law Association 
at the Congresses of York, 1864, and Antwerp, 1877, with 
the resulting rules, reformed at Stockholm, 1924.72 These 
"York-Antwerp Rules" have obtained almost universal 
force by insertion or reference in bills of lading and con-
tracts of affreightment. Such a clause may run as in the 
Argentine governmental form: General average is subject 
to the York-Antwerp Rules, 1924, and insofar as these do 
not decide, to the Argentine Commercial Code and usage. 
The place of the adjustment will be Buenos Aires and the 
carrier will appoint the adjuster or adjusters. 73 
Unfortunately, some forms still refer to the older draft 
of the Rules, and even the rules of 1950, though more com-
plete, have left gaps and are not used for every carriage. 
Hence there is still great force in the age-old principle that 
the adjustment of the claims should be made at the port 
of destination, or in case the voyage cannot be carried to 
its end, the port of refuge where ship and goods are sepa-
rated.74 Some formulations use less distinctive indications, 
71 L. MossA, 2 Derecho mercantil ( 1940) 549 (Spanish ed. of Diritto com-
merciale) and cited authors. 
72 Reports of the 33rd Conference (1925) 670 ff. A revision of the rules has 
been adopted at Amsterdam, September 19-24, 1949, by the International 
Maritime Committee and has become effective on Jan. r, 1950; see BENEDICT, 
6A Admiralty (ed. 7) 812. 
73 Rep. Argentina, Ministerio de Marina, Admin. Gen. de Ia Flota Mercante 
del Estado, s. 34, printed in MALVAGNI, Curso de derecho de Ia navegaci6n 
(1946) (Pocket Ann.). For analogous clauses recommended in the United 
States, see BENEmCT, 6A Admiralty (ed. 7) 821; KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of 
Lading (ed. 4) uo. 
74 United States: Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy (1930) 
281 U.S. srs; and cases cited by 2 BEALE 1332 § 411.2; 2 WHARTON 962. 
England: Lloyd v. Guibert (r865) L. R. r Q. B. us, 126; WESTLAKE§ 220; 
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such as the Portuguese Code referring to the port "where 
the goods will be delivered. " 75 
Many writers have attacked this very old practice and 
favored the law of the flag or the law of the contract. 76 
Their arguments are rather deceptive. Nor is the customary 
rule to be explained as lex loci solutionis or on some other 
theory. It is simply the practical need that points to the 
place where the last remaining goods are discharged. 77 As 
an English judge said in 1824: "The place at which the 
average shall be adjusted ... is the place of the ship's 
destination or delivery of her cargo," and the shipper of 
goods "by assenting to general average, must be understood 
to consent also to its adjustment, according to the usage 
DICEY (ed. 7) 837 Rule 162; LOWNDES & RUDOLPH, Law of General Average 
and the York-Antwerp Rules {ed. 8, 1955) 191. 
France: RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 199 §§ 2227 ff.; CROUVES, 2 Repert. 
287 No. 88. 
Germany: WAGNER, Seerecht 142; ScRAPS-ABRAHAM, 2 Seerecht {ed. 3) 
903 § 700 Nos. 31 f. 
Greece: App. Athens {April 8, 1895) Clunet 1897, 192. 
Italy: Former practice, see SCERNI 278. 
The Netherlands: C. Com. arts. 722, 723, 745 {distinguishing several cases); 
H. R. (June 22, 1928) 22 Revue Dor 434· 
Norway: S. Ct. (March 25, r886) Clunet r888, 151. 
Portugal: C. Com. art. 6 50. 
Spain: C. Com. art. 847 par. 2. 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. {Sept. ro, 1926) 82 Rev. Dir. III; (April 27, 1927) 85 
id. 460. 
Guatemala: C. Com. art. 961; MATOS 561 § 402. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Com. N a vi g. ( 1940) art. 17 {excepting the 
formalities and conditions of the stipulation on average reserved for the law 
of the flag, in accordance with the restriction on locus regit actum, see 
GowLAND, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 
at 303. 
75 Portugal: C. Com. art. 650. Often "port de reste" and "port de destination" 
are used synonymously, which is confusing. 
76 Survey of laws and literature in CROUVES, 2 Repert. 265 ff.; Note, 22 
Revue Dor 461; cf. 2 BAR 2212; 2 MElLI 369; LYON-CAEN, Clunet 1882, 593; 
EYNARD r8o; Inst. Droit Internat., 8 Annuaire {r886) 124; 6 LYON-CAEN et 
RENAULT§ 983; DESPAGNET 930; BoNNECASE, Dr. Com. Mar. 700 § 791. 
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Commercial Law { r889) art. 21 {reversed by 
the text of 1940) ; C6digo Bustamante, art. 288. 
7 7 Excellent, Note, 22 Revue Dor at 465. See also MONACO, Studi per Ia 
codificazione ( 1940) 142. 
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and law of the place at which the adjustment is to be 
made."78 The adjuster is not expected to study the laws 
of all the parties concerned, nor is there a reason why the 
law of the vessel which is a party to the community of 
interests, should be preferred to the other laws. The persons 
primarily interested are the consignees and the insurers. 
The binding force of foreign adjustment, undoubted as 
to the coadventurers, has been subject to certain questions 
with regard to the underwriters. But legal provisions and 
the revised clauses of the insurance policies have taken care 
of the doubts. 79 
The scope of the local law of the port is not always easy 
to trace. English and American discussions seem to be 
missing. In the Continental literature, the doubts have been 
increased by the frequent claim that the law of the flag 
should control, if not the whole matter, at least special prob-
lems. Of course, the law of the flag may adequately deter-
mine whether the master has to consult the crew before 
sacrificing goods,80 and in what cases he obligates the ship-
owner. But the relation between the shipowner and the 
cargo owners is the subject of the carriage contract, com-
plemented by usages.81 
Other questions discussed are: the meaning of maritime 
voyage in the average doctrine; who ought to contribute 
and to what extent (if not covered by the York-Antwerp 
Rules) ; and whether the obligation of the ship owner is 
personal or only ad rem. 
The German courts apparently resort indiscriminately to 
the law of the port of destination, applied by them to 
78 Abbott, J., in Simonds and Loder v. White (1824) 2 B. & C. 8os, 8II, 813. 
79 For a comprehensive discussion, see ARNOULD, 2 The Law of Marine 
Insurance and Average (ed. IS, 1961) 992 §§ 993 ff. 
8° France: Cass. req. (Feb. II, 1862) D. 1862.1.247· 
81 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (June 12, 1922) Hans. RGZ. 1922 No. I7S, 78 
Seuff. Arch. No. 96, approving SCHAPS, Seerecht (ed. 2) § 700 ns. 29 f.; Note, 
22 Revue Dor at 468. 
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affreightment. All other courts, in the true meaning of the 
tradition, look to the law applied by the adjuster. His con-
clusions are internationally respected, provided-and this 
should never be forgotten-that they are vested with the 
judicial authority of the country where the port lies. Thus, 
the Dutch courts, construing their new code provisions as 
the consecration of the universal custom, have recognized 
that a Swedish adjustment following the local law, had 
authority not only as respects the damage and the amounts 
assessed, but also in determining the parties liable.82 
8 2 H. R. (June 22, 1928) The Thabetta I, 22 Revue Dor 458. On connected 
doubtful questions in England, see DICEY (ed. 7) 839· 
PART TEN 
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE 
OF OBLIGATIONS 
CHAPTER 49 
Voluntary Assignment of Simple Debts 
I. THE PROBLEM 
1. Municipal Differences 
T HE full transfer of chases of action has become recognized in almost every municipal system. But the 
methods of dealing with the specific problems of this 
institution are not identical,! These problems arise out of 
the coexistence of three interested parties, the assignor, 
the debtor, and the assignee, and the additional possi-
bility of conflicts between two or more assignees and their 
creditors. The influences coming from the bordering fields 
of attachment, garnishment, and bankruptcy, least favored 
by international co-operation, further complicate the matter. 
Most of the legal diversity is caused by residua from 
former periods. There is, however, a difficult conflict be-
tween the interest of the debtor whose situation should not 
be altered by the act of two other parties without his con-
sent, and the modern desire for unhampered mobilization of 
values. A creditor ordinarily may vest any other person 
with his right, not only without the debtor's consent but 
without his knowledge. Notice, essentially required in the 
older codes, such as the influential French Code, in modern 
systems is only a means for improving the position of the 
assignee. Particulars in the protection of the debtor, on one 
hand, and of the assignee and his successors, on the other, 
vary and are often obscure. · 
1 For comparative municipal law, see KARL ARNDT, Zessionsrecht, 7 Beitriige 
zum ausliindischen und internationalen Privatrecht (Berlin, Leipzig, 1932). 
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The involved and delicate structure of the municipal rules 
has caused a peculiar contrast in classifying the incidents 
of assignment. This diversity demands a thorough investi-
gation before definitive conclusions are reached with respect 
to the advisable conflicts rules. 
The American decisions in point are numerous but mostly 
confined to life insurance policies. Appointment of a bene-
ficiary to insurance is not an assignment of the policy but 
has been adequately treated in conflicts law in an analogous 
manner. On the other hand, cases concerning bills and notes 
have been mixed into the discussion, which we must strictly 
avoid. Transfer of rights through the endorsement of nego-
tiable instruments follows special principles in municipal 
law as well as in conflicts law, although the differences are 
not equally accentuated in all systems. In some situations, 
endorsement has the effect of assignment, but even then 
the distinction is useful. 
To introduce the reader to the conflicts arising from the 
variety of municipal laws despite the modern tendency to 
uniform development, the following examples may serve: 
(i) Capacity of parties. Cabrera, President of Guate-
mala, deposited a sum of money with a London bank and 
later requested the bank to transfer this sum to Nunez, his 
illegitimate minor son. The English courts held the transfer 
void under Guatemalan law under which the son could not 
accept the assignment, although it would have been valid 
by English law? In the concurring, though entirely diverse, 
opinions, the former law was applied either as lex loci actus, 
or the proper law of the assignment, or the lex domicilii of 
the assignor and assignee. English law was considered as 
the lex situs of the debt and as its proper law. 
(ii) Assignability of the debt. Carr, injured in a railway 
accident in Iowa, assigned his claim for damages on the 
ground of tort by an assignment made in Illinois. The claim 
2 Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez, see inf,-a n. 23. 
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could be transferred in Iowa but not in Illinois where tort 
obligations were nonassignable under common law. The 
Iowa court applied its own law as that under which the debt 
arose.3 
(iii) Requirement of notification. The English creditor 
of a French debtor assigns in Switzerland the debt to an 
American, without giving the debtor notice through formal 
signification, as required by the French Civil Code, art. 
1690, although not in Switzerland. Supposing that French 
law governs the debt, most European courts hold the trans-
fer incomplete, either because French law governs the debt 
(Swiss conflicts rule) or because the debtor is domiciled 
in France (French conflicts rule). In the most frequently 
expressed American view, however, the transfer is perfected 
because made in Switzerland. 
(iv) Warranty of solvency of the debtor. German par-
ties once made an assignment in Niirnberg of a debt gov-
erned by Austrian law. The German courts denied liability 
of the assignor for the debtor's solvency according to the 
Austrian Code, following the Roman law in force in 
Niirnberg.4 
( v) Priority between successive assignees. A firm in the 
state of New York assigned its accounts receivable as 
security for a loan to a finance corporation in Philadelphia. 
The debtors in numerous states were not notified. After-
ward, the firm assigned one of these debts in payment to 
another creditor, who collected the money. At the time 
(before 194 5) in Pennsylvania failure to notify allowed a 
subsequent bona fide assignee by giving notice to the debtor 
to acquire a right superior to that of an earlier assignee. Ac-
cording to the "New York rule" (similar to German law) 
however, a prior assignee is not only to be preferred before 
payment of the debt but may recover from the subsequent 
assignee what the latter collects from the debtor. In the 
United States, under theory of law of the place of assign-
ment, it is uncertain which law would be applied. The Eng-
3 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (z886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 906, 
aff'd, 28 N. W. 612, infra n. 75· 
4 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) z62, Clunet 1892, 1039. 
See infra p. 423 n. 106. 
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lish and French conflicts rules call for neither of these laws 
but for those of the various domicils of the debtors. The 
German conflicts rule points to the laws governing the indi-
vidual single debts assigned. 
2. The Nature of Assignment 
Since in ancient laws obligations were strictly personal, 
neither in English nor in Roman law could a creditor put 
another person in his own place as holder of an obligatory 
right. The auxiliary practices developed in both laws for 
approaching this purpose were exactly the same. The 
creditor appointed the intended assignee as his agent for 
enforcing the claim and retaining the proceeds (mandatum 
agendi to a procurator in rem suam). Reflections of this 
stage of history persist in the Anglo-American literature. 
Notably, the question whether an assignee may sue the 
debtor in his own name has preserved an anachronistic 
importance.5 Also, the distinction between legal and equi-
table assignment is still significant in common law, although 
it should not affect the structure of the conflicts rules.6 Full 
and present transfer of the complete right of the creditor 
is the basic form of assignment. Modern efforts, to be sure, 
have tended to split the right into segments such as legal 
and beneficiary ownership, or substance of the right and 
its exercise. These differences are included in what is termed 
assignability in conflicts law.7 
It is opportune, however, to be clearly aware of the 
elements of a voluntary transaction in the course of which 
a chose in action is transferred from the owner to another 
person. The Romans spoke of the sale of a debt (emptio 
5 See 2 WHARTON 1482 § 735; CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 500 f., 694 if.; RoBERTSON, 
Characterization 273, 278. 
6 2 BEALE§§ 348-350, 353 (by implication). 
7 2 BEALE 12 51 § 348.2. E.g., if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust assigns 
his interest, he constitutes only a revocable power of attorney, GRISWOLD, 
Spendthrift Trusts 378. 
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venditio nominis) or of an estate ( hereditatis). N everthe-
less, only a century ago, the German literature had to be 
admonished to observe the duality of an obligatory con-
tract containing a promise to assign and a quasi-real con-
tract effecting the assignment. The distinction even now is 
not very familiar to many lawyers,8 and sometimes a court 
in this country thinks it necessary to recall it to the readers 
of its decision. But the distinction between sale or security 
arrangement and actual assignment is so well known9 that 
it may be surprising that no such distinction appears in any 
discussion of the conflicts problems. American courts and 
the Restatement ( § 350) seem to consider only a law gov-
erning the assignment, and German courts and writers 
speak exclusively of the law governing the underlying re-
lationship. The Restatement illustrates its rule exactly by 
mentioning warranty of the "assignor" for the existence 
of the debt, although in the modern doctrine (if not in the 
codes) this particular liability has always been the most 
characteristic incident, not of assignment, but of a promise 
to assign for value. 
The American attitude is the more striking, as in the 
most frequent language "assignment" evidently does not 
mean the entire contract, including the promise to transfer 
and the transfer, but is thought of as a unilateral mani-
festation of transferring the right, hence as a part of the 
all-inclusive transaction. Its definition in the Restatement 
of the Law of Contracts suggests the same idea.10 Never-
8 According to the original doctrine laid down in French C. C. art. r 583, 
sale or gift of a debt includes assignment. Only its effects as to third persons, 
including the debtor, depend on notice, C. C. art. r6go. However, in modern 
theory and practice, the situation is very similar to the rules of American 
statutes requiring notice. Therefore, the transfer of the debt in French law, 
even though simultaneously with the sale etc., is not a transfer by law, as 
GULDENER 89 construes it, naturally without French confirmation, but rests 
on the presumed intention of the parties. 
9 See the cases in 6 C. J. S. 1048 n. 50 distinguishing sale and assignment. 
1o Restatement of Contracts § 149· 
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theless, common law assignment is a bilateral transaction, 
a true contract, requiring acceptance, actual or presumptive, 
or better said, constructive. The language mentioned may 
have originated from the ancient appointment of an agent 
for enforcing the debt and at present may refer more pre-
cisely to the customary and useful separate instrument of 
assignment, evidencing the transfer especially to third 
parties. 
Scope of discussion. Although in the United States and 
most Latin-American countries assignment is distinguished 
from conventional subrogation, the kind of subrogation 
whereby the creditor and a voluntary payor agree on trans-
fer of the debt, is very nearly related to assignment. The 
practical analogy is so great that the assignment rules are 
generally applied.11 The same must be true of conflicts rules. 
In American conflicts treatment, the subject is sometimes 
termed assignment of contracts, which is too broad, since the 
transfer of an entire contract, occurring in modern com-
merce, cannot be adequately explained by a mere division 
into transfers of claims and debtsP We must be satisfied 
with the transfer of single or several claims. On the other 
hand, the Restatement is not justified in restricting the topic 
to the transfer of contractual rightsY The source of an 
obligatory claim is immaterial so long as the claim is 
transferable. 
The term "debt" is used in the broad sense of common 
usage, not restricted to monetary obligations nor to the 
duty to pay a fixed amount. It means here the right to 
claim that which is due (French cniance, German Forde-
rung), rather than the corresponding duty. 
u WE'NGLER, "Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch at 493 f. 
12 See recently, also for the literature, FRUH, Die Vertragsiibertragung im 
schweizerischen Recht, Ziircher Beitriige zur Rechtswissenschaft, N. F. Heft 
111 (1945). As to the conflict aspects and for further literature, see ZWEIGERT, 
"Das Statut der Vertragsiibernahme," 23 RabelsZ. ( 1958) 643; EHRENZWEIG, 
Conflict 438 n. 1. 
13 Restatement §§ 348 ff. 
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3· The Relationships Involved 
Simplification is always desirable m conflicts laws. Yet 
before deciding to what extent it may be reached through 
rules covering more than one of the relationships involved, 
we have to note them exhaustively. Although we limit our 
discussion to those assignments of debt that rest on volun-
tary obligatory contracts to assign, we have to distinguish 
four aspects of the problem: 
( 1) The original debt between C ( reditor) and D ( ebtor), 
doubtless governed by its own law (lex obligationis) ; 
( 2) The contract containing the promise to assign (causa 
cessionis) between C and P ( urchaser), following its own 
law according to its nature as sale, gift, security, substitu-
tion for payment, etc.; 
( 3) The assignment between C and P, the present trans-
fer of the debt; 
(4) The relation between P and D which may be altered 
by new events, such as payment, release, setoff, etc. between 
C and D. 
II. THE MAIN CONFLICTS SYSTEMS 
I. Situs Doctrine 
The statutists felt constrained by their territorial dogma 
to subject even intangibles to the statute real and had, there-
fore, to give them a local situation in a territory.14 Assign-
ments of debts were sometimes localized at the domicil of 
the debtor/5 but the vast rna jority of authors, particularly 
of the French scholars of the eighteenth century, accentu-
ated the situs of the property which a debt represents and 
located it at the domicil of the assignor as the party dis-
posing of his property.16 
14 Fundamental: 2 LAINE 265-278. 
15 GUY CoQUILLE, Questions et responses etc. (1634) quest. 237. 
16 See 2 LAINE 26 5 £. 
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This past has left its traces in the conflicts doctrine of 
the nineteenth century. In England and the United States, 
the domicil of the owner of a claim has been characteris-
tically identified with the situs of the claim, in analogy to 
his other movablesY Notably in the French and Italian 
literature, the same old view has found expression18 with 
some effect on codification.19 Sometimes the domicil has 
been replaced by nationality.20 
The modern French doctrine has taken the side of the 
small minority of statutists and consistently favored the 
law of the debtor. Also in this view the basis of the situs 
theory may sometimes be recognized.21 The Treaty of 
Montevideo declares the situs of the debt generally to be 
at the place of performance.22 
Nevertheless, in the present literature it is universally 
settled that chases in action do not really have any situs, 
and that if some fictitious situs must be construed in such 
17 United States: STORY§§ 397 ff.; I WHARTON 792 § 363; Vanbuskirk v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. ( I842) I4 Conn. 582: personal property in contemplation 
of law has no situs but follows the person of the owner. Speed v. May (I85I) 
I7 Pa. St. 9I for general assignments: the actual situs of personal property 
protects local creditors only against transfer by operation of law. Otherwise, 
the personal property follows the domicil of the owner, effective against 
attachment by resident creditors (at the debtor's domicil). This reasoning 
recurs in Cole v. Cunningham (I889) I33 U. S. at I29 and Barnett v. Kinney 
( I893) I47 u. s. 476. 
England: 4 PHILLIMORE 6II § 759, with citations. 
18 France: I FOELIX § 6I; DEMOLOMBE, 9 Cours § 6I; SURVILLE, "La cession 
et Ia mise en gage des cn\ances en droit international prive," Clunet I897, 67I, 
673 (for the cessibility of the claim); SURVILLE 280 § I7I and n. 3; ROGUIN, 
Regie de droit ( I889) I4I. 
Norway: The law of the creditor's domicil (perhaps not as lex situs) is 
adopted according to CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. I6I. 
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (March 4, I892) 2 Z.int.R. (I892) 477· 
1 9 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. I2. 
Belgium: Draft of I887, tit. pre!., art. 5, I9 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. 
(1889-90) 449· 
20 E.g., 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 222. 
21 England: In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [ I89I] I Ch. 536, 
per North, J., aff'd [I892] I Ch. 2I9. DICEY (ed. 5), Rule I53, but cf. DICEY 
(ed. 7) 55I n. 72 and accompanying text. 
France: WEiss, 4 Traite 43I f. 
22 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law ( 1889) art. 29; ( 1940) art. 33· 
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matters as taxation, jurisdiction, seizure, or administration 
of estates, the voluntary transfer of debts needs no such 
fixed relation to a territory. In fact, there is no reasonable 
ground for denying the parties to an assignment the full 
freedom in choosing the law applicable to it. 
Where the domicil of the debtor has been taken as de-
cisive in the modern literature, ordinarily other reasons 
have prevailed. But the old doctrine did include an insight 
into the subject matter that should not be entirely forgotten. 
The creditor's domicil must be important, in the absence of 
more weighty connections, as the center of the assignor's 
assets, in relation to his act of surrendering a right, part of 
these assets. A subsidiary rule, exclusively based on the 
domicil of the debtor, is condemned thereby. The dilemma 
of the old and still active controversy, whether the domicil 
of the creditor or that of the debtor of the assigned debt 
is decisive, is wrong in itself. 
2. England 
In the principal English leading case, it was declared that 
no clear statement of the law applicable to assignment was 
available;23 the four jurists, namely, the first judge and the 
three justices of the Court of Appeal, advanced no less than 
five different theories on the law determining the validity 
of, and the capacity to make, an assignment.24 
Falconbridge offers three theories for choice,25 and Foote, 
Cheshire, and Wolff have suggested to supersede the present 
confusion by a rule similar to the German, extending to the 
assignment the law that governs the debt assigned.26 
23 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ 1927] 1 K. B. 
669 at 688. 
24 See the satirical remark by FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules 
of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 94· 
25 FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (ed. 2) 495 ff. 
26 FoorE 426, 296; CHESHIRE ( ed. 6) 489 ff.; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 
(ed. 2) §§ sn ff. 
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Doubtless, the authorities are entirely inconclusive. We 
may find only some preference for two theories, one that a 
voluntary transfer of a chose in action is governed by the 
law of the debtor's domicil,27 and the other that it has its 
own proper law,28 which is presumably to be found at the 
place of assigning, either by mechanical rule29 or with better 
reason in case both parties are domiciled in the same juris-
diction.30 
The judicial indecision is moderated, however, by the 
incipient insight that the three parties involved in an assign-
ment of rights are connected by different relationships. 
Thus, the assignment of an English life insurance as a gift 
from a husband to his wife in Cape Colony was correctly 
subjected to their domiciliary local law.31 And in Canada 
it was clearly distinguished that a life insurance policy was 
under the law of Ontario, but the "assignment of or dealing 
with the benefits of the policy made by the assured in Mani-
toba" belonged to the law of the latter province.32 
CHESHIRE, 51 Law Q. Rev. (1935) 76, 85 and Priv. Int. Law (ed. 6) 491, 
497 reads to this effect a dictum by Warrington, J., in Kelly v. Selwyn [ 1905] 
2 Ch. II7; rejecting this argument, M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law ( ed. 2) 538 f. 
§ 512. But this decision concerns the question of notification, on which see 
infra II, 7· 
27 Lawrence, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez, supra n. 23, at 
697; approved by FREDERIC POLLOCK, 43 Law Q. Rev. (1927) 296. 
28 Lee v. Abdy (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309, 313; Greer, J., and Scrutton, L. J., 
in Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez (1926) 42 T. L. R. 625, 629, 95 L. J. 
Q. B. 955; [ 1927] I K. B. 669, 688; Chaugham, J., in In re Ansi ani [ 1930] 
I Ch. 407,420. 
29 See CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 495 f. who therefore emphasizes the "retrogression 
to the days when Private International Law of contracts was still inchoate 
and undeveloped." 
30 Bankes, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez [ 1927] 1 K. B. at 686; 
Luxmore, J., in Finska Angfartygs A/B v. Baring Brothers & Co. ( 1937) 54 
T. L. R. 147, 148. The case was, however, finally decided on the finding that 
the Russian proceeding was an unfinished direction by the government rather 
than an assignment not completed under the domiciliary Russian law, H. L. 
[ 1940] 1 All E. R. 20, 65 Ll. L. Rep. 189. 
31 Lee v. Abdy, supra n. 28. 
32 Headnote of Nat'! Trust Co. v. Hughes ( 1902) 14 Man. R. 41 concerning 
an analogous situation, quoted with approval in In re Sawtell [ 1933] 2 D. L. R. 
at 399· 
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3· United States 
During the nineteenth century and sometimes even at 
present,33 the law applicable to assignment has been re-
garded as a very uncertain matter, as in England. But now 
the courts are more often said to have settled upon a short 
and definite formula: voluntary assignment is governed by 
the law of the place where the assigning takes place, except 
that the question whether the debt is assignable is deter-
mined by the law of the place where it is made.34 In various 
instances, however, the need for amplifying this formula 
has been evident. We may take an appropriate suggestion, 
for instance, from a remarkable dictum of Peaslee, C. J., 
in the New Hampshire Superior Court. A life insurance 
policy in a Massachusetts corporation was assigned for 
security by the insured, a resident of New Hampshire, to 
a New Hampshire bank, despite the fact that his daugh-
ters were beneficiaries. Massachusetts law was held not 
applicable: 
"The rights of the insurer, or of any party against the 
insurer, are not involved. Nor is there any question as to 
the power of the assured to take this insurance from his 
children and give it to his creditors, or make it a part of 
his estate. The issue is whether his dealings with the policies 
in this state amounted to such action. The extent of the 
assignment made by the pledge of the policies as collateral 
security is the controlling factor in the case. This pledge 
was made in this state by and to local residents, and the 
designated beneficiaries also resided here. Such an undertak-
ing is to be dealt with according to local law."35 
33 See KOI!SSLER, "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of 
Accounts Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. (1946) 563, 614. 
34 See, e.g., LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 319 § 183 and in Cas~s (ed. 5) at 496; 
GOODRICH 292; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 44 j 6 C. J. S. 1053 § 7; FREUTEL, 
56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) at 68 n. 160. 
See also references in RG., 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 If. 
35 Barbin v. Moore (1932) 85 N.H. 362, 364, 159 At!. 409. 
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This distinction between the rights of any party flowing 
from the insurance contract and "the extent of the assign-
ment" ought to be remembered. 
The Restatement has made an attempt to establish more 
specific rules. Only assignability of the debt, again, is men-
tioned in § 348 as subject to the law of the place where the 
assigned contract was made; § 3 5o determines "the effect 
of an assignment of a contract right as between the assignor 
and the assignee" by the law of the place of assignment. 
Capacity of the assignor and formalities are subjected to 
the same law(§§ 351, 352). Finally, in application of the 
broad scope of the law of the place of performance in 
Beale's scheme, the law of the place where the assigned 
contract (sic) should be performed, decides "whether the 
right of an assignee can be destroyed by payment to the 
assignor" ( § 353), and "whether payment by the obligor 
to a second assignee destroys the right to performance of 
the first assignee" ( § 35 3). Beale later changed his mind 
with respect to §§ 353 and 354· In his treatise he advocates, 
for all questions involving priority among successive assign-
ees, the law of the place of assignment.36 
Both these attempts at classification are incomplete and 
doubtful. The local contacts employed to localize both the 
debt assigned and the assignment are the familiar and 
misleading mechanical references. No regard is given to the 
promise to assign. Even so, the American doctrine has the 
notable merit of giving the transfer of debt a clearly inde-
pendent function, if an exaggerated one. 
4· Germany and Switzerland 
The most comprehensive system has been developed and 
unanimously adopted by the courts and writers in Ger-
36 2 BEALE § 354.1 j cf. MALCOLM, Jetter published by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, 
32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) at 925. 
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many. 37 It is contained in two rules. On the one hand, the 
law governing the obligation assigned determines not only 
whether the debt can be transferred, but also all other re-
quirements of a transfer, and even the effect of the assign-
ment on the debt. As the most important consequence, which 
forms the issue in the great majority of the numerous cases, 
the law of the debt assigned determines whether notice of 
the assignment is essential to the change of the person of 
the creditor. Therefore, a debt of a French domiciliary, 
governed by German law, does not need the formal signifi-
cation, prescribed by the French Civil Code, article 1690,38 
regardless of where the assignment is made. Conversely, if 
a debt is governed by French law, the assignment wherever 
made needs signification (or a formal acknowledgment by 
the debtor) as an essential condition.39 The law of the debt 
also governs a number of other problems which we shall 
examine later. 
On the other hand, the law that governs the relationship 
motivating the assignment (causa) such as sale, giving in 
payment, security, determines the rights and duties arising 
as between the assignor and assignee. An often-mentioned 
consequence concerns the liability of a seller of a right for 
the existence of the debt and possibly for the solvency of 
the debtor.40 
The Swiss doctrine has espoused these rulesY 
37 FoRSTER-Eccms, Preussisches Privatrecht § II n. 33; GEBHARD, Mated-
alien 160 ff.; 2 ZrTELMANN 304; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 33; GuTZWILLER 1616; 
LEWALD 270 §§ 328 ff.; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 265; M. WOLFF, IPR. ( ed. 3) 151 f. 
38 0LG. Ko\n (Oct. 14, 189o) 2 Z.int.R. (1892) 161; (Nov. 4, 1892) 4-
Z.int.R. ( 1894) 65; OLG. Colmar (June 23, 1905) Clunet 1908, 536. 
39 RG. (June 2, 1908) 18 Z.int.R. (1908) 449, Revue 1909, 298 with French 
exequatur, App. Paris (June 24, 1909) Clunet 1910, 162; RG. (March 23, 
1897) 39 RGZ. 371, Clunet 1900, 634 (debt under Egyptian law, assignment 
under then French law of Cologne). 
40 RG. (Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z. int. R. (1892) 162, Clunet i892, 1039. 
41 BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) 18 BGE. 516, 522; (Oct. 8, 1935) 61 BGE. II 24-2, 
24-5; (Feb. 19, 1936) 62 BGE. II 108, uo, Clunet 1938, 963; 2 ScHNITLI!R 
(ed. 4) 659. 
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5· France 
The decisions,42 none of which were rendered by the 
Court of Cassation, share the often-proclaimed opinion that 
the law of the debtor's domicil at the time of the suit gov-
erns assignment. The once almost solitary precursor of 
this theory, Guy Coquille (A. D. 1523-1603),43 considered 
debts localized with the debtor because by his honesty or 
fraudulent manipulations, by the care or carelessness ap-
plied to his business, the obligor makes the claim valuable 
or fruitless. 44 The outstanding problem to which most 
decisions and literary utterances have been devoted, how-
ever, concerns the application of the French provisions 
prescribing notification of the assignment to the debtor. 
The contemporary authors agree, without believing in a 
fictitious situs, that the effects of an assignment for third 
persons, including the debtor, are made dependent by the 
Code on measures procuring publicity in the interest of 
"public credit." Technically, these provisions are regarded 
as prescribing formalities, subject to the law of the place 
where they should be performed.45 These statements have 
often sounded as though assignments were governed en-
tirely by the domiciliary law of the debtor. But the litera-
ture has become conscious of the importance of the law 
governing the debt, citing German decisions, and in prin-
4 2 Trib. Nancy (Mar. 25, 1890) Clunet 1891, 923; Trib. com. Seine (Mar. 5, 
1892) Clunet 1893, 166; Cour Paris (Feb. 16, 1910) S. 1912.2.276, Clunet I9I3, 
555; Cour Paris (Nov. IS, I927) Clunet 1928, 972, Revue Crit. 1934, 12I. 
43 CoQUILLE, Questions et responses etc. ( I634) quest. 237; I LAINE 297; 
2 id. 263. 
44 2 LAINE 265, in an often-cited passage, approves. 
45 WEISS, 4 Traite 43I; DESPAGNET 1140 § 396; BARTIN, Traite 760 § 371; 
Principes 31 § 374; PILLET, Principes 409; PILLET, Traite 760 § 371; NIBOYET 
820 § 702; 2 ARMINJON §§ 141 f.; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 7) § 474; 
ARMINJON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 505 § 308. 
For Belgium, POULLET § 280. 
For Japan, YAMAnA, "Le droit international prive du Japon," Clunet 1901, 
637· 
Institute of International Law, Draft 1927, art. 2, 33 Annuaire (1927) III 
198, 2I7. 
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ple also recognizes that the validity and effect of the assign-
ment, i.e., the relation between assignor and assignee, must 
have its own domain. The law of the debtor's domicil seems 
to be retained for the relation between the assignee and the 
debtor.46 This includes, e.g., the right of the debtor to set off 
a counterclaim that arose against the assignor.47 Niboyet, 
finally, has advocated that the law of the domicil of the 
debtor be neatly restricted to the question of notification.48 
6. The Netherlands 
While the last-mentioned theory combines elements of 
the French and German conceptions, the Dutch courts have 
lately combined regard for the debtor, as in French law, 
with an independent status for the transfer. They hold the 
transaction between assignor and assignee governed by its 
own law. Due to the argument, however, that a Dutch 
debtor cannot be subject to a foreign law by an act in which 
he does not participate/9 the effect as to the debtor is deter-
mined by the law of his own domicil.5{) 
7· Comparison 
Leaving aside the uncertain English choice of law and 
the abandoned situs theories, three systems are recogniz-
46 See BEOUIGNON, 5 Repert. 334 No. 7 and Note, Clunet 1937, at 784; 
BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 587 f. § 540, who, however, extends further the law 
governing the debt. 
41 This has been assumed by App. Colmar (Nov. r6, 1935) Clunet 1937, 781 
and approved by the author of the Note, ibid., although he criticizes that the 
decision (as usual) asserts the Ia w of the debtor's domicil as the general 
principle of assignment. Cf. infra n. 95· 
48 NIBOYET 819 § 702; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 669, 679; see also DESPAGNET II39 
§ 398· 
49 Rb. Utrecht (April n, 1928) W. n898; KoSTERS 803 ff. 
" 0 See the five cases in I VAN HASSELT 135 and the three in id., Supp. 40, 
where assignment was in Germany between Germans and the debtor was 
in the Netherlands. In Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 1927) W. n664,_ German law 
was applied to the assignment as between a German assignor and a Dutch 
assignee, see infra p. 422, n. 102. 
A provision to the same effect is contained in art. 21 of the Benelux Draft 
of 1951. 
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able. If adequately developed, they agree in distinguishing 
the relation, Assignor-Assignee, from that of Assignee-
Debtor. But they disagree with respect to both the decisive 
contacts and the classification of problems. The American 
doctrine emphasizes the law of the place of assignment and 
gives it wide scope; the German doctrine resorts to the 
usual individualized contacts and broadly extends the in-
fluence of the law governing the original debt; and the 
French prefer the law of the place of the debtor's domicil 
at least with respect to the problems concerning notice of 
the assignment. Moreover, between assignor and assignee 
the Germans and Swiss emphasize the underlying contract 
(causa) in contrast to the theoretically abstract act of trans-
fer, whereas in the Latin countries little distinction is made, 
and in the United States the promise to assign disappears 
behind the act of assignment when the choice of law is made. 
All three systems are visibly defective, which explains 
the existing uncertainty. Roughly speaking, only in the 
United States and Germany has the doctrine developed 
shape. But the American formulations are inexhaustive and 
use the vague and mechanical contacts of lex loci contractus 
and the like. The German and Swiss conception has com-
mitted the mistake of determining who is the creditor in 
all respects by the law governing the debt merely because 
the debtor must be assured against a change in the govern-
ing law which might injure his situation. The governing law 
may, indeed, prevent the debt from being assigned at all 
or preclude assignment to the particular purchaser, which 
is, by the way, not a frequent occurrence in present business 
law (as compared with marital law and succession). Yet, 
where the debt is assignable, since modern law has adopted 
the institution of full transfer of debts either without knowl-
edge of the debtor, or at least without his consent, the 
debtor has no legitimate interest whatever in the motive, 
form, and effects of an assignment. As a Dutch court said 
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quite adequately, the debtor may challenge a plaintiff be-
cause there was no valid assignment, but he has nothing to 
do with the events underlying the assignment.51 Hence, while 
the defenses of the debtor inherent in his contract must be 
preserved, nevertheless the debt may be transferred any-
where in the world and to anybody, without his consent as 




Although older requirements of form have vanished, the 
laws are divided in some respects, as on the effect of oral 
assignments. Writing is required, for instance, for an as-
signment at law in England, generally in Switzerland, and 
in many Latin jurisdictions. In the United States, except 
for local statutes of frauds, ordinary oral assignments for 
value are practically operative and irrevocable, although 
more doubts prevail when the transfer is made without con-
sideration. The general conflicts rule, asserted by Beale, 
would strictly invoke the law of the place of the assignment 
on the question of form. 52 But although this was the rule 
followed in old cases of general assignments for the benefit 
of creditors,58 there is no corresponding authority for single 
assignments.54 An analogous dictum by an English Judge 
has been justly criticized. 55 
In the countries following the optional principle of locus 
regit actum, the transfer of a claim may comply with the 
51 Rb. Maastricht (Feb. 7, 1935) N.J. 1936, No. 550. 
52 2 BEALE 1255. 
53 Speed v. May (1851) 17 Pa. St. 91; Birdseye v. Underhill (1888) 82 Ga. 
142. Cf. Barnett v. Kinney (1893) 147 U.S. 476 and 2 BEALE 987 § 263.1. 
54 Of BEALE's ( 1255 n. 6) two American decisions allegedly in point, neither 
is concerned with simple debt. In Capital Finance v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. ( 1926) 75 Mont. 460, as BEALE notes (n. s), the assignment was made at 
the place also considered determining the law of the :;tssigned insurance policy. 
55 Scrutton, L. J., in Republica de Guatemala v. Nufiez [ 1927] r K. B. at 689. 
See contra: CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 493 f., also against the dicta by Lawrence, L. J., 
in the same case. 
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formalities (or formlessness) either of the law of the place 
where it is made or of the law governing its contents. A 
number of Continental writers, however, make the applica-
tion of the principle dependent on its adoption by the law 
of the debtor as identified with that governing the assigned 
debt.56 Hence, a French-governed debt would be transfer-
able in the United States according to French formalities, 
even though the principle were not recognized here. This 
contention is one of the exorbitant inferences from the 
alleged paramount role of the law of the debtor or of the 
debt, but may be refuted also on the ground that the prin-
ciple locus regit actum operates on its own merits at the 
forum itself. 57 
It has been insisted, however, that the formalities pre-
scribed by the law of the debt should always be observed 
in the interest of the debtor, so as to give him an easy 
opportunity to ascertain his creditor. A debtor owing under 
Swiss law should be able to rely only on a written assign-
ment in accordance with article 16 5 of the Code of Obliga-
tions.58 But this formality is merely one of the conditions 
for acquiring title. What the debtor needs in order to 
obtain certainty about the right and the identity of a claim-
ant, is a different matter and may be conveniently left to a 
local law, either of the debtor's domicil or of the place of 
performance. 
Formalities to be observed in an assignmen-t, or in the 
appointment of a beneficiary, are often stipulated in insur-
ance contracts. These agreements naturally participate in 
the law governing the contract ;59 they are no concern of 
locus regit actum. 
The French provision (Civil Code, article 1690) that 
56 2 ZrTELMANN 394; VALERY 905; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 258. 
57 In this respect, see RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 70 f., 508 illus. r and BGH. (Oct. 
28, 1957) IPRspr. 1956-57 No. 32. 
58 GULDENER 34 f. 
59 Infra p. 417. 
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the debtor must be notified by signification or must accept 
the transfer in an acte authentique, has been consistently 
characterized in French conflicts law as constituting a 
formality, 60 without, however, subordinating it to the prin-
ciple locus regit actum. In Germany, the question whether 
it is really a formal requirement and therefore is replaceable 
by domestic formlessness has been much discussed and 
unanimously answered in the negative.61 The requirement 
goes to the substance of the assignment and as such causes 
an outstanding problem,62 important because the French 
provisions are the model for numerous enactments and 
certain minority rules in the United States. Only the details 
of the intimation to be performed under French law by a 
huissier or the public recognition of acceptance by the debtor 
are subject to substitution by local equivalents.63 
An analogous question arises on the characterization of 
the various provisions for regulating priority of claims by 
means of recording, registration, or annotation in the 
ledgers of the assignor. Also, these provisions are certainly 
no mere formalities.64 
2. Capacity 
In principle, the capacity required for the assignor and 
assignee has no relation to the original debt. While in most 
countries the personal law governs, American decisions have 
60 WEiss, 4 Traite 425; VALERY 5I7. 
61 RG. (June I, I88o) I RGZ. 435; (March 20, I883) IO RGZ. 273 and many 
times thereafter. 
62 Infra pp. 430 ff. 
63RG. (June 2, I9o8) I8 Z.int.R. (I9o8) 449· 
64 Cf. infra p. 442. In an English decision, In re Pilkington's Will Trusts 
[ I937l Ch. 574, cf. 9 Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1943) No. 64, a deed of assignment 
for the benefit of creditors in Scotland was exempted from the duty of registra-
tion under the English Deeds of Arrangement Act, I9I4, despite the English 
domicil of the debtor company. The court applied Scottish law as the law 
intended by the parties. If the court had considered registration as a 
formality, it would probably have only emphasized the Scottish place of 
executing the deed. In fact, the assignor was in Scotland, which would be 
decisive under the approach submitted infra p. 442. 
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generally preferred the law governing the assignment to 
that of a party's domicil.65 
New York, however, has sometimes claimed supremacy 
for its insurance statutes over the laws of the state of 
assignment. Thus an old New York statute provided that 
a married woman could not assign without the written con-
sent of her husband a policy of insurance upon the life of 
her husband for her sole benefit if issued under the laws 
of New York.66 In such case, it was held that her capacity 
should be governed neither by the state of the assignor's 
domicil nor by that of the place of assignment.67 On the 
other hand, the Connecticut court, by unusual reasoning, 
avoided the application of this statute in a case where New 
York was the domicil of the husband and wife, and the 
policy was delivered to them there by the New York agent 
of the Connecticut insurance company. The court tenuously 
declared that either the law of New Jersey where the 
assignment was "completed and delivered" or the law of 
Connecticut where the contract of insurance was perform-
able, governed, and under either law the assignment was 
valid. 68 The true choice should have been between New 
York law protecting its domiciliary and New Jersey as the 
alleged center of the assignment. 
Under the French Civil Code, judges, prosecutors, 
sheriffs, solicitors, etc. cannot be assigned choses in action 
that might be in the jurisdiction of the court in whose 
65 Thus, Miller, Executor v. Campbell ( 1893) 140 N. Y. 457 (married 
woman, lex loci cessionis against law governing insurance); Newcomb v. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. {1879) Fed. Cas. No. 10,147 (lex loci cessionis, also of 
the domicil of both parties, against the law governing insurance). 
66 New York: Laws 1879, c. 248. 
67 Hanna Milhous v. Johnson {1889) 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 382, 4 N. Y. Supp. 
199: married woman, in Ohio, beneficiary of a New York policy, assigned it in 
Ohio for security without the express consent of her husband; the New York 
court declares the act void under its own statute, applied under peculiar 
criteria. 
68 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt (1884) 52 Conn. 586, 592. 
The case wrongly goes under the head of "cessibility." 
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forum they exercise their functions. 69 This is a provision 
of exclusively domestic application. 70 
How is the requirement of an insurable interest, by 
which American statutes restrict the persons able to acquire 
life insurance policies by assignment, to be classified? The 
American decisions treat it as a part of the law of the 
"place of assignment."71 This may be based either on the 
normal classification of capacity under the law of the con-
tract, or on the idea of protecting the assignor who in every 
case was domiciled in the state of the assignment. Consider-
ing that the doctrine of this requirement is "a complex of 
rules of public policy designed to avert a number of harm-
ful social and economic tendencies, " 72 it may turn up pri-
marily as an obstacle to assignability because of the nature 
of the debt, and pertain to the law of the original contract. 
Yet in any case, the states establishing the requirement may 
feel impelled to enforce their public policy.73 
3· Assignability 
As noted before, the American doctrine concedes, appar-
ently as the sole exception to the law of the assignment, 
69 C. C. art. I597; see ARNDT, supra n. I. 
70 See 2 BAR 85 n. I4. 
71 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 139 S. W. 51, 
alf'd (I9I4) 234 U.S. 123: law of the place of assignment, also of the making 
of the insurance and the domicil of the assignor, against the domicil of the 
insurance company and the domicil of the assignee. Haase v. First Nat'! Bank 
of Anniston (1920) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 76I: place of assignment and domicil 
of both parties to it. 
72 EDWIN W. PATTERSON, "Insurable Interest in Life," IS Col. L. Rev. ( 19I8) 
4ZI. 
73 See Griffin v. McCoach ( I94I) 313 U. S. 498: public policy of Texas, 
domicil of the insured, may refuse to enforce the rights of beneficiaries who 
have no insurable interest despite the New York law of the insurance contract 
recognized by the lower Texas federal courts. HARPER, "Policy Bases of the 
Conflict of Laws," 56 Yale L. J. (I947) at 1175 n. 63, stresses the conflict with 
New York law and the interest vested under this law, but is sympathetic to 
the decision. On certain earlier decisions, see CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and 
Life Insurance Contracts ( ed. 2, 1958) 463 f. § 89 with a strong argument for 
the liberal attitude. 
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that the transferability of a debt is controlled by the law 
governing the debt. Hence, it may be stated that on this 
classification all conflicts systems agree. 74 
(a) Legal restrictions on assignment. Hostility to the 
institution of assignment or to the full transfer of obliga-
tory rights has all but disappeared. But prohibitions are 
frequently imposed, whether on account of the special na-
ture of certain debts, or for the protection of legal policies, 
or through contractual limitations, which are prevailingly 
held valid in the United States and abroad. 
Thus we may note cases extending the law governing the 
debt to such questions as-whether a tort action may be 
assigned ;75 whether an unconditional beneficiary of an in-
surance policy may be replaced, 76 or replaced without his 
consent ;77 in particular, under what circumstances a wife as 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy acquires a vested 
right;78 whether an insurance policy may be assigned with-
out the consent of the insurer and may be pledged79 to the 
company ;80 and whether an employee may assign his right 
74WESTLAKE § 237; RG. (Nov. 28, 1887) 20 RGZ. 234; GEBHARD, Mate-
rialien 160; DIENA, 2 Dir. Com. Int. 26o; 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER, IPR. 
29; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 260 n. 85. Contra: EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 638 f. 
75 Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 906, 
aff'd, 28 N. W. 612. 
Switzerland: Similarly, for an alimony claim, BG. (Feb. 13, 1897) 23 BGE. 
I 136, 140. 
76 Wilde v. Wilde ( 19II) 209 Mass. 205. 
Canada, Sask.: In re Duperreault [1940] 3 W. W. R. 385. 
Switzerland: App. Ziirich (Nov. 23, 1934) and BG. (March 7, 1935) 10 
Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 587. 
77 Haven v. Home Ins. Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 291, 130 S. W. 73· 
Contra: Fourth Nat'l Bank of Montgomery v. Norfolk (1929) 220 Ala. 344, 
probably to protect the woman, a citizen, but without invoking public policy. 
78 N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams (1914) 155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W. 
1108 grants the vested right to the husband; incidentally, the court eliminates 
classification of the problem as one of family law depending on the domicil. 
79 For the legal prohibitions in Italy, see VIVANTE, Trattato Dir. Com. 
§ 1877; in Argentina, I. HALPERIN, El contra to de seguro ( 1946) 522. 
so Eagle v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. ( 1911) 48 Ind. App. 284. 
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to wages, 81 once wrongly subjected to the law of the place 
of assignment.82 
Conversely, an analogous classification is suitable to a 
legal provision that the debtor cannot avail himself of a 
contractual agreement not to assign the debt, as against an 
assignee who did not know of this agreement at the time 
of the assignment.83 Although the assignee is protected 
thereby, the debt is so directly affected that its law should 
govern. 
(b) Formalities or conditions stipulated. The law gov-
erning an insurance contract applies when the policy requires 
written notice of assignment,84 or when the by-laws of an 
insurance company make a change in the beneficiary void 
unless certain formalities are observed.85 The gold bonds 
of the Cnited States Treasury have been an outstanding 
illustration. The text printed on the bonds indicated as 
creditor a named person or his assignee registered in the 
books of the Treasury, and provided for the making of 
assignments in a foreign country before a diplomatic or 
consular officer of the United States. On the occasion of 
the assignment of such gold bonds by notarial instrument 
in Germany, the Reichsgericht had difficulty in interpreting 
these clauses and co-ordinating them with the German con-
flicts rules. 86 It is quite certain, however, that American 
law governed the entirety of the effects of these stipulations 
81 Coleman v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co. ( 1936) 2 N. E. (2d) 349 
(statute of Indiana); see also St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Crews (1915) 51 Okla. 
744. 151 Pac. 879. 
82 Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. of Indiana ( 1918) 
285 Ill. 233, in fact applying the law of the forum, and deciding against the 
loan company on other grounds such as usury. I do not regard this decision as 
justified by the lack of specifying the place of performance, as BATIFFOL 430 
n. 4 suggests. 
83 Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 1260 par. 2. 
84 Colburn's Appeal (1902) 74 Conn. 463. 
85 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Adams ( 1928) 222 Mo. App. 689. 
86 RG. (Nov. 5, 1932) 87 Seuff. Arch. 161 No. 87, IPRspr. 1933 No. 20, 
criticized by M. WoLFF, 7 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1933) 794· 
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and, according to the prevailing opinion, recognized their 
force as against third persons. If it were true that in the 
United States the law of the place of assignment governs 
such question, this would include a renvoi to the German 
law of the locus contractus.87 But it is submitted that Ameri-
can law, as governing the original debt on every possible 
theory, extends to the contractual restrictions on its transfer. 
(c) Under the lex Anastasiana, which continued in force 
in various parts of Germany before 1900, the assignee of a 
debt was not allowed to collect more from the original 
debtor than the consideration stipulated in the assignment.88 
By constant court practice, this rule was applied when it 
was included in the law governing the original debt. 89 The 
French Code, article I 699, and many codes following it, 
have maintained the late Roman rule with regard to debts 
in litigation. Continental conflicts literature is extremely 
divided in this regard, mainly because it is not clear whether 
the retrait litigieux serves primarily to protect the debtor 
against a virtual deterioration of his situation, to discourage 
unsound law suits, or to avoid exploitation of creditors by 
professional traders in dubious debts. Moved by this doubt, 
Pillet has preferred the lex fori. 90 In my opinion, this doubt 
should lead to the law of the assignment, since technically 
the effects of the transfer are modified. 
(d) Parti.al assignment. Finally, whether a debt can be 
divided and partially transferred, is subject to the law of 
the debt. Thus, it was decided as early as I 840, in the case 
of a claim payable by a debtor in Maryland and assigned 
in Tennessee, that the assigned claim was enforceable in 
87 Thus, M. WoLFF, ibid. 
88 Cod. 4, 3 5, 22; 23. 
89 Oberapp. Ger. Miinchen (Jan. 7, 1845) r Seuff. Arch. No. 402; Prussian 
Obertribunal (Nov. r6, 1858) 30 Striethorst 353; 2 BAR § 276; 2 ZITELMANN 
394; WALKER 431; 2 BROCHER 199· 
90 PILLET, I Traite 763; 2 id. 499 § 646. 
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equity in Louisiana to the extent that it would be in 
Maryland.91 
4· Relation between Assignee and Debtor 
An assignee has no more rights than his assignor. Hence 
the debtor can use defenses that would be available to him 
as against the assignor, in addition to those which he may 
have against the new creditor. The German doctrine is 
unanimous in declaring that, since the law under which the 
obligor owes cannot be changed by the act of other parties, 
all his defenses are determined by the law governing the 
debt.92 
It is scarcely believable that under American conflicts 
rules the law of the debt should be restricted to the question 
of its "assignability." In the above-quoted dictum of 1932, 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire referred to the law 
of the original insurance debt in considering the rights of 
the insurer and/ or any party claiming rights against him 
as well as the right of changing the beneficiary.93 Defenses 
of lack or failure of consideration, of frustration of a con-
dition or breach of contract,94 are obviously determined by 
the same law. This law ought no less to govern defenses 
against the assignee on the ground of his own behavior or 
of setoff (if characterized as substantive) of the debtor's 
own counterclaims. 
Compensation, setoff, and recoupment available to the 
debtor against the assignor at the time of assignment or 
91 Jackson v. Tiernan (1840) IS La. 485. The place of the payment was also 
the place of the debtor's domicil but not of the assignment, as BATIFFOL 430 n. 4 
thought. 
92 WALKER 490 and n. 12 simply concludes: the law controlling the debt also 
governs the relation between assignee and debtor. 
9a Barbin v. Moore, supra n. 35· 
94 No confirmation, though, seems to be afforded by Bankers Life Co. v. 
Perkins (1936) 284 Ill. App. 122, I N. E. (2d) II2, mentioned by BATIFFOL 
431 n. 2. 
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before notice of it to the debtor, are clearly in the same 
class, provided they are considered to be substantive. Such 
counterclaims, hence, are subjected to the law of the debt 
by the Germans, to the law of the debtor's domicil by the 
French, and probably to the law of the forum in jurisdic-
tions where they are regarded as merely procedural means 
of defense. 
Illustration. Busche! in Berlin assigned a claim against 
a buyer in Strassburg to a bank in Berlin. The buyer coun-
tered the action of the assignee by claiming une exception 
de compensation against the assignor. The court of Colmar 
assumed that primarily under the French doctrine the law 
of the domicil of the debtor governed the problem; the de-
fendant, having recognized the assignment by letter, would 
not be permitted to resort to compensation (C. C. art. 
1295). The parties seemed to agree on the application of 
German law which perhaps governed the debt and allowed 
the debtor compensation ( BGB. § 404) ; this right, how-
ever, was waived, as the court held.95 
The German doctrine includes in the law of the debt also 
the rules permitting the debtor in good faith to pay to the 
assignor or a wrong assignee, or to transact with him to the 
detriment of the assignee. We shall have to examine this 
point specifically.96 
5. The Promise to Assign 
Limiting our discussion to cases where the assignment 
is based on an obligatory contract rather than on obliga-
tions ex lege, we have to deal with such transactions as sale 
of a debt, agreement to assign for accord and satisfaction 
or for security of payment, agency and partnership includ-
ing the duty to confer claims acquired upon the principal 
or partner, etc. According to the distinction discussed m 
9 5 App. Colmar (Nov. 16, 1935) Clunet 1937, 781, cf. supra n. 47· 
96 Infra pp. 427 ff. 
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the beginning of this chapter (p. 399), the validity of 
such contracts is tested by their governing laws, not that 
of the assignments. The American decisions have not faced 
the question. They inquire into the efficacity of assignments 
in view of usury,97 gambling,98 and absence of valuable con-
sideration,99 or the lack of insurable interest.100 But in the 
cases decided, the places of the promise to assign and of 
assigning were indistinguishable. 
In the German doctrine, it has been characteristically 
regarded as a matter of course that the law governing the 
9 7 In Runkle v. Smith ( 1918) 89 N. J. Eq. 103, an interest in a trust in New 
Jersey was assigned as security for a loan to a loan company in Pennsylvania. 
It seems that the court localized both the loan and the assignment in Pennsyl-
vania, although the court speaks only of the latter. The interest was excessive 
under both laws. In In re Eby (1929) 39 F. (2d) 76, the parties, in contracts 
including assignment of book accounts, stipulated for the law of Delaware 
although the Commercial Credit Co. was incorporated and had its home office 
in Maryland. The court localized "the contracts" either in Maryland ("last 
act") or Delaware, both having no usury law. It would seem that if the court 
incorrectly emphasized the assignment as such, it should reasonably have con-
sidered the law of North Carolina where the assignor was a merchant and 
kept his books. Cf. infra IV, 3· 
Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co. (1934) 127 Neb, 450, 255 N. W. 
558, 256 N. W. 5n, LORENZEN, Cases 472 deviates by declaring the excessive 
interest on the loan for which the assignment was made as security, contrary 
to the settled public policy of the forum, the domicil of the debtor; perhaps 
the court had a hidden feeling that wages should not have been assigned for a 
small loan at 3!% a month. But juridically the dissenting vote was right. 
98 Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen ( 19II) 139 S. W. 51: assignor, citizen 
of Texas, and the agent of the assignee made the agreement as to the assign-
ment of two life insurance policies in Texas, also place of the insurance 
company. Under Texas law, it was a gambling contract. Cf. Phillips v. Green 
(1922) 194 Ky. 254: draft given in a gambling house to carry on gambling; 
Bernstein v. Fuerth ( 1928) 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp. 791: check endorsed 
on board a ship moving along the coast for a gambling loss, but no place of 
endorsement where gambling was illegal "was proved." 
99 Glover v. Wells (1891) 40 Ill. App. 350: assignment for security for a 
pre-existent loan which was held to be a sufficient consideration under Iowa 
law; evidently the entire arrangement took place in Iowa .. Colburn's Appeal 
( 1902) 74 Conn. 463: while the policy was governed by New York law and 
the prescribed written notice was observed, the question whether the transfer 
of the interest of the insured to his wife was for valuable consideration, 
depended on the law of Massachusetts where the couple was domiciled. 
Contra, for the law of the debt: GULDENF.R 59, stressing the basic nature 
of consideration in common law, but forgetting that it regards only the 
rei ation Assignor-Assignee. 
1oo Supra n. 71. 
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original debt should decide whether a change of creditor 
requires the existence of a valid underlying cause (e.g., 
promise) between assignor and assignee. The law governing 
the promise to assign (the "cause" of assignment), then, 
should determine whether this requirement is fulfilled. Since 
the Dutch courts are firm in classifying the conditions of 
assignment with the law governing the latter/01 the follow-
ing Dutch case has been criticized in Germany :102 
A German in Germany made a loan to another German 
domiciled in Holland and assigned the claim to a Dutchman 
by correspondence. The debtor questioned that there was 
valid title, essential for the transfer under Dutch law. But 
the court held that the assignment was made in Germany 
where an assignment is valid by itself (as an "abstract" 
transaction) and it was immaterial, therefore, to inquire 
into the consideration. German writers object that if the 
loan was governed by Dutch law, the Dutch requirement of 
a cause was peremptory.103 
The decision was correct as to the classification. A debtor 
is not entitled to reject an assignee purchasing an entirely 
assignable claim under a foreign law. Whether the assignor 
or the assignee is the true creditor, is an exclusive matter 
for the law governing their relationship. The American 
view is in full harmony with this conception, which has an 
analogue in the English rule: A debtor may not decline per-
formance to an assignee on the ground that there is no con-
sideration for the assignment as between assignee and 
assignor .104 
Effects. The underlying transaction between assignor and 
assignee determines what accessory rights, liens, securities 
or preferences ought to be transferred together with the 
101 Supra p. 409. 
1o2 Rb. Haarlem (Feb. 22, 1927) W. n664. 
103 LEWALD 272, followed by RAAPE, IPR. ( ed. 5) 508 f. 
104 In re Westerton [ 1919] 2 Ch. 104; Holt v. Heatherlield Trust, Ltd. 
[ 1942] 2 K. B. I; JENKS-WINFIELD § 287. 
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main objectl05 and whether the grantor enters into a war-
ranty for the existence of the debt, and possibly for the 
solvency of the debtor ;ws also what steps to enforce the 
debt must be taken by the assignee in case of legal or con-
tractual warranty of solvency; for what period a warranty 
is presumed to last, and what may be recovered on this or 
other grounds from the assignor.107 
The law governing the internal relationship also decides 
whether a person is entitled to have a chose in action trans-
ferred on the ground of such claims as may belong to a 
principal, a partner, a surety paying the debt, a codebtor 
paying, etcetera. 
6. The Transfer 
Formatio11. Assignment may be conceived as a unilateral 
declaration by the assignor, but in any reasonable view 
requires at least tacit acceptance. The consent must be seri-
ous, not simulated.ws These requirements have nothing to 
do with the original debt. Likewise, essentials, such as 
notice, recording, and registration, pertain to the orbit of 
the transfer, but not of the debt. 
The same is true of the admission of a fiduciary assign-
1 05 This is usually confused with the question whether such collateral rights 
actually follow the assigned right without an express clause. 
106 Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 19, 1891) 2 Z.int.R. ( x892) 370, Clunet 1893, 904; RG. 
(Dec. 3, 1891) 2 Z.int.R {1902) 162, 164, Austrian debt; German sale of it, no 
warranty of solvency contrary to Austrian Allg. BGB. § I397· See also RG. 
(May 25, 1928) JW. 1928, 2013, IPRspr. 1928 No. 13. The literature underlines 
this point specifically. 
107 Cf. Austria: C. C. §§ 1398, 1399; Swiss C. Obi. arts. 171 par. 2, 173; 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1267; Cuba: C. C. art. I 530. 
In the decision of the Bavarian Supreme Court, supra n. 106, the assignor 
paid the assignee the deficiency, and after the debtor pad come to fortune 
again, sued the assignee for recovery; also this incident was correctly sub-
jected to the law of the sale. 
108 BG. (June 3, 1897) 23 BGE. II 8x8, 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 170 applied the law 
of the assignor, meant to be the law governing the act of transfer. But the 
same court (Nov. 24, 1906) 32 BGE. II 696 subjected the problem to the law 
of the debt, as also 2 FRANKENSTEIN 26 advocates. 
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ment for the purpose of collecting the debt, 109 and the 
conditions of a security assignment. Also, if the law of the 
assignment were to recognize a unilateral act of the assignor 
as constituting the transfer, this ought to suffice even though 
unknown to the law of the debtY0 
This is contrary to the German and Swiss principle that 
a mode of transfer not permitted by the law governing the 
debt has no effect against the debtor; although the obli-
gatory contract may follow a different law, its fulfillment 
by assignment should be amenable to the law of the debt. 
This principle is a curious obstacle to the international 
negotiation of claims, subjecting without any justification 
cause and transfer necessarily to different laws. 111 A doubt 
in this respect may arise in the case of future and con-
ditional debts. Thus, where a French real-estate broker 
assigned his Swiss-governed claim for a conditional fee in 
France under French law, the Swiss Federal Tribunal classi-
fied the problem whether this claim was assignable, without 
hesitation under the law of the debt; on this ground the 
court was able to affirm its jurisdiction which is restricted 
to revising the application of Swiss law.112 The American 
theory leads to the opposite result, since the law of the as-
signment is considered independent.113 The latter view is the 
109 Moore v. Robertson (1891) 17 N. Y. Supp. 554, assignment executed in 
England, but see infra n. 168. 
Contra: OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 31, 1924) 34 Z.int.R. (1925) 447, though 
stating that such a trust is known to both English and German law, applies 
German law as the "national law" of the debtor. (Recognition of fiduciary 
assignment as a full transfer is not yet a matter of course; in Switzerland, 
doubts have been dispersed only by BG. (June 12, 1945) 71 BGE. II 167). 
110 Contra: GULDENER 25 f. 
111 On this point, GULDENER 41, as the only Continental writer, has seen the 
right solution. 
112 BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132, 134. 
113 In Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. of Indiana (1918) 
285 Ill. 233, the assignability of future wages is determined under the law 
believed to govern the assignment, cf. supra n. 71. In the decision In re New 
York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co. (D. C. Conn. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 874, 
876, it is not certain for what reason the assignment of a partly conditional 
right as collateral security is determined under New York law; probably 
because this choice of law was not disputed. 
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF SIMPLE DEBTS 425 
correct one, so far as classification is concerned and thereby 
the state competent to protect the assignor is indicated. The 
Dutch courts hold likewise.114 The objections against trans-
fer of future or conditional debts are well known; they con-
tinue in a great number of countries and of American states 
to produce the requirement that the contract from which the 
debt should flow must exist at the time of the assignment.115 
Historically, the reluctance to treat a half-completed chose 
in action as an object of disposition is quite comparable to 
the slow process by which a future crop was admitted as the 
res for a sale.116 In addition to remainders of this conceptual 
difficulty, there is always a suspicion of fraudulent acts to 
deprive creditors of an asset.U7 Surrender of future means 
of livelihood or of entire stocks of assets has been disap-
proved also in the manifest interest of the assignor.118 But 
no interest whatever of the original debtor is involved. His 
situation remains unchanged, since the debt can only be 
enforced when it is mature. 
Scope. Two cases may illustrate the question of the scope 
of an assignment: 
A seller of merchandise in Le Havre, France, drew a 
draft on his German buyer and discounted it at his local 
banker. Did he impliedly assign to the banker his right to 
recover the price on the ground of the sale? Under French 
law, indorsement in fact transfers the provision, the claim 
of the drawer against the draweeY9 The Reichsgericht 
abandoned the rigid observance of German concepts1w and 
followed the French law, excusing this application by refer-
ence to French business practice. French law was not 
1 14 Hof Amsterdam (March 4, 1936) N. ]. 1936, No. 746. 
115 Restatement of Contracts 154; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 413, cf. § 16St A. 
116 See in the Roman development, PAULUS, Dig. x8, x, 8. · 
117 Thus, in Germany see ARNDT, supra n. 1, 33 ff. 
118 2 WILLISTON u83 and 5 id. § 1652. 
119 C. Com. art. u6. See supra pp. 398-400. 
12o OLG. Hamburg (Dec. xs, 1900) 56 Seuff. Arch. z6o, Clunet 1905, 669, 
had expounded these principles. 
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thought to be applicable because the debt was under German 
law, and notification therefore was declared unnecessary.121 
Without such prejudice, it would have been obvious that 
French law governed the scope of the transfer. This result 
is laid down at present in the Geneva Convention on the 
conflict of laws relating to bills of exchange (article 6) 
as incidental to the law creating the draft. 
Potter & Co. in Augusta, Georgia, drew a draft repre-
senting the price of fifty bales of cotton sold by them to a 
firm in Winterthur, Switzerland. The draft was successively 
endorsed to a broker, a firm in New Y ark, and a banker 
in Paris who sent the paper for collection to a bank in 
Winterthur. The Paris banker sued the buyer exclusively 
on the basis of the sales contract. The assignments con-
ditioning his right were inferred by the Appeal Court from 
the special usages of the cotton trade, whereas the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal recognized that American law governed 
the original endorsements and assumed that the lower court 
could, without so stating, base its recognition of the usages 
upon American law. The claim for the price itself was 
considered governed by the Swiss law of the debt.122 
A last example may show the effect of an assignment as 
between the parties : 
An American case was decided upon the following as-
sumptions.123 Under the law of Louisiana, if the holder 
of a claim secured by a lien assigns part of this claim, the 
assignor loses his priority to the assignee insofar as the 
proceeds of the lien are insufficient to pay both assignor 
and assignee; under Mississippi law, assignor and assignee 
share the proceeds equally pro rata. The court rested its 
choice of law on the place of the assignment and could have 
supported this choice by the situs of the lands subject to 
the lien. 
121 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, Clunet 1908, 531; 1910, 227; cf. 
KUHN, Comp. Com. 258; GULDENER 46. 
122BG. (Sept. 17, 1892) Kindlimann v. Marcuard, Krauss & Cie., 18 BGE. 
516. 
123 Couret v. Conner (1918) uS Miss. 374· 
VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF SIMPLE DEBTS 427 
IV. PROTECTION oF Goon FAITH 
I. Fundamental Distinction 
Since a debtor should not be harmed by a transfer of the 
claim to a new creditor without his consent, it is a universal 
principle that he may deal with his original creditor, or with 
an assignee, so long as he may in good faith believe him to 
be the owner of the claini. The older legal systems pre-
scribed, for this purpose, that notification to the debtor or 
his acceptance of the assignment should be an essential 
requisite of the transfer. Noncompliance with such pro-
visions prevents the completion of the assignment and cer-
tainly belongs to the law governing its formation (supra 
II, 6). 
By modern methods, mere agreement to transfer consti-
tutes assignment. Separate rules have to safeguard the in-
terest of debtors, despite the validly completed transfer,-
rules forming a distinct complex closely connected with the 
debtor rather than with the parties to the transfer. 
From the situation of a bona fide debtor, however, we 
have thoroughly to distinguish the somewhat analogous 
problems occurring when the claims of several successive 
assignees conflict with each other, or an assignee comes into 
competition with an attaching creditor of the assignor or 
with his trustee in bankruptcy. Confusion with the first-
mentioned group of problems is facilitated by their twofold 
similarity: bona fide ignorance of a prior assignment may 
favor a later purchaser of a claim, and notification to the 
debtor often has been made a decisive factor also in acquisi-
tion of priority by an assignee or garnishor. In the older 
systems, best represented by the French Code, in fact, the 
same "signification" to or acceptance by the debtor, decisive 
for the debtor's position, likewise determines the effects of 
assignment as to all other "third persons." In England "it 
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is established, in the case of statutory and equitable assign-
ments, that an assignee must give notice to the debtor in 
order to secure his title against later assignees. " 124 In fact, 
English and some American courts make no distinction 
between conflicts involving protection of the debtor and 
those which concern priority between successive assignees. 
The German courts do not even see the problem. French 
writers emphasize strongly that notification to the debtor 
serves as a general measure of publicity, guaranteeing the 
notifying assignee priority of rank over any other claim-
ant.125 Insofar as this argument reaches unity of criterion 
for the effect of all assignees and other claimants, it has 
great force. But the "publicity" resulting from knowledge 
by the debtor is not very impressive. There is no law any-
where constraining a debtor to impart his knowledge to 
someone else, except in actual garnishment proceedings. 
However, that there is a great difference of policy and 
purpose between protecting the debtor and marshalling 
priorities, becomes manifest in considering the modern form 
of assignment by formless agreement. Nothing can demon-
strate this better than the most recent American develop-
ment of the technique for ascertaining priority. From 194 5, 
numerous new American statutes have established recording 
in public files or marking in the books of the assignor of 
accounts receivable as the method to secure priority of 
claims. These devices illustrate the fact that priority is a 
matter connected with the assignor rather than with the 
debtor. 
These statutes, however, have been necessitated by an-
other confusion ensuing upon a mysterious amendment of 
1938 to the Bankruptcy Act. Transfers by an insolvent 
debtor to one of his creditors, in preference to others of 
the same class, for an antecedent debt are vitiated by Sec-
124 CHESHIRE & FIFOOT, Law of Contracts (ed. 5, 1960) 427· 
125 BAR TIN, 3 Principes 33 f.§ 374; NIBOYET, 4 Traite 672 f. 
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tion 6o (a) of the Act if made within a certain period before 
the petition for bankruptcy is filed. A transfer falls within 
the critical period if it is not "perfected" previously. The 
former Bankruptcy Act required for this purpose that re-
cording or registering should be done if it was required or 
even only permitted "by law."126 The amended test requires 
for perfection: 
"That no bona fide purchaser from the debtor127 and no 
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the 
property so transferred superior to the rights of the trans-
feree therein." 
This formulation introduced a new test, the "hypothetical 
bona fide purchaser test," not defined in the Act. It is com-
mon opinion that even in the old version the federal pro-
vision referred to ~he state law applicable according to the 
rules of conflicts law, and this view is upheld upon the 
amended test.128 
To the surprise of many lawyers and the finance institu-
tions concerned, the courts have applied the section to the 
assignment of book accounts for security, which are in most 
cases made without notice to the debtors. Such application 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Klauder 
Case129 was the more striking, because the section deals with 
preferences given to antecedent debts to the detriment of 
other creditors of the same class and in the case at bar the 
bank assignees of the debt, with consent of a consortium of 
creditors, furnished new capital to the now bankrupt as-
signor. The assignment was held imperfect because under 
126 Judicial construction seems to have distorted this provision by giving 
publication a retroactive effect. 
127 Debtor, here, of course, means the bankrupt, not the person of whom 
we speak as debtor in our context. 
128 Mr. Justice Jackson in Corn Exchange Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Klauder (1942) 318 U.S. 434, 437 with citations; Judge Goodrich in In re 
Rosen (1946) 157 F. (zd) 997; McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (1944) 292 
N.Y. 347, 55 N. E. (2d) 192, aff'd (1945) 323 U. S. 365, 369, per Stone, C. J. 
1 29 The Klauder Case, supra n. 128. 
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the then law of Pennsylvania the debtors in their various 
states should have been notified, and therefore a subsequent 
assignee in good faith could have acquired a right superior 
to the bank. 
This and other decisions, prejudicial to nonnotification 
financing of accounts receivable/30 have provoked the large 
series of new statutes assuring measures of publicity. Their 
confusing variety adds to the present difficulties of the 
courts in interstate cases.131 Thereby the conflicts problem, 
unsolved thus far, has become particularly acute, and it 
would seem time for agreement on an adequate rule. 
2. Protection of the Debtor 
(a) Municipal systems.132 The debtor obtains his most 
secure position in those jurisdictions where, according to 
the repeatedly mentioned French model, notification by 
either the assignor or the assignee is rigorously required for 
completion of the transfer.133 In English equity and in a 
130 See in particular, MALCOLM, "Explanation and Analysis of Massachusetts 
House Bill No. 642 relative to Assignments of Accounts Receivable and other 
Choses in Action," 30 Mass. L. Q. ( I945) No. 2, 26; KUPFER and LIVINGSroN, 
"Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The 
Aftermath of its Implications," 32 Va. L. Rev. (1946) 910; ALAN V. LOWEN-
STEIN, "Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the Bankruptcy Act," I 
Rutgers U. L. Rev. (1947) 1. 
131 KoESSLER, "Assignment of Accounts Receivable," 33 Cal. L. Rev. (1945) 
46, 86; id., "New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts 
Receivable," 44 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1946) 563 at 6oo, 6o4. See on recent proposals, 
Note, "Inventory and Account Financing," 62 Harv. L. Rev. (1948) 588, 593 f. 
and n. IS· Moreover, see CRAIG, "Accounts Receivable Financing: Transition 
from Variety to Uniform Commercial Code," 42 B. U. L. Rev. ( I962) I87; on 
conflict of laws, id. 206. 
1 32 ScHUMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch at 37; ARNOT, supra n. I, 
83 If. 
133 See, e.g., England: Law of Property Act, I925, s. 136; Holt v. Heather-
field Trust, Ltd. [ 1942) 2 K. B. I clarifies that the decisive time is when the 
debtor receives the written notice. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1264 par. 1. 
Mexico: C. C. art. 2047. 
Portugal: C. C. arts. 789, 790. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 167. 
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number of codes, positive knowledge is equivalent to notifi-
cation ;134 in contrast, the French Court of Cassation allows 
the debtor to resist an assignment of which no notice has 
been given, although known to him.135 In some laws, includ-
ing the United States, not even a debtor without knowledge 
is protected, if he has reason to inquire at the time of pay-
ment to his original creditor.136 In Germany, the debtor 
is entitled to require presentation of a written assignment 
or a formal notice by the assignor.137 
The provisions vary greatly with respect to the form of 
notification. In the United States, it is immaterial who 
notifies and whether he does it orally or by writing. The 
French Civil Code demands a formal signification by the 
assignee employing a huissier, the enforcement officer, or 
an acceptance of the assignment by the debtor in an acte 
authentique (article I 690). A written document of assign-
ment shown to the debtor is enough to be effective in the 
United States and Germany.138 
The French provision, however, following the Coutume 
de Paris, speaks only of the relatiQn as between the debtor 
and third parties. A widespread theory contrasts the rela-
tion inter partes, between assignor and assignee, as independ-
ent of notification.139 In the numerous countries following 
the French lead, it is often said accordingly that notification 
134 E.g., Austria: All g. BGB. § 1395. 
Cuba: C. C. art. I 527. 
Germany: BGB. § 407. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1264 par. 2. 
1as After a long controversy, Cass. civ. (June 20, 1938) D. 1939.I.z6; (Nov. 
27, 1944) Gaz. Pal. 1945·1.13, strongly criticized as illogical and inequitable by 
BOITARD, 43 Revue Trim. D. Civ. ( 1945) II9 f. 
136 Restatement of Contracts § 170; Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 167; Germany: 
broad judicial construction of § 407 cit. 
137 BGB. § 410. 
138 Restatement of Contracts § 170, comment to subsec. 2 a11d ill us. 6; BGB. 
§ 410. 
139 Arg. C. C. art. II38 j see ALBERT WAHL, Note, S. 1898.I.II3. Against this 
dominant opinion, PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite ( ed. 2) § II28. 
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is not a requisite of validity of the assignment but a condi-
tion of its effect as to third persons.140 In similar formulas, 
the present English literature states that to perfect title as 
between assignor and assignee no notice to the debtor is 
necessary, but notice serves to prevent the debtor from 
paying the assignor.141 The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
having proclaimed the minority rule essentially requiring 
notification, subsequently dispensed with it as between as-
signor and assignee.142 The meaning of these distinctions is 
not exactly the same everywhere and often doubtful.143 But 
their mere existence helps to underline the dual relationship, 
too often disregarded in conflicts law. 
In the United States, the prevailing system is closely 
analogous to the legal provisions of the German Code. As 
the Supreme Court expressed it, after one nonnotified 
assignment, a subsequent assignee takes nothing by his as-
signment because the assignor has nothing to give.l44 If 
Williston objects that according to the same decision an 
assignor retains the power to discharge the claim by settle-
ment until notice is given to the debtor/45 this is only a 
means to protect the debtor. The transfer of a claim resem-
bles that of a chattel, the possession of which, retained by 
the vendor, helps a bona fide purchaser to acquire title. 
Until the debtor's good faith is broken, he may pay the 
140 See, e.g., for Argentina, C. C. arts. 1493 ( 1459), I 501 ( 1467) ; cf. 
I. HALPERIN, El contrato de seguro (1946) 522. 
Brazil: C. C. arts. 1067, 1069 distinguishes even three effects: before notifica-
tion as between the parties; after notification as to the debtor; and with regard 
to various requirements of publicity, as to other interested persons. 
141England: PoLLOcK, Contracts (ed. 13) 176; Gorringe v. Irwell India 
Rubber Works ( x887) 34 Ch. D. 128. 
142 Peters v. Goetz (1916) 136 Tenn. 257, x88 S. W. II44; Naill & Naill v. 
Blackwell (1932) 164 Tenn. 615, 51 S. W. (2d) 835. 
143 ARNDT, supra n. x, at 89 denies any real importance to the distinction in 
France. 
144 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co. (1923) 264 U.S. 182, I97· 
145 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts 1258. 
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debt, or be released, or acquire defenses for value, irrespec-
tive of the transfer.146 
(b) Conflicts rules. Again, three systems are in dispute. 
(i) Law of the assignment. American courts, subjecting an 
assignment to the law of the place where it is made, could 
be expected to include the provisions concerning notification. 
This has been the method of dealing with general assign-
ments for the benefit of creditors in the last century when 
such transactions were frequent. A general assignment, good 
where made, has been deemed to be good everywhere, ir-
respective of a requirement of notice in other states, 147 
although with certain reservations for other local credi-
tors.148 Also ordinary assignments have been treated like-
wise in a few decisions, 149 and by Beale.150 
(ii) Law of the debt. Squarely opposed, the established 
German doctrine asserts that it depends on the law govern-
ing the original claim, not only what effect an unknown 
assignment has on the debtor's position but even whether 
its transfer is completed by the agreement or only by noti-
fication. The literature has insisted upon this result with 
emphasis.151 As mentioned before, when a debt governed 
by French law is assigned in Germany, the solemnities of 
146 WILLISTON, 2 Contracts § 433; Restatement of Contracts §§ 167, 170. 
147 Train v. Kendall ( 1884) 137 Mass. 366; First Nat'! Bank v. Walker 
(1891) 61 Conn. 154; Barnett v. Kinney (1893) 147 U.S. 476. 
148 Cf. STUMBERG (ed. 2) 401 f. n. 6o. 
149 Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. ( 1842) 14 Conn. 582; Clark v. 
Connecticut Peat Co. (1868) 35 Conn. 303; Hanna v. Lichtenhein (1918) 182 
Am. Dec. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. 58o. 
To the same effect once in Germany, Oberapp. Ger. Liibeck (Nov. 29, 1855) 
cited by 2 BAR 81 n. 2 (at least where the lex loci was more favorable to the 
assignee) and in France, Trib. Seine (March 15, 1907) Clunet 1908, 1II8, 
Revue 1908, 182 (superseded). 
150 2 BEALE § 354.1, abandoning the position taken in Restatement §§ 353, 
354; see MALCOLM, letter printed by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 36, 
at 925. 
151 2 BAR 82; GEBHARD, Materialien 162; 2 ZITELMANN 394; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 
261; NEUMEYER, IPR. § 33; LEWALD 271 f.; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 265; GuTZ-
WILLER 1616; M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) 151 f.; RAAPE, IPR. (ed. s) so6 f.; 
KEGEL, Kom. (ed. 9) 577 note 251 before art. 7 EG. BGB. 
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signification have been held indispensable/52 while assign-
ment in France of a German-governed debt is considered 
complete without any notification.153 Accordingly, the law 
of the debt decides the effect of a payment by the debtor to 
his original creditor ;154 the debtor is supposed to rely on 
it.155 The Swiss courts follow this view/56 which has been 
recommended also for England157 and France.158 
(iii) Law of the debtor's domicil. The French courts 
firmly apply the local law of the debtor's domicil/59 allegedly 
as a general rule for assignments, but in fact dealing usually 
with the requisite of signification.160 More or less in the 
same application, this theory is shared by most French and 
Italian writers/61 and has found favor also in England162 
and sometimes in the United States.163 Even the German 
Supreme Court has twice spoken of the debtor's domicil 
as if it were decisive by itself, instead of being only the 
presumptive place of performance of the debt ;164 and the 
Hanseatic Appeal Court has concluded that every debtor 
may rely on the protection afforded by such provisions as 
152 See supra n. 39· 
153 See supra n. 38. 
154 WALKER 487. 
155 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 29, I906) I6 Z.int.R. (I9o6) 33I. 
156BG. (Oct. 8, I935) 6I BGE. II 242; (Feb. I9, I936) 62 BGE. II Io8. 
157 FOOTE 296; CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 498; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 538 
§ 5I2. 
158 BATIFFOL 429, 432. 
159 Supra n. 42. 
160 BATIFFOL §§ 530, 531; cf. NIBOYET, cited supra n. 48. 
161 See citations supra n. 45· 
Italy: Cass. Rome (Nov. 7, I895) S. I895·4·I3; Clunet I895, 664 speaks of 
the national law of the debtor. 
162Jn re Queensland etc. Co. [I89I] I Ch. 536; [I892] I Ch. 2I9, C. A. In 
this connection, Kelly v. Selwyn [ I905] 2 Ch. 117, I2I f., requiring notification, 
in contrast to New York law, makes sense, as it adopts English law, because 
an interest in an English trust is assigned. Cf. WESTLAKE I 52· 
163 See PARMELE in I Wharton 796 and the cases collected infra ns. I66 ff. 
164 RG. (March 7, I907) 65 RGZ. 357 stressed the fact of the debtor's 
German domicil, and RG. (Nov. 5, I932) IPRspr. I933 No. 20 subjects the 
requirements of assignment to American law because of the domicil of the 
debtor which was also deemed to be the place of performance. 
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the Belgian Civil Code, article I 690, as well as the German 
Civil Code, § 410, according to the laws and usages in his 
country.165 
The same current of thought can be found in American 
decisions, sometimes influenced, as in France, by the con-
flict of assignment and garnishment. Thus, in I 874, notice 
was declared necessary in Tennessee for the protection of 
its own citizens, even in the case of a foreign general assign-
ment.166 In an I 883 case, the Minnesota court stated that 
the assignment was executed in Illinois and as far as the 
rights of assignor and assignees were concerned inter se, 
they were governed by Illinois law, that is, they were valid 
without notification, but in a garnishment suit affecting at-
taching creditors, Minnesota, the debtor's domicil, "cannot 
permit the laws of another state to be imported and over-
ride the settled policy of our own laws. In such a case comity 
must yield to policy, otherwise ... a citizen of our own 
state who had been debtor to a nonresident would never 
be certain to whom he was liable, for his liability would 
be as uncertain and variable as might be the domicile of 
his creditor."167 A decision of a New York court held the 
collecting agent of English creditors, suing for tort, capable 
of standing in court as a fiduciary assignee, according to 
New York law.168 This holding was not based on local 
procedures,169 but on the argument that under New York 
law the assignment was full and complete, although it was 
executed in England and under English law its validity 
required a written notice to the debtor. English law "can-
165 OLG. Hamburg (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 15. 
1sa Flickey v. Soney (r874) 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) r69. 
167 Lewis v. Bush ( 1883) 30 Minn. 244 at 247· Only at the end the opinion 
verges to the qualification of Minnesota also as place of performance. 
168 Moore v. Robertson {r89r) 17 N.Y. Supp. 554· 
169 Also the precedents cited for the capacity to sue of an assignee appointed 
for the purpose of collection use substantive reasoning: Church, C. J., in 
Sheridan v. Mayor ( r876) 68 N. Y. 30, 32; Ruger, C. J., in Greenwood v. 
Marvin (r888) rrr N.Y. 423,440. 
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not control the law of this state," of which the defendants 
(the debtors) are residents. A more recent New York case 
may be mentioned as a parallel, although exclusively dealing 
with the priority problem. It was recognized that despite 
the facts pointing to New York as the place where the 
assignment was to be localized, Missouri law applied in 
granting priority to the second assignee giving first notice 
to the debtor, an insurance company of that state, the in-
surance contract having been made there with a resident to 
be performable there.170 These additional factors, of course, 
may also support the application of the law of the debt or 
of the place of performance. 
(iv) Lex loci solutionis. Finally, the Restatement in-
tervenes on the ground of its theory that the place of 
performance always determines the person to whom per-
formance is due. Consequently, this law, that is, the law 
governing performance of the original debt, determines 
whether the debtor can effectively pay to the assignor 
( § 3 54). Such fragmentary rules at least indicate a tendency 
to abandon the application of the law of the assignment to 
this problem. Others have reached the same approach on 
the general principle of lex loci solutionis, 171 which is the 
normal judicial rule in Germany because this law would 
generally govern the debt and effects of the assignment on 
the debt. 
( v) Rationale. The problems regarding the protection 
of an innocent debtor are not solved adequately either by 
the Germans, indiscriminately applying the law governing 
the debt,172 or by Beale's ubiquitous law of the place of 
170 Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey (1934) 275 N. Y. Supp. 420; cf. 
CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (ed. 2, 1958) 467 f. 
171 BATIFFOL 433 § 537; STUMBERG (ed. 2) 261. 
172 When 8 LAURENT 198, 200 § 131 declared that he did not understand 
why the law of the debt should govern as to third persons, 2 BARSon. I (b) 
replied that Laurent stayed in the dark, because he assu:r.ed a statute real of 
a debt. But Bar and the other German writers have, in their turn, lumped 
too many things together under the law of the debt. 
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assignment. Take the simplest cases. Under the German 
approach, an American debtor does not effectively pay 
anywhere to any assignee without formal signification, if 
the debt is governed by Argentine law as in the case of a 
credit given by a bank in Buenos Aires. And according to 
Beale, a French debtor in Paris may effectively pay to an 
assignee if the latter purchased the claim in the United 
States, contrary to French law which would not recognize 
the payment. 
We should think, on the contrary, that existence of a 
debt is one thing, transfer of a claim as an asset is another 
thing, and sure identification of the actual creditor is some-
thing still different. The German provision that the debtor 
may require a written instrument stating the assignment 
is an example. From the Swiss requirement of written assign-
ment, it follows that a debtor domiciled in Switzerland must 
not pay without a written document or otherwise assuring 
guarantee. 
Certainly a debtor must know that the possibility of 
foreign assignments imposes on him the risk incurred by 
ignorance of foreign laws. But it is legitimate for his domi-
ciliary law to mitigate his difficulties. 
Forced by the conflicts situation, we may discover that 
the principal rules in discussion are no part of the effects 
of assignment with which the codes naturally associate them. 
Recently, Judge Goodrich found that the privilege, if any, 
of a second assignee having notified the debtor, "comes not 
from his status as bona fide purchaser, but from his activities 
following his belated assignment."178 The situation is 
changed after his assignment by a new event. We may say 
that the legal systems, each in its way, modify the result of 
their rules regulating assignment by a separate set of rules 
regulating the conditions and effects of an excused ignorance 
of these results by the debtor. It seems perfectly natural 
1 78 /n re Rosen (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (zd) 997 at 1001. 
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to think of the law at the debtor's domicil as competent 
to do so. 
If, instead, the place of payment should be urged, it 
is true that the question concerning the right of the debtor 
to deposit the sum due in court or with a public office, dif-
ferently treated by the laws, has the closest connection with 
the mode of payment.174 But the debtor may well have, in 
addition, a special right of deposit in the case of a pre-
tended assignment, dependent on the law of his domicil. 
More important, we should not forget that payment is 
not the only subject of this class of rules, which includes 
release, deferment of the time of performance, acquisition 
of counterclaims against the assignor, the effect of judg-
ments, etc. Likewise, the debtor may be entitled to deal 
at any place with a pseudo assignee showing him a genuine 
token or written instrument of assignment, with effect 
against his true creditor.175 At the same time, it may be seen 
again, that all these are not incidents of the original contract 
or of the assignment, to which they run counter. 
It is true that the debtor may change his domicil whereas 
he cannot unilaterally change the place of performance. But 
the latter place is too often uncertain,176 and has other well-
known drawbacks_l76a 
174 For the law of the place of payment, WEISS, 4 Traite 398; DESPAGNEr 
§ 311. For the law of the debt, 2 ZrTELMANN 399; WALKER 450. 
175 Cf., for instance, Restatement of Contracts §§ 166, 167, 170, 173; German 
Civil Code §§ 406-410. 
176 In an interesting section of his work on Spendthrift Trusts (ed. :z, 1947) 
114 § 113, GRISWOLD looks for a subsidiary conflicts rule for the application of 
the statutes restraining the beneficiary of a trust in disposing of his interest in 
life insurance proceeds. He decides in favor of the place where the proceeds 
are payable, but concedes that when the policy gives no clear indication of this 
place, it is difficult to choose between the domicil of the insurance company and 
the domicil of the beneficiary. 
176a EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 641 agrees that application of the debtor's domi-
ciliary law "may furnish the most generally acceptable solution," whereas the 
Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No. 6 ( 1960) § 353 suggests that the 
debtor be protected if either the law governing the obligation or the law 
governing the assignment grants such protection. 
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3· Priority of Assignees 
(a) Municipal systems. Two opposite solutions are pro-
vided in the French and the German laws. In the former, 
not until notification is the assignment perfected as against 
all "third" parties, including the creditors of the assignor 
and subsequent assignees from the assignor. Also the new 
Italian Code seems to give absolute preference to the as-
signment first notified to the debtor or first accepted by the 
latter by an act provided with a certain date. The German 
Code simply perfects the transfer through the contract of 
assignment; the assignee hence has a complete priority over 
all other pretenders. Consequently, if the debtor is dis-
charged in good faith by payment to a subsequent purchaser, 
really a pseudo assignee, the prior assignee is entitled to 
recovery from the second on the ground of unjust enrich-
ment.l77 
In the United States, there has been for a long time an 
"irreconcilable conflict" on the question whether notifica-
tion is necessary for the priority of an assignment.178 The 
federal courts, for a time, operating a separate doctrine of 
"general law" in diverse citizenship cases did not require 
notification, but reserved undetermined equitable exceptions 
for a second assignee where notice was given only by the 
latter.179 At present, in the great majority of states, choses 
in action are transferred by the agreement between assignor 
and assignee, with full effect against all parties. Within this 
177 France: C. C. art. 169o; Germany: BGB. §§ 398, 408, 816 par. z; Italy: 
C. C. ( 1942) art. 126 5· 
178 6 C.]. S. II45, Assignment § 91. Cf. list for 1923 in 264 U. S. 191 ns. 3 
and 5; and see the articles by KoESSLER, supra n. 131. 
179 Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (C. C. A. 1st 1922) 280 
Fed. 8o3; rev'd (1923) 264 U.S. 182. The decision is superseded by the Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins Case (1938) 304 U.S. 64, also n. 8 in 318 U.S. 437; but 
has been mentioned more recently as representing the "federal rule" expressed 
in Judson v. Corcoran (1854) 17 How. 612, by Chief Justice Stone in 
McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co. (1945) 323 U.S. 365, 373· 
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group, however, there are differences. In particular, the 
so-called "New York rule" agrees with the German con-
ception, whereas according to the "Massachusetts rule" a 
subsequent assignee may retain what he collects on the 
ground of his notification.180 The latter variant, adopted 
by the Restatement on contracts is usually explained by the 
assumption of negligence or estoppel on the part of the 
prior assignee, which, however, is nonexistent in nonnotifi-
cation financing. 
The more suitable new statutes have adopted the methods 
of filing in a public record, or notation in book accounts.181 
(b) Conflicts law. In the jurisdictions directing priority 
among domestic claims by the test of notification, following 
some idea of publicity, the competition of foreign-governed 
claims is apparently subordinated to the same principle. 
On the other hand, in the German type of system if the law 
governing the first assignment recognizes its validity, the 
subsequent transfers are ineffective. Beyond these partial 
results, no certain conflicts rule is discoverable anywhere. 
In an English decision, the place of the debtor was pre-
ferred to all other local connections, without any convincing 
reason.182 Some examination of the problem involved has 
been occasioned by recent discussion in the United States 
on the following subject. 
(c) United States: Accounts receivable. The scarce au-
thority includes two cases in which the parties to a se-
curity transfer of accounts receivable stipulated for the 
law at the place of the financing bank, and in each case the 
court disregarded this stipulation. In the extravagant de-
cision by a federal district court in In re Vardaman Shoe 
180 See the articles by KOESSLER, and that by KUPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra 
ns. 130, 131. 
181 I bid. 
182 In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co. [1891] x Ch. 536, aff'd 
[ I892] I Ch. 219. 
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Company/83 it was held that such a clause could not be 
opposed to the trustee in bankruptcy, he being "a stranger 
to the contract."184 The judge refers to the law of the 
assignor's place as the situs of the debt. In the remarkable 
decision in In re Rosen/85 Judge Goodrich eliminated the 
agreement which most clearly referred to Pennsylvania law 
for all rights of the parties, validity, construction, and 
enforcement and "in all respects," for the reason that this 
clause was part of the general arrangement of financing 
and assigning, while the claims and even the contracts pro-
ducing them were not yet all in existence. This was con-
trasted with the actual transfer, not of the claims which 
did not take place, but of the money collected by the debtor 
bank. But it would seem that the court was moved rather 
by the striking fact that routine had led the Philadelphia 
bank to a stipulation for Pennsylvania law manifestly dis-
astrous to its own interests in view of the notification re-
quirement/86 which was in force in Pennsylvania at that 
time and was thereafter quickly repealed.187 The pleadings 
themselves referred to the law of New Jersey, where the 
assignor carried on his business and the debtors were domi-
ciled. No general conclusion against party disposition of 
the applicable law should, hence, be inferred from either 
case. 
The same two decisions, however, in pointing to the 
assignor's place of business, provide us with a strong hint 
respecting the needed rule in the absence of stipulation for 
the applicable law. Thus far, every writer states that the 
courts are very inconsistent in this matter. A qualified ob-
183 ( 1942) 52 F. Supp. 562, 565. 
184 See against this thesis, KuPFER and LIVINGSTON, supra n. 130, 32 Va. L. 
Rev. (1946) at917. 
185 (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 157 F. (zd) 997, 999, aff'g (1946) 66 F. Supp. 174 on 
other motives. 
186 I d. at 998. 
187 Pennsylvania: 69 Purdon's Stat. ( 1941) § 561. 
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server has noted only with diffidence that the courts "confine 
their attention to the laws of either the borrower's domicil 
or the lender's domicil."188 The immense increase of financ-
ing by assignment of existent and future business accounts 
should be bolstered by an absolutely sure and more ade-
quate law. 
The place of the debtor has, indeed, been unanimously 
discarded in recent American legislation. "It is virtually 
impossible to base a course of conduct upon the laws of 
the states of domicile of the account-debtors because the 
mechanical problems arising from any such theory of opera-
tion would be so complex as to be prohibitive."189 This was 
said against the Supreme Court decision in the Klauder 
Case190 and may likewise be objected to an old decision of 
the German Supreme Court.191 The place of the lending 
bank192 has no visible merits either. 
The only suitable contact of accounts receivable is with 
the business place where the books are conducted. Two 
American courts, long ago, understood this need.193 In the 
case of In re Rosen, the result reached was practically 
identical through the consideration that assignor and debtor 
made and had to perform their original contract in New 
Jersey and the actual assignment was to be localized there.194 
In In re P ardaman, the judge emphasized that the situs of 
the debt was at the debtor's place of business, although he 
188 MALCOLM, "Conflicts of Laws, Accounts Receivable," 30 Mass. L. Q. 
( 1945) 38, 41. 
189 MALCOLM, id. at 41. 
190 Supra p. 429 n. 128. 
191 RG. (March 23, 1897) 39 RGZ. 371, 374 f. 
192 Thus, Note, "What Law Governs the Assignment of a Bank Account," 
40 Harv. L. Rev. (1927) 989, 993· 
193 Trust Comp. v. Bulkeley Union (C. C. A. 6th 1906) 150 Fed. 510, and 
the result agrees with Engelhard v. Schroeder ( 1920) 92 N. J. Eq. 663: the 
parties resided in New Jersey, but the firm was in New York and New York 
law was applied as lex loci contractus. 
194 Supra n. 185. 
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pointed out that the result would not be different under the 
law of the place where the assignment was executed.195 
The situation is finally clarified by the weight accorded 
to recording or "book-marking" in the statutes. If these 
publicity measures in the state of the assignor were merely 
regarded as territorial, they would exclusively operate by 
public law within their jurisdiction. Such a theory would be 
irreconcilable with Section 6o (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
It is indispensable that these provisions should be respected 
everywhere. 
(d) Other assignments. The domicil of the assignor 
should be competent to determine priority in all cases. This 
is the true reason behind the situs doctrine.195a 
v. CONTACTS 
The American doctrine overestimates the scope of the 
law that may govern the assignment, and is obscure on the 
scope of the law of the original debt. The German doctrine 
commits the opposite, and worse, mistake of extending the 
law of the debt, against reason, to the questions whether 
the transfer may be "abstract,"196 what its form should 
be,197 whether the transfer requires notification to the debtor 
or his knowledge,198 at what time it may take place/99 
195 52 F. Supp. 562, 565 f., supra n. 183. 
The rule advocated above has been adopted in the Restatement (Second), 
Tent. Draft No. 6 (1960) § 354 (2); see comment, id. at 177 ff., and note, id. 
at 180 f. Moreover, see FLANAGAN, "Assignments of Accounts Receivable and 
Conflict of Laws under the Bankruptcy Act," 2 Vand. L. Rev. (1949) 409; 
Comment, "Multistate Accounts Receivable Financing: Conflicts in Context," 
67 Yale L. J. (1958) 402; EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 637 f. All of these authors 
urge the application of the law of the assignor's place of business, partly 
because the books will be kept there. 
195R More complicated rules have been furnished by EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 
640 f. and by the Restatement (Second), Tent. Draft No.6 (1960) § 354· 
196 LEWALD 272; RAAPE 277. 
197 LEWALD 273; RAAPE 277. 
1 98 LEWALD 271. 
199 LEWALD 273 § 332. 
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whether future and conditional claims are assignable,200 and 
connected problems. 201 
These two best developed systems, furthermore, contrast 
in emphasis; Americans stress the actual transfer of a chose 
in action, Germans, the underlying relationship causing the 
transfer. Without doubt, it is desirable to have one conflicts 
rule covering the entire relationship between assignor and 
assignee, particularly in view of the theory prevailing in 
the rna jority of systems that an assignment is not valid 
without a valid promise to assign. 
From these premises, we reach the following conclusions. 
Assignee-debtor. The law governing the debt (by no 
means necessarily the law of the place of contracting) deter-
mines the rights and obligations between assignee and 
debtor, excepting the provisions respecting a debtor ignor-
ing the assignment in good faith. 
Assignor-assignee. Where assignor and assignee are dom-
iciled in one jurisdiction and there enter into both the agree-
ment to assign and the assignment, this determines the law 
in every opinion. Judge Learned Hand's proposal to subject 
voluntary assignments to the formula lex loci contractus 
contemplated precisely this situation.202 
In the rare cases where promise and transfer occur at 
different places, the analogy to sales of chattels and also 
due regard to the interests of third persons in intangible 
things that have no visible situs, give prime consideration 
to the actual transfer. The American theory is right also on 
this point. 
Where assignor and assignee are domiciled in different 
jurisdictions, the old idea that the debt is located at the 
2oo BG. (Feb. 24, 1915) 41 BGE. II 132. 
201 LEWALD §§ 333, 334· 
2o2 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. 2d 1939) 104 F. 
(2d) 665, 125 A. L. R. 1281, CHEATHAM, Cases (ed. 4) 695. 
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assignor's domicil furnishes the most convincing test for the 
relationship between the parties to the assignment.2{)3 
This same test has been in particular deduced above from 
the needs of a transfer of accounts receivable for security, 
and more generally as the most advisable criterion for 
determining the priority of successive assignments by the 
original creditor. 
Debtor's protection. With respect to the protection of a 
bona fide debtor, a third rule is desirable. The law of his 
domicil should determine the conditions and effects of his 
dealing with a person whom he is entitled to believe his 
creditor, although this person is not really his creditor. This 
contact, used by French and Dutch courts, is preferable to 
the law of the place of performance indicated in the Restate-
ment ( § § 3 53, 3 54) , a place often uncertain or left to the 
option of the creditor. Above all, the statutes are more or 
less understood to intend the protection of their domi-
ciliaries and must be applied accordingly, if unnecessary 
conflicts are to be avoided. 
203 With regard to the assignment of an insurance claim, the same opinion 
is suggested as a matter of course by BRUCK, Privatversich. R. ( 1930) 722. 
CHAPTER 50 
Other Transfers of Simple Debts 
I. TRANSFER OF CLAIMS BY LAw 
1. Subrogation by Law1 
SUBROGATION, the substitution by law of one who pays a debt in place of the creditor, is related to the 
voluntary assignment which a third party satisfying 
the creditor may be entitled to request instead of discharge. 
For instance, a surety paying the creditor may demand such 
assignment under Roman law (beneficium cedendarum ac-
tionum). In fact, the analogy between such compulsory "vol-
untary" assignment and immediate transfer by force of law 
(or judicial proceedings) is rather close. Subrogation is 
merely a technical improvement in the interest of the payor 
securing his position, particularly in the case of the credi-
tor's insolvency. Because of this functional similarity, the 
modern codes declare the rules of assignment applicable by 
analogy to the legal transfer of claims.2 Whether the effect 
of a subrogation is a clear succession to the title or the 
practical equivalent, e.g., acquisition of the right of collec-
tion, is of no concern for our purpose. 
It follows for the conflict of laws that subrogation is to 
be governed by the same law under which the payor might 
demand assignment of the debt. This is the law governing 
the contractual or legal relationship between the payor and 
1 Comparative municipal law: WENGLER, "Surrogation," 6 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterbuch (1938} 460, 483 ff. (subrogation of a person). 
Conflicts law: GULDENER 12 5 If. 
2 Germany: BGB. § 412. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 166. 
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the creditor, not the law governing the princi-pal debt. 
Courts have sensed this better than some writers. 
Illustration. Bales of Swedish cellulose, consigned to the 
Snia Viscosa Company in Milano, Italy, sank in Holland in 
fluvial transportation by a Swiss carrier. The buyer had 
insured the loss in Italy with Italian insurers and recovered 
from them. The insurers were allowed to take recourse 
against the Swiss carrier. Although the claim of the insured 
against the carrier was governed by Swiss law, this claim 
was transferred by subrogation to the insurer according to 
the Italian Commercial Code, then in force, article 43 8 
paragraph 1. This provision did not restrict subrogation to 
tort actions as the Swiss law on insurance contracts, article 
72, does. Swiss BG. (May 7, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81, 88. 
Where, for instance, a surety pays to the creditor, it is 
the task of the law governing suretyship,3 and not of the 
law governing the principal debt,4 to determine whether 
the surety has to demand assignment before paying, or 
acquires the claim by virtue of the payment. This law in-
cludes conditions and effects, although the transfer of ac-
cessory rights thereby involved, according to the situation, 
may require additional consultation of other laws.5 Simi-
larly, it has been held in Germany that a Belgian by paying 
customs duties to the Belgian state according to Belgian 
law, acquired the right of that state, effective in the Ger-
man bankruptcy of the debtor.6 
The law of the principal debt, of course, determines the 
transferability of the debt.7 The tendency of the German 
and Swiss doctrine to enlarge the role of this law, incon-
3 See particularly German RG. (April 23, 1903) 54 RGZ. 3 II, 316; LETZGUS, 
3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 849; BATIFFOL 425 n. 6 § 541 and Traite (ed. 3) 677 § 626; 
DOMKE, Clunet 1938, 417; ARMIN JON, Droit Int. Pr. Com. 485 § 293· 
4 Thus 2 ZITELMANN 394; NEUMEYER, IPR. 29. 
5 See PILLET, 1 Traite 176 for the problems; RILLING, supra Ch. 47 n. t, 
76-79· 
6 OLG. Hamm (April27, 1912) 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 358, Revue 1914, 460. 
7 1 FIORE § 196; 2 RoLIN § 979· 
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sistent with what is plainly suitable here, has nevertheless 
influenced a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal8 and its 
commentators. 
A German engineer employed by the Swiss federal rail-
roads was injured in the Swiss service and awarded com-
pensation by the German board of accident insurance. 
According to the German law of social insurance, the tort 
claim against the Swiss railroads passed automatically to 
the German board. The Federal Tribunal acknowledged 
this effect of the law governing the relation between injured 
and payor, considering under Swiss law that the tort debt 
also was assignable and that although the debt was not 
ipso jure transferred to the social insurance office, the insti-
tution of subrogation was familiar. From this decision, 
writers have inferred the proviso that the law governing 
the transfer can operate only if the law of the debt recog-
nizes the transfer.9 
Even this restricted reference to the debtor's law 1s un-
8 BG. (Feb. z8, 1913) 39 BGE. II 77, z Praxis 171. 
More recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal affirm that, in principle, 
subrogation is governed by the law of the relationship between creditor and 
subrogee; see BG. (Jan. zo, 1948) 74 BGE. II 81; BG. (Sept. zz, 1959) 85 
BGE. II z67, Revue Crit. 1960, 345 with Note by AUBERT, Clunet 1961, zz8; 
App. Bern (Feb. z6, 1963) 100 Z. bern. J.V. ( 1964) 270. For criticism, see 
KELLER, "Anwendbares Recht hinsichtlich der Subrogation des Schadenver-
sicherers," 56 SJZ. (1960) 65. 
In contrast with these decisions, a French court has refused to apply a Swiss 
statute providing for subrogation in favor of a social security fund which had 
compensated the Swiss victim of a traffic accident in France; see App. 
Besan~;on (May 14, 1959) Clunet 1960, 778 with Note by BREDIN and Revue 
Crit. 1960, 67 with Note by LOUSSOUARN; see also EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 442. 
9 LEWALD 277 § 336, followed by RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 509 f. (the German 
law can only order the transfer and it was up to the Swiss law to carry it 
out); M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) 152 and Priv. lot Law (ed. 2) 545 § 518. 
GULDENER 139 even criticizes the decision because it should have applied only 
Swiss law. 
Recently a German author has urged the acknowledgment of subrogation 
only if both the law of the principal debt and the law of the relationship 
between payor and creditor grant subrogation in the specific case; see 
HoFFMEYER, "Zur Aktivlegitimation ausliindischer Ladungsversicherer bei 
Regressklagen," 125 Z. Handelsr. (1962) 125. This article, incidentally, affords 
a useful comparative survey of legal provisions concerning subrogation in 
matters of marine insurance. 
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necessary and confusing. It suffices that under the law gov-
erning the debt, it can be transferred to any other person. 
If it is transferable, the debtor has no justifiable interest 
in the form and the modalities of the transfer, and still less 
has the law of the debt any bearing. 
The wrong approach was followed by a Dutch decision 
in an analogous case. Two German postal officials serving on 
through trains were injured in accidents on Dutch territory 
and pensioned under the German social security scheme. 
The Appeals Court of Amsterdam rejected the recourse of 
the German board against the Dutch railroads, because 
Dutch law did not acknowledge subrogation in analogous 
cases and therefore the tort obligation was satisfied by the 
award of pensions granted by the board to discharge its 
own liability.10 
This naive reasoning overlooks the entire modern de-
velopment of concurrence of debts where the ultimate loss 
falls on one codebtor. In the conflicts field, it demonstrates 
the mistake of allowing the law of the debt to interfere. 
A different answer is contained in a French decision.11 
A Dutch car owner, insured against fire with an English 
company, lost the car in a fire at a French garage. The 
company paid the damage to the owner and recovered from 
the garage company. The insurance contract was deemed to 
be governed by Dutch law and produced legal subrogation 
(Dutch C. Com. article 284) at the time of the payment. 
10 Hof Amsterdam (April 12, 1921) N. J. 1922, Sox. 
Contra: Rb. Utrecht (May 7, 1952) N.J. 1953, 276, Clunet 1957, 476, Revue 
Crit. 1954, 784 with Note by BATIFFOL; in this case the court applied Belgian 
law granting subrogation of a proprietary right to a movable situated in 
Holland and covered by a Belgian insurance contract. On the other hand, see 
Hof Arnhem (Nov. 29, 1955) N. J. 1956, 231 and Rb. Leeuwarden (Dec. 13, 
1960) N. J. 1961, 330; in these analogous cases subrogation was denied 
according to Dutch law. For a discussion, see SAUVEPLANNE, "De subrogatie 
in het internationaal privaatrecht," De conflictu legum (Nederl. Tijds. Int. R., 
Special Issue October 1962) 413 and BATIFFOL, Traite (ed. 3) 677 § 626. 
11 App. Riom (Jan. 29, 1932) Gaz. Pal. 1932.r.7o7, Revue gen. des assurances 
terrestres 1932, 29 5 with note by PERROULD. 
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The French-governed obligation of the garage company 
was ascertained as soon as plaintiff showed himself to be 
regularly subrogated under Dutch law. This result conforms 
to our own conclusions, but the court based it on obscure 
reasoning and the alleged rule for "quasi contracts" that 
the law of the place of the generating fact, that is, of the 
payment, governs.12 
Likewise, in another case involving insurance against 
risks of carriage, a New York insurance company was 
recognized as subrogated to the insured because it had paid 
the client in France and subrogation at that time had be-
come known to French law.18 If the lawyers concerned had 
cared to consult the law of New York, they would probably 
have reasoned otherwise. 
Considering the great and ever-increasing importance of 
subrogation in modern relationships, its fate cannot be 
reasonably made dependent on the accidental place of pay-
ment. Subrogation flows from the law governing the under-
lying obligation, 14 which we have found also to influence 
the law granting recovery of unjust enrichment. Where, for 
instance, an injured driver of an automobile has released 
the tortfeaser but cashed the insurance money, he is bound 
to refund this money, according to American views.15 How 
could this rest on the law of the place of the payment? The 
relationship insurer-insured dominates the entire problem. 
In the case of accident insurance, we have found earlier 
12 See PERROULD, ibid., and contra: supra p. 378. 
13 Tr·ib. civ. Seine (Jan. 2, 1935) Revue gen. des assurances terrestres 1935, 
346 and note by PERROULD, also approved by PICARD et BESSON, I Traite 624 
§ 305. 
14 This should be true even in a system where subrogation, e.g., of the 
insurer, is merely based on the law plus the payment, in minimizing the 
(insurance) contract, as in the doctrine of the Italian courts on the ground 
of former C. Com. art. 438, see Cass. Ita!. (Feb. 19, 1937) 39 Dir. Marit. 
( 1937) So and note by BERLINGIERI. 
15 See on this and related questions, BILLINGS, "The Significance of Sub-
rogation in Automobile Insurance Practice," Ins. L. J. 1948, 707. 
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that a direct action by the injured party against the insurer, 
when granted by the law of the place of the accident, ought 
to be allowed elsewhere.16 It is added here that if the in-
sured has been satisfied by the insurer, their relationship 
determines the transfer of the tort action. 
This would also seem to furnish the right solution to the 
recent controversy whether an insurer against liability is 
subrogated in a claim based on the Federal Tort Claims 
Act of 1946/7 which assimilates the United States as wrong-
doer to private persons. The Act presupposes that an indi-
vidual in an identical case would be liable under the law of 
the place where the loss or damage occurred. It is entirely 
unjustified to require another federal law to extend the right 
to sue especially to a subrogee.18 At least one circuit court 
has recognized the subrogation.19 Where a transferable 
claim arises from the tort according to the law of the place 
of wrong, its transfer to the insurer by operation of law 
depends simply on the law governing the insurance contract. 
One difficult problem should be briefly noted. Subroga-
tion as respects the same debt is often granted by statute 
to persons differing in their relationships to the debtor. For 
instance, it has been discussed in Germany that the Code 
entitles a surety paying the creditor to avail himself of a 
mortgage securing the debt,20 but the Code also subrogates 
the owner of the mortgaged property if he is not the prin-
cipal debtor to the creditor, apparently including the right 
16 See Vol. II (ed. 2) pp. 263 f. 
176o Stat. 842 § 41o(a), 28 U. S. C.§ 931 (a). See BRENTON, "The Case 
for Subrogees under the Federal Tort Claims Act," Ins. L. J. 1948, 189. 
18 Thus, as claimed by the government and sustained in several decisions 
dismissing actions by insurers, Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States (D. C. 
S. D. Ohio 1949) 74 F. Supp. 723; Cascade City, Mont. v. U. S. (D. C. Mont. 
1947) 75 F. Supp. 85o; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. U. S. (D. C. E. D. N.Y. 
1948) 76 F. Supp. 333· 
19 Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th 1948) 167 F. (2d) 655 
reversing Rusconi v. U.S. (D. C. S.D. Cal. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 669. 
2o BGB. §§ 774, 412, 401. 
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against the surety.21 Can such owner recover from the 
surety? Is this a question of who first manages to pay? Or is 
it a case of equal distribution? Prevailing German opinion 
has recognized that the surety's position is superior; he 
may recover from the owner but the latter cannot recover 
from him.22 
Analogous delicate questions have been raised in the 
United States;23 some judicial decisions have been justifiably 
criticized. Thus, a tortfeasor without doubt is responsible 
to the subrogated insurer. Hence, in the better opinion, the 
insurer of one of two tortfeasors may recover from the 
other tortfeasor half of what he pays to the injured party.24 
An employer paying compensation to an employee ought to 
have recourse against the insurer of a workman's accident.25 
Other cases are more doubtful. 
In conflicts law, the difficulty is increased at least in the 
cases, probably infrequent, where the persons potentially 
entitled to subrogation enter into the connection independ-
ently of each other. 
However, modern legal science ought to solve the mu-
nicipal problem in a uniform manner, establishing a grada-
tion of liabilities, preliminary to the rank of rights subject 
to subrogation. 
2. Other Transfers by Law 
"Provision."26 The only topic ordinarily attracting atten-
tion in the Continental literature on this subject has been 
21 BGB. §§ 1143, 1249, 412, 401. 
22 STROHAL, 6r Jherings Jahrb. (1912) 59 ff.; RG., 76 Seuff. Arch. I35· 
In Austria followed by 2 EHRENZWEIG I § 293 and n. 36; 2 id. 2 § 3II n. 20. 
23 LANGMAID, "Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship 
and Insurance," 47 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1934) 976, also in Legal Essays in Tribute 
to Orrin Kip McMurray (1935) 245. 
24 LANGMAID, id. 998 ( 264) against decisions. 
25 LANG MAID, id. roo7 ( 272) against decisions. 
2s Basic: ERNST E. HIRSCH, Der Rechtsbegriff Provision im franzosischen und 
international en Wechselrecht ( 1930) 146 ff. 
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the transfer of the so-called "provision" to the successive 
endorsees of a bill of exchange under French law and those 
following the French doctrine. The rights to funds covering 
the draft and belonging to the drawer, including obligatory 
rights such as claims or credits due him by the drawee, are 
transferred to the payee by the negotiation of the bill and 
successively to the endorsees with every further endorse-
ment.27 But this means only that the holder of the bill is 
entitled to such claims as the drawer may happen to have 
against the drawee at the time of maturity to the extent of 
the amount indicated in the bill. Text and construction make 
it clear that this is not an ordinary implied assignment; it 
does not necessarily have a present object and does not 
prevent the drawer from disposing of the funds before 
maturity. Hence, it is a transfer created and peculiarly con-
ditioned by law. And this law is correctly and prevailingly 
identified with that governing the creation of the bill of 
exchange, which is, in the predominant opinion, rightly or 
wrongly, the law of the place of issue.28 That this law also 
should intervene in transferring the right of cover from one 
endorsee to the other, although the endorsement is gov-
erned by the law of its own place, has seemed impossible 
27 France: C. Com. art. n6, as amended by Law of Feb. 8, I922. 
Italy: Law No. 48 of Jan. I5, I934, art. I. 
Scotland: British Bills of Exchange Act, I882, s. 53 (2}. 
The problem was discussed formerly in American courts but has been 
liquidated by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, § I27, cf. 5 U. L. A. 
§ I27, and for the distinction of transactions to be observed, Guggenhime & 
Co. v. Lamantia (I929) 207 Cal. 96, 99, 276 Pac. 995· 
28 HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at I62. 
France: Cass. civ. (Feb. 6, I900) S. I900.I.I6I, Clunet I900, 6os; 4 LYON-
CAEN et RENAULT§ 644. 
Italy: CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 373 ff. 
Germany: OLG. Kolmar, decisions cited by HIRSCH, supra n. 26, I68, I70. 
Contrarily, in Illinois cases, before the uniform law, the law of the place 
of payment has been applied. National Bank of America v. Indiana Banking 
Co. (I885) II4 III. 483, 2 N. E. 40I concerning a check, in which case there 
are doubts on the correct localization, see HIRSCH, supra n. 26, at I54· Abt v. 
The American Trust & Savings Bank (I896} I59 III. 467,42 N. E. 856 (draft). 
Cf. also Vol. IV ( ed. I) pp. I44 ff., 232 f. 
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to some dissenters,29 while the German courts look for 
circumstances suggesting a tacit assignment of the accessory 
right.30 
The prevailing simple solution was inserted in the Geneva 
Convention of 1930,31 adopting the controversial rule that 
rights once acquired by the first endorsee pass to each 
successor, without regard to the respective rule of the place 
of endorsement, and that such rights correspondingly revert 
in the case of recourse for nonpayment. Of course, the 
drawee has his normal defenses against any transferee; this 
is no exception to the rule. 
The connection with the doctrine of negotiable instru-
ments justifies this solution which, in itself, would be ex-
orbitant. 
A General Rule'? Some statutes, that of Texas being ap-
parently the last left in this country, provide that the bene-
ficial interest of a spouse granted him in an insurance on the 
life of the other spouse automatically returns to the grantor 
in the event of divorce. In an older case, such effect of a 
Hawaiian divorce decree was disregarded in California in 
a matter of jurisdiction.32 In another case, it was held that 
the law governing the insurance determines whether the 
right of the beneficiary is lost by a divorce.33 But more 
29 DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. §§ 217, 223; GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ, "La cam-
bia)e nel diritto internazionale privata," 12 Studi di diritto internazionale 
(Milano 1946) 238, arguing on the analogy of voluntary assignment; see for 
other writings, GULDENER 50 f. 
30 RG. (March 19, 1907) 65 RGZ. 357, and other decisions, see HIRSCH, 
Jupra n. 26, at 168 ff. 
31 Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection 
with Bills of Exchange etc., art. 6: "The question whether there has been an 
assignment to the holder of the debt which has given rise to the issue of the 
instrument is determined by the law of the place where the instrument was 
issued." HunsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 554· 
32 McGrew v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (1901) 132 Cal. 85, 64 Pac. 
103, criticized by 2 BEALE 1254 because the woman and the policy had been 
under the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian court from the beginning. 
33 Pendleton v. Great Southern L. I. Co. ( 1929) 135 Okla. 40, 273 Pac. 1007; 
2 BEALE 1212 n. 2. 
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recently, the Second Federal Circuit Court decided by a 
rna jority that the designation of the wife as beneficiary in 
an insurance contract made in New York state, giving an 
irrevocable right under New York law, was destroyed as 
an effect of divorce in Texas where the spouses had moved. 
Judge Learned Hand based this decision on a general rule; 
he held that there was no reason why a legal transfer should 
not be subject to the same conflicts rule as a voluntary 
assignment, and thus to the law of the place of assignment, 
which he assumed should govern.34 That this rule should 
sanction the surprising effect of the exorbitant Texas rule 
on a right irrevocable under a New York insurance contract, 
has been convincingly criticized.35 In the rule itself, the 
reference to the mechanical law of the place of assignment 
should be eliminated. Apart from this, however, it may be 
contended that an expropriation of a debt does not depend 
upon the permission of the law governing the debt, unless 
the right is personal. But the local contacts appropriate in 
this matter can scarcely be stated in terms of one simple con-
flicts rule.36 
II. TRANSFER OF LIABILITY37 
The most important situations involving a change of 
debtor occur in connection with inheritance and transfer 
of an enterprise,38 both of which belong primarily to the 
doctrines of property. 
34 New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spence (C. C. A. zd I939) I04 F. 
(zd) 665. 
35 See Clark, J., dissenting opinion id. 668 ff.; Note, 49 Yale L. J. { I939) 335· 
36 LETZGUS, 3 Z.ausi.PR. {I929) 852; GULDENER III If.; RILLING, supra Cb. 
47 n. I, 71. 
37 BRINER, "Die Schuldubernahme im Schweizerischen Internationalprivat-
recht," I27 N. F. Ziircher Beitriige zur Rechtswissenschaft (I 947}. 
38 RG. (March 27, I905) I5 Z.int.R. (1905) 306 does not contribute much: 
a German bought a business in England taking over all assets and liabilities; 
the obligations arising have been naturally subjected to English law. 
On comparative aspects of transfer of enterprises: BA YITCH, "Transfer of 
Business. A Study in Comparative Law," 6 Am. J. Comp. Law (I957) 284. 
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By voluntary act of the debtor, an individual debt cannot 
be transferred to another debtor without the creditor's 
assent. He can, where his duty is not strictly personal, accept 
the promise of another person to perform the duty. 39 Such 
assumption by agreement, taken as merely constituting a 
relation between the debtor and his substitute (the ex-
promisor) participates in the law of the sale, lease, or 
other transaction in which it is included, or may be subject 
to an independent law. 
Modern laws, however, have brought forth various in-
stitutions resulting in the addition of a new debtor ( "cumu-
lative" assumption of liability), or the replacement of the 
old by the new debtor ("privative" assumption of liability). 
In the latter case,· the idea that the new promisor succeeds 
in place of the old obligor without any other change of the 
substance of the obligation and its accessories, is more or 
less developed. Whereas the German Civil Code has estab-
lished a fullfledged succession in the debt by agreement of 
the new promisor either with the creditor, or with the old 
debtor plus consent of the creditor, 40 the French doctrine, in 
the absence of sufficient provisions of the Code, has ap-
proached the desired results by adjusting institutions like 
novation, delegation, third-party contractsY In the United 
States, direct action by the creditor against the new debtor 
has been provided by using novation and reducing the new 
obligation to the conditions and amount of the original 
liability,42 or by construing the creditor as the beneficiary 
39 This is what is usually termed assignment of liability; 7 HALSBURY 
302 § 420; Restatement of Contracts § 160 (3); German BGB. § 329: 
"Erfiillungsiibernahme"; Swiss C. Obi. art. 175: usually termed "Interne 
Schuldiibernahme." 
40 Germany: BGB. §§ 414, 415: "Schuldiibernahme"; Switzerland: C. Obi. 
art. 176; Mexico: C. C. ( 1928) art. 2051: cesi6n de deudas. 
41 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) §§ 1142-1145; cf. in the 
Italian C. C. ( 1942) arts. 1272, 1273. 
42 Restatement of Contracts §§ 427, 428; WILLISTON, 3 Contracts § 1865. 
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of the assignment of liability,43 or under certain conditions 
by operation of law.44 
Again, in the German doctrine, the law of the original 
debt has been applied to determine conditions and effects 
of the acts and agreements in question.45 
Illustration. Two women, domiciled nationals of Czecho-
slovakia, purchased in 1922 a house in Dresden, and by 
agreement assumed personal liability on a debt secured 
by a mortgage. Although they discharged it by payment in 
depreciated marks, they were held subject to the German 
law of revalorization, because the debt was governed by 
German law. Their domicil, important under other circum-
stances, was considered immaterial.46 
But, quite as a promise of suretyship and an assignment 
of right, any agreement introducing a new promisor of the 
original debt, has an independent existence. A proper law 
governing it may follow from a stipulation for the appli-
cable law or be inferred from the circumstances. As in the 
other types of transactions mentioned, of course, the law 
governing the original debt is presumably the most closely 
connected law.47 
To presume, to the contrary, that the new promise should 
43 Restatement of Contracts §§ 135, 136; CORBIN, "Contracts for the Benefit 
of Third Persons," 46 Law Q. Rev. ( 1930) 12. 
44 Restatement of Contracts § 164. See in particular, GRISMORE, "Is the 
Assignee of a Contract Liable for the Non-Performance of Delegated Duties?" 
18 Mich. L. Rev. (1920) 284,287 ff. 
45 Germany: RG. (June 13, 1932) JW. 1932, 3810; WALKER 494· 
Switzerland: 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 660. 
46 RG. (Oct. 17, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 34· NussBAUM, D. IPR. 267. The 
case of assumption of a mortgage debt on the occasion of purchase of land, 
specifically regulated in BGB. § 416, has been simply subjected to lex situs 
by RG. (March 22, 1928) JW. 1928, 1447, but the mortgage debt is not 
necessarily under lex situs, cf. 2 BEALE 946 and n. 7· 
47 This view was propounded by 2 ZITELMANN 395; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 268, 
although they postulated the personal laws of the two debtors and complicated 
the problem by their formulations. 
In cases where the buyer of land has assumed the mortgage debt, the lex 
situs may reasonably apply; thus the German RG. (Jan. 12, 1887) 4 Bolze 
No. 22, and the Austrian OGH. (June 26, 1930) JW. 1931, 635. 
458 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
be governed by the law of the domicil of the new promisor, 
as the Swiss Federal Tribunal has done,48 is an instance of 
exaggerated emphasis on the debtor's domicil. 
The law governing the original debt, it is true, deter-
mines whether the original debtor is discharged. But even 
when the new promise is governed by another law, practical 
difficulties are improbable since discharge and new promise 
are essentially connected, by one or the other construction, 
in every legal system.49 
III. NovATION 
The problem may be illustrated by adding foreign ele-
ments to an American case :50 
Sharp had a contract with the baker Voight to deliver 
flour. Voight sold his bakery to Manfre and notified Sharp 
that he had to deal exclusively with the successor. Sharp 
acknowledged this letter and wrote Manfre insisting on 
strict compliance with the contract terms. But later Sharp 
demanded cash payments and in their absence refused de-
livery. The court held that by his letters Sharp discharged 
the old contract totally and substituted a new contract of 
analogous content with Manfre. The court preferred the 
view that the old contract was rescinded to construing a 
novation as some courts would have done. 
If Sharp should be in state X and Voight in state Y and 
the laws of X and Y differ on the question of interpreting 
48 Swiss BG. (Nov. II, 1941) 41 Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 100 reported by BRINER, 
supra n. 37, 56, dealing with cumulative assumption of liability, but apparently 
applicable "a fortiori" to transactions freeing the original obligor, see BRINER, 
supra n. 37, at 68. 
49 See on these problems M. WOLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) 153 f.; BRINER, supra 
D. 37, 44 f. 
Cf. also M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law ( ed. 2) 458 § 441 and Re United 
Railways etc., Ltd. [1959] I Ail E. R. 214, 228 ff. (C. A.); the court relying 
on M. WoLFF, op. cit., ruled that the discharge of the original debtor is 
necessarily determined by the proper law of his debt, but the learned judge 
did not express a concluded opinion on the question of which law should 
govern the substitution of a new debtor. (!d. at 233.) 
50 Manfre v. Sharp (1930) 210 Cal. 479, 292 Pac. 465. 
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the intention of the parties or on a presumption of survival 
of the original debt, which law governs? The problem has 
come up in Europe in the case of the peculiar Swiss certifi-
cate of deficiency issued to a creditor who has not been 
satisfied because of the debtor's insolvency. This certificate 
creates a new title for enforcement, not subject to limitation 
of time.51 A French court has termed this transformation 
a novation.52 In a Swiss case, the creditor of a French-gov-
erned debt claimed that the amount originally expressed 
in French francs was transformed by novation into Swiss 
francs as of the time when the certificate was issued. The 
French currency had declined afterwards. The Federal 
Tribunal, however, stated that the conversion of the sum 
had been made merely for the purpose of the first enforce-
ment. It was then asked whether the fact that the defendant 
had consented to the conversion at the time created a con-
tract of novation in favor of the amount in Swiss francs 
appearing in the certificate. The court denied this under 
Swiss law, held applicable either as that of the assumed 
place of contracting or as that intended by the parties. 53 
The agreement, thus, was subjected to an independent 
law rather than to the (French) law governing the principal 
debt. But the problem concerned the interpretation of the 
agreement of the parties, not the permissibility of novation. 
Since novation is known in practice to every system, the 
Swiss solution is obviously correct in the case at bar of an 
agreement between the two original parties to the obli-
gation. 
More complicated cases may cause doubts. But it may 
be generally said that the extinguishing effect depends on 
the law of the debt, although the new obligation is governed 
51 Switzerland: A Federal Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act, art. 149 par. 5; 
on the international force of the imprescriptibility, see infra p. 528. 
52 App. Colmar (May 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 468. 
53 BG. (June 3, 1947) 73 BGE. II 102, 105. 
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by its own law,54 that may or may not be identical with the 
first. It is important that we should treat all transactions 
modifying an obligation under analogous principles, since 
they are overlapping and varying in the different systems. 
IV. JuRISDICTION FOR GARNISHMENT55 
Although enforcement of a claim is a topic of adjective 
law, forcible satisfaction of money obligations by resort to 
obligatory claims against third persons is frequently in-
cluded in treatises on conflicts law. Certain problems of 
jurisdiction present international interest and have influ-
enced other important subject matters, such as war seizures. 
Close historical and systematic connections with the tradi-
tional situs doctrines are evident. 
However, this exceptional discussion of a jurisdictional 
and procedural subject merely involves the transfer, for 
the purpose of execution, of a debt from the creditor to his 
own creditor. This includes seizure of the debt only so far 
as it is preparatory to this transfer. We are not dealing with 
attachment in any other function, such as founding jurisdic-
tion or as a conservatory measure, despite the historical 
and practical connections between these institutions. 
Orderly garnishment proceedings (as contrasted with in-
terim proceedings for conservatort6 purposes) should con-
54 PILLET, 2 Traite 214, generally followed. A similar contrast between the 
effect of discharging the old and creating a new obligation is made with 
respect to deeds and judgments, see M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law ( ed. 2) 549 
§ 524, subjects not to be dealt with here. Private autonomy is recognized by 
ROLIN, 2 Principes §§ 989 ff., DESPAGNET § 313 j its limitation, 2 ARMIN JON 
§ 156. 
55 BEALE, "The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a 
Debt," 27 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1913) 107; RHEINSTEIN, "Die inliindische Bedeutung 
einer ausliindischen Zwangsvollstreckung in Geldforderungen," 8 Z.ausi.PR. 
(1934) 277; RABEL, "Situs Problems etc.," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) 
II8, 126, infra n. 79· 
56 As to this latter, the older Continental tendency connected with the situs 
theory regarding the court at the creditor's domicil as the competent forum 
(see also Chirkasky v. Pride, 41 Harv. L. Rev. (1927) 924), has been given up. 
The forum makes its jurisdictional rules freely and largely, cf. ANZILOTn, 
Rivista 1908, x8o. 
OTHER TRANSFERS OF SIMPLE DEBTS 461 
sist in a desirable system of three phases. The garnishee 
would be ( 1) forbidden to pay his debt to his creditor, the 
original debtor; he would be ( 2) finally ordered to pay it 
to the garnish or; and ( 3) the original debtor would at least 
be duly notified of any measure that may affect his interests. 
If appropriate international co-operation existed, these 
three steps could be carried out conveniently even though 
two or three countries were involved. Such harmony, how-
ever, is far from being established, and not even within the 
United States is the justified postulate achieved, expressed 
by Stumberg, that the proceedings should be conducted 
against both the creditor and the debtor in their respective 
jurisdictions. 57 
I. Domicil of the Original Debtor 
As things stand, the old idea that a claim is situated at 
the domicil of the creditor and therefore must be attached 
there, is often recognized in domestic law but is rarely 
observed in taking jurisdiction for garnishment. Some states 
of the Union seem still exclusively to permit garnishment at 
the domicil of the orginal debtor.58 The Swiss courts, con-
sidering a debt situated at the place of the creditor's domi-
cil, take jurisdiction when the original debtor is domiciled 
in the forum, 59 and also when he is domiciled abroad and 
the garnishee is domiciled in the forum ;60 but as a recent de-
cision has made clear, garnishment is ordered only under 
51 STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 109. 
58 Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Nash (1897) 118 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825; 
STUMBERG (ed. 2) 107 n. 33 adds: "cf. apparently in accord, Beasley v. Lennox-
Haldeman Co. (1902) n6 Ga. 13, 42 S. E. 385; Bullard and Hoagland v. 
Chaffee (1900) 61 Neb. 83, 84 N. W. 6o4; cf. 38 C. J. S. 338 § 125." 
59 BG. (Dec. 9, 1930) 56 BGE. III 228, 230 referring to 53 id. III 45 and 
citations. 
60 The older decisions of the Federal Tribunal on jurisdiction for attach-
ment, up to (March u, 1930) 56 BGE. III 49, so, recognizing this, have been 
interpreted as including garnishment; really they deal with provisional attach-
ment. See 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 889 n. 153 and GULDENER, Internationales Zivil-
prozessrecht 180. 
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the condition that official notification to the debtor by letter 
rogatory is effected.61 
Most systems, at present, localize the debt in connection 
with the debtor's debtor rather than with the original 
debtor. They disagree, however, on the exact localization: 
whether the domicil of the garnishee or the place where he 
can personally be sued. 
2. The Garnishee's Domicil 
In the prevailing Continental doctrine, it is recognized 
by tradition from the statutists that the situs of a debt for 
the purpose of executive attachment is at the domicil of 
the debtor. 
France. This proposition has found its clearest expres-
sion in France.62 The reasoning rests on the old twofold 
ground that the court at the debtor's domicil has general 
jurisdiction over him (actor sequitur forum rei) and that 
his movable assets, the objects of enforcement, are deemed 
to be assembled there (mobilia ossibus inhaerent). Modern 
authors know that to speak of situs is figurative but add 
that the domicil is the most readily ascertainable of all 
places involved. 
The French Court of Cassation has rigorously carried 
out this theory in international relations. On the subject of 
executive attachment and garnishment (saisie-arret and 
saisie-execution), it maintains that the court of the gar-
nishee's domicil has exclusive jurisdiction for seizing the 
debt. If the original debtor is domiciled in France but the 
garnishee is domiciled abroad, no French court has jurisdic-
tion, just as in the case of seizure of other property situated 
61 BG. (Feb. 20, 1942) 68 BGE. III 10, 14. 
62 WEISS, 4 Traite 430; GLASSON, MOREL et T!SSIER, 4 Traite de procedure 
civile ( ed. 3, 1925-36) II66 j LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 7) § 474• 
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in a foreign country.63 In a part of the literature, the situs 
theory is even taken more literally and either explained 
by a statute real64 or anchored in the territorial nature of 
enforcement. 65 
Germany. Section 23 of the German Code of Civil Pro-
cedure on jurisdiction, construed by the courts as a general 
principle for the situs of debts, localizes debts at the 
debtor's domicil. On this basis, jurisdiction in attachment 
and garnishment66 is assumed when the garnishee has his 
domicil in the forum; this excludes recognition of foreign 
jurisdiction even at the domicil of the original debtor.67 
Correspondingly, a garnishment at the domicil of the gar-
nishee in a foreign country is recognized,68 when it is not 
in conflict with a domestic measure.69 
Where the garnishee is domiciled abroad but the original 
debtor has his domicil in the forum, in one opinion the 
forum on grounds of comity should not render a garnish-
63 Cass. civ. (May 12, 1931) S. 1932.I.137, D. 1933.I.6o; Cour Paris (Dec. 
I 3, 1932) Clunet 1934, 1207. Consequently, courts in Alsace have assumed 
jurisdiction at the domicil of the garnishee, applying their own local civil 
procedure differing from the French; see App. Colmar (March 23, 1938) 
Koechlin v. Risacher, 19 Rev. Juridique d' Alsace et de Lorraine ( 1938) 587. 
On jurisdiction in the Netherlands, see PoLENAAR, Procesrecht ( 1937) 273 ff., 
83. 
64 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE ( ed. 4) § 357, criticizing this theory because 
local sovereignty, rather than the statute real, is respected. More recent 
editions of this treatise do not refer to, and comment on, the theory mentioned. 
65 NIBOYET, Note, S. 1932.1.137· 
66 "Forderungspfiindung" and "Uberweisung," the latter either as assign-
ment at the nominal sum in lieu of payment (an Zahlungsstatt) or for 
collection (zur Einziehung), ZPO. §§ 829, 835. 
67 REICHEL, "Internationale Forderungspfiindung," 131 Arch. Civ. Prax. 
(1929) 293· Cf. RG. (June 2, 1923) 107 RGZ. 44, 46 (on war seizures). 
68 RG. (Oct. 12, 1895) 36 RGZ. 355: the debt is situated not at the place 
of performance in Germany, but at the domicil of the (debtor's) debtor 
either in Rumania or in Vienna; RG. (June 18, 1907) 63 Seuff. Arch. 41 
No. 27: the debt is situated in Switzerland at the domicil of the debtor's 
debtor and subject to the local power of enforcement. RG. (May 16, 1933) 
140 RGZ. 340 restates energetically the principle. 
Austria: Jurisdictionsnorm § 99 par. 2. 
69 STEIN-JONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3· 
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ment order; this would even violate international law.70 
This opinion has been rejected.71 In the prevailing view 
confirmed by the Reichsgericht, the order, notified to the 
original debtor, is valid within the forum if notice can be 
served on the garnishee within the forum or abroad. 72 This 
service, however, is an essential part of the proceedings, 
the efficacy of which therefore normally depends upon the 
co-operation of the foreign state, which is not likely to be 
granted.73 
The guaranties provided in the domestic sphere to safe-
guard the interests of all parties involved are deficient in 
the international field. Res judicata and the effects of notice 
of suit to a third party and of failure to give such notice 
usually are not effective beyond the borders of the state 
where garnishment is sought or, on the other hand, the 
debtor is in litigation with the garnishor or the garnishee.74 
This may or may not be in the interest of the various 
parties. 
Remarkably, in the United States, the emphasis on the 
domicil of the garnishee has had some following. 75 
3· Personal Jurisdiction over the Garnishee 
The common law doctrine seems also to derive from cer-
tain statutist teachings. A basic difference from the Conti-
nental variant is due to interpretation of the Roman rule, 
70 See HUGO KAUFMANN, JW. 1929, 416; KG. (April 5, 1929) JW. 1929, 
2360. 
71 JoNAS, JW. 1932, 668; STEIN-JONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3; RHEINSTEIN, supra 
n. 55, 282-284. 
72 RG. (May r6, 1933) 140 RGZ. 340. 
Similarly, Austria: OGH. (Aug. 12, 1927) 9 SZ. 516 No. 174· 
73 Austria and Czechoslovakia: Exekutionsordnung of May 27, 1896, RGBI. 
No. 79, § 294; WALKER 490; OGH. (Dec. 23, 1925) 7 SZ. roo6 No. 406. 
Germany (itself): STEIN-jONAS, ZPO. § 829 I 3· 
Switzerland: 2 SCHNITZER ( ed. 4) 890. 
Other countries: 1 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1927) 407. 
74 See RG. (July 3, 1903) 55 RGZ. 236, 239; (Sept. 26, 1913) 83 RGZ. u6. 
75 MINOR 287 § 125. 
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actor sequitur forum rei, as basing personal jurisdiction 
upon the presence or submission of the defendant rather 
than upon his domicil. When the English courts in garnish-
ment proceedings abandoned the in rem theory of the cus-
tom of London76 and analyzed the situation of simple debts 
in terms of personal jurisdiction, they emphasized the place 
where the debt is "properly recoverable." It is not exact, 
however, that personal service on the garnishee is the only 
requirement. The courts consider, as it seems, all the cir-
cumstances. Thus, Lord Scrutton, in a leading case where 
the theory was applied to the war seizure of a deposit in a 
London bank, 77 pointed out that the debt arose in London 
and that the original debtor made an appearance in the 
lawsuit and submitted to the jurisdiction, obtaining a benefit 
thereby. Lord Scrutton thought that any foreign country 
would recognize such jurisdiction. In fact, in another case 
of war seizure concerning life insurance policies, Atkins, 
then L. J., states as a rule derived from the ecclesiastical 
authorities: 
"That in the case of an ordinary individual ... for a 
long time the situation of a simple contract debt under 
ordinary circumstances has been held to be where the debtor 
resides; that being the place where under ordinary circum-
stances the debt is enforceable, because it is only by bringing 
suit against the debtor that the amount can be recovered."78 
Hence, the mere fact that the third debtor, the New York 
Life Insurance Company, had a branch office in London 
was not held sufficient to locate the debt because this was 
only one of several places of business,78a but something more 
76 BEALE, 27 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, at 112; I BEALE 458. 
71 Swiss Bank Corp. v. Boehmische Industrial Bank [ I923] I K. B. 673, 682. 
78 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public Trustee [ 1924] 2 Ch. IOI, II9. 
78 .. For a Dutch decision to the same effect, see H. R. (Nov. 26, 1954) N. J. 
1955, No. 698, 4 Nederl. Tijds. Int. R. (I957) 96: the obligation of a Dutch 
corporation to pay salary to one of its employees working at a branch office 
in Indonesia was deemed not to be subject to garnishment in the Netherlands. 
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was needed for the localization of the debt; in the instant 
case, this additional element was found in the promise in-
cluded in the policy to pay sterling in London. "That right 
is situate in this country, and only in this country." Uncer-
tain as the law in England remains, it seems that a mere 
temporary sojourn of the garnishee, in the absence of the 
original debtor, would not induce an English court to render 
a garnishment order. All judges in the last-mentioned case 
regretted that they had to decide without having the policy 
holders in court, who should have been necessary parties-
a point worth noting. 
United States.19 American courts, in the great majority, 
have construed the proceedings as directed against a debt 
located for jurisdiction purposes wherever the garnishee 
could validly be served with process. The debt is where the 
garnishee may be sued personally by his creditor. Under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as the Supreme Court 
has stated in approving this view, any other state must 
recognize the double effect of the proceedings, divesting 
the original debtor and investing the garnishor.80 The courts, 
conformably, take jurisdiction wherever the garnishee is 
found and process is personally served on him within the 
state, although it is sometimes required in addition that his 
debt be payable thereY 
Normally, of course, a debtor is found at his domicil. 
Moreover, in several states domicil is sufficient for assuming 
jurisdiction even in the absence of the debtor; this ap-
proaches the Continental reasoning. As explanation, it is 
79 When I wrote first on the matter ("Situs Problems in Enemy Property 
Measures," 11 Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) at 126), Professor SUNDERLAND 
aided me with enlightening remarks, which I am using again with gratitude. 
80 Harris v. Balk (1905) 198 U. S. 215; Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. 
Deer (1906) zoo U. S. 176; Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Hostetter (1915) 
240 U. S. 6zo; Restatement § 108. 
81 State ex ref. Fielder v. Kirkwood (1940) 345 Mo. 1089, 138 S. W. (zd) 
1009. 
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said that the domicil is the situs of the debt fixed by the 
legislature, or that it is the actual, as distinguished from the 
legal, situs, or that the debt is treated as a fund in the hands 
of the debtor at his domicil.82 
But the fact that domicil does increasingly determine 
jurisdiction and that this seems to enjoy interstate effect if 
fair notice is given to the debtor,83 only increases the num-
ber of jurisdictions having power to dispose of the debt. 
The American writers84 have noted two defects of this 
mechanism, more serious than the Continental shortcomings 
because they apply primarily to the relation among sister 
states. 
The original debtor is not necessary to the essential 
judicial proceedings. It is generally desired that he should 
be notified of a garnishment proceeding. But not even this 
requirement of fair justice is rigorously observed in all 
courts. The Restatement is satisfied with a reasonable at-
tempt to give notice. If notice is given, he is supposed to 
appear at any place in the vastness of the United States 
where his alleged creditor happens to find and sue his 
alleged debtor. Federal interpleader85 may force him to 
similar sacrifices. If he is not made aware of the proceed-
ings, he will probably be able to defend against full faith 
and credit of the judgment, and ought to be able also to 
deny that it is res judicata against him.86 But not always is 
he certain of such protection. 
The risk imposed upon the garnishee, on the other hand, 
is the following. 
82 MINOR 287 ff. § I2 5; STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 107 with citations. 
83 See Mr. Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee ( 1917) 243 U. S. 90 and 
comment by STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 78. 
84 BEALE, 27 Harv. L. Rev., supra n. 55, 120; GOODRICH § 68. 
85 See the interesting complications described by CHAFEE, "Federal Inter-
pleader," 49 Yale L. J. (1940) 377,423. 
86 GooDRICH 146 § 68; but cf. the restricted formula in 38 C. J. S. § 577· 
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4· Double Payment of the Debt 
English and American courts have dealt with cases where 
a garnishee objected that he may be compelled to pay the 
same debt again if his creditor should sue him in a foreign 
country where the domestic garnishment is not recognized 
as res judicata. Where this danger was convincingly proved, 
the garnishment order has been denied. 87 When proceedings 
are pending in another state, American courts are anxious 
to protect the garnishee against double proceedings by di-
vergent methods, such as abatement of the action, stay pend-
ing foreign decisio~, or mere suspension of enforcement. 88 
The German Supreme Court did not believe that it pos-
sessed such discretionary power. 
A German seller had a claim for the price of delivered 
locomotives against a Portuguese buyer and owed the com-
mission fee to the Portuguese broker. The claim of the 
broker against the seller was garnished in Germany by a 
German creditor of the broker. The court rejected the 
defense of the garnishee seller that in Portugal the broker 
had garnished the price owed by the buyer who was forced 
to pay.89 
In view of this situation, an authoritative German writer 
has contended that actual exercise of foreign jurisdiction 
should be recognized, when under its compulsion a debtor 
87 England: Martin v. Nadel [ 1906] 2 K. B. 26 and cit. 
Canada, C. App. Ontario: Richer v. Borden Farm Products Co. ( 1921) 49 
0. L. R. 172, 64 D. L. R. 70 and cit. 
Quebec: The Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Perrault (1882} 26 L. C. J. 382, 
385, 389; Harris v. Cordingley (1899) 16 Que. S. C. sox; Fraser v. The 
Beyers-Allen Lumber Co. etc. (1913) 45 Que. S.C. 42; JOHNSON (ed. 2) 976 ff. 
United States: Parker, Peebles and Knox v. Nat'] Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford 
(1930) III Conn. 383, 150 Atl. 313; cf. Notes, 40 Yale L. J. (1930) 139; 69 
A. L. R. (1930) 609. Weitzel v. Weitzel (1924) 27 Ariz. 117, 230 Pac. uo6; 
Clark-Wilcox Co. v. Northwest Eng. Co. (1943) 314 Mass. 402, so N. E. 
(2d) 53· 
88 Note, 91 A. L. R. 959, 964; 5 Am. Jur. 34 §§ 698 f. 
89 RG. (Nov. 3, 1911) 77 RGZ. 250; cf. RHEINSTEIN, supra n. 55, 287 n. I; 
2 FRANKENSTEIN 265 who approves the decision. 
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has paid either to his creditor despite a German attachment 
or to the creditor of his creditor on the ground of foreign 
attachment. 90 
5. Conclusion 
Evidently, no system has been found suitable to organize 
harmonious international proceedings. One difficulty is non-
recognition of foreign seizures, another the hardships for 
individual parties to appear in foreign jurisdictions. In both 
respects, however, improvements have been found in part 
and could be amplified. A common basis of recognition is 
afforded by the widespread idea that a debt may be seized 
at the domicil of the debtor.91 It seems exaggerated that in 
the United States mere feasibility of service of process, 
whatever its merits as a foundation of personal jurisdiction, 
suffices to create rights to the detriment of out-of-state 
creditors. 
On the other hand, the methods by which the American 
courts are enabled to avoid the danger of double payment 
by the garnishee ought to be followed in the civil law courts. 
The promising development of federal interpleader is 
another progress mitigating the difficulties of the parties 
involved. 
Notification to the foreign original debtor should be re-
quired more distinctly and more forcefully. 
90 JoNAs, JW. 1932, 668 and STEIN-JoNAs, 2 ZPO. § 829 n. VI 3; VII I b. 
On the defenses based on unjust enrichment, see RHEINSTEIN, 8 Z.ausi.PR., 
supra n. 55, at 288 and n. I. 
91 See particularly RHE!NSTEIN, supra n. 55· 
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Setoff and Counterclaim (Compensation) 1 
''COMPENSATIO est debiti et crediti inter se contri-
butio,"2 is a definition from the end of the classical 
Roman period. At that time, as it seems, it had be-
come a general habit to allow a defendant in a lawsuit a 
defense by claiming against the plaintiff a debt due by the 
latter to the defendant.3 The history of this institution 
before and after this momentous stage has been agitated 
and has led in the modern codes to related but differentiated 
regulations, all parts of substantive private law. In Eng-
land, an entirely independent doctrine slowly emerging 
shows various parallels to the Roman development, but has 
remained original and, in contrast to the Continental sys-
tems, confined within the framework of judicial procedure. 
In this matter, we must separate not only the two groups 
of municipal bodies of law but also their application in 
conflicts law. 
I. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 
1. Institutions Involved 
The English methods of setoff and counterclaim are 
clothed in terms of procedural remedies to be used by a 
1 SACERDOTI, "Des conflits des lois en matiere de compensation des obliga-
tions," Clunet 1896, 57; Tosi-BELLUCCI, "La compensazione nel diritto 
internazionale privato," 84 Archivio giuridico ( 1910) 9; DOLLE, "Die Kom-
pensation im internationalen Privatrecht," 13 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und 
Prozessrecht ( 1924) 32, with illustrations; DE NovA, L'estinzione delle 
obbligazioni convenzionali nel diritto internazionale privato ( 1931) 209; 
GRAF, Die Verrechnung im internationalen Privatrecht (1951). Comparative 
municipal law: GERHARD KEGEL, Probleme der Aufrechnung: Gegenseitigkeit 
und Liquiditiit, rechtsvergleichend dargestellt, 13 Beitriige zum ausliind. und 
int. Privatrecht ( 1938). 
2 MODESTINUS, Dig. 16, z, I. 
3 BoNFANTE, Istituzioni di diritto romano ( ed. 8) 401. 
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defendant against a plaintiff. A rich and differentiated de-
velopment from this origin in the United States has pro-
duced a variety of regulations of setoff, recoupment, and 
cross action, and of the so-called counterclaim in the "code 
states," comprising setoff and recoupment. The many statu-
tory changes, differences between state and federal juris-
dictions, and the influence of equity have resulted in a 
progressive adjustment to practical needs. Perhaps for the 
same reasons, however, the subject is so loaded with particu-
laristic complications that no serious effort has ever been 
made to reconsider the entire matter from the viewpoint of 
substantive law. It still remains in the common opinion a 
topic of procedure, subject, as a matter of course, to the law 
of the forum. 
Following the language of the Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts, we shall speak of "setoff and counterclaim," 
or more briefly, according to English models, of "setoff," to 
cover the ground taken in civil law by compensatio. The 
exceptional rules on bankruptcy and judgment debts must 
be reserved. Mutual accounts by agreement are a separate 
topic to be discussed later. 
English and American lawyers are extremely firm in as-
serting that setoff and its associates are procedural institu-
tions. As a particularly impressing feature, there is no 
extra judicial setoff, except in case of insolvency. A debtor: 
"Cannot, in the absence of agreement, apply a set-off in 
reduction of his debt, on a tender of the residue; but he 
may avail himself of such set-off by way of defence or 
counter-claim in an action by the creditor. " 4 
Undoubtedly, many a time thoughtful judges and writers 
have penetrated behind the procedural aspect into the situ-
ation of the parties. No one, in fact, denies that under the 
conditions of the law the parties have a right to a setoff. 
4 }ENKS-WINFIE.LD § 216. 
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The well-known dictum of Judge Mack ( 1923) may be 
remembered : 
"The right of a counterclaim and set-off having been 
first introduced as a part of our procedural law, halting 
recognition is just beginning to be given to the fact that 
the right as between litigants is something more than a 
procedural convenience and is really a requirement of sub-
stantive justice. That the right of set-off and counterclaim 
is regarded in our law today as affecting, in important as-
pects, the substantive relations between the parties, is clearly 
seen in the rules as to the assignment of choses in action 
being subject to existing set-offs or counterclaims."5 
The Contracts Restatement is the most eloquent testi-
mony to the substantive nature of the party relations in-
volved. Nevertheless, its classification as procedural seems 
unchallenged. 
2. Conflicts Principle 
In consistency with their general attitude in the municipal 
sphere, common law lawyers do not hesitate to state the 
simple rule that setoff and counterclaim follow the law of 
the forum. 6 To preclude excessive application, the meaning 
of this rule has been clarified by Minor: how the defense 
is pleaded and what effect the plea has is regulated by the 
procedural law of a court, but the validity and effect of 
5 The Gloria (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1923) 286 Fed. 188, 192. Rosenberry, J., in 
Shawano Oil Co. v. Citizens State Bank (1936) 223 Wis. 100, 269 N. W. 675: 
"A right of offset is more than a procedural matter. Under § 331.07 the 
plaintiff was entitled to set off ... upon the payment of its note." 
6 England: MacFarlane v. Norris ( 1862) 2 B. & S. 783; Meyer v. Dresser 
(1864) 16 C. B. (N. S.) 646, 664; WESTLAKE§ 346; FoOTE 555; DICEY (ed. 6) 
859, 865 Rule 193· In contrast with the sixth edition of Dicey's book, the 
seventh edition takes the position that setoff, but not counterclaim, may also 
directly attach to the plaintiff's claim and consequently be governed by the 
lex causae; see DICEY ( ed. 7) II02 Rule 204. 
United States: STORY § 575; WHARTON § 788; MINOR § 2II; 3 BEALE 1606 
§ 593.1, citing decisions from 1846 to 1932; GOODRICH 192. 
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each claim is measured according to the law governing it. 7 
Only on an express or implied agreement of the original 
parties to an instrument, may setoff be considered an equity 
attaching to the instrument.8 
3· Foreign Compensation m Common Law Courts 
How should civil law compensation, a substantive in-
stitution, be treated in a common law court? Authority is 
scarce. But the oldest American decision relating to the 
matter recognized a setoff allowed in a sister state and 
expressly stated that the setoff "does not relate to the form 
of proceeding but goes to the merits of the case; and shews, 
that no recovery ought to be had. So far from relating to 
the form of the remedy, it shews there ought to be no 
remedy." 9 This line of thinking seldom has been followed/0 
but may be regarded as allowing a common law court to 
admit an allegation that compensation has been achieved 
under the law of a civil law country.U At least, the writers 
seem in agreement that foreign discharge of an obligation 
by compensation is recognizable.12 Moreover, if two debts 
7 MINOR 525 § 2II. 
8 MINOR 526; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws ( ed. 2) 371 n. (g). 
9 Vermont State Bank v. Porter (1812) 5 Day (Conn.) 316 at 321; 5 Am. 
Dec. 157. 
10 United States: Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Mechanics' 
Savings Bank (C. c. A. 3d I899) 97 Fed. 297. 56 L. R. A. 228: the statutory 
liability of a stockholder, resident of Pennsylvania, to the creditor of an 
insolvent Kansas corporation would have been extinguished by the claim of 
the stockholder against the corporation for the payment of bonds under Kansas 
law, governing both claims; this equitable defense is recognized. To interpret 
it as a defense at law, in order to serve in the federal court, has been dis-
approved. See Anglo-American Land, M. and A. Co. v. Lombard (C. C. A. 
8th 1904) 132 Fed. 721, 733· 
11 England: Allen v. Kemble ( 1848) 6 Moo. P. C. C. 314, 321: discharge 
of a debt by compensation under Roman Dutch law was recognized, although 
the decision is inconclusive with respect to the conflicts rule, FALCONBRIDGE, 
Conflict of Laws ( ed. 2) 372. 
12 DICEY (ed. 7) 812 illus. 3· See also EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 437, who urges 
permitting a setoff granted by the very same foreign statute under which the 
plaintiff is suing. But why should this technicality matter? 
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face each other in compensable condition according to 
French law governing both debts, their extinction may be 
claimed by either party in an American court. It is imma-
terial where either debt arose. But if the two debts are gov-
erned by different laws, it may be doubtful which law, or 
whether both simultaneously, should be applied. This is a 
problem very controversial in Europe, which we must con-
sider later. 
On the other hand, it has been concluded that the law of 
the forum is free to authorize, by its judicial discretion, a 
setoff not permissible in the governing foreign lawY 
4· Application in Civil Law Courts 
The Continental literature, aware of the different charac-
terization of set.off and compensation in the unanimous 
Anglo-American view has responded by assuming that the 
English and American remedies are inapplicable in civil law 
courts. Generally, it seems to be felt that such a court has 
to apply the law of the forum, on an assumed renvoi from 
the governing law.H 
This solution has been challenged, however. In a thor-
ough comparative study, conforming to the standards re-
affirmed in the present work, Gerhard KegeP5 has examined 
the general function and two of the main conditions of com-
pensation and the common law remedies in question. As 
a result of his analysis, the author states that, under present 
concepts of analytical jurisprudence, counterclaim in Eng-
land, New Jersey, Arkansas, and Connecticut is in fact a 
strictly procedural defense, but English and American setoff 
and recoupment, and counterclaim in the code states, contain 
a mixture of substantive and procedural elements. He draws 
this conclusion from the common roots of setoff in judicial 
13M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law (ed. 2) 456 f.§ 439· 
14NEUNER, Privatrecht und Prozessrecht (I925) 59, I33; DOLLE, supra n. I, 
at 34· 
15 KEGEL, supra n. I, esp. 4I ff. 
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practice and in bankruptcy law which is a substantive insti-
tution, the analogous structure of setoff in bankruptcy and 
insolvency cases, the language of certain decisions, and the 
existence of extra judicial setoff in installment sales and bank 
accounts. Despite some doubts, the author is inclined to 
think that it should be possible to extract the substantive 
rules and apply them in a civil law court.16 For instance, 
conflicts law as understood on the Continent, may be able 
to observe the rules usual in a specific American court on 
the question whether the defendant may plead a debt which 
is owed by or owing to certain third persons.17 In contrast, 
the requirement of a liquidated sum, where it still exists, 
is so dominated by procedural convenience as to dissuade 
us from transplanting it to a foreign forum.18 This interest-
ing inquiry deserves to be extended to the remaining prob-
lems. Some day a common platform will be found. 
In the meantime, so long as no American court applies 
the rules of another state on this subject, it will be inadvis-
able for a civil law court to proceed differently. The diffi-
culty of extracting the substantive rules or of ascertaining 
the actual law of an American state is very great.19 Any 
attempt to transform setoff and counterclaim into pure 
private law, seems premature. In the phase reached by 
these institutions up to the present time, foreign conflicts 
law ought to leave them totally unobserved. 
All European writers seem to agree, however, that in a 
case governed by English or American law compensation 
16 KEGEL, supra n. I, 48 f. 
11 /d. at 153. 
18 /d. at 174. 
19 As an example, it may be considered that in the United States, even 
where a claim barred by a statute of limitations may be used for pleading 
setoff, various theories exist concerning the effect of the plea. While the 
question whether a claim barred by limitation may be pleaded is substantive 
in the Continental view, the effect of a successful plea, in an American court, 
representing a claim exceeding the plaintiff's demand regards the extent of 
the bar procedurally conceived. For three different solutions of the latter 
problem, see Wooo, 1 Limitations 307 ns. 15-17. 
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is not effective except if invoked as a defense or by cross-
action in court.20 In such cases, the court treats compensa-
tion as pleaded exclusively on the ground of a procedural 
party declaration, not on the ground of an extra judicial act 
and, hence, applies its own procedural rules involving un-
conditional and conditional compensation,-the latter occur-
ring when the defendant avails himself of his counterclaim 
only on the condition that the plaintiff's claim is held effec-
tive. The private law of the forum serves to fill the gaps 
left by the procedural rules. 
II. CIVIL LAW 
I. Institutions Involved 
ucompensatio" of debts appears in various kinds, the 
most important of which are at present effectuated either 
by operation of law or by extra judicial informal declaration 
of either party. "Legal compensation" stems from the un-
considered generalization, in the Corpus Juris, of a classical 
dictum, uipso iure compensatur," which had been said of a 
certain type of banker who was compelled by the Praetor, 
in suing customers, to restrict his petitions to the balance 
of current accounts.21 This slogan, as finally adopted in 
the French and Austrian Civil Codes and many subsequent 
laws,22 means that the two debts extinguish each other at the 
first moment of their coexistence in compensable condition. 
Although this construction still produces its consequences 
if the compensation is considered "definitely" established, 
2o DOLLE, supra n. I, 42. 
21 GArus IV §§ 64-68; LENEL, Edictum perpetuum § IOO; Dig. I6, 2, 2I; 
C. 4, gi, I4; PERNICE, Labeo, Vol. II, I, 279; LENEL, Palingenesia Paulus 
No. I273· 
22 Argentina: C. C. art. 8I8. 
Austria: C. C. § § I438 If. 
Brazil: C. C. art. I009. 
France: C. C. arts. I290 If. 
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. I285; C. C. (I942) art. 1241 says even expressly: 
"i due debiti si estinguono." 
Portugal: C. C. art. 768. 
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its peculiar automatic working has been abandoned. The 
defendant in a lawsuit must invoke the fact of the compen-
sation or be deemed to renounce it and revive the discharged 
debt.23 
The modern type of compensation proclaimed by the 
German Civil Code24 rests upon a declaration of one party 
to the other, either extrajudicially or in pleading. When this 
is done, the effect is retroactive so that the debts are deemed 
extinguished as of the first moment of their simultaneous 
existence in the condition required for setoff. Thus, in both 
the French and German systems, for instance, the running 
of interests of any percentage is terminated on both sides 
from that time. 
The conditions in the civil law systems also are roughly 
the same, to the extent that two persons must be reciprocally 
and personally bound by obligations, existent and enforce-
able, to the payment of money or other fungible things of 
like nature. 
These parallels in operation and prerequisites have 
afforded a sufficient basis for the dominant conflicts doc-
trine in Europe, comprising all Continental laws in a joint 
conflicts rule concerning compensation.25 What the rule 
should prescribe is another question. 
2. Conflicts Theories 
As usual, a variety of theories has been set forth.26 At 
present, only three deserve mention and only two of these 
seriously compete for prevalence. 
23 2 COLIN et CAPITANT 123; PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 
§ 1290. 
24 Germany: BGB. § 387. 
Japan: C. C. art. 505. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 120. 
25 TOSI-BELLUCCI, supra n. I, 26-28, often cited. 
26 See the critical surveys by 2 ARMIN JON § 155; DE NOVA 181 ff. An 
individual theory has also been hinted at by 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 234. 
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As in common law, the law governing the debt will deter-
mine whether it is in existence, mature, liquid, and enforce-
able,27 if the law or laws controlling the compensation 
require these conditions. We are interested only in what 
law or laws are in fact controlling. 
(a) Lex fori. The law of the forum has been postulated, 
sometimes invoking the common law, by a series of authors. 
Some have had in view lawsuits exclusively ;28 others have 
assumed that the connection with procedural rules should 
prevail,29 or that the court ought to be able to decide accord-
ing to equity.30 These views have repeatedly been criticized 
and are commonly rejected. Characterization of compensa-
tion as a remedy or as procedural is regarded as a grave 
mistake.31 
(b) Laws of both debts cumulatively. Many French 
authors, 32 supported by Zitelmann and other writers,33 have 
required that when claim and counterclaim are governed 
by different laws, compensation must be simultaneously 
authorized and made effective by each law. They argue that 
discharge of both debts requires consent of both laws. Al-
though the principal claim depends only on its own law, 
the counterclaim is not extinguished unless the law govern-
ing it so provides, and without such extinction not even the 
27 E.g., RG. (July I, 1890) 26 RGZ. 66: French-Rhenish law is consulted for 
the question whether a legacy claim is exigible. It was wrong that OLG. 
Frankfurt (April 27, I923} JW. I924, 7I5 applied German bankruptcy law to 
decide premature compensability of a debt in a Dutch bankruptcy. 
28 2 BAR 9I (with important qualifications}; VALERY I008 § 700; and to 
some extent in an elaborate way, SACERDOTI, supra n. I, at 57· 
29WALKER 5I5; see also VAREILLES-SOMMIERES §§ 4I5-4I8. 
so ROLIN, 2 Principes 578 §§ 996-998. 
31 See especially TOSI•BELLUCCI, 84 Archivio giuridico ( I9IO} at 47 ff.; 
DE NovA 147 ff. 
32 SURVILLE 380 § 267; PILLET, 2 Traite 2I5 § 502; 2 ARMIN JON § I 55; and 
others. 
33 2 ZITELMANN 397 ff.; KosTERS 812; see for Brazil the citations by 2 
PONTES DE MIRANDA 233, cj. ESPINOLA, 2 Lei lntrod. 624 n. (b). DOLLE, 
supra n. I, 32; DE NovA 234 ff.; GRAF, supra n. I, at 74 ff., 93 ff.; two 
German decisions cited by LEWALD § 348 (b). 
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principal claim would be discharged. Against the objection 
that this method gives preference to the law according to 
which setoff is not effective,34 it has been replied that favor-
ing the less exacting law would harm the authority of the 
more severe law; either law has "equal authority."35 
The precise meaning of this theory seems to vary. In 
the most consistent variant, however, the entire problem 
whether compensation by unilateral act is effective in the 
individual situation, must be decided by both laws. The 
total facts are tested by both legal systems cumulatively.36 
We shall see what this means. 
(c) Law of the principal claim. A vigorous third theory, 
at present prevailing in the German and Swiss doctrine, is 
satisfied with the observance of the provisions which govern 
the claim against which compensation is declared. If the 
law governing the principal debt predicates that the debt 
is discharged, this is all that is needed.37 Or in terms of pro-
cedure, the law that governs the debt sought to be enforced 
and alleged to be discharged by setoff, is competent. 
The followers of this theory effectively refute the main 
argument of the adversaries, viz., that because of the nature 
of compensation both laws must agree in extinguishing both 
debts. The party claiming the setoff avails himself of a 
means of discharge by which a unilateral use of a counter-
claim is substituted for payment. This must be permissible 
under the law determining the modes of discharge. Insofar, 
34 CERETI, Obblig. I48. 
3 5 DE NOVA 164 f. 
36 Thus expressly, DoLLE, supra n. I, 40; and seemingly, 2 ARMIN JON 343; 
DE NoVA 240; BATIFFOL 450 § 567. 
37 BAR, Lehrbuch u8; 2 BAR 9I; NEUMEYER, IPR. 29 (in principle); M. 
WOLFF, IPR. (ed. 3) ISO f. 
Germany: ROHG. (June 4, I873) IO ROHGE. 226; RG. (July I, 1890) 26 
RGZ. 66; OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, I917) 36 ROLG. Io5. 
Danzig: OLG. (Feb. 28, I934) IO Z.ausi.PR. ( I936) 107. 
Switzerland:BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. II 383,384, and cit.; id. (June 26, 
1951) 77 BGE. II 189, 190 f.; id. (June 24, 1955) 81 BGE. II I75, I77; 2 
MElLI 35 § 107 j SCHOENENBERGER-] AEGGI No. 366. 
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however, as this party employs his own claim, he does so not 
by any forcible method of self-help, but by a voluntary 
disposition, to which he is entitled under the law governing 
his claim. It remains merely to ask whether this law frees 
the debtor; this will always be true, since the creditor has 
received satisfaction, except when setoff is not known to 
this law.38 
3· Rationale 
The arguments used for the two antagonistic Continental 
opinions have not sufficed to convince either party. It would 
seem that these theories are too much dependent on the 
municipal doctrines, and moreover that they are framed 
in all too general terms. 
Where the axiom, ipso iure compensatur, is the basic con-
cept, as in France and Italy, it might be natural to assume 
that automatic termination of two debts by "law" pre-
supposes approval by both laws. This idea, however, should 
have been discarded when it was settled that one of the 
parties must act to set the mechanism of the double dis-
charge in motion. 
The modern German doctrine, on the other hand, may be 
inclined to consider the claim to be discharged by declara-
tion of the debtor as the main problem. Also some common 
law writers may think that, if any law other than the law 
of the forum is considered, it is the law governing the debt 
sued upon. But the matter is not so simple. 
In fact, the subject is so involved as to suggest future 
special investigation. Only some of the problems may be 
illustrated here. 
Although we surmise that the mode of operation by pro-
cedural defense or extra judicial declaration is immaterial, 
and disregard the variety existing in the effects of compen-
as LEWALD 283 f. 
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sation, the conditions to be fulfilled are still not all sus-
ceptible of the same treatment. 
(a) The innumerable provisions by which compensation 
is excluded because of the nature of a debt may be divided 
into two classes: prohibitions to discharge a certain debt 
by compensation and prohibitions to use a certain debt as 
a means of compensation-thus concerning compensation 
against a debt and through a debt. But both groups defy 
the double-law theory. 
On one side, certain claims are privileged so that they 
cannot be extinguished without consent of the creditor ex-
cept by actual payment or equivalent satisfaction. Thus, 
according to the various systems, a debtor may not be dis-
charged by setoff, for instance, from a debt grounded on 
tort (or intentional wrong, or unlawful possession) ; from 
a judgment debt; from restitution of a deposit (or a bank 
deposit); from an unattachable debt such as an obligation 
to pay wages may be, etc. The debtor may not set off against 
such a claim. It is not true, however, that the obligation 
in these cases is not "susceptible of compensation." The 
creditor of such an obligation based on tort, deposit, or 
wages is not prohibited, in principle, from extinguishing it 
by using a debt of his own; this is permitted by the law 
governing his privilege, and a fortiori by a law without 
such prohibition. 
An exception confirms the rule. Although the provisions 
concerning compensation merely state that there can be no 
unilateral compensation against an unattachable debt or 
a debt of certain wages, it has been inferred from other 
sources of law in Switzerland that a wage earner cannot 
dispose of his wages insofar as they represent his minimum 
living standard.39 
39 v. TUHR, All g. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. § 78 n. 76; 1 OsER-SCHOENEN-
BERGER 638 III. 
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Even so, it is exclusively the law governing the employ-
ment which prevents the employer, and by exception the 
employee, from disposing of the claim for wages. 
Illustrations. (i) A, an employee of B, owes B repay-
ment of a loan. Under the law governing the employment, 
B is not entitled to satisfy his claim by withholding wages. 
A, under the law governing the loan, is entitled to com-
pensate it by setting off his wage claim, usually even in-
cluding future claims. But, by exception, the law governing 
the employment also precludes A from resorting to this 
right of compensation. 
( ii) A has deposited a sum of money with B. Under the 
French Civil Code, article 1293 n. 2, a depositary is not 
allowed to set off any claim of his own. French law, how-
ever, permits the depositor to set off his own claim. German 
law has no such prohibition. It has been deduced from the 
double-law theory that B cannot set off, even though the 
deposit be governed by German law, if B's counterclaim 
against A is under French law. This result has been advo-
cated, although in this case either law would permit the 
compensation.40 
It seems logically and practically sufficient, however, that 
a prohibition by a law should apply to the case for which it 
is meant. 
On the other side, claims of a certain origin or affected 
by certain occurrences, are considered too weak to discharge 
a normal claim. Thus, a debtor may not compensate for 
his debt through a claim barred by limitation of action, or 
by an exception of fraud or informal release. Again, it 
appears that the law of the claim to be discharged, here the 
blameless claim, is alone material. 
Illustration. Jackson sued his employer for back salary 
and commissions; the defendant moved for setoff by cross-
action on a claim for conversion; this claim was not yet 
barred by limitation at the time of the action, but the period 
lapsed during the trial. Under such circumstances, two 
40 DOLLE, supra n. 1, 40. 
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Texas decisions have held setoff accomplished by operation 
of law; two are of the contrary opinion.41 If there were 
equally different solutions in two civil law jurisdictions, the 
law under which the suit is brought alone could decide the 
time when limitation will bar counterclaim. 
Hence, prohibitions on compensation, either against or 
through a claim of a certain nature, are determined in prin-
ciple by the law of the principal claim. 
(b) This principle is not adequate for the requirement 
of reciprocity, that is, the condition that claim and counter-
claim should exist between the same parties or persons 
equivalent to them. 
Illustrations. ( i) Suppose the principal debt is governed 
by New York law, whereas the surety has bound himself 
under the law of Cuba. The former law prohibits,42 the 
latter allows,43 the surety to use a counterclaim of the debtor 
against the suing creditor. We have found earlier that the 
relationship between the principal and the surety should 
be consulted, in addition to the law of the suretyship.44 
(ii) Under German law, a debtor may compensate 
against a subassignee such counterclaims as he acquired 
against the assignee before notice of the subassignment, 
even though he did not know of the assignment until he 
heard of the subassignment.45 He cannot do so if his debt is 
governed by English law and the subassignee was without 
notice of the counterclaim.46 
Should he be permitted to discharge his German-governed 
debt by an English-governed counterclaim against the as-
41 See Birk v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 918 and Note, 
13Tex.L.Rev. (1935) 540. 
• 2 Gillespie v. Torrance (x862) 25 N.Y. 306. 
43 Cuba: C. C. art. 1197· 
44 Supra Ch. 47 ns. 48-51. 
<5 Commentaries to BGB. § 406. 
Switzerland: v. TUHR, Allg. Teil Schweiz. Oblig. R. 752. 
See also Wyman v. Robbins (1894) 51 Ohio St. 98, 37 N. E. 264. 
46 /n re Milan Tramways Co. ( 1884) 25 Ch. D. 587. 
United States: Restatement of Contracts§ 167 (3); x8 Minn. L. Rev. (1934) 
733· 
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signee? It is repugnant to the common law that a creditor 
should free a debtor against his will. 
In all such cases where three parties are involved, mere 
observance of the law governing the principal debt is in-
sufficient. 
(c) Exclusion of unliquidated debts from setoff, as pro-
vided in the Latin systems, under the influence of the Corpus 
Juris, has led to the following problem : 
Illustration. A has a German-governed claim against B 
who opposes an Italian-governed unliquidated counterclaim. 
The latter is available for compensation under German law, 
though possibly needing special procedural treatment until 
verification; this would suffice under the theory invoking 
only the law of the debt to be discharged.47 Compensation 
has been declared ·excluded, however, under the two-laws 
theory, because Italian law is supposed to require "liquidity" 
in the interests of both parties.48 
Historically, the requirement of liquidity served the pur-
pose that plaintiffs should be protected from being exposed 
to vexatious delay of the suit by fictitious or unsubstantiated 
allegation of exceptions. More emphasis has been attributed 
in modern times in France to the idea that compensation is 
a means of abbreviated double payment-upaiement 
abrege." This theory excludes debts of uncertain existence 
or amount from the function of paying as well as being paid. 
But such an idea does not necessarily affect compensation 
against a debt governed by a law admitting illiquid debts. 
Since liquidity is generally regarded also in Latin laws 
as a substantive requirement for legal compensation, the 
one-law theory seems to suffice. 
A different aspect is presented by the Anglo-American 
requirement of liquidity excluding from setoff debts which 
must be assessed by a jury. As a matter of procedure, the 
47 RAAPI!, IPR. (ed. 5) 517. 
48 Dll NOVA 167 n. 2. 
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common law requirement pertains to the law of the forum. 
And so does the French judicial compensation, which may 
intervene after the defendant's counterclaim has been ascer-
tained in the proceedings. 
Conclusion. In most respects, it would seem that the 
law of the principal debt should exclusively permit or pro-
hibit the use of compensation against the principal debt 
and determine the availability of the specific opposite claim 
for compensation. This theory is, however, not correct in 
all respects. More research is necessary to clarify this 
subject. 
III. CoNTRACT OF CoMPENSATION 
Nothing in the above-discussed doctrines affects volun-
tary agreements providing for the compensation of either 
existing or future debts. They have not always been held 
licit,49 but are now everywhere permitted, and subject to 
their own law or that of the main contract to which they 
are ancillary. 
The Continental writers are almost unanimous in fol-
lowing the intention of the parties. 50 In England, the right 
of setoff has been recognized when based on an express 
term of the original contract but it is not settled whether 
it may subsequently be agreed. 51 
The most prominent example is afforded by running 
accounts. The working of book accounts with periodical 
balances and acknowledgments is extremely controversial 
in theoretical construction, and certainly shows fundamental 
differences between common law and Continental practices.52 
49 Crews v. Williams (1810) 2 Bibb (Ky.) 262 and other old decisions. 
50 DIENA, 2 Dir. Int. Com. 152 § 124; id., 2 Principi 263; DESPAGNET 921 
§ 316; TosJ-BELLUCCI, supra n. 1, 73 n. 2; 2 MElLI 36 speaks of the 
contractual exclusion of compensation. 
51 FOOTE 556; HIBBERT 189. 
52 See the excellent article by ULMER, "Kontokorrent," 5 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterbuch 194, 216. 
486 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
It would seem that these multiple differences ought not 
to affect the formation of a conflicts rule. But this is an 
unsolved problem,53 except for one important case. When 
a private individual keeps a running account with a bank, 
his relationship is covered as a whole by the law of the 
place where the bank office or branch involved is situated. 54 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has clearly stated this solution 
with regard to the relation flowing from a current account.55 
It was embarrassed, however, when both parties to the 
account were professionally engaged in banking; in the 
particular case, the court clung to the law of the forum 
invoked by both attorneys.56 
53 z BEALE § 322.1 argues exclusively from the viewpoint of lex loci 
contractus. 
54 Cf. supra Ch. 34 ns. 56 ff. and FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 
473 No.4· 
55 BG. (Nov. 22, 1918) 44 BGE. II 489, 492; (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 id. II 383, 
385. 
56 BG. (Oct. 26, 1937) 63 BGE. II 383, 386. 
CHAPTER 52 
Statutes of Limitation 
J. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
I. The Problem 
T HE conflicts law with respect to limitation of action by lapse of time has been discussed since the thir-
teenth century, and in this long history, "all possible 
and also impossible ideas have found advocates."1 "Few 
arguments have been so much discussed and have occasioned 
so many varied and disparate opinions as that concerning 
the law controlling limitation of action."2 Although the 
truth of these statements is all too apparent to students of 
conflicts laws, only two main systems have stayed in com-
petition. They correspond almost exactly with the division 
between common law and civil law. In British jurisdictions 
and in the United States, in principle "limitation of actions" 
is said to affect the "remedy" only and to belong to the 
procedural law of the forum; every court applies the do-
mestic statute of limitation, in principle excluding all foreign 
statutes. In the countries of the civil law, after long drawn-
out debates, it is at present uniformly recognized that limi-
tation of "action" is a misnomer and that it affects the 
substantive right; prevailingly, it is determined by the law 
governing the obligation. 
This contrast is notorious. Excellent surveys of the world 
literature in older and recent writings have tended to uni-
1 I VAREILLES-SOMMIIlRES 26I; quoted by DE NOVA 96 § I7. 
2 DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 440. 
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form conclusions in favor of the substantive classification.3 
At least one energetic article has come forth to vindicate 
the viewpoint of the common law.4 The Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1926 reached a sensible proposal for uni-
formly applicable rules.5 Must we go again over all this 
territory? 
Unfortunately, it is still necessary to do so. Too much 
in the debates going on for so many centuries has been a 
strange mixture of obsolete legal terminology and con-
cealed policy considerations; the policies have been too 
often one-sided or confused; and the provincial lawyer's 
thinking has usurped undue privilege. The subject, thus, 
has become an outstanding illustration of the necessity for 
an unbiased and supernational discussion. 
Our inquiry, however, has to start with the municipal 
law. This exception from the habits of this present work 
does not include an inconsistency of methods. Although con-
flicts law ought to have its own standards and evaluations, 
analytical research serving the formation of uniform con-
flicts rules always requires investigation of similarities and 
dissimilarities of the various systems, and furnishes a par-
ticularly useful help when it reveals substantial analogies. 
In this matter, objective criticism discovers vital analogies 
despite different labels, concepts, and characterizations, 
3 On the present doctrine in Continental literature, particular mention is due 
to jEAN MICHEL, La prescription liberatoire en droit international prive 
(These, Paris, 19II) (second edition, Paris, unavailable), the substance of 
which Michel has condensed in r Repert. 292 ff.; DE NovA, L'estinzione delle 
obbligazioni convenzionali ( 1931) 97-137; BATIFFOL §§ 575 ff., 586. 
Other (selected) special treatments: WUNDERLICH, Zur Lehre von der 
Verjiihrung nach internationalem Rechte, in Festschrift fiir Ernst Heinitz 
(Berlin 1926) 481-512; ScHOCH, Klagbarkeit, Prozessanspruch und Beweis 
im Lichte des international en Rechts ( 1934) 52 ff., IIO ff.; ScHLINK, "Die 
internationalprivatrechtliche Behandlung der Verjiihrung in den Vereinigten 
Staaten," 9 Z.ausi.PR. ( 1935) 418; PHILONENKO, "De Ia prescription extinctive 
en droit international prive," Clunet 1936, 259, 513. 
4 I am speaking of the impressive article by AILES, "Limitation of Actions 
and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Mich. L. Rev. ( 1933) 474-502. 
5 Viennese Meeting, 1924, 31 Annuaire ( 1924) rSz. 
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which, together with their influence on practical solutions, 
must be questioned as a first step to a sound conflicts law. 
It is to be borne in mind that we are here concerned ex-
clusively with the rules concerning ordinary obligations, and 
not claims flowing from property rights or obligations aris-
ing out of family relations or succession. 
2. Historical Note 
In order to gain an objective view of the problem, a few 
historical facts should be kept in mind. 
In the ancient Roman common law (ius civile), most 
actions were "perpetual," whereas the praetorian actions 
were often limited to a year (ann us utilis). 6 Greek practice 
developed a rebuttable presumption against the existence of 
a debt after a long time,7 probably the model of a late 
Roman practice known to us by an imperial edict for Egypt.8 
Theodosius II subjected the old perpetual actions to a 
praescriptio longi temporis, resulting in their "extinction" 
of the action and this prescription went over into Justinian's 
compilation.9 Almost all features of the modern provisions 
on "limitation of actions"-the English term itself is bor-
rowed from Theodosius and Justinian-are contained in 
the Corpus Juris: commencement of the period when the 
action is born, causes and effects of suspension and inter-
ruption, revival, and so forth. 
An important modification, however, was worked out in 
England after the civil war10 and in secular disputes in civil 
6 See, e.g., BUCKLAND, A Textbook on Roman Law ( ed. 2, 1932) 689. 
7 PARTSCH, Longi temporis praescriptio uS f. 
8 Papyrus Flor. No. 61, I, 45 (85 A. D.); for an application, see Papyrus 
Oxyrhynchos No. 68 (131 A. D.). 
9 C. Theod. 4, 14, r, 3 (A. D. 424); C. Just. 7, 39, 3, 2: hae autem actiones 
annis triginta continuis extinguentur, quae perpetuae videbantur, non illae 
quae antiquitus fixis temporibus /imitantur. 
10 See ANGELL 310 § 28 5 on the development through Brown v. Hancock 
{1628) Cro. Car. II5, 79 Eng. Re. 701; Tankersley v. Robinson (1629) Cro. 
Car. 163,79 Eng. Re. 742; Stile v. Finch (1634) Cro. Car. 381,79 Eng. Re. 932. 
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law; the effect of the lapse of time, originally operating 
automatically, was changed into a mere defense to be 
pleaded by the defendant at his pleasureY The influence of 
canon law and English equity jurisdiction may be neglected 
in a discussion restricted to obligationsP 
Byzantine, Continental, and English sources all speak of 
"action" as the object of limitation. The meaning of the 
word is indicated by the long and firm doctrinal tradition 
coming from classical Roman law and represented by the 
category of jus quod pertinet ad actiones/3 co-ordinate with 
the law of persons and the law of things. Roman and Eng-
lish professional legal practice started from a few formulas 
of procedure to be used in certain cases. The progress 
consisted in increasing the number and refining the use of 
these formulas until the procedure extra ordinem in one 
system and equity in the other became the means of new 
developments. But not withstanding the dissolution of 
formalism and the enrichment of the system, the ancient 
jurisconsults and the English jurists until the nineteenth 
century14 considered the decision of lawsuits as the object 
of all their efforts, and the question under what conditions 
a petition (action) could be judicially recognized and en-
forced as their central problem. 
11 In canonist procedure since the end of the fourteenth century, the court 
took notice ex officio. The German doctrine adopted the defense theory as 
late as the nineteenth century. See ERNST HEYMANN, Das Vorschiitzen der 
Verjiihrung (1895) and KIPP, 45 Z. Handelsr. (1896) 6o8. 
12 The comparatively few cases in which laches has been applied not to 
property claims but to suits for restitution, do not directly apply the statute 
of limitation, see Restatement of Restitution § 148. The recent judgemade 
German "Verwirkung" (see comments on § 242 BGB.) is analogous and 
clearly substantive. Whether also the equitable institution of laches is sub-
stantive-as I assume and a Note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 341 evidently 
implies-and whether therefore it is to be applied by foreign judges, is an 
interesting question to be discussed under the general problem of broad 
judicial discretion exercised upon foreign authorization. 
13 GAlUS IV I ff. ; Just. Inst. 4, 6 ff. 
14 PLUCKNETT, A Concise History of the Common Law (ed. 5, 1956) 381 f. 
defines the process of separation of law and procedure since the eighteenth 
century and concludes: "Much experimentation is going on, both in England 
and America." 
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Actio, hence, technically the acting of the plaintiff in 
introducing and pursuing his claim, in the classical texts 
covers both the procedural activity of the plaintiff and his 
right to win his cause. An actio in personam particularly is 
a formulary means of proceeding, but it is also an oblig-
atory right: "Nihil aliud est actio quam ius quod sibi 
debeatur, iudicio persequendi."15 
The pandectists, though slowly continuing the work of 
the Corpus Juris in the transformation of the system of 
actions into a system of rights, nevertheless retained the 
double-sided concept of action. In the nineteenth century, 
the "law of actions" was conceived as the borderland be-
tween private and procedural law, including the effects on 
the rights in issue of the commencement of a suit and the 
judgment. The development of "action" in the English tech-
nical language seems obscure, but may have followed similar 
lines. A late testimony, however, is furnished by the English 
Sale of Goods Act and its American parallel. After having 
described in four parts the sales contract and its contents, 
these acts in a "Part V, Actions for Breach of the Contract" 
include the "remedies" of the seller and the buyer as to the 
price, rescission, general damages, etc., but contain almost 
nothing referring to procedure. Breach of contract, just as 
commission of a tort, produces rights for the injured party. 
While these rights are referred to as actions and remedies, 
these terms consider the rights as objects, but not as means, 
of procedure. 
Holdsworth, it is true, thinks that it is reasonably clear 
from the words of James I's statute "that the statute 
affected not the right under a contract but the right to en-
force it. " 16 This can scarcely have been the idea. By pre-
scribing that the actions should be commenced and sued 
upon within six years, or otherwise its enforcement would 
15 CEtsus, Dig. 441 7, 51; Just. Inst. 4, 6 pr. 
16 8 HOLDSWORTH 65. 
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be denied, the statute destroyed the only form in which the 
right appeared in the legal world. When later, in 1698, the 
court of the King's Bench said of a claim, "It is a debt 
though barrable by pleading of the statute,"17 it meant only 
to save the claim for accounting in an administration pro-
ceeding before an ecclesiastical court. Subsequently, other 
effects of the debt were recognized. But the contrast be-
tween right and remedy was superimposed on the statute. 
The two elements of "action" were finally disjoined by 
the German Pandectist, Windscheid.18 He distinguished 
"Anspruch"-claim or pretense in precarious translations-
and right to sue or "Klagerecht." Klageverjahrung, limita-
tion of action, thenceforth was replaced by Anspruchsver-
jahrung, limitation of claim. The ensuing German and later 
the Italian scholars have devoted an enormous amount of 
thought to both of these basic concepts. The German Civil 
Code, precisely at the place where it indicates the object 
of limitation of action, defines the Anspruch as "the right 
to demand from another person an act or a forbearance" 
( § 194). While this means, in application to property, that 
the various rights flowing from a violation of property 
right are barred in contrast to the ownership, mortgage, 
etc., which is not necessarily affected, in the better opinion 
an obligatory right is identical with an Anspruch and object 
of limitation. Recent literature leaves no doubt that in any 
case the object affected by limitation is the right and not the 
procedural power of a plaintiff. Rather, it has been empha-
sized that the attempt of Windscheid and the German Code 
to save the elements of the Roman actio by inserting the 
"claim" between the substantive right and the procedural 
right of enforcement, has failed; it would simply be the 
17 Wainford v. Barker (1698} 1 Raym. (ed. 4, 1790) 232. 
18 WINDSCHEID, Die Actio (1856). 
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right that is affected by limitation.19 But this is immaterial 
for our purpose. 
What matters is that the law of limitation as well as the 
meaning of action have undergone important modifications, 
although the Anglo-American legal language has persisted. 
N alve students of the statutes of limitation are continuously 
misled by this terminology, although erudite jurists cer-
tainly should not need to be warned. 
It seems opportune to make one more general observa-
tion. American discussions have shown meritorious en-
deavors to clarify the relationship between substance and 
procedure. Through Walter Wheeler Cook's writings, it 
has been recognized that the line of delimitation between 
these two fields may vary according to the purposes of the 
rules of law to be subordinated. From this acknowledgment 
of the relativity of terms, seemingly some scholars have 
concluded that the concept of procedure is flexible to the 
degree that it does not possess any general meaning. A 
further inference may be that a domestic statute of limita-
tions is "procedural" in the meaning of conflicts law, al-
though a foreign statute may be substantive. All this is 
mistaken. There is no ground for contending that for the 
purpose of conflicts law-that is, for the question whether 
domestic or foreign law should apply-several concepts of 
procedure are necessary or useful. The main, and probably 
the exclusive reason for discussing the scope of procedure 
in this field is afforded by the universally recognized prin-
ciple that foreign private law is potentially applicable but 
foreign procedural law is not. The idea underlying this 
principle is simple and although it needs certain exceptions, 
it does not call for subtle conceptual distinctions. The idea 
19 See CARNELUTTI, "Appunti sulla prescrizione," 10 Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ. 
( 1933) I 32; BETI'I, Diritto processuale civile italiano ( 1936) 166 f. § 38. 
The literature on the procedural part of actio has produced an overwhelm-
ing variety of opinions. 
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is this: Every court wants to administer justice in the forms 
and methods regulated for proceedings at the forum. Court 
and parties are not to be disturbed in their observance of 
the legal rules prescribing the steps to be taken for insti-
tuting, pursuing, and terminating lawsuits. This includes, 
indeed, rules limiting the time in which a procedural act 
such as pleading, objection, offer of evidence, or appeal must 
be made.20 Whether it also includes the right of a defendant 
to withstand the exercise of a superannuated substantive 
right by opposing to the cause of action a counterright on 
the same plane-"A .plea of limitation is an answer to the 
merits"21-, is the problem of conflicts law to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
II. MuNICIPAL CoNCEPT 
1. Main Features of Limitation 
The specialists of conflicts law sometimes seem to be 
entirely unaware of the fact that limitation of action has 
the same structure under all the statutes of the world. What-
ever the influence which the Corpus Juris or the statutist 
doctrines may or may not have exercised on English courts, 
it is a strange mistake to attribute the rift in the conflicts 
rules to a substantial cause. There are local deviations from 
the over-all picture22 but, roughly, the institution is uni-
versally organized on the following lines. 
(a) Lapse of time. The period of limitation starts to 
run when the cause of action is completed (actio est nata). 
2o Unanimous opinion, relating to the "peremption d'instance," see for 
France, 2 ARMIN JON 345, VALERY 1010; for Italy, DE NOVA 120, I93 n. I; 
for the Netherlands, MULDER 232. In Louisiana, the term seems to be used 
as equivalent to a time period destroying the right, cf. Hollingsworth v. 
Schanland (I924) I55 La. 825, 99 So. 6I3, that is, "decheance" in the French 
language, below. 
21 WooD, I Limitations 304 § 63a. 
22 For the United States, cf., e.g., Credit Manual of Commercial Laws 
(1945) 267. 
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The march of time is suspended by infancy and other indi-
vidual incapacity to litigate. It is interrupted, in the lan-
guage of Justinian, when debtors "acknowledge the debt 
whether by payment or otherwise" (debitum agnoverint vel 
per solutionem vel per alios modos, C. J. 8, 39, 4). 
(b) Defensive remedy. Contrary to original ideas, the 
court takes notice of a completed limitation only if the de-
fendant avails himself of the bar, in the form prescribed 
by the procedural law, such as a special plea.28 The German 
Code, emphasizing the substantive character of this defense, 
expresses it in the terms of a private law "exception," that 
is, the debtor's right to refuse performance,24 which oper-
ates outside judicial proceedings as well as in court. 
Even apart from extra judicial acts employing the de-
fense, the procedural disposition of the effect of limitation 
is a most characteristic point of the law of limitation. Under 
the influence of moralistic and natural law conceptions, it 
has become traditional to explain that it must be left to 
the conscience of the debtor whether he will resort to a 
defense regarded as immoral by some social philosophers. 
However, barons returning from exile after the English 
civil war, probably had good reasons for acknowledging 
their old debts.25 Preserving credit, desire for a test, and 
other considerations looking to the future usually are active 
motives. 
With all statutes recognizing the defendant's right to 
dispose of the bar,26 it is difficult to believe that the state 
claims a paramount interest in avoiding stale claims so as 
23 Wooo, I Limitations (ed. 3) § 7· 
24 BGB. § 222 par. I. 
25 This is a suggestion by HESSEL E. YNTEMA. 
26 England: See PoLLOCK, Contracts (ed. 13) 511 f. 
United States: 53 C.]. S. 958 § 24 n. 49; 34 Am.]. 318 § 405 n. 9· 
Austria: Allg. BGB. § 1501. 
France: C. C. art. 2223; cf. DALLOZ, Repert., Prescription Civile Nos. 47 ff. 
Germany: BGB. § 222: right to refuse performance. 
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to insist on the application of its own statute of limitation. 
Certainly, courts are glad to be spared the difficult ascer-
tainment of old causes of action. But a public policy so 
stringent as has been vindicated in support of the Anglo-
American theory is scarcely reconcilable with the fact that 
the protection of the statute is in the discretion of the de-
fendant. As it is said in France: 
Prescription is not absolutely a means of public policy; it 
does not go beyond the sphere of the particular interests 
of the creditor and debtor. Moreover, it involves an evalua-
tion of moral nature; certain consciences would not admit 
they were liberated without having paid, whatever the age 
of the debt. If, then, the debtor insists on paying, it would 
be wrong to consider that he contracts a new debt or that 
he makes a gift to the creditor.27 
(c) Waiver. This character of the bar by limitation is 
confirmed by the almost universal rules that a debtor is free 
to waive a completed limitation by agreement28 and the 
widely held opinion that parties may in advance agree on a 
shorter period than the statutory period.29 Although the 
codes usually do not allow the parties to enlarge the period 
or to waive the bar before it is acquired, courts have often 
favored party autonomy.30 
27 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 797 § I380. 
28 Austria: Allg. BGB. § I 502. 
France: PLANIOL et RrPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 804 § I387. 
Italy: C. C. ( I942) art. 2937 par. 1. 
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. I4I par. I (a contrario). 
Anticipatory waiver of prescription is invalid. 
29 United States: Order of Travelers v. Wolfe (I947) 33I U. S. 586, 6o8 n. 
20 emphasizes the extraterritorial effect. 
France: Constant practice; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TrssrER § 96; "an 
astonishing permission," PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 762 
§ I349· 
Germany: BGB. § 225 sent. 2. 
Italy: On the controversy, see DE NovA 98 n. 2. 
Switzerland: On the possibility of extinguishing the debt of contractual 
limitation, see 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER art. I29 n. I. 
ao For France, see PLANIOL et RrPERT, 7 Traite Pratique ( ed. 2) 764 § I350. 
On evasion through choice of law, permitted by German courts, see infra 
p. 528 n. I03, cf. p. 5I5· 
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(d) Effect. What is the effect of a judgment dismissing 
the claim on the ground of limitation? Fine considerations 
of this problem were expounded by Story in his personal 
remarks in Leroy v. Crowninshield.31 But in his treatise, 
Story borrowed from Boullenois32 the idea that such judg-
ment merely abates the action, since it denies but the 
remedy. 33 This was mistaken. The old scholars disputed the 
question whether the defense of prescription belonged to the 
exceptiones ordinatoriae (procedural) or to the decisoriae 
(substantive). The first were objections to the court taking 
cognizance of the complaint because a prerequisite con-
dition of the proceeding was missing. The latter exceptions 
went to the merits. Some authors considered prescription 
as substantive for the reason that it was an exceptio per-
emptoria; this argument was correctly refuted by Boullenois, 
whom Story quoted comprehensively.34 But on the other 
hand, this exception was also not to be stamped as pro-
cedural because of its preliminary character, i.e., preventing 
the court from looking into the other merits.35 
Since Baldus, old and modern Italian and French authors 
have prevailingly categorized this exception among the 
decisoriae and the judgment as going to the merits.36 Boulle-
nois was part of a minority to which, it is true, Ulric Huber 
belongs.37 StoryB8 was perhaps misled by Pothier's remark39 
31 ( x82o) 2 Mason I 51, Fed. Cas. No. 8269. 
32 BoULLENOIS, I Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des Ioix (1766) 
82 ch. 3 obs. 23 p. 530. 
33 STORY § 576. 
34 STORY § 579 p. 720, giving a translation. 
3 5 Correctly, Wooo, r Limitations 304 § 63a. 
36 On Baldus, Salicetus, Paulus de Castro, Dumoulin, and the entire litera-
ture to the end of the x6th century, MICHEL 27-31; Burgundus, MICHEL 39; 
the great majority of successors of d' Argentre, id. 63 f.; the 19th century, 
id. 137-142. 
31 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7 (Guthrie tr. Savigny su). On VoET, 
father and son, see infra Ch. 53 ns. 12, 13. 
38 STORY § 580 and notes. 
39 POTHIER, Prescriptions, Introduction, sect. II § 30 par. I; Obligations 
§ 687. Pothier did say, however, that the creditor conserves his claim but 
has no action any more, a proposition that puzzled Bugnet; cf. POTHIER's 
description of fins de non-recevoir, Procedure Civile, sect. I § 35· 
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that in France the judgment of dismissal took the form of 
ufin de nonrecevoir." The category of a nonreceivable 
demand half-way between an action umal fondie" and an 
action udeboutee d'instance" corresponds with defenses 
various in nature, which were joined together by the French 
science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for cer-
tain procedural ends.40 It happens that this complex group 
of defenses, affected by a procedural reform of r935, 41 has 
recently been the object of a new discussion and apparently 
approaches its dissolution. There is no doubt where in this 
new development prescription belongs. The Court of Cassa-
tion has expressly declared it to be "a means of defense on 
the merits" ("un moyen de defense au fond") .42 
This is the universal practice, including the United 
States.43 Only because in England and this country limita-
tion has territorial effect, this res judicata is said to be 
restricted to the forum. 44 Correspondingly, when an action 
is dismissed by a foreign court on the ground of limitation, 
the action may be brought again at the forum. 45 Evidently, 
this reasoning is wrong when the foreign court means to 
dismiss the suit with prejudice. 
Merely "procedural" obstacles to a favorable decision 
have no effect on the cause of action. With the traditional 
antithesis of remedy and debt or cause of action, there can 
be no doubt that a judgment on the merits affects more than 
the remedy. 
Perhaps, the question may be raised how a dismissal on 
40 See the informative article by BEQUET, "Etude critique de Ia notion de 
fin de non-recevoir en droit prive," 47 Revue Trim. D. Civ. ( I947) I33· 
41 Decret-Loi, Oct. 30, 1935, D. I935-4-42I; C. Civ. Proc. art. I92, amended. 
42 Cass. civ. (Feb. 23, I944) S. I944·I.II7 at 120 with note by MoREL. 
43 United States: Wooo, I Limitations 304 § 63a; FREEMAN, 2 Judgments 
I538 § 726. 
Civil Jaw: MICHEL I44· 
44 Bank of United States v. Donnally ( I834) 8 Pet. S. C. 36I; Warner v. 
Buffalo Drydock Co. (C. C. A. 2d I 93 3) 67 F. ( 2d) 540. 
45Harris v. Quine (I869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 6sz; DICEY (ed. 7) 1104 No.7· 
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the ground of failure of jurisdiction should be characterized. 
But thus far, this question seems outside discussion of our 
subject. 
(e) Natural obligation. Finally, in all systems the true 
kind of limitation leaves intact some important effects of 
the debt. There remains in the language of natural law and 
Lord Mansfield46 a "moral" obligation, usually designated 
by the Romanistic term a natural, or by some pandectists 
and Sir Frederic Pollock an imperfect, obligation. The 
debtor may still discharge the barred debt by payment, not 
as a gift; he cannot recover such payment at all or only 
under specified conditions. He can revive it to full effect 
by a new promise or an acknowledgment (at common law 
without new consideration) ;47 also, the debt may be secured 
by pledge, mortgage, or suretyship, or insurance, etc. 
Anglo-American lawyers have assumed that these resid-
ual effects are due to the fact that the debt is intact and 
only the remedy is affected. American decisions have, for 
instance, concluded that the creditor may still claim fore-
closure of a mortgage as only the remedy is alleged to be 
eliminated.48 But the German Code which more than any 
other has accentuated that the debt itself is affected by the 
exception, fully recognizes this particular effect after the 
debt is barred. 49 Legal effects cannot depend on how we 
describe the weakening of the creditor's right. "A statute 
transforming an enforceable debt into a natural obligation, 
is not a procedural rule."50 
46 See 8 HOLDSWORTH 26. 
47 On the change of background in history, see HOLDSWORTH, ~9 Law Q. 
Rev. (1923) 146 and 8 History 39· 
48 First Nat' I Bank of Madison v. Kolbeck ( 1945) 247 Wis. 462, 19 N. W. 
(2d) 908, Note, 161 A. L. R. (1946) 886. The concurring vote of Fowler, J., 
is significant: as long as there is no payment of the debt, there is no extinguish-
ment of it; without a debt there can be no mortgage. 
49 BGB. § 223 par. 1. 
oo DREYFUS, L'acte juridique en droit international prive (These 1904) ~77· 
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2. Limitation and Preclusion 
Modern Continental laws have developed in contrast with 
limitation (prescription) a concept of preclusive periods 
of time (dechtfance or delai fixe, Ausschlussfrist). Preclu-
sion seems to me a good term to indicate this group. Its 
most typical characteristics are that the time runs without 
suspension and interruption, as in the ancient actiones per-
petuae, and that judicial notice is taken of the preclusion 
of action, at least when the lapse of time is on the face of 
the pleadings. 51 Usually these periods are short and in-
tended to precipitate some act such as giving notice of 
defects, consent, or an overdue performance. Where the 
bringing of an action is conditioned by a time limitation, 
the distinction of this group from limitation is the more 
delicate as many transitory types exist in between. Suspen-
sion because of impossibility of suing, for instance, may be 
excluded in limitation cases and allowed in preclusion cases. 
Each single statute must be properly investigated.52 Con-
tinuous attempts, it is true, have been made in the common 
law countries, in conflicts law, to distinguish an operation 
of the law "extinguishing the right" from limitation as 
restricting the exercise of the right, a contrast that has 
retained a few followers also on the Continent.53 This served 
to establish the possibility for a period of time to affect the 
right. But the formula is wrong. 
What is more, conflicts law cannot establish any distinc-
tion between the varying shades of municipal institutions. 
51 France: PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 818 ff. §§ 1402 ff. 
Germany: ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY (ed. 14) 994 f. § 230 III. 
Italy: C. C. ( 1942) arts. 2964 ff.; ENRICO GrusrNI, Decadenza e prescrizione 
(Univ. Torino, Memorie dell'Istituto Giuridico II No. 54) 63. 
5 2 BAUDRY-LACANTINER!E et TISSIER §§ 36 ff.; PLANIOL et RIPERT1 7 Traite 
Pratique (ed. 2) 820 f. VAN BRAKEL, I Nederl. Verbintnissenrecht (1942) 2.63. 
53 12 AUBRY et RAu 534, 535 n. 9; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et T!SSIER 35· 
Apparently also MoorcA, 1 Teoria della decadenza (1906) 178 (according to 
GIUSINI1 supra n, 51, at II), 
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No satisfactory line can be drawn to determine which of 
the foreign statutes responds to the usual, domestic, type 
of limitation of "action" and which not. Carrying out such 
a distinction "would lead to incertitude and injustice."54 It 
is unnecessary if all limitations are classified into the scope 
of the law governing the contract.55 
Evidently, the convenience of a simple comprehensive 
rule has also motivated a provision of the Treaty of Ver~ 
sailles. Each state participating in a clearing of prewar 
debts was declared to be responsible for the payment of 
debts due by its nationals, except-among other cases-
"in a case where at the date of the outbreak of the war 
the debt was barred by the laws of prescription in force 
in the country of the debtor." 56 This English draft, in~ 
tending to reproduce the French version ( "la dette hait 
pre serite"), included not only a "debt due" in the case of 
a limitation of action under English concepts but also all 
other time restrictions.57 
In American law, limitation of action is sharply distin~ 
guished in theory from time periods for the exercise of a 
right, the lapse of which extinguishes the right. But in prac-
tice the difficulties of classification are certainly not less than 
in Europe. Where the distinction has become significant in 
conflicts law the result is unhappy.58 
3· Right and Remedy58a 
Although customarily used by Anglo-American courts 
and noncritical lawyers, the antithesis of right and remedy 
54 BATIFFOL 455 § 578. 
55 MICHEL 150 ff.; DE NovA 192 ( 120). 
56 Treaty of Versailles, Annex § 4 to art. 296 (b) ; Annex § 4 par. 1. 
57 RABEL, Rechtsvergleichung vor den Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofen 
( 1924) 55 f.; followed by WuNDERLICH, supra n. 3, 492. 
58 Cf. GooDRICH 203 on the difficulty of determining whether a limitation is 
on the right; and infra pp. 519-521. 
&sa See MaRINEAU, "Rights and Remedies," 8 Am. J. Comp. Law ( 1959) 263; 
NIEDERLANDER, "Materielles Recht und Verfahrensrecht im internationalen 
Privatrecht," 20 RabelsZ. (1955) I, 
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was employed in the nineteenth century only by a few Con-
tinental advocates of the lex fori. 59 In fact, the entire idea is 
unique. Who would describe the debt of a minor as a right 
unimpaired by the fact that he cannot be sued on it? 
For a sound const~uction of the legal phenomenon pre-
sented in our case of an actionless debt, its two sides ought 
to be considered. A debt that can be enforced in court if the 
defense of limitation is not affirmatively pleaded, certainly 
survives the running of the period of time. 60 But if it is 
awkward after the lapse of time to deny the existence of a 
right, it is still less reasonable to think it unaffected by the 
absence of the faculty of unconditional judicial enforce-
ment. The correct description of the situation is very simple. 
uLe droit du crediteur n'est pas eteint mais transforme." 61 
The German and Swiss Codes express the same truth by 
stating that limitation of action affects the "claim."62 
A rapidly increasing number of leading Anglo-American 
scholars have professed their disapproval of the procedural 
or remedial theory. Lorenzen has expounded his criticism in 
an authoritative article. 63 Westlake was in opposition. 64 
Falconbridge calls both right and remedy ambiguous and 
misleading terms.65 Stumberg considers procedure to be the 
method of presenting the facts, whereas limitation concerns 
the legal effect of a fact upon a right. 66 Cheshire67 and 
59 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique ( ed. 2) 734 § 1325 remarks that this 
is a rather muddled idea. 
60 POLLOCK, Contracts (ed. 13) 511. 
6 1 PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique ( ed. 2) 8o8 § 1393. 
62 BGB. § 194; cf. ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY (ed. 14) 996 § 231. 
Switzerland: See OSER-SCHOENENBERGER 640 f. 
63 LORENZEN, "The Statute of Limitation and the Conflict of Laws," 28 Yale 
L. J. ( 1918) 492, Selected Articles 352. 
64 WESTLAKE § 238. See also GUTHRIE in his translation of Savigny 267 ff. 
65 FALCON BRIDGE, Conflict of Laws ( ed. 2) 284. 
66 STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 147. 
67 CHESHIRE (ed. 6) 685; "English law is unfortunately committed" to this 
view. 
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Beckett, 68 as well as Goodrich69 and several judges 70 have 
declared to the same effect. From Story in his first decision71 
to Wharton72 and the just-mentioned writers, the rule has 
been upheld exclusively because it "is now too firmly settled 
to be shaken" (Wharton). But knowing the truth ought to 
have consequences. 
American doctrine has utilized this inveterate antithesis 
of right and remedy for various purposes, but quite un-
necessarily. Thus, the requirement that a time limit on the 
"remedy" must be pleaded specially, has not been extended 
to the defense of "extinction" of the right by lapse of time.73 
In reality, the difference is that between an exception op-
posed to a correct cause of action and the denial of the 
cause of action. Both positions are taken in purely pro-
cedural manner. They might not have been distinguished 
at all if the historical special treatment of limitation of 
action had not been looked upon with disfavor. 
Also the fact that federal courts in diverse citizenship 
cases have now to follow the substantive law of the state 
courts but preserve their procedural rules, has nothing to 
do with the opposition of right and remedy. The proof is 
that the state statutes on limitation apply.74 Even when a 
68 BECKET!', 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 66, criticized by MEN-
DELSSOHN-BARTHOLnY, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 1935) at 31 n. 2, by 
arguments opposed in the present book. 
s9 GooDRICH 201. 
70 Gilpin v. Plummer (C. C. D. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 5451; Cochburn, 
C.]., in Harris v. Quine (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652. See also Note, 9 U. of Chi. 
L. Rev. ( 1942) 723. 
71 LeRoy v. Crowninshield (182o) 2 Mason 151. 
A curious attempt to refute Story's doubts has been made by Mr. Justice 
Wayne in M'Eimoyle v. Cohen (1839) according to the report by ANGELL 59, 
but the passage is not included in 13 Pet. S. C. 324, 327 (38 U. S. 169, 172). 
Angell's praise of these polemics against the better informed Story seems 
unaccountable. 
72 2 WHARTON 1271 § 545· 
73 Lewis v. Mo. Pacific R. Co. ( 1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23 S. W. (2d) 100; and 
see 54 C. J. S. 491 § 357 n. 21. 
74 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York (1945) 326 U.S. 99, 105, 107, 111; see cases 
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federal statute creates a liability without adding a time 
limitation, the general state statute is resorted to. 75 Federal 
law may incorporate state "remedies" as well as "sub-
stance." 
4· Contrasting Legislative Policies 
It has been an easy temptation to explain the Anglo-
American doctrine by a peculiar conception of the purpose 
of limitation. Following other propositions of this kind, 
it has recently been said that in civil law an exception based 
on limitation flows from the obligation itself, but at common 
law a plea of limitation is made in the interest of justice.'6 
This contrast begs the question of the conflicts law. The 
municipal regulations contain nothing to cause any differ-
ence in the relation between limitation statutes and con-
ceptions of justice. 
Another recent writer asserts that a deep-seated differ-
ence exists throughout French, English, and German laws 
between short and long periods of limitation; although short 
limitations are unmistakably a part of substantive law, the 
long periods, in his opinion, concern procedure.77 Again, 
no proof is afforded. 
Indeed, as usual, it is not true that different policies 
govern in the several jurisdictions or in the variants of the 
same institution. All municipal laws in this matter are 
guided by a complex of motives. It is in the public interest 
cited by Goodrich, J., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F. (2d) 
972; PUTMAN, 1945 Annual Survey 53, 1946 id. 62. 
7 5 Federal antitrust laws: Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co. of 
N.J. (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 1018; federal liability of National 
Bank stockholders: Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946} 156 F. (2d) 47; 
Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946} 156 F. (2d) 972; and see Holmberg 
v. Armbrecht (1946) 327 U.S. 392; cf. PUTMAN, 1946 Annual Survey 62. 
76 MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, "Delimitation of Right and Remedy," 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 20 at 31 n. 2. He adds another distinction, contrary 
to the facts found here. 
77 PHILONENKO, "De Ia prescription extinctive en droit international prive," 
Clunet 1936, 259, 513 at 527, 532, 545· 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION 505 
that peaceful situations should not be disturbed after a long 
time. A debtor should not be forced to answer claims of 
obscured origin. He should not have to preserve instru-
ments, receipts, and accounts for an unlimited time. Wit-
nesses and documents may disappear. The courts should not 
be troubled with difficult determinations of fact. The credi-
tor may have been negligent in the enforcement or be 
deemed to have waived his claim. The debt may have been 
discharged in fact without receipt. This mixture of consid-
erations prevails everywhere without discernible variants. 78 
It also colors all particular statutes with only one known 
exception. 79 
5· Comparative Conclusion 
In municipal law, limitation of action always affects the 
right, and the degree of this effect is no suitable criterion 
for distinctions. In this domain of internal effect, statutes 
of limitation belong to substantive, as contrasted with ad-
jective, law. If the common law theory as formulated by 
past undeveloped scholarship is to be justified, and not 
respected simply because it exists, the reasons must be found 
in the field of conflicts policy. 
On the side of the literature supporting the Continental 
theory, however, some unfounded views have been ex-
pressed. It has often been claimed that in contrast to Eng-
land, Continental limitation of action "extinguishes" the 
obligation80 and this term, as used in fact in the French 
Civil Code, has found much favor in other codes.81 But as 
we have seen, it can only be said in French law that the de-
78 This is also the opinion of BATIFFOL 455 § 576. 
79 lnfra Ch. 53 p. 514 on French C. C. art. 2275. 
80 E.g., DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 443; DE NovA 132. 
81 C. C. art. 1234: "Les obligations s'eteignent .... Et par Ia prescription, 
qui fera !'objet d'un titre particulier." 
The new Italian Code starts its provisions on "prescrizione e decadenza," 
saying "Every right is extinguished by prescription, when the holder does not 
exercise it during the time determined by law," art. 2934· 
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fendant may avail himself of the bar and that the judgment 
dismissing the action is res judicata on the merits. There 
are little-noted problems in modern law concerning the time 
when the obligation finally becomes ineffective in and outside 
of court. Yet an obligation enforceable so long as the debtor 
does not react, or generating any of the effects of a natural 
obligation, is not dead. 
It has also been contended in supporting the Continental 
conflicts rules that the debt carries in itself from its be-
ginning the germ of its destruction through lapse of time.82 
This argument could correctly be denied from the American 
side; it is a "false premise that there is some immutable, 
preordained duration" of the effectiveness of a debt.83 The 
proof is that the law governing limitation may change, 
which is an important point for the doctrine of conflicts. 
In view of the structure of this legal institution, there is 
also no reason in the arguments of Savigny that failure to 
incur the lapse of time is a condition of the validity of the 
obligation,84 or of Laine that limitation is a modality in-
herent in the obligation.85 
In fact, the right of a debtor to bar the action of his 
creditor, by invoking its limitation by lapse of time, is al-
ways a substantive right, even though the lapse of time does 
not extinguish the claim and is not inherent in the debt. 
82 E.g., I FRANKENSTEIN 595; DE NOVA 132 § 24. 
83 AILES, supra n. 4, 500. 
84 SAVIGNY § 574 at notes (t) ff.; his specified arguments, however, are still 
excellent. 
85 LAINE, 19 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. ( 1889-90) 55· 
CHAPTER 53 
Statutes of Limitation: Comparative Conflicts 
Law 
I. THE CoNFLICTS THEORIES 
I. Procedural Theory 
(a) Anglo-American principle. The English courts have 
laid down the principle generally followed in all common 
law jurisdictions as well as in Scotland.1 An English court 
applies exclusively the English statutes of limitation. An 
action barred by these is not allowed, even though the claim 
is governed by foreign law under which no bar is incurred;2 
correspondingly, a claim barred only under the governing 
foreign law is admissible ;3 this even when the claim has been 
dismissed abroad on the ground of limitation of action 
there.4 The abundant American authority has unhesitatingly 
followed this model.6 
(b) Former Continental following. The territorial con-
ception, which the English approach suggests, once induced 
numerous scholars and courts in France, Germany, and else-
1 DICEY ( ed. 7) Rule 204 ( 3) and p. 1092; GOODRICH 201 § 82. 
2 British Linen Co. v. Drummond (1830) zo B. & C. 903; The Alliance Bank 
of Simla v. Carey (188o) 5 C. P. Div. 429. 
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl. & F. z. 
Canada: Rutledge v. U. S. Savings & Loan Co. (1906) 37 S. C. R. 546; 
Quaker Oats Co. v. Denis (1915) 8 W. W. R. 877, 24 D. L. R. 226. 
3 Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N.C. 202. 
Scotland: Fergusson v. Fyffe (1846} 8 Cl. & F. 121. 
Canada: Bowes Co. v. American Ry. Express Co. (1924) 26 0. W. N. 290. 
4 Harris v. Quine (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 652. 
5 WHARTON 1245 § 535 n. 4; MINOR § 2IOj 3 BEALE 1620 § 603.1. On the 
early cases, see AILES, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 31 
Mich. L. Rev. ( 1933) 474 at 488; Restatement§§ 6o3, 604. 
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where, to profess a procedural doctrine. 6 Their influence 
has practically disappeared.7 
(c) Present following. It is difficult to ascertain in what 
countries the old theory, expressed in decisions and by 
writers, has been maintained to the present time. This has 
been reported for the Czechoslovakian in contrast to the 
Austrian construction of their identical codes, 8 and was 
probably once the practically prevailing attitude in the 
Soviet Union.9 It has also been contended for Hungary10 
and the Islamic states.11 
2. The Situs Theory 
It has been taken for granted since Story's writings that 
the Anglo-American conflicts theory in this matter continues 
the doctrine of the Dutch statutists. This is not entirely 
exact. And the true story seems to explain the strange atti-
tude preserved by the French courts. Paul Voet, discussing 
the standing question involving the case where the statutes 
of limitation at the domicils of the debtor and the creditor 
state different periods of time, gave this opinion: 
"Respondeo, quia actor sequitur forum rei, ideo extraneus 
petens a reo, quod sibi debetur, sequetur terminum statuti 
e See the list of writers and decisions in MICHEL III ff.; WEISS, 4 Traite 
399 n. I; MICHEL, IO Repert. 296 Nos. 33, 34· The most influential of these 
writers was LABBE, Note, S. I869.1.49. 
7 Infra n. 30. The German courts, applying German common law, defied 
the procedural theory of the Prussian Supreme Court, FORSTER-ECCIUs, I 
Preussisches Privatrecht 67. 
s LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 208 No. I76. 
9 MAKAROV, Precis 262 f.; and more simply, for interterritorial law, in 7 
Z.ausl.PR. (I933) I65. According to I LUNZ I98 f. the Soviet law is now 
following the modern theory that limitation of action is governed by the lex 
causae. 
1° Kurie P. IV 464I/ I933, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) I73 No. 4, in a special case; 
and generally as reported in OLG. Miinchen (Feb. 2, I938) H. R. R. I938, 
I402. However, SzA.szY, Droit international prive compare (I940) 553 mentions 
Hungary among countries following the I aw of the contract. Accord, RECZEI 
299 f. 
llz ARMINJON 350. 
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praescriptum actioni in foro rei. Et quia hoc statutum non 
exserit vires extra territorium statuentis, ideo, etiam reo 
alibi convento, tale statutum objicere non poterit."12 
The first sentence says that the court at the debtor's 
domicil applies its own statute of limitation because it is the 
law of the place where the debtor must be sued. This is con-
firmed by Jan V oet: 
" ... spectandum videtur tempus, quod obtinet ex statuto 
loci, in quo reus commoratur,"13 
and explained by the latter through reference to his dis-
tinction between movable and immovable property.H A 
personal action is a movable, hence deemed situated at the 
domicil of the creditor. However, for the purposes of bank-
ruptcy proceedings and limitation of action, the contrary 
position is preferable because the judge of the place where 
the creditor must sue the debtor, has the power to prevent 
the creditor from exacting the debt: 
"N am et debitum necdum exactum magis esse in potestate 
judicis, ubi debitor, quam ubi creditor domicilium fovet vel 
ex eo manifestum est, quod creditor forum competens et 
judicem debitoris sequi debeat." 
This discussion, couched in traditional terms of a stand-
ard problem, is not yet based on the procedural construction 
of limitation, but clearly on the doctrine placing immovables 
under the lex rei sitae, movable chattels under the lex domi-
cilii of the owner, and disputing whether personal actions 
belong to the latter group. In his second sentence, Paul Voet 
started to consider a case outside of the alternative of the 
creditor's and the debtor's domicils, where the debtor is 
sued at a place other than his domicil, but he contented him-
12 PAUL VoET, De statutis, s. 10, cap. un., § I, citing only GABRIEL, Commun. 
cone! us., lib. 6, conclus. 11. 
13 }AN VOET, Comm. ad Pand., lib. 14, tit. 3, § 12. 
14 I d., lib. I, tit. 8, § 30. 
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self with the statement that the statute of the debtor has no 
application.15 
In the Nether lands, it was only Huber who on the 
strength of two Frisian decisions and contrasting the forum 
with the lex loci contractus rather than with the domicil of 
the creditor, acceded to the theory that "praescriptio" like 
uexecutio" does not belong to the "validity" of the contract 
but to the time and mode of bringing an action.16 
In France, Boullenois, the chief authority relied upon by 
Story, argued on the lines of the situs theory, leaving it 
doubtful whether he recommended the lex fori or rather 
the law of the domicil of the debtor.17 With him, the two 
doctrinal currents, of situs and procedure, united in a mixed 
flow of ambiguous reasoning18 which persisted in some 
French writings throughout the nineteenth century and has 
prevailed in the French courts up to the present. Quite 
clearly, Pothier at one place follows the situs theory;19 it 
should not be controversiaP0 that this passage means to 
apply the law of the creditor's domicil. 
In this literature, the principle that the debtor's ordinary 
forum is at his domicil has been kept in mind.21 As in the 
doctrine of assignment,22 however, the emphasis has shifted 
to the protection of the debtor; the defense of limitation 
is granted in his interest, and therefore is to be based on 
the law of his domicil.23 Some French courts24 and consist-
15 Contrarily, MICHEL 40 reads this passage as though it declared expressly 
the lex fori competent and indicated the basic theory of both Voets. 
16 HUBER, De conflictu legum § 7· 
17 MICHEL 56. 
1s "Au XIXe siecle I' equivoque persiste," MICHEL 91. 
19 POTHIER, Prescriptions, Pt. II art. V § 251, cf. supra n. r. 
20 See for the controversy, e.g., SURVILLE 384; VALERY 1010; 2 ARMINJON 
346; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE et TISSIER 783 § 977· It is well known to historians 
that compilers are in danger of following divergent views according to the 
predecessors they have before their eyes. 
21 BROCHER, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles} ( 1873) 142; 2 BROCHER 408. 
22 Supra pp. 401-402, 408, 430. 
2 3 For the French authors, see MICHEL 91 ff.; DE NovA 101, 103 § 19. InGer-
many, GRAWEIN, Verjiihrung und Befristung (188o) 56, 201; THoL, Einleitung 
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ently the Court of Cassation,25 repeating the same words, 
have sanctioned this view. When the question arose what 
time should be taken to ascertain the law, the debtor's 
domicil at the commencement of the suit, rather than that 
at the time of contracting, was held decisive.26 No doubt, 
this doctrine approaches closely the application of the law 
of the forum. Criticism, therefore, points out the same 
defects as are charged to the lex fori theory: the rule in-
terferes with the natural scope of the law governing the 
obligation and allows the debtor arbitrarily to choose the 
applicable law.27 Also, the effect of prescription is to liberate 
the debtor but not to protect him.28 
At present, no theoretical follower of this rule seems to 
exist. The classification of limitation of action, in the mean-
ing of the French courts themselves, is very probably that 
it is a substantive institution and a protection of the debtor 
rather than an application of lex fori. 29 
3· Substantive Theory 
For decades the overwhelming authority of the European 
Continent and Latin America has considered limitation of 
action as a part of substantive law with extraterritorial 
in das deutsche Privatrecht (1850) § 85 n. 9· As an optional defense, 2 BAR 101. 
24 NIBOYET § 709 recognized four diverse judicial solutions, including those 
of the 19th century. 
25 Cass. civ. (Jan. 13, 1869) S. 1869.1.49; (July 28, 1884) D. 188p.3oo; 
(Jan. 9, 1934) D. 1934.1.22, S. I934·I.20I, Revue Crit. 1934, 915, Clunet 1934, 
672; (July 1, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 175, Clunet 1937, 302; Cour Paris (Jan. 
13, 1947) Revue Crit. 1947, 297, and Note, BATIFFOL. 
Recently the Court of Cassation held that the defendant may avail himself 
of the statute of limitation of the lex contractus if this is more favorable to 
him than the lex domicilii; Cass. civ. (Jan. 31, 1950) Revue Crit. 1950, 415 and 
Note, LENOAN. Still more recently the Court applied the lex contractus to the 
question of limitation as a matter of course without even contemplating the 
lex domicilii; see Cass. civ. (March 28, 1960) Revue Crit. 1960, 202 with Note 
by BATIFFOL, Clunet 1961, 776. 
26 Cour Paris (July 6, 1937) Clunet 1938, 78. 
27 See lastly, Note, BATIFFOL, to Cour Paris (Jan. 13, 1947) Revue Crit. 1947, 
297. The arguments go back to Hertzius, Wachter, and Savigny. See WALKER 
325· 
28 2 ARMINJON § 158 (2); see especially DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 441. 
29 See following note. 
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applicability.30 Agreement is practically complete that the 
law of the contract governs. 
(a) Antiquated theories. In the long history of this 
subject, various suggestions have been advanced in favor 
3° Citations have been collected by MICHEL I37-I42; LORENZEN, 28 Yale L. J. 
( I9I9) 493, 496 n. 2I ; AILES, supra n. 5, 478. See in addition the citations for: 
Canada, Quebec: Wilson v. Demers (Montreal I868) I2 L. C. J. 222; see, 
however, on the provisions of Quebec C. C., "a complex hybrid," JoHNSON 
( ed. 2) 869 f. n. 24; CASTEL, P. I. L. 89 f.; CASTEL, Cases 3 I2. 
Austria: WALKER 325; OGH. (Dec. 29, I93o) SZ. XII No. 3I5; OGH. (April 
I, Ig6o) 82 J. BJ. ( Ig6o) 553 and Note, SCHWIMANN; BoLLA 27 f. 
Belgium: Inconsistent, see MICHEL 10, some courts following, with the 
French courts, the law of the debtor's domicil; GRAULICH 9I f. § I29. 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 225 No. 84, citing a Supreme Court 
decision (June I9, I925). See also BoRUM (ed. 4) I72 ff. and 0stre Landsret 
(March 26, I953) Ugeskr. Retsv. I954, 359, Clunet I96o, 492. 
Estonia: App. Tallinn (Nov. 20, I93I) Clunet I936, 665. 
France: Cass. civ. (July I, I936) Clunet I937, 302, Revue Crit. I937, I75; 
NIBOYET 824 § 706, Revue Crit. I934o 9I5; BATIFFOL § 585 and Traite (ed. 3) 
589 § 54I; the Notes (by PRUDHOMME?) in Clunet I937, 302; I938, 278 and 
279; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 7) 587 f. § 476i. 
Germany: Cases from I4 ROHGE. 258 to (July 6, I934) 145 RGZ. I2I, 
Clunet I935, 1190; (March 20, I936) 151 RGZ. 20I; I RGR. Kom., Vorbem. 
before § I94; RIEZLER in I Staudinger n. 9 before § I94; LEWALD §§ 96-100; 
RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 498. The most recent cases are BGH. (June 9, I96o) NJW. 
1960, I720 and the unpublished case of BGH. (Jan. ro, 1958) there cited. 
Greece: Aeropag (I93I) No. 21,42 Themis I94; (I934) No. 303,45 Themis 
794; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS I3I n. II. 
Italy: Cass. (Jan. 29, I936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I I033, Giur. Ita!. 1936 I 202, 
Riv. Dir. Proc. Civ. I936 II 1oo; (March 6, I940) Riv. Dir. Pub. I940 II 467, 
cf. Note, BRUNELLI, id. 468; Trib. Rome (Oct. 5, I95I) Revue Crit. 1953, 128 
and Note, DE NovA. 
The Netherlands: App. den Haag (March I5, I9IO) W. 8984, I VAN HASSELT 
30I; Rb. Rotterdam (Nov. I, I9I7) N. J. I9I8, 952, I VAN HASSELT 302; Rb. 
Utrecht (April 4, I928) W. II895, MULDER 232; App. Amsterdam (Oct. 24, 
1946) N.J. I947, No. 229 (English law of the contracts). 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 580 No. I59; S. Ct. (June 12, 1928) NRt. 
1928, 646, 7 Z.ausl.PR. ( I933) 946. 
Poland: S. Ct. (May 30, I933) Clunet I936, 702. 
Sweden: S. Ct. (Jan. 29, I929) Nytt Jur. Ark. I929, I; I930, 692 No. I98; 
see BAGGE in Festskrift tilliignad Erik Marks von Wiirtemberg (I93I) I9 (cf. 
5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 740, 7 id. (1933) 933 No.2); NIAL (ed. 2) 49 f.; BEcKMAN, 
"Das internationale Privat- und Prozessrecht in der Sch wedischen Recht-
sprechung und Literatur," 25 RabelsZ. ( I96o) 496, 517 f. 
Switzerland: BG. (March 5, 1957) 83 BGE. II 4I, 47 and cases cited there. 
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civ. Law (r889 and 1940) art. 51. 
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 229, 295· 
Argentina: App. de La Plata (May 14, 1957) Revue Crit. 1958, 94 and Note 
by WERNER GOLDSCHMIDT. 
Brazil: PONTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625. 
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of some special laws. The sheer variety of all these theories 
aroused a false sense of superiority in some advocates of 
the lex fori, but they now belong to the past. As there have 
been frequent critical reviews of these opinions,31 a few 
words will suffice. 
Law of the debtor's domicil. In addition to the above-
mentioned French views regarding the significance of the 
debtor's domicil, it is worth remembering that during a cer-
tain period the Scotch courts "looked not to the debtor's 
domicil at the time of the action but rather to his domicil 
during the whole currency of the term of limitation."32 
Scandinavian courts, of course, include limitation of action 
in the law of the debtor's domicil33 because they consider 
this the law of the contract.34 
The nationality of the debtor was taken as a test by the 
special provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles which 
puzzled us in the 1920's.35 The treaty excluded from gov-
ernment guaranty in clearing proceedings the debts "barred 
by the laws of prescription in force in the country of the 
debtor." Evidently it was felt necessary to establish a con-
flicts rule otherwise lacking in the international forum. Sig-
nificance of the debtor state's law for the liability of the 
same state may have seemed natural. 
Lex loci solutionis. The literature has amply dealt with 
the idea of Troplong that loss of action by limitation is a 
punishment to the negligent creditor and therefore depends 
31 Notably, WILHELM MuLLER, Die Klageverjiihrung im internationalen 
Privatrecht (Diss. Erlangen 1898) ; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 439 ff. (merely 
repeated by MASSART, Della prescrizione estintiva in dir. int. priv., Pisa 1930); 
MICHEL and DE NOVA, supra Ch. 52 n. I. 
32 Lord Justice Clerk McQueen in Cheswell v. York Buildings Co. (1792) 
Bell Oct. 364, 377, Mor. Diet. 4528; GUTHRIE in Savigny tr. at 269. 
33 See, e.g., the Norwegian S. Ct. decision, supra n. 30; a Danish decision 
of I932, 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 923 No. 3· 
34 Vol. II (ed. 2) p. 476 n. I78. 
35 DoLLE, Das materielle Ausgleichsrecht des Versailler Friedensvertrages 
(Berlin 1925) I38-140. 
514 MODIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 
on the law governing performance36 and other propositions 
to the same effect, that limitation rests upon the presumption 
that the payment has in fact been made at the place where 
it was due.37 
Such a presumption of a payment is at present a visible ele-
ment only in certain short limitations, the model of which are 
the provisions of the French Civil Code (articles 2271 ff.) 
that teachers, innkeepers, physicians, attorneys, shopkeep-
ers, etc. must sue for their fees within six months to two 
years; the law assumes that in such cases payment is often 
made without receipt.38 Not even these special provisions 
suggest a reason why the place of payment should control 
the termination of the debt. They raise another problem, 
though. The defense of limitation may be countered by the 
plaintiff's tendering an oath "on the question whether the 
thing has been really paid" (article 2275). This procedural 
act cannot be produced in a court unfamiliar with the ancient 
deferment of oath,39 while its formalized effect cannot be 
entirely reached by ordinary means of evidence. Should, 
therefore, the forum substitute its domestic statute, which 
usually also prescribes short periods in similar cases ?40 
It would seem that rules of the forum on evidence for the 
rebuttal of a presumption de facto come nearer to the 
applicable provision than a domestic statute of limitation. 
Transition from the legal effects of the ancient procedure by 
party oath to modern rules of evidence is a well-known his-
torical development analogous to the suggested substitution. 
Lex loci contractus. Writers believing that the law of the 
place of contracting governs contracts either by natural 
36 TROPLONG, I Prescription § 38. Contra: the authors cited by MICHEL 85 f.; 
DE NovA 99· 
37 LEHR, I3 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I88I) 5I6. Contra: DE NOVA IOI. 
The same result was based on the public interest by 8 LAURENT 334 § 234· 
38 See PLANIOL et RIPERT, 7 Traite Pratique (ed. 2) 810 § I394· 
39 Contra: I FRANKENSTEIN 369 who would have the court use the foreign 
procedure. 
40 Thus, NEUNER, Der Sinn I24 f. 
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law or by the presumable intention of the parties have advo-
cated this device especially for limitation of actions.41 
(b) Lex contractus. By overwhelming consent in most 
civil law countries, the law governing the contract as such 
controls limitation of action. However, doubts have been 
raised respecting the role of party autonomy. 
Choice of law by the p'arties. Two questions must be 
distinguished: 
If the parties agree on an applicable law for the contract, 
does it include limitation of action? This has been wrongly 
denied by some writers, even supporters of party autonomy 
in general, because of the allegedly imperative effect of the 
statutory period of time. Hence, the predestined law, pref-
erably lex loci contractus, re-enters the picture.42 But im-
perative municipal law is far from being identical with 
stringent public policy.43 
Illustration. Willy and Roger de Perrot concluded in 
N eucha tel a contract with the company, Suchard S. A., 
giving them the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the 
Suchard products (chocolate, cocoa, and sweets) in the 
United States and Canada. The contract provided for the 
application of the usages and laws of the United States. 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, therefore, in a suit for breach 
of contract, applied American law, identified with the law 
of Pennsylvania, to the question of limitation of action, 
although the contract was made in Switzerland, the de-
fendant company was Swiss, and the plaintiff had returned 
to Switzerland seventeen years before. BG. (March I 51 
1949) 7 5 BGE. II 57, 65. 
May the parties stipulate specifically for a special law 
4 1 See the citations in DE NovA§ 23. 
42 DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 444-446; id., 2 Principi 264; MicHEL 159; French 
decisions cited by 1 FRANKENSTEIN 597 n. 152 seem to join in this view. 
43 Infra pp. 525 ff. Even the French Supreme Court has recognized the 
faculty of the parties to eliminate the alleged socially necessary protection 
of the debtor by his domiciliary law, by stipulating another law in the con-
tract, Cass. req. (March 5, 1928) D. 1928.x.8I, S. 1929.I.217, cf. the reference 
to this decision by a French tribunal in Clunet 1938, 281. 
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to prolong the period of limitation allowed by the law of 
the contract? This is a practically important question. 
American courts have raised various objections to any party 
agreement modifying legal limitations of time for bringing 
suits and are prone to override a clause backed by foreign 
law but disapproved by local policy.44 However, such clauses 
have been upheld against the lex fori. 45 
We have to concentrate on the main subject. 46 
II. COMPROMISES 
(a) Basic Anglo-American exception. From 1726, Eng-
lish courts recognized in theory that foreign law could dis-
charge a debt so as to make its enforcement at the forum 
impossibleY The procedural principle, laid down in the 
leading cases for limitation, hence, was always accompanied 
by the exception that a foreign statute "extinguishing" the 
substantive right, or imposing "a condition upon the right" 
was to be recognized at the forum. 48 This might have re-
sulted in broad application of foreign limitations.49 But 
nothing of this sort developed. In fact, the courts seldom 
find foreign general statutes of limitation answering that 
description. The writers explain this by observing that 
English and American statutes scarcely ever expressly de-
clare the right extinguished,50 or that the courts are keen 
44 See for the cases, Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at 140 f., speaking of a 
confused picture. 
45 See infra ns. 89, 131. 
46 For the same reason, no attention will be given to the "saving'' and 
"tolling'' statutes caused by the procedural theory. 
47 Burrows v. Jemino (1726) 2 Strange 733, 93 Eng. Re. 815; see for the 
subsequent decisions, AILES, supra n. 5, 491. 
48 Huber v. Steiner (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 202, citing STORY who himself 
spoke of time limitation extinguishing claim and title, which, as well as his 
case material on the distinction between the title and the right of action, 
"belongs to property and not to obligation," WEsTLAKE § 239· 
Scotland: Don v. Lippmann ( 1837) 5 Cl. & F. 1, 7 Eng. Re. 304. 
Canada: Bryson v. Graham (r848) 3 N. S. R. 271, and decisions supra n. 2. 
4 9 Optimistically so understood by DE Nov A II 6, construing a system of 
twofold characterization. 
50 AILES, supra n. 5, 493· 
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on discovering a reason for not making an exception. 51 This 
tendency, we may add, is greatly aided by the formula of 
the exception. Genuine statutes of limitation never "extin-
guish" the right, even though they may use this expression. 
Thus the statute of Louisiana, identical with the French, 
has been construed as procedural according to the British 
model in Louisiana itself, 52 and in Missouri. 53 The French 
Code was read in the same manner by Tindal, J., in Huber 
v. Steiner in I 835 54 and by Judge Learned Hand in 1930.55 
Whether the New Jersey statute restricting to three months 
the time for recovering the amount of a deficiency after 
foreclosure of a mortgage on New Jersey land, extinguishes 
the right, has been a riddle in the courts of New Jersey and 
New York for a long time. 56 
The general statutes of limitation of Wisconsin57 and 
the Maryland58 statute on bills, bonds, and judgments have 
been recognized as "extinguishing the right," but although 
the Wisconsin court seems to reject the British doctrine, 
in the Maryland case it was only stressed that the debt 
could not be revived by subsequent acknowledgment. Also, 
51 STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 149· 
52 This seems proved by Erwin v. Lowry (1847) 2 La. Ann. 314; Newman 
v. Goza (1847) 2 La. Ann. 642, 646; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Haack 
(D. C. W. D. La. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 55, 64 f. See also PERKINS, "Limitation 
of Actions in Conflict of Laws," 10 La. L. Rev. (1950) 374· 
53 McMerty v. Morrison (1876) 62 Mo. 140, 144. 
54 Tindal, C. J., in Huber v. Steiner, supra n. 3· MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, 
46 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 31 n. 2 and AILES, supra n. 5, 499 approve 
Tindal's construction of C. C. art. 1234 as "procedural." Cf. infra n. 115. 
55 Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (C. C. A. zd 
1930) 43 F. (2d) 941; HARPER eta!., Cases 57· 
56 Stumpf v. Hallahan ( 1905) 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1062; 
Hutchinson v. Ward (1908) 192 N.Y. 375, 85 N. E. 390; Apfelberg v. Lax 
(1931) 255 N.Y. 377, 174 N. E. 759; following these precedents, Paterno v. 
Eager (1943) 179 Misc. 966, 40 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 465 (substantive), reversed 
( 1943) 18o Misc. 582, 45 N. Y. Supp. (zd) 225 because of the contrary 
construction of the statute by the highest local courts. 
57 Brown v. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21; Rathbone v. Coe (1888) 6 Dak. 91, 
soN. W. 6zo. 
58 Baker v. Stonebraker (1865) 36 Mo. 338; see other cases in AILES, supra 
n. s, 493 n. 110. 
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a Czarist Russian ten-year limitation has been applied as 
terminating the right.59 
Special statutory liabilities. American courts feel more 
secure ground when a special rather than a general foreign 
statute is in issue. Death statutes have been an example of 
provisions creating a substantive right not known at com-
mon law and simultaneously ending it within a specified 
period. 00 Analogous cases have concerned the liability of 
trustees of a business trust or of stockholders in corpora-
tions61 and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.62 This 
recognition of applicable foreign limitations has been ex-
tended to statutes specifically qualifying a right created by 
another statute.63 
A characteristic controversy has developed around the 
effect of statutes of the forum creating a right similar to 
the foreign-governed claim in issue but limiting it to a 
period of duration shorter than the foreign statute. Logic 
seems to advise that the local prescription is restricted to 
the domestic-governed right; in this sense, some cases have 
admitted that nothing prevents the application of the foreign 
statute even if its period is longer than that of the forum. 64 
59 In re Tonkonogoff's Estate (1941) 32 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 661. 
60 The Harrisburg ( 1886) II9 U. S. 199; for other cases, and particulars, 
see HANCOCK, Torts 134; AILES, suPra n. 5, 495 f.; recently, e.g., Summar v. 
Besser Manufacturing Co. (1945) 310 Mich. 347,352, 17 N. W. (2d) 209. 
61 Davis v. Mills (1904) 194 U.S. 451; Norman v. Baldwin (1929) 152 Va. 
8oo, 148 S. E. 831, 833. 
62 Atlantic Coast LineR. R. v. Burnette (1915) 239 U.S. 199; AILES, suPra 
n. 5, n. 129. See also State ex rei. Winkle Terra Cotta Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 295, 40 S. W. (2d) 1050 (contractors' bonds) 
and cf. Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) at 139· 
63 Mr. Justice Holmes in Davis v. Mills (1904) 194 U. S. 451; Osborne v. 
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. ( 1913) 87 Vt. 104, 88 Atl. 512. Restatement § 6os 
comment a. 
In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd. (C. C. A. 2d 1955) 220 F. (2d) 
152, CHEATHAM, Cases ( ed. 4) 402, the test of specificity was applied to the 
reverse effect: an action based upon the Panamanian Labor Code was con-
sidered not to be barred, although the limitation period prescribed by the 
same statute had elapsed; the court was not satisfied that the period in 
question was "specifically" aimed against the particular right which the 
plaintiff sought to enforce. 
64 Theroux v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1894) 64 Fed. 84; 
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However, in a con~rary view, the statute of the forum ex-
presses public policy barring all suits of the type in ques-
tion.65 This division of opinion demonstrates the futility 
of both approaches. Evidently, public policy may as well 
reside in genuine limitation as in preclusion by lex fori, and 
the decisions are visibly veering to the identification of 
both.66 
In their embarrassment, the courts take it as a favorable 
indication when the foreign statute is called substantive in 
its own state. This self-characterization may occur for 
various purposes, such as in order to decide whether inter-
ruption of the running time by suing or revival through 
acknowledgment is possible ;67 whether the statute may act 
retroactively ;68 whether special pleading is necessary ;69 
whether a foreign judgment is enforceable despite domestic 
bar ;70 or a judgment is dead. 71 The inference for extra-
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co. (1904) 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o; 
Keep v. Nat'! Tube Co. (C. C. N. J. 1907) IS4 Fed. 121; Cristilly v. Warner 
(1913) 87 Conn. 461, 88 At!. 7n; Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C. C. A. 
6th 1942) 124 F. (2d) 663; cf. Wilson v. Massengill (C. C. A. 6th 1942) 
id. 666, 669; see Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. ( 1942) 727 n. 31. 
65 PARMELE in 2 Wharton 1264 § s4ob; Hutchings v. Lamson (C. C. A. 7th 
1899) 96 Fed. 72o; Tietfenbrun v. Flannery (1930) 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 
8S7, seemingly approved by 3 BEALE 1629 § 6os.r; Rosenzweig v. Heller ( 1931) 
302 Pa. 279, IS3 At!. 346, noted, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 193 I) 1 IIz; Broderick v. 
Pardue (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) I02 S. W. (2d) 252; White v. Govatos ( I939) 
40 Del. 349, Io Atl. (2d) 524. 
66 In the Maki Case of I9421 supra n. 64, the foreign limitation of six 
years was contained in a Minnesota statute covering all actions commenced 
"upon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty 
or forfeiture." The domestic (Michigan) restriction of three years to recovery 
of injuries to person or property is a clear limitation of action. Both provisions 
thus appear to be genuine limitations of action, rather than "extinguishing" 
devices. 
67 Hollingsworth v. Schanland (I924) ISS La. 82s, 99 So. 6I3 ("peremp-
tion"). 
68 McCracken County v. Mercantile Trust Co. (I886) 84 Ky. 344, I S. W. 
sss. 
69 Cooper v. Lyons ( I882) 9 Lea (Tenn.) S96; Wood & Selick v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique (C. C. A. 2d I930) 43 F. (zd) 941; HARPER et al., 
Cases S7i Lewis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1929) 324 Mo. 266, 23 S. W. (2d) xoo; 
Carpenter v. United States (C. C. A. 2d 1932) s6 F. (2d) 828. 
•o Brown v. Parker ( I87I) 28 Wis. 21. 
71 Angell v. Martin (r88o) 24 Kan. 334· 
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territorial applicability may be more or less convincing. 7la 
Insecurity, however, is very natural with such nebulous 
criteria and the fundamental inadequacy of the distinction 
between "extinguishing the right" and only affecting the 
"remedy." The courts must be aware that they speak in a 
concerted language. What is their real impulse? Not only 
a European writer, 72 but also Mr. Justice Holmes73 has 
declared: 
"In cases where it has been possible to escape from that 
qualification (as procedural) by a reasonable distinction 
courts have been willing to treat limitations of time as 
standing like other· limitations and cutting down the de-
fendant's liability wherever he is sued." 
It may be preferred to assume with Ailes that "statutes 
are often labelled 'substantive' or 'procedural' depending 
upon the result sought,"74 but this does not give a much 
different impression. Hancock points to the courts of North 
Carolina and Pennsylvania refusing to recognize the dis-
tinction between special statutory provisions and general 
statutes of limitations, because they are satisfied with the 
results of the procedural principle: 
"The distinction, though groundless, is probably symp-
tomatic of dissatisfaction with the general principle and of 
a desire to limit its sphere of operation. " 75 
The above-mentioned controversy concerning foreign 
limitations that are longer than the domestic periods, led a 
federal circuit court in 1942 to reasoning which sounds like 
the end of the tortuous development of the procedural con-
struction: 
na Reliance on self-characterization by the lex causae is also rejected by 
EHRENZWEIG, Conflict 431. 
72 MICHEL 157. 
73 Davis v. Mills (1904) 194 U. S. 451, 454· 
74 AILES, supra n. 5, at 493 n. n6 in fine. 
75 HANCOCK, Torts 135. 
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"Why should not this limitation accompany the new right 
created by the statute wherever enforcement of the right 
is sought, if the substantive law of a sister state is by comity 
to be recognized and enforced ?"76 
(b) Borrowing statutes. The application of the lex fori 
indeed has been finally cut down to half size by statutory 
clauses, now adopted in a great majority of the states.77 
Their general intention is to protect the defendant against 
a plaintiff "shopping around" for a forum with a limitation 
long enough to allow suit. Therefore, they recognize under 
certain conditions foreign limitation or extinction of a cause 
of action brought to the forum. 
Unfortunately, these statutes are of different types, and 
all of them are awkwardly drafted.7711 Most of them iden-
tify the competent foreign statute by pointing to the law 
of the place where the cause of action "arose" or "oc-
curred," a language adequate only for tort actions. Some 
recognize the statute of the state where the defendant re-
sided when the action originated, irrespective of where this 
happened. 
In application to contractual and other nondelictual obli-
76 Martin, C. J., in Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., supra n. 64, at 666. 
77 Note, 75 A. L. R. ( 1931) 203; Restatement § 604 is thereby abrogated, 
YNTEMA, 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183, 213. 
••a A Uniform Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act was promul-
gated in 1957; see 1957 Handbook of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws 264. If it should be enacted in a sufficient 
number of states, a certain uniformity of borrowing legislation would ensue. 
For a discussion of the still remaining deficiencies, see PROYECT, "A Study of 
the Uniform Statute and the Present State of the Law Limiting Claims Arising 
in Foreign States," 4 Wayne L. Rev. (1958) 123; 5 id. (1959) 226; VERNON, 
"Report on the First Tentative Draft of the Uniform Statute of Limitations on 
Foreign Claims Act," 3 Wayne L. Rev. (1957) 187; VERNON, "The Uniform 
Statute of Limitations on Foreign Claims Act: A Discussion of Section Two," 
4 St. Louis U. L. J. (1957) 442; VERNON, "The Uniform Statute of Limitations 
on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems," 12 Vand. L. Rev. (1959) 971; 
VERNON, "Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes," 
32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. ( 1960) 287. 
For further studies of present problems in the field of borrowing statutes, 
see NORDSTROM, "Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations-A Quaking Quag-
mire in a Dismal Swamp," 16 Ohio S. L. J. (1955) r83; EsTER, "Borrowing 
Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws," 15 U, of Fla. L. Rev. (1962) 33· 
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gations, the courts have assumed that the cause of action 
arises at the place of performance.78 What sort of reason-
ing is required thereby, has been illustrated by a recent con-
troversy necessitating a decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. A federal statute of 1913 obligated the 
stockholders of an insolvent national bank to make addi-
tional payments, without prescribing a time of limitation. 
The state statutes of limitation of the forum, including its 
borrowing statutes, had to supply the rules, but what stat-
utes were to be borrowed, i.e., in what state did the cause 
of action arise? On the direction of the Comptroller in 
Washington, the receiver in Louisville, Kentucky, where 
the defunct bank had at all times actually carried on its 
transactions, issued the summons. The Sixth Federal Circuit 
Court declared that the cause of action was the failure to 
pay the amount at the receiver's place and therefore the 
Kentucky statute applied.79 The Third Federal Circuit 
Court, however, held that the cause of action, created by a 
federal law and dependent on the act of federal authority 
did not arise in one particular state more than in another.80 
It resorted to the law of Pennsylvania as law of the forum. 
The Supreme Court approved the first opinion, agreeing 
with the prevailing construction of the place where the 
cause of action arises.81 However, it is never correct simply 
to localize a right flowing from a breach of contract or the 
violation of a legal obligation at the place where the per-
formance is due, rather than where the obligatory relation-
ship is centered. The supporting reason should have been 
what was incidentally mentioned, i.e., that the liability in 
virtue of the federal statute inhered in the membership in 
78 Cf. STUMBERG ( ed. 2) 149 n. 55· 
79 Miller, C. J., in Helmers v. Anderson (C. C. A. 6th 1946) 156 F. (2d) 47· 
80 Goodrich, C. J., in Anderson v. Andrews (C. C. A. 3d 1946) 156 F. (2d) 
972. The criticism in Notes, 6o Harv. L. Rev. ( 1946) 303 and 32 Cornell L. Q. 
( 1946) 276 fails to censure the technique of the borrowing statutes. 
s1 Cope v. Anderson (1947) 331 U. S. 461. Approved by HARPER, "The Su-
preme Court and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. ( 1947) 883, 910-912. 
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the former banking corporation and could have been better 
localized, under the circumstances, at the central office than 
in the charter state. 
The borrowing statutes, moreover, refer, in one or an-
other respect, to the (factual) residence of the defendant at 
the time of the origin of the cause of action; in part require 
that both parties resided in the same state during the full 
period; and establish more conditions of residence at the 
time of action. The complications, doubts, and variety so 
accomplished are astonishing.82 
The New Y ark statute distinguishes, like a few others, 
between residents and nonresidents of the forum, and in 
particular excludes from the bar such causes as originally 
accrue in favor of residents of New York. 83 Where how-
ever, a nonresident sues a resident on a foreign cause of 
action, the shorter foreign limitation is observed.84 The Wis-
consin lawmakers exclude the application of a foreign limi-
tation if a claimant for personal injuries was a resident of 
the forum at the time of such injury.85 
As a whole, this broad exception to the procedural prin-
ciple is a half measure, the statutes, with the exception of 
that of Kentucky,86 leaving intact all domestic bars in addi-
tion to those foreign. Such theories have been called irra-
tional, because a more incisive foreign statute is applied 
and a weaker one is refused effect.87 On the other hand, 
complaint has been raised against them as an unwarranted 
departure from the procedural principle. 88 
82 See the surveys, 75 A. L. R. (1930) 203-232; 149 A. L. R. (1944) 1224-
1238; 53 c. J. s. (1948) 977 ff. 
83 New York: Civil Practice Act§ 13, as amended by law of April 15, 1943. 
84 Dictum in Kahn v. Commercial Union of America, Inc. (1929) 227 App. 
Div. 82, 237 N. Y. Supp. 94, where a six-month limitation of New York is 
applied against a thirty-year period of French law, an application in itself 
understandable. See infra ns. 97, 100. 
85 Wisconsin: Stat. (1957) § 330.19 (s). 
86 Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. ( 1914) 157 Ky. 113, 162 S. W. 564. 
87 BAR, Book Review on Wharton quoted in 2 WHARTON 1245 n. 3· 
88 AILES, supra n. 5, 501 in fine. 
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In fact, the borrowing statutes are intended to protect 
the debtor against the obvious iniquity that, having once 
acquired repose, he should be again vulnerable to attack 
merely because he changed his residence. However, it is 
still less equitable that a creditor should lose his action 
simply because the debtor changes the place where he can 
be sued. 
(c) Continental proposals. Arguments on exactly the 
same topic have been much discussed in the European orbits. 
The authors following the procedural principle themselves 
felt the desire to restrict the hazards just menti9ned. On 
the other hand, writers of the adversary school of thought 
sometimes conceded overriding considerations of the forum. 
All these compromises, however, have been more or less 
openly established on the ground of public policy which will 
be presently discussed. 
(d) Contractual and corporative limitations. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in a recent majority 
opinion, enumerates the various modifications imposed on 
the general principle that lex fori governs limitation, and 
among them mentions contractual stipulations limiting the 
time for bringing an action, recognized in a long line of 
cases. 89 The decision adds that limitation of time for suit 
by the constitution of a fraternal benefit association is pro-
tected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.90 Among other 
possible implications, it is doubtful whether the argument 
is equally valid for all suits between a corporation and its 
members. 
(e) Federal characterization. Nothing is more indicative 
of the awareness, in the United States, of the true char-
890rder of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe (1947) 331 
u. s. s86, 607, 6o8 n. 20. 
90 !d. 624. The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black, by a kind of 
argumentum ad abmrdum, extends the scope of the majority decision very 
far. His criticism is shared by HARPER, "The Supreme Court and the Conflict 
of Laws," 47 Col. L. Rev. (1947) 883, 895-900. 
On the special subject of the insurance companies, cf. supra pp. 332-334· 
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acter of limitation of action than its recognition first in a 
hint,91 then a straight decision,92 by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. For the purpose of application of state 
statutes to lawsuits before federal courts in diverse citizen-
ship cases, the statutes of limitation are expressly termed 
substantive law, and this has even been extended to equity 
cases where an exception may have been expected.93 It should 
not be objected that characterization for this purpose may 
soundly be distinguished from conflicts characterization.93a 
The manner in which the opinion of the Supreme Court is 
motivated,94 refutes any such distinction; indeed, there is 
no reason why the contrast of substance and procedure 
should not be exactly the same in both cases.95 
III. THE RoLE OF PuBLIC PoLICY 
The Anglo-American conception of limitation survives in 
this country in a vastly reduced and amorphous shape. Its 
only real support is not procedural characterization but the 
91 Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 202. 
92 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York ( 1945) 326 U.S. 99· 
93 TUNKs, "Categorization and Federalism, etc.," 34 Ill. L. Rev. ( 1939) 271. 
osa Accord, SEDLER, "The Erie Outcome Test As a Guide to Substance and 
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. (1962) 813, 846 If. Cf. 
also the interesting dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson in Wells v. 
Simonds Abrasive Co. (1953) 345 U. S. 514, suggesting that in pursuing the 
Erie doctrine the federal courts, in cases of wrongful death statutes, should 
apply the statute of limitation of the lex causae rather than that of the state 
in which they are sitting. 
94 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 326 U. S. 109: "And so the question is not 
whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some 
sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and 
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, 
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect 
that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the 
result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that 
would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in 
a State court?" 
Cf. EsTEP, Note, 44 Mich. L. Rev. (1945) 477· 
9 5 In the United States, constitutional control for the protection of foreign 
limitation statutes has only been exercised in a few special cases, on which 
see Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. (1948) 136 at 142-146. See also Wells v. Simonds 
Abrasive Co., supra n. 93a, CHEATHAM, Cases (ed. 4) ss8; JOHN A. CAR· 
NAHAN, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause-Its Effect on Statutes of Limita-
tions," 4 Duke B. J. (1954) 71; STEWART & MusGROVE, "The Full Faith and 
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British territorialism of former centuries which at present 
must take the appearance of public policy of the forum. 
This is probably the general opinion, although theoretical 
considerations are scarce and usually mix the points of view 
regarding remedy and policy. The former Continental lit-
erature, on its way from the same basic conception, took 
more opportunity for emphasizing, by arguments pro and 
contra, the role of local ordre public. 
Around the turn of the century, a considerable group of 
authors believed they had discovered a sound compromise 
between the law of the forum and that of the contract in 
reserving for the court its domestic statute when the period 
prescribed by it was shorter than that of the lex causae.96 
Some proposals restricted this concession to the longest 
period known to the forum, usually thirty years. Others have 
distinguished all "long" and all "short" periods. Finally, 
Rolin, reporter to the Institute of International Law, allo-
cated to the law of the forum also certain limitations such 
as the French period of five years for rents (C. C., article 
2277), in contrast to the very short limitations which in 
French law rests on a presumption of payment made.97 Bar, 
to protect the defendant, allowed him an option between 
the local statute and the law of the contract, if sued at his 
domicil.98 
Wherever in these suggestions the lex fori was main-
tained, its clear ground was the reaction of public policy 
against claims regarded at the forum as superannuated. 
This idea was directly formulated so as to form the only 
Credit Clause As Related to the Diversity Clause in Statute of Limitations 
Cases," II Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (I954) 47; VERNON, "Some Constitutional 
Problems in the Conflict of Laws and Statutes of Limitations," 7 J. Pub. L. 
(I958) I20. 
96 I AUBRY et RAU I65 and n. 69; DESPAGNET 925 § 3I7, citing cases; 
WEiss, 4 Traite 407; ROLIN, I Principes §§ 338 f.; VALERY IOI4 § 703; Bosco, 
Rivista I93I, 4I3. Also PHILONENKO, Clunet I936, 259, 5I3; }ITTA, Methode 
355· 
9 7 RoLIN, 3I Annuaire (I924) at I6I. 
98 2 BAR 99. IOI. 
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exception to the law of the contract, in the resolutions of 
the Institute of International Law: 
Liberatory prescription may also be deemed acquired by 
the courts seized of litigations by virtue of their own law 
of the forum, if the invoked limitation, according to this 
law, constitutes an institution of absolute public policy, pre-
venting the application of any foreign statute, even that 
normally competent to govern it as, for instance, in the 
interest of third persons, on consideration of humanity, 
etc.99 
This proposal was an attempt to include the common law 
courts in a universal rule. However, in Europe itself all 
such far-reaching exceptions to the law properly governing 
the obligation are entirely and deservedly discarded.100 A 
public policy, not strong enough to be enforced by the court 
except when pleaded by the defendant should not be a 
reason to shield one who changes his abode arbitrarily to 
the forum, nor should it be a ground to remove limitation 
from many other important incidents of the governing law. 
True, statutes of limitation are usually "imperative" in 
municipal law so that the parties are not allowed to agree 
in advance to waive the statute or prolong its period of time. 
But, as the Italian Supreme Court has put it, terminating 
a long-continued controversy in that country: 
Although it cannot be denied that limitation of action is 
founded also on considerations of public order (which are, 
however, joined by other, not less important, reasons), this 
does not mean that it belongs to the international public 
order. Therefore, limitation is not considered by the court 
without party request; it can be waived after the time has 
lapsed; and the time is suspended if impossibility to sue is 
proved.101 
99 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. III. 
100 DE NOVA§ 130; 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 667 f. 
101 Italy: Cass. (Nov. 13, 1931) Foro Ita!. 1932 I 2332, and (March 3, 1933) 
Riv. Dir. Priv. 1934 II 67, Clunet 1936, 697. Accord, Cass. (Jan. 29, 1936) 
Foro Ita!. 1936 I 1033, 1040, applying an American statute. 
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The Italian Court still left open (in 1933) the question 
whether a foreign period of time longer than the domestic 
period may offend the public policy of the forum.102 The 
better-elaborated German doctrine of courts and writers 
sharply rejects such inconsistency. Whether a period of 
limitation is longer103 or shorter104 than the local statute 
admits makes merely a technical, but not a moral, and cer-
tainly not a fundamental, difference.105 In France, the same 
view seems to prevail after the long controversy.106 
The domain of stringent public policy, thus, shrinks to 
the extent of extreme cases: The Reichsgericht once held 
the Swiss rule that a deficiency certificate against an in-
solvent debtor is not subject to limitation107 "contrary to 
the purpose of German legislation," because the statutes 
of limitation serve also the public welfare, viz., peace and 
security.108 But embarrassment followed as to the rule 
102 Cass. (March 3, 1933) supra n. 101. Such offense was contended by 
CERETI in Fedozzi 736, and repeatedly; DE NoVA 196; App. Milano (March 
28, 1916) Riv. Dir. Com. 1916 II 896; App. Firenze (June 8, 1927) Rivista 
1928, 245· 
103 RG. (July 8, 1882) 9 RGZ. 225; (Nov. 22, 1912) Leipz. Z. 1913, 550 
(Dutch thirty years instead of German two years); OLG. Hamburg (July 1, 
1912) 25 ROLG. 218, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 342 (English six years instead of 
German three years to six months). 
Switzerland: App. Bern (Nov. 3, 1927) Bl. IPR. 1928,286. 
104 LEWALD 29 § 33· 
105 MICHEL 227, 239 j I FRANKENSTEIN 209, 597 j WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 
52 n. 3, 486. 
Accord in Switzerland: 2 ScHNITZER ( ed. 4) 666 £. 
Brazil: ESPINOLA, Lei Introd. 628, citing MACHADO VILLELA, 0 Direito 
internacional privado no C6digo Civil brasileiro ( 1921) 334-
Austria: The Supreme Court has invoked Austrian public policy against a 
Czechoslovakian statute substituting a three-year period of limitation for a 
thirty-year period; OGH. (Feb. 26, 1958) 3 Z. f. RV. (1962) II7 and MAGER-
STEIN, "Die Verjiihrungsfristen ausliindischen Rechts und der ordre public," 
77 J. Bl. (1955) 470. 
106 MICHEL, IO Repert. 305 Nos. 79-83, 307 No. 87; BATIFFOL 459 §§ s8s f.; 
with more reservations, N!BOYET § 708. 
107 Switzerland: Law on Enforcement and Bankruptcy, art. 149. 
1°8 RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) xo6 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278. In an analogous 
case, the French App. Colmar (Mar. 31, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 468, 2 Giur. 
Camp. DIP. (1937) 127 No. 85, held the Swiss provision not offensive to 
French public order, but stressed the fact that the French thirty-year limitation 
had not yet run out. 
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positively to apply, and it was not true that every debt must 
be prescriptible.109 Occasionally, it has been contended that 
a foreign period should not apply when it is unreasonably 
short,110 or, under reference to National Socialist intran-
sigence, that a Hungarian thirty-two-year period was unac-
ceptable in face of a German two-year period.111 
Is it worth while to introduce an element of uncertainty 
for the sake of such rare discrepancjes? Curiously enough, 
we may point to an American decision which did not hesitate 
to apply the Ohio borrowing statute in favor of the Penn-
sylvania statute ending in two years the right to sue for an 
injury committed in the later state. Under Ohio law, the 
plaintiff, only J! years old at the time of the injury, would 
have enjoyed suspension and could have sued after eighteen 
years.112 Consideration of domestic protection of citizens 
could have been expected to work in this case, if anywhere. 
But the court acted wisely in maintaining the rule. Do Amer-
ican courts, as it had been contended, really feel it unbear-
able that Continental general limitation periods usually are 
of thirty years ?113 If so, this would be the only understand-
able concession to public policy. 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 
The earliest attitude of Story and approval by most 
modern Anglo-American scholars have not prevented their 
acknowledgment of the existing principle, short of legisla-
tive reforms. On the Continent, conformingly, courts and 
authors have taken this procedural theory at its face value 
as the law of the Anglo-American countries, ignoring such 
important exceptions as the American and Canadian borrow-
109 WuNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 481, so6. 
110RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 5) 498 f. 
111 OLG. Miinchen (Feb. 2, 1938) H. R. R. 1938, 1402. 
112 Hilliard v. Pa. R. Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1935) 73 F. (2d) 473, cert. denied, 
294 u. s. 721. 
113 Suggested by Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1942) 724 at n. II. 
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ing statutes. The two groups, almost neatly divided on the 
lines of common law and civil law, thus face the problem 
how to treat the opposite conception of the statutes of 
limitation. Here, the three theories of characterization-
applying the conception of the forum; of the foreign law; 
and of analytical jurisprudence-demonstrate their most 
significant consequences.114 
I. Characterization According to Lex Fori 
We have seen that the English courts remain fixed on 
the axiom that any foreign statute of limitation is in-
applicable, excepting conceivable but rarely recognized 
statutes "extinguishing the right." This distinction was 
applied to the French prescription, and it was found that 
it also did not "extinguish the right"115 and hence did not 
affect a French note. One hundred years later, an outstand-
ing American judge repeated this investigation and reached 
the same result.116 He ascertained in a perfectly correct 
statement that the French institution is of exactly the same 
nature as the American general statutes of limitation. But 
when, for this reason, he again classified French limitation 
as procedural and therefore inapplicable, he demonstrated 
the inherent vice of characterization according to the lex 
fori. Not only has a wrong municipal theory transgressed 
into conflicts law, so that the similarly constructed statutes 
of the sister states have become inapplicable, but this theory 
is extended to foreign limitations considered in their own 
countries as substantive. 
114 See 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 241, 278; Vol. I {ed. 2) pp. 69 ff. On the 
occasion of a German decision of 1932, the three theories were advanced 
simultaneously in I Giur. Comp. DIP. ( 1932) x6o ff. No. 40, the first being 
advocated by the decision and the Note by SIEBERT, and the second with 
ill-placed vehemence by AGo, the third, my own, being explained by LUDWIG 
RAISER. 
115 Tindal, C. J., in Huber v. Steiner ( 1835) 2 Bing. N.C. 202. 
116 Judge Learned Hand in Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique (C. C. A. 2d 1930) 43 F. {2d) 941, HARPER et al., Cases 57· 
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The same approach, however, has marked the entire 
German doctrine.U7 It seemed to provide escape from other 
egregious blunders.118 Exactly as the English and Ameri-
can judges mentioned above examined the French Code, 
the courts investigated English law with the identical clear 
result that limitation of actions was subject essentially to 
the same rules as German Anspruchsverjahrung.U0 The 
German courts and writers now unanimously state that what 
imports is only that in the German view limitation is sub-
stantive and for this reason the New York statute does 
operate in a German court. Also, in other countries this 
form of characterization has found favor. 120 
On the European side, it is true, the effect is reasonable. 
But the underlying theory is less admirable, as has been 
shown just above, on the common law side. So long as the 
English and American courts believe in construing a Swedish 
statute by the method which they learned for the interpreta-
tion of the Statute of] ames I, we shall have no harmonious 
conflicts solution. And the reader should take a moment to 
consider the law of a world where an admittedly identical 
phenomenon is termed, classified, and treated in oppo-
site manners by the two chief legal groups of western 
civilization I 
117 ROHG. (June 15, 1875) 15 ROHGE. r86; RG. (May 8, r88o) 2 RGZ. 
13; OLG. Hamburg (July r, 1912) 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 342; RG. (July 6, 1934) 
145 RGZ. 121, IPRspr. 1934 No. 29, Revue Crit. 1935, 447; 6 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. No. 130. 
KAHN, I Abhandl. 103 ff., II9; 2 BAR 95 f.; LEWALD 73 § 98; SCHOCH, 
Klagbarkeit etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, no and n. 2. 
118 1 nfra n. 122. 
119 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 28 at 59; RG. (July 6, 
1934) supra n. II7; cf. EcKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 152. 
120 Denmark: S. Ct. (July 19, 1925) 6 Repert. 215 No. 10. 
France: 2 ARMINJON 346. 
Italy: FEDOZZI-CERETI 736. 
Sweden: Decision of the Swedish Supreme Court, and BAGGE, supra n. 30. 
Switzerland: (Semble) App. Tessino (Sept. 23, 1929) and Bezirksgericht 
Zurich (Dec. 19, 1928) 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 725; (probably) 2 ScHNITZER (ed. 
4) 667 f., and definitely BG. (March 15, 1949) 75 BGE. II 57, 66. 
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2. Characterization According to Lex Causae (Secondary 
Characterization) 
Reputable authors advise a compromise to the effect that 
the forum should apply its domestic statute of limitation 
in principle to all cases decided at the forum, but recognize 
a foreign-governing law with the content given it in the 
foreign country. Characterization by lex causae and sec-
ondary characterization agree on this point.121 The Swedish 
statute is applicable since it is considered substantive in 
Sweden, and the Ontario statute is not applied because it 
is construed as procedural in Ontario. Thus, while theory 
( r) provides the German courts with satisfactory decisions 
and leaves the American courts in the dark, theory ( 2) 
rescues the latter courts from their predicament. However, 
it immediately puts the Continental courts back in an in-
soluble puzzle. We are again where the Reichsgericht was 
in r88o.122 
At that time, the German Supreme Court hearing an ac-
tion on a note issued in Tennessee, speculated that it could 
neither apply the Tennessee statute because it was pro-
cedural nor the German statute because it was intended only 
for a German-governed contract. Hence, a Tennessee note 
could never be prescribed as far as the German courts were 
concerned-an outcome amazing even to the hardboiled 
specialists of conflicts law. Corrections have been attempted. 
Thus, it was assumed that American law refers the question 
of limitation to the domestic law of the forum exercising 
jurisdiction of the claim and this renvoi ought to be ac-
cepted.123 Also the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
121 AILES, supra n. 5, 482; CHESHIRE ( ed. 3) 74-75, 834; ROBERTSON, 
Characterization 64, 248 ff.; PONTES DE MIRANDA, Recueil 1932 I 625 § 7· The 
so-called "foreign court's interpretation test" advocated by R. M. Z., "Statutes 
of Limitation: Lex Loci or Lex Fori," 47 Va. L. Rev. ( 1961) 299, 307 f. is in 
fact identical with the characterization according to the lex causae. 
122 RG. (Jan. 4, x882) 7 RGZ. 21, 24; (May x8, x889) 24 RGZ. 383, 393· 
123 OLG. Darmstadt (Nov. 2, 1906) cited by LEWALD 73 No. 98; I FRANKEN-
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in a most involved reasoning, so argued.124 Another escape 
was discovered by scrapping the entire conflicts rule and 
reverting to the domestic statute on the ground of public 
policy.125 Also this solution, curiously to say, was followed 
in a decision of the Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
on the basis of the German conflicts rule referring to Scotch 
law.126 
But how awkward is a treatment that requires such pre-
carious counteractions I Are we compelled to use in the two 
groups different approaches for reconciling divergent rules? 
The situation is not really similar to the conflict between 
domiciliary and nationality principles that calls for two 
methods of employing renvoi. The German doctrine has 
abandoned the entire approach,-a fact that should have 
given thought to the recent advocates of this artifice. 
3· Characterization According to Comparative Analysis 
Although we have to recognize the existence of the terri-
torial Anglo-American rule, so far as it reaches and so long 
as it survives, we need not recognize any mistaken char-
acterization. We apply a foreign "law" in its entirety with-
out regard to its own categorizations.127 Once a court, 
STEIN 596; WUNDERLICH, supra Ch. 52 n. 3, 503, 506. PACCHIONI 331 rejects the 
renvoi but asserts that the lex fori enters into a gap of the foreign law. 
Contra: The Swedish Supreme Court, see BAGGE, supra n. 30. 
124 Weiser & Co. v. The Heirs of Ludwig Diirr, 6 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 
632, 634: German conflicts law declared applicable refers to English law of 
contracts which excludes limitation of actions as procedural. Hence, nothing is 
left but to apply the German provisions on limitation. SCHOCH, Klagbarkeit 
etc., supra Ch. 52 n. 3, n6 n. 3, criticizes this decision because it looks at once 
to a conflicts law instead of asking the preliminary question what is procedural 
and what substantive law. But how can this be done by a court not having a 
lex fori, if no characterization can be evaluated as right or wrong, but only as 
inherent in a determinate system, as the same author contends (at 112 n. 3)? 
The tribunal followed its course: (July 22 and Oct. 6, 1927) C. G. Baron et 
Salaman v. Hugo Schnetzer, 7 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 427; (June 12, 1929) 
C. A. Rebus v. Theodora Hennig, 9 id. 19. 
125 RG. (Dec. 19, 1922) ro6 RGZ. 82, Revue 1926, 278. 
126 Cook v. Kutscher (May 31, 1926) Case No. 2263, 6 Recueil trib. arb. 
mixtes 540. 
127 Vol. I (ed. 2) pp. 71 f. 
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whether American or European, knows that limitation is 
always a part of the substantive law, although it may not 
be applied in all courts in the same way as other parts are 
applied, there is no obstacle to the desired application. An 
American court has to apply Dutch or German statutes of 
limitation because they belong to the governing law, not 
only in the eyes of Dutch and German courts but also in 
correct American theory.127a Swiss or Argentine courts 
ought to apply the New York statute for the same reason. 
Of course, the force of this view is restricted by the 
positive Anglo-American law. That it should be reformed, 
is unquestionable.127b 
4· Conclusion 
In theory it should be frankly acknowledged by any 
court in this country and abroad that the effect of lapse of 
time on an obligation is an incident of the law governing 
it. Foreign statutes of limitation are therefore applicable 
to a foreign contractual or legal obligation. 
This theory is for the time being restricted in British 
jurisdictions, and to an essentially lesser extent in the United 
States, through the age-old thesis that a court ought to 
apply its domestic statute of limitation. The resolutions of 
the Institute for International Law have recognized this 
phenomenon as an exception based on public policy/28 but 
go so far as to perpetuate the excuse of common law courts 
for not applying statutes of civil law countries. At most, 
common law courts may reciprocate with other common law 
jurisdictions when the other statutes prescribe a longer 
period than the forum does. Even this is anachronistic. 
It would seem easy to enlarge the borrowing statutes in 
127a This view is shared by McDONNOLD, "Limitation of Actions-Conflict 
of Laws-Lex Fori or Lex Loci?" 35 Tex. L. Rev. (1956) 95· 
127b Accord, JoHN A. CARNAHAN, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause-Its 
Effect on Statutes of Limitations," 4 Duke B. J. ( 1954) 71. 
12s 31 Annuaire (1924) 1&2 art. III, quoted supra p. 527. 
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the field of obligations by replacing them through a very 
brief uniform rule. The uniform statute has simply to pro-
vide that an obligation governed by the law of a foreign 
state or country is exclusively subject to the effects of lapse 
of time, as imposed by that law on the rights of the credi-
tor. This would end an overcomplicated and unjust legal 
situation. 
V. ScoPE oF THE RULE 
Whether and when a cause of action arises is naturally 
determined by the law governing the obligation, even in 
common law courts.129 The conditions of effective lapse of 
time depend, conforming to the respectively adopted prin-
ciples, in this country on the lex fori or the borrowed 
statute,130 and in Continental courts, except the French, on 
the law governing the obligation. This law determines also 
whether the parties are permitted to agree on a longer or 
shorter period of time.131 
Illustration. A German buyer sued an Austrian seller for 
rescission on the ground of implied warranty and for dam-
ages on the ground of express warranty. According to the 
splitting method, the Appeal Court of Hamburg applied 
German law to the rescission and Austrian law to the dam-
ages. In consequence, the question whether the time of 
limitation was interrupted by a formal expert inspection 
of the goods, was answered affirmatively as respects rescis-
sion, under the German BGB., § 477 par. 2, and negatively, 
with respect to the damages,132 under the Austrian Allg. 
BGB., § 1977, and an Austrian Supreme Court decision. 
With a better choice of law, only Austrian law would have 
been applicable; under the common law approach, only Ger-
man law. 
129 Glenn v. Liggett (1890) 135 U.S. 533. 
1 30 With all preliminary questions, see 75 A. L. R. (1890) 203. 
131 In st. of Int. Law, 31 Annuaire (1924) 182 art. II; DE NovA 170 n. 2; 
BATIFFOL 455 § 578. But see for the American decisions, supra ns. 44, 89. 
132 OLG. Hamburg (April 28, 1920) Hans. GZ. 1920, Hbl. 182 No. 91. 
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The Railway Convention of Bern,133 however, took the 
usual easy way out, by limiting action for total loss of 
goods to one year but referring the causes of interruption 
and suspension to the law of the country in which the action 
is brought.134 This example has been followed by other con-
ventions of unification.135 
German courts have repeatedly dealt with the case where 
a claim was sued upon in a foreign court; did this act inter-
rupt the period of limitation established by the law of the 
debt? The answer has been affirmative on the condition that 
a judgment following the action would be recognized in 
the forum.136 This questionable solution, however, has been 
restricted to the case where German Ia w governs the obliga-
tion,137 and is criticized in the literature where it has been 
recently suggested that the effects of foreign lawsuits on 
limitation of action should be subordinated to the rule, 
locus regit actum.138 
133 Of Oct. 23, 1924, art. 45 § 4, HUDSON, 2 Int. Legislation I448, revised 
Nov. 23, 1933, HUDSON, 6 id. 556, in force since Oct. I, 1938. The pertinent 
provision is now to be found in art. 46 § 5 of the Bern Convention, as revised 
on Oct. 25, 1952, in force since March x, 1956. A further revision of Feb. 25, 
1961, has not yet come into effect. 
134 For an application of the then art. 45, see Trib. com. Seine (Nov. 25, 
1905) Clunet I9o6, 837. 
135 E.g., Warsaw Convention on international air transportation, of 1929, 
art. 29 (2) (HuDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 114) ; Brussels Convention on collisions 
on the high seas, of I9IO, art. 7, par. 3 (BENEDICT, 6 Admiralty (ed. 7) 37) ; 
Geneva Convention on collisions in inland navigation, of Dec. 9, 1930, art. 
8 (3), not in force (HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 8I8). The Uniform Laws on 
bills of exchange and on checks chose another more complicated method, see 
Annex II art. 17 and Annex II art. 26, respectively (HUDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 
547 and 913). 
1360LG. Hamburg (March I3, I9o6) Hans. GZ. 1906, Hbl. No. so; OLG. 
Celie (Dec. n, I907) I ROLG. 158; RG. (Sept. I8, I925) 129 RGZ. 385, 389, 
Clunet I926, 737· 
137 OLG. Breslau (Dec. I9, I938) JW. 1939, 344, H. R. R. 1939, No. 375, 
approved by 2 SCHNITZER (ed. 4) 668. 
138 KATINSZKY, 9 Z.ausi.R. ( 1935) 855, criticizes confusion of substantive 
requirements for conflicts law and procedural requirements for recognition; 
an unjust and inconsistent result. On this basis, KALLMANN, "L'effet sur Ia 
prescription liberatoire des actes judiciaires intervenus en pays etranger," 
Revue Crit. I948, I ff., esp. 31, undertakes to formulate a theory. 
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New York, 414. 
United States, 405-406, 417, 
428-430, 44o-443· 
contacts 
assignor's place, 401, 442-
445· 
contracting, 410, 415, 433-
444· 
debtor's place, 402, 404, 
434-436, 44Q-445· 
law of original debt, 407, 
410, 433-434, 443· 
place of performance, 436. 





debtor in good faith, 427, 43o-
438, 445· 
debtor's defenses, 419-420. 




formality stipulated, 417. 
future debts, 424-425. 
gambling debts, 421 n. 99. 
insurable interest, 415, 421 n. 
roo. 
interest in trust, 421 n. 97, 
438 n. 176. 
interests involved, 395, 427-
428. 
legal restrictions, 416. 
lex Anastasiana, 418. 
life insurance, 404-405. 
municipal laws, 395-396, 43o-
433, 439-440. 
nature, 398-400. 
notice to debtor, 397, 412-413, 
431-438. 
partial, 418, 426. 
priority of assignees, 397, 428, 
439-443· 
procurator in rem suam, 398. 
promise to assign, 399, 410, 
421-423. 
protection of good faith, 427-
443· 
provision, 425. 
relationships involved, 401, 
419-423, 444-445· 
retrait litigieux, 418. 








U. S. Treasury bonds, 417-
418. 
validity, 421. 
wages, 417 ns. 8r, 82. 
warranty, 397, 399, 423. 
wife beneficiary, 416 n. 78. 
A usschlussfrist, 500. 
A usstrahlung (radiation), 197. 
Austria. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
warranty of solvency, 397, 423 
ns. ro6, 107. 
Authority, Chapter 40. See also 
Agent, Representation. 
concept, 132-133, 143-144, 
145· 
administrators, I 54· 
and agency, 127-135. 
apparent, 132, 142-143, 144, 
178-rSo. 
capacity, I 76. 
conflicts rules 
England, 157-158. 




Latin America, I 6o. 
United States, I5g-I6o. 
contacts, I43-I44· 
place of agent, I48, I55 ff. 
determined, I 6g- I 7 I. 
place of principal, I47, I54-
I55, I67-I69. 
proposed, I73-I74· 
rationale, ISS-156, I71-I74· 
contract with third party, I45-
I46, 169-I7I. 
death of principal, I8S. 
extent, I62-I6J. 
form, I45, I74-I76. 
history, 125, I27-IJ2. 
implied, I 77- I So. 
incident of main contract, !26-
I27, I69, I7I-I74, 176. 
independent concept, 127, 130, 
IJ4, 139· 
interest involved, I47-149, 
I52, ISS· 
intrinsic requirements, I 77. 
lack of, 146. 
by law, 153. 
legal, 152-ISS· 
officers of corporation, I 54-
ISS· 
principal's intent to authorize, 
167-I69. 
procura, I 53· 
ratification, 181-I85. 







unauthorized, I 46. 
undisclosed principal, 126 n. 2, 
IJO, 134, 139. 
unnamed principal, 1 34· 
voluntary private, ISS-I86. 
Average 
general, 388-392. 
particular, 2 77. 
Banks 
current accounts, 486. 
deposits, I6-17. 
Barcelona Convention and Stat-
ute on the Freedom of 
Transit, of April 14, I92I, 
JOJ. 
Bareboat Lease, 241. 
Beneficium cedendarum actionum, 
364, 446. 
excussionis personalis, 363. 
Bern Conventions. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Bills of Lading, 243, 244· 
and transportation contract, 
245-247· 
endorsement, 28I. 
forms, 255, 280. 
goods not shipped, 284. 
obligation to issue, 278-279. 
person of debtor, 281. 
rights of holder, 28o-287. 




Bonds, IG--I6, 30, 33· 
U.S. Treasury, 417-418. 
Borrowing Statutes, 52I-524, 
529. 
Branch of Insurer, 339-342. 
Brazil. See also Table of Statutes, 
Latin America. 
air law, 3I I. 
assignment, 432 n. 140. 
employment, I9I n. 14, I94 n. 
27. 
sale of immovables, I07 n. 10. 
workmen's compensation law, 
213 n. 2. 
Broker, 205-210. 
grain, 20 5-207. 
insurance, 158. 
real estate, 209-210. 
ship, 169. 
stock exchange, 205-209. 
Brokerage Contract, 205-209. 
Bruck, Ernst, 339· 
6I2 INDEX 
Brussels Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 
Burden of Proof, 363. 
Bustamante Code. See Table of 
Statutes. 
Canada. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
employment, I95 n. 29. 
insurance, 328-329, 335· 
workmen's compensation, 2I3 
n. 2, 227-228. 
Capacity 
assignment, 396, 4I3-4I5. 
authorization, I 76-177. 
immovable, 106, I I4. 
married women, 106, I20 n. 
6o, I36-I37, 138-139, 156-
I57· 
surety, 362 n. 43· 
Carriage, Maritime Transporta-
tion of Goods, Chapters 43-
44, Other Transportations, 
Chapter 45· See Maritime, 
Transportation. 
Carrier, 244-245. 
liability exemption, 247 n. 28. 
Causa, 8o-88, 42I-423. 





implied authority, I77-I78. 
limitation of action, 529-535· 
common law, 5I7, 5I9, 530. 
comparative, 533-534· 
continental, 53o-53 I, 532. 
federal, 524-525, cf. 503-
504. 
lex causae, 532-533· 
lex fori, 53o-534. 
secondary, 532-533. 
Charter Party, 241, Chapters 43 
and 44· See Maritime Trans-
portation of Goods. 
form important, 255, 259-260, 
262 n. 104. 
Chatenay v. Brazilian Sub-
marine Telegraph Co., I32, 
ISO, I57, I58, I63, I68. 
C.I.F. Sales, 62-63. 
Classification 
agency and employment, I 89. 
contract and title, 8o-88. 
contract and workmen's com-
pensation, 2 I 8-22 I. 
limitation and preclusion, soo-
501. 
private and public law, I97-
200. 
problems of assignment, 40I, 
409-426, 444-445· 
property and risk, 9 I. 
three relationships in agency, 
I43-146. 
tort and workmen's compensa-
tion, 216-2I8. 
Collective Bargaining, 198. 
Commissionaire, 245· 
Compensation, Chapter 5 I. See 
Setoff. 
contract of, 485-486. 
Concurrence of Actions 
contract and tort, 278 n. s6. 
workmen's compensation, 229-
236. 
Conditional Debts, 424-425. 
Conditional Sales, 85-88. 
forfeiture, I04. 
redemption, 86 n. 24. 
repossession, 86-87. 
Contracts. See Law. 
Contract and Transfer, 8o-88, 
I06-I07, 399, 4IO, 421-
423. 
Contract and Transfer of Title, 
78-8o, 8o-94, I I4-I22. 
Contrats d' adhesion 
affreightment, 269 n. I9. 
in general, ix, x. 
loan, 8, IO. 
Conversion of Foreign Money, 
26-29. 
date, 27-29, 387-388. 
INDEX 
Copenhagen Draft (Agency). 
See Table of Statutes. 
Copyright, Sale of, 76-77. 
Corporation, powers of principal 
officers, I5 3-I 54· 
Counterclaim 
assignment, 4I9-422. 
by surety, 363, 483. 
Covenants for Title, I 14-122. 
Currency Restrictions, 48-50, 
368-369. 
Custody 
after transportation, 294· 
of rejected goods, 99-IOO. 
Damages, sales, 102. 
Death 
of principal, 185-I86. 
statutes, 5I8. 
Debentures, I I. 
Debt 
discharge, Chapters so-53. 
transfer, Chapters 49-50. 
Debtor, protection, 401-402, 408, 
4IO, 445, 51o-5II. 
Decheance, 500. 
Deed, delivery, 108. 
Delivery 
of deeds, 108. 
of documents, 94, IOo-Ioi. 
of goods 
concept, 63-66. 




Devaluation, IS ff. 
Divorce, effect on insurance, 454-
455· 
Doctrine of Mandate, 126, I27-
I35· 
Documents, In Sales 
tender, 57 n. 25, 94, 98. 
Doing Business, 329. 
Domicil, replaced by habitual 
residence, 72. 
Employment Contract, Chapter 
41, 187-200. 
concept, 187-189. 
for foreign country, I9I-I92, 
I93-I94, I94-I95· 
occasional or temporary work, 
I92. 
private and public law, I97-
I99· 
by state, I96 n. 34· 
traveling salesmen, I93 n. 23. 
working place, I92-I95· 
Encumbrances, I I6-I 1 7, II9. 
Enrichment, 375-388. See Un-
just Enrichment. 
Enterprise, transfer of, 455· 
Equitable 
assignment, 398. 
remedies, I I2. 
"Establishment," 72. 
Estoppel, I 20. 
Exceptio rei venditae et traditae .• 
12o-I2I. 
Exchange 
order for, 205-209. 
sales on, 73· 




Fair, sales on, 53 n. 12. 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 200. 
Fiction of Identity, I35-I39· 
Fin de non recevoir, 497-498. 
Fluvial Transportation, 303-304. 
F.O.B. Sales, 61-62, 83 n. 17, 
95· 
Foreign Money Debts, 26-29, 
42-44· 
Form 
assignment, 411-413, 417. 
authority, 145, I74-I77. 
bill of lading, 280. 
charter party, 278. 
examination of goods, 98-99. 
sale of immovable, I 13-114. 
suretyship, 362 n. 42. 
Forwarding Agent, 245, 261. 
INDEX 
France. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
assignment, 402, 408-409. 
compensation, 4 76-4 77. 
employment, 195 n. 29, 196. 
garnishment, 462-463. 
insurance, 336, 339, 344-345· 
in foreign money, 26. 
international payment, 25, 38-
39. 
lesion, 122-123. 
limitation of action, 51o-5II. 
mandate, 126, 129-131. 
privilege of seller, 88-go. 
tender of documents, 94· 




Fraternal Benefit Associations, 
332-334, 524 n. go. 
Freight, 
after delivery, 288. 
distance freight, 287. 
Future Debts, 424-425. 
Gambling Debts, 421 n. g8. 
Garnishment, 46o-469. 
Geiszler v. De Graaf, r 18. 
General Average, 388-392. 
foreign adjustment, 391-392. 
last port, 389. 
law of adjuster, 391-392. 
York-Antwerp Rules, 389. 
General Maritime Law, 248-
249, 254· 
Geneva Conventions. See Table 
of Statutes. 






bill of lading, 283-285. 
compensation system, 4 77. 
currency restrictions, 48-50. 
employment, 196, 197-198. 
foreign money debts, 38, 42. 
garnishment, 463 f., 468-469. 
splitting the contract, 52, 92-
94, 98 n. 78. 
stipulated place of perform-
ance, 62. 
tender of documents, 94· 
title theory, 8o-8r, 84-85. 
workmen's insurance, 213, 227, 
448-449· 
Gold Clauses, 2o-25, 36-46. 
bullion clause, 23. 
coin clause, 2o-22. 
prohibitions, 24-46. 
value clause, 22. 
Grainbroker, 205-207. 




insurance, 33 7. 




Habitual residence, 56, 58 
Hague Committee Drafts, 1928, 
on Conflict of Laws (Sales) , 
51 n. I. 
Hague Convention 1955· See 
Table of Statutes. 
Hague Drafts, 1931 and 1951, 
on Conflict of Laws (Sales), 
51 n. I, 53 ns. II, 13. 
Handlungsgehilfe, 189. 
Holmes, ro6, I 14, 135· 
Immoral Contract, 124 n. 75. 
Implied Authority, 177-180. 
Inhabitants, 348. 
Inspection of Goods, g8-99. 
Insurance, Chapter 46. 
accident, 2 I 3· 
American Constitution, 33o-
332, 333, 347 n. 95· 




automobile, 334, 351. 
branch office, 339-342. 
constitutional limitations on 
state supervision, 343 n. 83. 
contacts 
branch office contracting, 
319-324, 335-336. 
by correspondence, 350. 
party autonomy, 326, 346-
347· 
place of insured, 321-322, 
326. 
place of insurer, 321, 338-
343, 348-351. 
proper law, 326. 
situation of risk, 334, 344-
345, 351. 
supervising state, 343-345· 
delivery, 329, 348. 
doing business, 328 and n. 30, 
329. 
double insurance, 345 n. go. 
draft of Uniform Law, 334-
335, 349-352 ns. 104-105. 
fire insurance, 330 n. 35, 347-
348, 351-352. 
in foreign money, 26. 
fraternal benefit association, 
332-334· 
government control, 326-329, 
343-345· 
health insurance, 352. 
immovables, 35 1. 
inhabitants, 348. 
insurable interest, 4 I 5, 42 I n. 
100. 
interest of state, 33 I. 
license, 349-350. 
life insurance, 322-324, 334, 
348-351, 404-405. 
local agent, 328-329, 349· 
mail-order insurance, 350. 
marine insurance, 325, 335 n. 
56, 337-338. 
party autonomy, 326, 346-347. 
proper law, 326. 
property, 326, 329-330 n. 35, 
334, 344-345, 347, 351. 
risk situation, 334-335, 344-
345, 351-352. 
standard policy, 327. 
statutes, 325-330. 
subrogation, 45 r. 
supervision, 326-330, 343-345· 
Uniform Law draft, 334-335, 
349-350, 351-352. 
workmen's compensation, 213, 
214, 227-228, 352. 
Inter-American Convention on 
the Rights of the Author in 
Literary, Scientific, and Ar-
tistic Works, of July 22, 
1946, 77· 
Interest of a State, 234-236, 
332-333· 
International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 
15 n. 48. 
International Labour Code of 
195 r. See Table of Statutes. 
International Monetary Fund 





of bonds, 13-14. 
of insurance policy, 329, 349· 
Italy. See also Table of Stat-
utes. 
compensation of debts, 476 n. 
22. 
employment, 190 n. ro, 194 n. 
28, 197 n. 35· 
lapse of time, 500 n. 51, 505 n. 
Sr. 
law of the flag, 26 5-266. 
representation, I 3 I. 
sales of immovables, I07 n. ro. 
workmen's compensation, 219, 
228. 
Jason Clause, 256. 
INDEX 
Joint Resolution of Congress on 
Gold Clauses, I9, 23 n. I I, 
32, 36-4I, 44-45· 
Jurisdiction for Garnishment, 
46o-469. 
Klauder Case, 429, 442. 
Kommissioniir, I89. 
Laband, on authority, I29-I30. 
Labor Courts, 2I5. 
Labor Law, Chapters 4I and 42. 
Land Transportation, 304-3IO. 
of baggage, 304. 
contract and tort, 309-310. 
free pass, 309· 
of goods, 3o6-309. 
of persons, 309-310. 
through carriage, 3I6-3I8. 
Latin America. See Table of Stat-
utes for individual countries. 
agency, I6o. 
contracts of adhesion, ix, 263, 
306 n. 32, 336. 
extracontractual obligations, 
378 n. 30, 381. 
general averages, 389-390, ns. 
74. 76. 
insurance, 336. 
sale of immovables, 105, 107. 
situs of debts, 402. 
transportation, 263, 277, 300, 
306-307, 308 n. 44· 
Law of the Agent 
authority, I48, I55-I74· 
contract of agency, 202-2IO. 
determination of this place, 
I69-I7I. 
rationale, I55-I56, I7I-I74· 
scope, I74-I86. 
Law of the Buyer, 57, 59-60, 69. 
Law of the Country of Currency, 
32-33, 35· 
Law of Creditor's Domicil 
loan, 5, IO. 
suretyship, 357-358. 
Law of Debtor's Domicil 
borrower, 4-5. 
surety, 359 n. 32. 
Law of Financial Market, I I-
I4. 
Law of the Flag 
employment, I96. 
maritime affreightment, 248, 
25I n. 47, 253-255, 265. 
Law of the Insurance, 45o-45 I. 
Law of the Insured, 32I, 326-
327. 
Law of the Insurer, 32I-322, 
338-343. 348-351. 
Law of Nationality Common to 
Parties, 196 ns. 32, 33, 258, 
260 n. 92, 262 n. 103, 336. 
Law of a Party, 72-73. 
Law of the Place of Contracting 
agency, 201. 
authority, IS8-I6o, 163-I64, 
I83-I84. 
conditional sales, 85 n. 22. 
employment, I9o-I92. 





goods, 249-252, 256-263, 
27o-27I. 
persons, 298-302. 
qualified by additional circum-
stances, 53-54, IIo-I I I, 
II9-I20, Igi, I93, 347-
348. 
sales, 5 I-53, 58, 107-109, 




Law of the Place of Destination, 
land, 307. 
maritime, 257 n. 78, 258, 263, 
27I, 282-283. 
Law of the Place of Dispatch, 




Law of the Place of Employ-
ment 
authority, 161, 164-167. 




ance, 352 and n. 106. 
Law of the Place of Loss, 213, 
252 n. 49, 264, 306-307. 
Law of the Place of Perform-
ance 
affreightment, 257 n. 78, 258-
259, 263, 271, 281-283, 
29o-293· 
currency restrictions, 50. 
insurance, 336 n. 6o. 
loan, s-6. 
sales, 52-53, 63 n. 44, 97-98, 
I09. 
subrogation, 45o-451. 
Law of the Place of the Principal 
authority, 147, 155-156, 167-
168. 
employment, 192-195. 
Law of the Principal Debt, 358-
359, 447-449, 479· 
Law of Two Debts, 478-479. 
Law of the Seller, 55-57, 69-70. 
Law of the Shipowner, 268-270. 
Law of the Suretyship, 447. 
Legal Authority, 152-155. 
Legal Tender, 25, 32-33, 34· 
Letter of Credit, 101. 
Lex Anastasiana, 418. 
Lex fori, 316, 472, 478, 507, 513. 
Lex loci delicti 
affreightment, 252 n. 49, 264. 
insuranc~, 2 I 3· 
workmen's compensation, 216, 
229-230. 
Lex pecuniae, 32, 35· 
Lex situs, 8o-81. 
repossession, 86-88. 
sale of immovables, 105. 
compulsory, 106-107, 120. 




carrier, in general, 277-278, 
see Chapters 43-45· 
employer, Chapters 41 and 42. 
exemption clauses, 247 n. 28, 
278 n. 54· 
stockholder, 518 n. 61, 522-
523. 
transfer of, 455-458. 
License 
insurance business, 325-330, 
343-345, 349· 
patent, sale of, 75. 
Limitation of Action, Chapters 
52 and 53· 
nature, 494. 
actio, 491. 
action, 487, 491-492. 
action arising, 535. 
affreightment, 296. 
Anglo-American principle, 507. 
Anspruch, 492. 
A usschlussfrist, sao. 





concepts, municipal, 494-499. 
conflicts rules 
Anglo-American, 507-508. 
civil laws, 508-517. 
contacts, 512 ff. 
domicil of debtor, 51o-5II, 
513. 
forum, 507-508, 536 ns. 
134, 135. 
party autonomy, 515-516. 
death statutes, 518 n. 6o. 
decheance, sao. 
defensive character, 489-490, 
495-496. 
effect, 497-499. 
exceptiones decisoriae, 497· 
extinguishing the debt, sao, 
502, 503, sos, 516-520. 
618 INDEX 
Limitation of Action (continued) 
federal law, 503-504, 524-
525. 
fin de non-recevoir, 498. 
fraternal benefit association, 
524 n. go. 
French courts, 510-5II. 
general statutes, 5I7. 
history, 489, 508-51 I. 
international problem, 529. 
interruption, 536. 
Klageverjahrung, 492. 
lapse of time, 494-495. 
liability of employer, Chapters 
4I, 42· 
liability of stockholder, 518 n. 
61. 
liability of stockholder of na-
tional bank, 522-523. 
main features, 494-499. 
mixed theories, 5I6 ff. 
municipal comparison, 505-
506. 
municipal theories, Chapter 52. 
natural obligation, 499· 




prescription, 495-496, 498. 
presumption of payment, 514· 
procedural exceptions, 516-
525. 
procedural theory, 487, 493-
495, 503, 507-508. 
procedure, concept, 493-494· 
protection of debtor, 510-51 I. 
public policy, 525-529. 
remedy, 487, 491, 499, 501-
504. 
res judicata, 497-498, 506. 
rescission, 535-536. 
scope, 535-536. 
situs theory, 508-511. 
special pleading, 503. 
special statutes, 518-520. 
statutes, borrowing, 521-524, 
529. 
statutes, extinguishing, 500, 
502, 503, 505, 517-521. 
statutes, general, 5 I 7. 
statutes, special, 5 I 8-520. 
stipulated, 496 n. 30, 5I5-5I6, 
524, 535 n. I 31. 
stockholders, 518 n. 6I, 522. 
Story, 497, 510. 
substantive theory, 497-498, 
505, 511-5I6. 
theories, 507-5 I 6. 
transforming effect, 502. 
treaties, 536. 
uniform statute suggested, 535· 
waiver, 496. 
Liquor Prohibition, 55 n. 18, 184. 
Literary Rights, 76-77. 
Lloyd v. Guibert, 109, 151, 179, 
247, 253, 254, 276, 389. 
Locatio conductio operarum, I88, 
Locatio conductio operis, I 88, 
240 n. 2. 
Locatio conductio rei, 240 n. 2. 
Louisiana 
agency, merger of persons, I 38. 
authority, concept, I26 n. 2. 
lesion, I 22. 
seller's privilege, Sg. 
statute of limitation, 5 I 7. 
warranty, 95 and n. 68. 
workmen's compensation, 220. 
Lucerne Draft (Agency). See 
Table of Statutes. 
"Main Contract" of Agent, 145,, 
Mandate, 127-135· 
Maritime Assistance and Salvage, 
374-375· 
Maritime Transportation 
of baggage, 302-303. 
of goods (See Maritime 
Transportation of Goods). 
of persons, 298-302. 
Maritime Transportation of 
Goods, Chapters 43 and 44· 
affreightment, 241-244. 
ordinary, 275. 
bareboat lease, 241. 
INDEX 6Ig 
Maritime Transportation of 
Goods (continued) 
carrier, 244-245. 
cesser and lien clause, 280. 
charter parties, 24I-243, 275-
277. 
conflicts rules, 247-263. 
C6digo Bustamante, 262. 
France, 257· 
Germany, 258-26I. 
Great Britain, 253-256. 
Netherlands, 26I-262. 
United States, 248-252. 
contacts 
accidents, 252, 264. 
arrival, 280 n. 63. 
contracting, 27o-27I, 280 n. 
63. 
destination, 27 I, 282-283, 
29Q-293· 





consignee, rights, 295-297. 
custody, 294· 
demise, 24o-24I. 
distant freight, 287-288. 
form of bill of lading, 280. 
form of charter party, 279. 
forwarding agent, 245. 
freight, 287-289. 
general maritime law, 248-
250, 264. 
general ship, 243· 
goods not shipped, 284. 
holder of bill, 28o-287. 
interpretation, 279-280, 293· 
lease of vessel, 24o-241. 
limitation of action, 296. 
notice of loss, 295-296. 
obligation to issue bill, 278-
279. 
party autonomy, 247-248, 251. 
person of debtor, 28o-281. 
port regulations, 289-290. 
private carrier, 245 and n. 23. 
public policy, 263, 274-275, 
284, 294, 296. 
rights of consignee, 295-297. 
rights of holder, 28o-287. 
scope of contracts rule, 2 77-
297· 
stipulation for time of claim, 
296. 
through carriage, 292, 3I6-3I8. 
time for claim, 296. 
types of contracts, 239-244. 
unification, 239. 
Market, sales on, 53 n. I I. 
Married Women, I06, 120 n. 
60, 136-139, 156-157· 
Maryland, statute of limitation, 
517. 




master's domicil, I92-I93 
servant's working place, I93-
I95· 
public law, I97-200. 
public policy, I98-2oo. 
Metallistic Theory, 20. 
Michigan, statute of limitation, 
519 n. 66. 
Milliken v. Pratt, 137, I38-I39, 
I 56, I 59, 362. 
Minnesota 
statute of limitation, 5I9 n. 66. 
workmen's compensation, 223. 
Missouri, In re, 254· 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
title transfer, 84-85. 
unjust enrichment, 386-387. 
voluntary agency, 374-375· 
Mode of Performance, money 
debts, 34, 40, 4I-44· 
Money of Account, 34· 
Money Deposits, 16-I7. 
Money Loans, Chapter 34· 
bonds, II-I6. 




Money Loans (continued) 
finance agency, g. 
individual loans, 7. 
lender's duties, 4, Io-II. 
mass loans, 8. 
rationale, 7-10. 
state as debtor, I I, I4-I6. 
state structure, 3· 
Money Obligations, Chapter 35. 
contacts, 32 ff. 
conversion, 26-29. 
judicial, 28-2g. 
currency of debt, 34· 
default, 34-35. 
devaluation, I9-20. 
exchange restrictions, 48-50, 
366-368. 
foreign money debts, 26-29. 
French doctrine, 25, 38-39. 
gold clauses, 36-4I. 
bullion, 23. 
coin, 2o-22. 
prohibition, 24-25, 36-45. 
value, 22, 36-45. 
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28, I97 n. 35· 
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seller's privilege, go. 
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between the parties, So. 
confused with con tract, 79, 8 I, 
85. 
Paris Peace Treaty between Italy 
and the Allied and Asso-
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workmen's compensation, 220 
and n. 27. 
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intention to authorize, I67-
r6g. 
revocation of authority, r86. 
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ter 41. 
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Promise of Transfer, So ff., 85. 
Property, transfer of, 78 n. I. 
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undisclosed principal, I3g-140, 
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Risk of Loss, gi-94· 
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2; id. Ig.2.Ig.7, 240 n. 2; 
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applicable law, 105-113. 
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laesio enormis, 122-124. 
warranty of title, 114-122. 
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contacts, 5I-73· 
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contracting, 51-53. 
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proposed, 63-73. 
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f. o. b. 61-62, 83 n. 17, 95· 
inspection, g8-gg. 
letter of credit, 101. 
of license, 75· 
on market, 53 n. I I. 
notice of defect, g6-g8, 9g. 
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477· 
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474· 
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Setoff and Counterclaim (con-
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laws of both debts, 478-479. 
ipso iure compensatur, 476. 
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procedural application in civil 
law courts, 474-476. 




surety, 364, 419-420. 
Shipmaster, authority, 150-152, 
253-254, 255 n. 68, 28o-
28I. 
Shipmaster and Crew, hire, 196 
n. 35· 
Shipment to Carrier, 63-69, 70. 
Ships, sales, 74-75. 
Situs Theory 
assignment, 401-403. 
limitation of action, 508-5 I I. 
restitution, 384. 
sale of immovables, 105-112, 
114-122. 
Smith v. Ingram, 120. 
Soliciting Agent, 182-185. 
Soviet Maritime Law, 243, 247, 
272-273, 274, 278 n. 57, 300 
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Spain, sale of immovables, 107 n. 
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Specific Performance, 102-103. 
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Status of Employment, 223. 
Statute of Frauds, 55 n. 17. 
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Stockholders, 518 n. 61, 522-523. 
Stiickgiitervertrag, 243, 244. 
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494· 
Sunday Contracts, 55 n. 19, 184. 
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concept, 353-354· 
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burden of proof, 363. 
capacity, 362 n. 43· 
contacts 
contracting, 357· 
creditor's place, 357-358. 
law of principal debt, 359· 
proposal, 361-362. 
surety's place, 359 n. 32. 
surety's place of payment, 
359 n. 33, 360. 
cosureties, 366-368. 





exoneration, 365-366, 388. 
extent, 356, 363-364. 
form, 362 n. 42. 
guaranty, 353. 
independent law, 354· 






sureties, several, 366-368. 
termination, 365. 
terminology, 353-354· 
Switzerland. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
currency restrictions, 50 n. 1 30. 
sale of immovables, 107 n. 10. 
unilateral obligations, 5, 360, 
369. 
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Third Party Contract with Agent, 
I45, I47· 
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Through Carriage, 70, 292, 304-
306, 3Ifr3I8. 
Time for Claim. See Limitation 
of Action. 
affreightment, 29fr297. 
limitation of action, 5 I 5-5 I 6, 
524, 535 n. 13I. 
Time for Notice 
affreightment, 298. 
sale, 99· 
Title and Contract 
conditional sales, 85-88. 
sales, 8o-88, 10l"r107. 
Tort Actions 
liability of shipowner, 278. 
workmen's compensation, 21 I, 
214, 229-232. 
Traditio, system of, 78, 8I, 84-
85. 
Tranches, 14, 32. 
Transfer of Claims by Law, 44fr 
455· 
accident insurance, 45o-45 I. 
beneficium cedendarum action-
urn, 446. 
bill of exchange, endorsement, 
453· 
contacts, 447-45 I. 
divorce, effect, 454-455. 
insurer subrogee, 423, 45o-45 I. 
provision, 452-454. 
rank of subrogees, 451-452. 
right to sue, 451. 
subrogation, 446 ff. 
surety, 364, 447· 
Transfer and Contract, 8o-88, 
I07, 399. 410, 42I-423. 
Transfer of Liability, 455-458. 
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of goods, Chapters 43-44· 
land, 304-3 10. 
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mixed, 31fr318. 
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Traveling Salesman, I62, 179. 
Undisclosed Principal, I26 n. 2, 
13G-I35, I39· 
contrast to civil law, I 39-I41. 
right to sue and be sued, I39-
I40, 145· 
Uniform Commercial Code. See 
Table of Statutes. 
Uniform Statute (Draft), In-
surance Conflicts Law, 334, 
349-350. 
Unilateral Contracts, 5, 36o n. 
35· 
United States. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
agency, Chapters 39-41. 
authority, I2fri27, I59-160. 
conditional sales, 8 5-88. 
contract and title, 8I-82, 10l"r 
107. 
divorce effect, 454-455. 
foreign money conversion, 28-
29. 
fraud by seller, 82-83. 
garnishment, 46fr469. 
gold clause stipulation, I9, 20. 
insurance, 3I9-334· 
Constitution, 330-332, 333· 
decisions, 3 I9-325. 
reform, 334-335. 
statutes, 325-330. 
Joint Resolution of June 6, 
I933 on gold clauses, I9, 23 
n. II, 32, 3fr4I, 44-45. 
lex situs, 85-86. 
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goods, 248-252. 
rescission, 82-83. 
right to sue, 45 I. 
INDEX 
United States (continued) 
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suretyship, 357-359· 
workmen's compensation stat-
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243 n. 14. 
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conflicts rules, 378-381. 
contacts, 378-381. 
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theoretical approach, 382-384. 
Unpaid Seller, 88-90. 
Versailles Treaty between the 
Allied and Associated Pow-




Draft, 1926, of conflicts rules 
on sales, 51 n. I, 53 ns. 
II, 12, 58, 74• 
loan of I902, 30, 45· 
Rules, I926, on rate of ex-
change, 28 n. 32. 
Voluntary Agency, 37D-375· 
conflicts rules, 3 7 I -3 7 4· 
preceding relationship, 372-
374· 
Wager, 206, 207 n. 75· 
Wages 
assigned, 417 ns. 81, 82. 
setoff, 48I-483. 
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Warranty of Quality, 94-IOO. 
Warranty of Title, 108. 
assignment, 397, 399, 423. 
history, I I6-I22. 
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garding International Air 
Transport, of October 12, 
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3I4, 315, 3I6, 356. 
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contract theory, 216-2I8. 
incidental work, 224-225. 
insurance, 2I3, 214, 237. 
interest of state, 234· 
multiple claims, 229-236. 
municipal systems, 21 I-2I3. 
occasional work, 224-225. 
optional acts, 2I2-2I3, 220, 
221. 
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several claims, 229-236. 
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tort action, 229-232. 
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treaties, 214, 225, 228-231. 
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Young Loan, I 6. 
